Read a sampling of News items and State Department telegrams covering much of the first year of the war in Vietnam.

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50 Years Ago Today

Special thanks to: Rachel Quist

June 1962 - July 1962 - August 1962 - September 1962 - October 1962
November 1962 - December 1962
January 1963 - February 1963 - March 1963 - April 1963 - May 1963
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--------- June 20, 1962 is the First Date in this Series ---------

June 21 1962: "A patrolling armored train and 36 yards of track were blown up by communist land mines 340 miles north of Saigon". Source: Associated Press, Pacific Stars And Stripes Newspaper, June 26, 1962, Page 23

Also on this date: "The toxic defoliant Agent Orange was first tested, at a grassy area on the Eglin Air Force Base near Valparaiso, Florida". Source: Alvin L. Young, The History, Use, Disposition and Environmental Fate of Agent Orange (Springer, 2009) pp193-194

June 22 1962: "The US Policy Planning Council, headed by Alexis U. Johnson and Robert S. McNamara, publishes the draft Basic National Security Policy on Military Strategy". Source: Department of State, S/P Files: Lot 69 D 121, BNSP Draft 6/22/62.

June 23 1962: "Prince Souvanna Phouma becomes Prime Minister of Laos. During the 1960s and early 1970s Souvanna struggled to retain a neutral position; with the proximity of the war in Vietnam, his efforts were in vain, and he came to depend upon U.S. military assistance". Source: "Souvanna Phouma". Encyclopedia Britannica Online. 2012. Web. 18 Jun. 2012

June 24, 1962: "George Fryett, the first American taken as a Prisoner of War during the Vietnam War, was released by the Viet Cong on June 24, 1962. Fryett served with the Military Assistance and Advisory Group (MAAG) in the Republic of Vietnam starting in July 1961. He taught English in his off-duty hours and was on his way to visit one of his students when he was ambushed by Viet Cong guerrillas and was taken as a Prisoner of War on December 24, 1961". Source: MilitaryTimes. And/Or Defense Prisoner of War Report, Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO), June 6 2012, page 5.

June 25, 1962: 226. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State. Saigon, June 25, 1962, 7 p.m.

1659. Dr Gordon Smith, American medical missionary from Danang, visited me June 22. Dr. Smith has lived and worked in Viet Nam for some thirty years, mainly among the Montagnard population in central Viet Nam. In summary, main points which Dr Smith made were:

1. Military situation and aggressiveness of GVN military and paramilitary forces have greatly improved during past six months. He thought that without increased US assistance last winter, Viet Cong would by now have taken over SVN. He was especially complimentary of work of Special Forces Units.

2. Nevertheless, popular support for GVN continued to decrease alarmingly in central coastal provinces (Quang Nam, Quang Ngai, Binh Dinh, Phu Yen) where Dr Smith has wide first-hand knowledge of conditions. He attributed this to belief by people of Communist allegations against Diem and his family and government; to lack of GVN contact with people; and to lack of efficiency in GVN's execution of plans for benefit of people. He said that most of his own converts. both Vietnamese and Montagnards, several now themselves Christian missionaries, were bitterly anti-government and thus inclined to believe promises of Viet Cong that liberation Front would be better than present government.

3. He then said that it was his strong impression that American military influence in central Viet Nam was pressing Vietnamese military in direction of a military coup d'etat against the GVN. I questioned him very closely on this... (follow link for more)
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1961–1963
VOLUME II, VIETNAM, 1962, DOCUMENT 226

June 26, 1962: " AP Reporter Peter Arnett start[s] his Vietnam assignment...arriving in Saigon. At that time the American military was 'advising' the South Vietnam government in its war against the communist government of North Vietnam. He discovered, by traveling to the battlefields and through the government bureaucracy how corrupt the South Vietnam government was and how slowly, but surely, the United States government was being pulled into a new war". Source: MatrixZine, Non Fiction Book Reviews #51, Live From The Battlefield:
From Vietnam To Baghdad: 35 Years In The World's War Zones, by Peter Arnet

Also on June 26, 1962: Chinese Ambassador Yuen Tse Kien repeatedly emphasized that economic and social works to improve the lot of the peasants should be in the very first phase because they are essential for winning the people to the support of the Government. He said the Vietnamese are a good people, but they have been buffeted and forced to work for both sides in conflicts for 17 years since 1945. Now that they are being asked once again by the GVN to provide work and make other sacrifices in connection with the strategic hamlets program, they must be given some compensation for what they are being asked to do. If it is not demonstrated to them that they are going to get something in the way of concrete benefits out of this program, the risk is great that the strategic hamlets program will drive them over to the enemy. Source: Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, United States Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963 Volume II, Vietnam, 1962, Document 228

June 27, 1962: President John F. Kennedy held a press conference; he begain with a statement concerning the movement of Chinese Communist military forces into the Taiwan Strait area, warning the Peoples Republic of China that the United States would take action if an attack against the offshore islands Quemoy and Matsu threatens Taiwan. Source: White House Audio Recordings, 1961-1963. Digital Identifier: JFKWHA-109. Archival Creator: Department of Defense. Defense Communications Agency. White House Communications Agency. (1962 - 06/25/1991)

Also on this date: Vietnam. General Situation Evaluation. The GVN is making progress against the VC, but it is still too early to predict assured success in the counterinsurgency effort. The strategic hamlet program and the two clear-and-hold operations now under way are moving forward well and seem to promise good results. With US assistance, the RVNAF has significantly reduced its reaction time in recent months and appears to have upset the VC timetable. Government efficiency is slowly improving. By patient pressure, the mission has been able to eliminate or shortcut some of the bureaucratic delays, to speed supplies and funds to the clear-and-hold operations and to the Montagnard refugees. The present mass movement of the Montagnards out of VC controlled areas may represent a major victory for the GVN if it can provide prompt relief measures and train the Montagnard irregulars. Source: Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, United States Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963 Volume II, Vietnam, 1962, Document 230.

June 28, 1962: In an offensive operation against the Viet Cong about 20 miles northwest of Saigon, South Vietnam, 16 "Mule Train" C-123s and 10 Vietnamese Air Force C-47s dropped more than 1,000 Vietnamese paratroopers.  This type of mission was important at first for the "Mule Train" planes but faded as the helicopter replaced the parachute as the preferred method of airborne attack. Source: "Mule Train" By Walter J. Boyne. Air Force Magazine. February 2001. AND A War Too Long: The USAF in Southeast Asia 1961-1975. by John Schlight Published June 1st 2004 by University Press of the Pacific. Pg 8

June 29, 1962: The University of California Regents voted to end compulsory ROTC for its students. Source: A Proud History-A Bright Future. The Regents of the University of California, Davis campus.

June 30, 1962: There [are] 6,419 Americans in South Vietnam.  This [is] a steep rise in American advisory strength from only 900 at the start of 1962. Source: The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia: The Advisory Years to 1965, Robert F. Futrell with the assistance of Martin Blumenson (1981). Page 93. and Page 162.

June 1962 - July 1962 - August 1962 - September 1962 - October 1962
November 1962 - December 1962
January 1963 - February 1963 - March 1963 - April 1963 - May 1963
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July 1, 1962: The construction of the new Independence Palace started on 1 July 1962, the home and workplace of the President of South Vietnam during the Vietnam War. The palace needed reconstruction following a failed assassination and coup attempt on 27 February 1962 in which two pilots of Diệm’s Vietnam Air Force rebelled and flew two A-1 Skyraider (A-1D/AD-6 variant) aircraft towards the palace and bombed it. The palace was the site of the end of the Vietnam War during the Fall of Saigon on April 30, 1975, when a North Vietnamese Army tank crashed through its gates. Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reunification_Palace

Also on July 1, 1962: President Kennedy ordered 1,000 of the Marines in Thailand to return to their ship. Withdrawal of additional Marines and soldiers may follow, depending on "general conditions." Source: MARINE CORPS HISTORICAL REFERENCE PAMPHLET. A Chronology Of The UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS 1947-1964, VOLUME III. HISTORICAL DIVISION HEADQUARTERS, U. S. MARINE CORPS WASHINGTON, D. C. 1971. P.56

July 2, 1962: Raul Castro (younger brother to Fidel Castro) and a high-level Cuban military delegation arrive in Moscow to discuss arrangements for missile deployment. Raul Castro spends a total of two weeks consulting with Soviet officials before returning to Cuba on July 17. Source: Chronology 1, Compiled for The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962 Edited by Laurence Chang & Peter Kornbluh (New York: The New Press, 1992, 1998). Pg 352

July 3, 1962: The Chinese Communist and North Vietnamese delegates assailed the presence of American troops in Thailand at the resumption in Geneva of the fourteen-nation talks on Laos. (1:7). Source: New York Times Chronology (July 1962) - JOHN F. KENNEDY PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

July 4, 1962: In a note to Britain, the Soviet Union called for the withdrawal of all American military advisers from South Vietnam. Moscow denied a British charge that Communist North Vietnam was behind guerrilla warfare in the south. (1:7)

A demand that American troops get out of another Indo-China country, Thailand, was made by the pro-Communist Deputy Premier of Laos, who charged that United States planes were dropping arms to natives fighting his forces. (3:5)

Source: New York Times Chronology (July 1962) - JOHN F. KENNEDY PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

Also on July 4, 1962: The Burma Socialist Programme Party was established by Ne Win's military regime. Source: "The Constitution of the Burma Socialist Programme Party"

July 5, 1962: Prince Souvanna Phouma, the new Premier of Laos, conferred separately with the British and Soviet co-chairmen of the Geneva conference on Laos about the neutrality Declaration to be made by the Laotian Government. (1:7). Source: New York Times Chronology (July 1962) - JOHN F. KENNEDY PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

July 6, 1962: 234. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam

Washington, July 6, 1962, 3:02 p.m.

20. Saigon's 14.2 Contains verbatim text. As per last sentence reftel Department is considering proposing for highest level signature following message to Diem to overcome fears US will move toward neutralization policy for Viet-Nam and gain GVN cooperation at Geneva. Request comments following text priority.

“Ambassador Nolting has told me of your concern over our Laos policy. It is a concern which I have long shared; the Laos situation is difficult, and the negotiations we are now seeking to complete at Geneva have not been easy. Perhaps it would be useful if I indicated to you in brief the basis of our thinking about Laos and our Southeast Asia policy as a whole.

We have sought to counter the Communist drive in Southeast Asia by programs and tactics which recognize both the regional nature of the Communist threat and the peculiar circumstances of each country in the region. We vary our strategies but at the same time we maintain our overall policy objective, which is to do everything in our power to help the nations of Southeast Asia preserve their independence.

In Laos, the United States believes that a neutral government, committed to neither the West nor the East, is most likely to succeed in providing the Lao people with peace and freedom. We are supported in this belief by most Free World Governments.

In negotiating with the Communists to achieve a free and neutral Laos, we have not been unmindful of the relationship between Laos and the security of its neighbors. We have sought to build adequate safeguards into the Laos settlement. We are aware of the danger that the Communists will not honor their pledges. But the only alternative to a neutral Laos appears to be making an international battleground of Laos. This would not help the Lao people and it would not contribute to the security of Laos' neighbors.

In the case of your own country, the strategy best calculated to preserve Vietnamese independence and enable your brave people to build a better future is clearly very different from the strategy required for Laos. I can assure you without reservation that this administration is not seeking a neutral solution for Viet-Nam. There is no change in the policy towards Viet-Nam which this administration has pursued since it took office. We have helped and shall continue to help the Vietnamese defend themselves. We believe our cooperation has been effective and will continue to improve. We believe the Vietnamese will defeat Communist aggression and subversion

In pursuing our efforts to insure peace and freedom for the people of Southeast Asia the United States must, of course depend heavily on its friends. Most of all, we must have the cooperation of the Governments and the peoples of Southeast Asia itself. Your Government has been most closely associated with mine in this effort, and together we have achieved a great deal to defeat the Communist threat to Southeast Asia. It is my earnest hope that you will instruct your representatives at Geneva to continue this fruitful cooperation there by helping us to establish a truly neutral Laos.

The Geneva conference cannot fully succeed without your help. I am convinced that failure at Geneva would have grave consequences for all the people of Southeast Asia.”

Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/7-562. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Heavner on July 5; cleared with Cottrell, Cleveland, Wood, and S/S. Also sent to Geneva and repeated to London, Paris, Vientiane, and CINCPAC.

Source: Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, United States Department of State. FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1961–1963, VOLUME II, VIETNAM, 1962, DOCUMENT 234

July 7, 1962: 236. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State

Saigon, July 7, 1962, noon.

21. Reference: Department telegram 1266.2 Joint Embassy-MACV message. On basis several extensive briefings (including one June 25 with President Diem) and our own staff evaluation of technical factors and GVN preparations, Ambassador and COMUSMACV satisfied (1) crop destruction program could produce substantial military advantage; (2) satisfactory destruction of crop targets could result, as evidenced by Delmore Report;3 and (3) no further technical experimentation necessary.

Further convinced that GVN methods of determining targets, based on best available ground and air intelligence, take into account all necessary factors. MACV staff is in position to render adequate technical advice.

Only factor not entirely determined is RVNAF capability launch and sustain on its own a crop destruction program on operational basis. RVNAF plans deploy helicopters for spraying, providing both air and ground cover during operations. Latter will involve considerable number troops in areas of substantial VC strength and control. Best way determine GVN capability is to concur with trial operation on limited basis, with dear understanding results thereof will be used decide whether further operations feasible.

Propose, therefore, work out with GVN trial operation Phu Yen Province. Target zone encompasses area BQ750650 to BQ955650 to BQ750490 to BQ955490. Would involve destruction of eight target plots within defined area, totaling 2500 acres of rice, corn, sweet potatoes and manioc. Determination this target based upon best intelligence available from both military and political channels and would be re-confirmed by joint US/GVN assessment prior to attack. Proposed anti-crop operation to be initiated and conducted solely by GVN with US participation being limited to sub-rosa technical advice and assistance. GVN will carry out using helicopters as primary means of dispensing chemicals, and employ ground and air cover as necessary.

Target in general area Hai Yen II and could contribute to overall success that operation. Incursion of GVN forces into VC controlled and occupied territory may result in bonus effect of engagement of sizable VC forces by VN troops. Equally important, considerable GVN civic action resources and US support already deployed this area, thereby providing better opportunity follow up quickly re social, economic, political aspects crop destruction operation.

Request Washington approve above program and authorize release sufficient chemicals to GVN to undertake this operation. Based on results operation, we would then consider jointly with GVN further target areas which they have already developed on priority basis within a suggested overall crop destruction program.4

Nolting

Source: Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, United States Department of State. FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1961–1963. VOLUME II, VIETNAM, 1962, DOCUMENT 236

Also on July 7, 1962: In Vietnam, we are up against an enemy who uses Mao Tse-tung's tactics. The text-book rule of imposing our will on enemy forces needs further interpretation. The real contest is to win over the people on the land, which includes protecting them. - Robert S. McNamara. Source: Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, United States Department of State. FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1961–1963. VOLUME II, VIETNAM, 1962, DOCUMENT 237. Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense's Assistant for Special Operations (Lansdale) to the Secretary of Defense (McNamara)

July 8, 1962: On 8 July 1962, ordered by Gen Ne Win, Brig-Gen Aung Gyi, Col Kyaw Soe, Col Saw Myint, Col Min Thein, Lt-Col Sein Lwin, and Maj Tun Yi, the fascist Burmese soldiers from Burma Rifle Battalion 4 killed students by three minute shoot and two minute wait repeatedly as well as then destroyed the Student Union Building, which had a prominent standing in the history of Burma independence movement. Artillery officer Hla Myint laid dynamites thoroughly around the solid walls and demolished the Student Union Building. Student leaders were Ko Thet (Ba Ka Tha) and Ko Ba Swe Lay (Ta Ka Tha). Ko Kyaw Win of Myaungmya, who was in bed with injuries, and about 100-400 students were blown up together with the building under a bloody policy declared by Gen Ne Win as to match “sword with sword, spear with spear.” The bodies, some students still alive, were crushed at the sewage treatment plant in Rangoon. Source: Burma National News. 1962 Rangoon University Students Uprising. Monday, 18 July 2011 22:42

July 9, 1962: Army SP4 George Fryett, who spent 6 months as a prisoner of communist guerrillas in Vietnam, reuinited with his parents at Los Angeles Airport and announces plans to "bask in the sun, see the Hollywood Bowl and Disneyland" and to regain the 26 pounds he lost in Viet Nam. Source: Yank Freed By Viet Reds Plans LA Sightseeing. The Modesto Bee. July 11 1962. Page 15.

Also on July 9, 1962: 238. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam

Saigon, July 9, 1962, 8 p.m.

28. Re: Confe's 1196 and 1197.2 You are authorized to deliver the following letter from President Kennedy to President Diem urgently.

“I have been told of your concern over the agreements on Laos now being negotiated at Geneva. Since these long and difficult negotiations are reaching a conclusion, I thought it would be helpful to Your Excellency for me to review with you our thinking about Laos and Southeast Asia generally.

We have sought to counter the communist drive in Southeast Asia by programs and tactics which recognize both the regional nature of communist threat and the particular circumstances of each country in the region.

In the case of your own country, the strategy best calculated to preserve Vietnamese independence and enable your brave people to build a better future is clearly very different from the strategy required for Laos. Such a strategy is based upon the fierce desire of your people to maintain their independence and their willingness to engage in an arduous struggle for it. Based as it is on these facts, our policy toward Viet-Nam must and will continue as it has since my administration took office. We have helped and shall continue to help your country to defend itself. We believe your efforts have been and will continue to be increasingly effective. We believe the Vietnamese will defeat communist aggression and subversion.

In Laos, the circumstances are quite different. Because of that country's location and because of the conditions in which its people find themselves, the United States believes that a neutral government, committed to neither the west nor the east, is most likely to succeed in providing the Lao people with peace and freedom. We are supported in this belief by most of the free world governments.

In negotiating with the communists to achieve a free and neutral Laos, we have not been unmindful of the relationship between Laos and the security of its neighbors. We have sought to build adequate safeguards into the Laos settlement, including assurance Lao territory will not be used for military or subversive interference in the affairs of other countries. We are aware of the danger that the communists will not honor their pledges. But the only alternative to a neutral Laos appears to be making an international battleground of Laos. This would not help the Lao people and it would not contribute to the security of Laos' neighbors.

I am informed that the Geneva negotiations have reached the point where the agreements which have been hammered out over the past thirteen months are nearly ready for signature. In considering the position of our government at this juncture I think it is important for us to keep firmly in mind the real political foundation upon which these agreements rest.

When Mr. Khrushchev and I met in Vienna last year,3 we were able to agree on only one of the many issues which divide us. This was our mutual desire to work for a free, independent and neutral Laos. The result has been that the Soviets, as one of the Co-chairmen, have undertaken an international responsibility under the Geneva Accords to assure the compliance of the communist signatories with the terms of those accords. This responsibility will be tested soon as the agreements are signed.

In return for these undertakings by the Soviets, both your delegation and mine have made some concessions in the course of the thirteen months of negotiations. These concessions are the result of the almost complete ineffectiveness of the Royal Laotian Army, as demonstrated again in the recent action at Nam Tha. It is only the threat of American intervention that has enabled us to come as far as we have in Laos. But I hope you agree with me that considering this deteriorating situation the safeguards built into the Laos settlement give us the best hope of future improvement against continuing communist military encroachment through that country.

It is in this lilt [light] that I hope you will reconsider the wisdom of insisting upon a solution of the problem of diplomatic recognition by Laos as a condition for your signature of the Geneva Accords. I recognize the importance of the question and particularly the problem it may create in other countries. On the other hand, I believe that when it is compared with the change of achieving a viable settlement of the Laos problem, the question of the type of representation in Vientiane should not be allowed to determine your country's attitude toward our mutual effort at Geneva.

I hope you will instruct your delegation not to raise issues on which general agreement had been reached last December, nor to bring up new issues. It is unrealistic to expect that other countries will undertake obligations to your nation unless your government, through its signature of these accords, assumes reciprocal obligations. That is why I urge you most earnestly to continue your help in making it possible for the Geneva Accords to be signed promptly by all the participants.

In working to ensure peace and freedom for the people of Southeast Asia, the United States must, of course, depend heavily on its friends. Most of all, we must have the cooperation of the governments and the peoples of Southeast Asia itself. Your government has been most closely associated with mine in this effort, and together we have achieved a great deal to defeat the communist threat to Southeast Asia. It is my earnest hope that we may continue this fruitful cooperation by working together to establish a truly neutral Laos.”

In presenting letter you should stress in strongest terms the importance we attach to Vietnamese help in reaching Laos settlement, safeguards we have in Russian promises and which we building into settlement itself and our determination continue help Viet-Nam defend itself.

We plan no publicity on this note and believe you should request GVN handle as classified communication

Rusk

Source: Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, United States Department of State. FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1961–1963. VOLUME II, VIETNAM, 1962, DOCUMENT 238

July 10, 1962: Telsar 1 satellite was launched by NASA aboard a Delta rocket from Cape Canaveral, marking the first active commercial communications satellite in orbit and the first privately-sponsored space launch. The Telstar 1 allowed for live TV and radio broadcasts from around the globe. Source: Significant Achievements in Space Communications and Navigation, 1958-1964. NASA-SP-93. NASA. 1966. pp. 30–33

July 11, 1962: Acting Director of Central Intelligence Marshall S. Carter transmitted a memorandum to Secretary of Defense McNamara giving an analysis of the overall situation in South Vietnam with special emphasis on the Strategic Hamlet Program, the situation of the Montagnards, and the capabilities of the armed forces. Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963. Volume II, Vietnam, 1962, Document 240

July 12, 1962: Prominent Senator Barry Godwater (R-Ariz) told the Senate that if America fails to fight to hold the defensive "keystone" mountains of Laos, all of Southeast Asia will untimatly fall into communist hands; he called the US policy of seeking a neutral Loas "absurd." Source: Calls Laos Uplands Strategic. Pacific Stars and Stripes Newspaper. 1962 July 15, page 3.

July 13, 1962: The Nationalist Chinese and South Vietnamese envoys complained Friday July 13, 1962, that their efforts to set up diplomatic missions to Laos are being stalled in favor of Communist China and North Viet Nam. Source: Laotians Said Favoring Reds. UPI. Galveston Daily News. July 14, 1962. Page 6

July 14, 1962: Alan L. Blewett, civilian pilot for Bird and Son and SFC Raymond Parks, Special Forces advisor, and a Thai interpreter were aboard a Camair Navion aircraft destined to Pak Sane, Vientiane Province, Laos, when the plane and all three aboard went missing. Source: Defense Prisoner of War Report, Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO)

July 15, 1962: The single approved defoliation operation at Bien Hoa started the week of 15 July 1962. Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963. Volume II, Vietnam, 1962, Document 248. Section g.

July 16, 1962: The Report of Control Commission for Viet-Nam, 16 July 1962, is issued and indicates that the hostilities in VietNam, which in the first 5 months of this year alone resulted in the death of more than 9,000 people, are planned, caused, and led by the Communist authorities in North Viet-Nam. Source: The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition, Volume 2, pp. 814-815

July 17, 1962: Raul Castro leaves Moscow after two weeks of secret talks with Nikita Khrushchev and other high-ranking Soviet officials on the scheduled deployment of Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba. Source: Chronology 1, Compiled for The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962 Edited by Laurence Chang & Peter Kornbluh (New York: The New Press, 1992, 1998). Pg 352.

July 18, 1962: All four U.S. Air Force crewmen aboard a twin engine C123 transport plane that crashed in the jungles of South Viet Nam on Sunday, July 15 1962, were found alive today. Source: US Airmen Alive in Viet Nam. The Telegraph, Nashua New Hampshire. July 18 1962. Page 1.

July 19, 1962: CIA's Presidential Checklist noted that Raul Castro left Moscow without publicity and indicated that this was a "pretty good sign that the visit was unproductive." The CIA misinterpreted the lack of publicity as the meeting resulted in a formal agreement between Cuba and the USSR. Source: Chronology 2. Compiled for The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) "Chronology of Specific Events Relating to the Military Buildup in Cuba," Undated.

Also on July 19, 1962: The National Security Council Special 5412/2 Group (and later the Presidet) approves a proposal that U-2 flights over Cuba be continued at their current rate of two a month. Source: Chronology 2. Compiled for The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) "Chronology of Specific Events Relating to the Military Buildup in Cuba," Undated.

July 20, 1962: Sixteen Marine Corps helicopters, aided by thirteen US Army helicopters, spearheaded a highly sucessful miltiary operation 50 miles west of Saigon on what was believed to be the first night helicopter combat mission in history. Source: U.S. Copters Fly Viet Nam Mission. Youngstown Vindicator. July 20 1962. Page 4.

Also on July 20, 1962: Tou Samouth, Communist leader of the Khmer People's Revolutionary Party in Cambodia, was arrested by government police, tortured and then killed. His successor, Saloth Sar, would go on to lead the Communist Party of Kampuchea as Pol Pot, and then exact revenge on former government employees. Source: Karl D. Jackson, Cambodia, 1975-1978: Rendezvous with Death (Princeton University Press, 1992) p18; Wim Swann, 21st Century Cambodia: View and Vision (Global Vision Publishing House, 2009) p242

July 21, 1962: The Associated Press publishes a wildly syndicated story titled "Crazy Mixed Up War In South Viet Nam" which is highly critical to the U.S.'s role, especially they way in which Special Forces troops are used in Vietnam. Source: Associated Press. Crazy Mixed Up War In South Viet Nam . Story by William L. Ryan.
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July 22, 1962: U.S. Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, James Barrington, arranged for U.S. Ambassador at Large, W. Averell Harriman, to meet privatley with the North Vietnamese Foreign Minister Ung van Kiem in Mr. Barrington's room at the Hotel Suisse in Geneva. Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963. Volume II, Vietnam, 1962, Document 247. Memorandum of a Conversation. Columbia University, Harriman Papers, Vietnam. Drafted by Sullivan and authorized by Harriman

July 23, 1962: The International Agreement on the Neutrality of Laos was signed in Geneva. Source: "14 Nations Sign Pact Of Peace For Laos", Miami News, July 23, 1962, p10A

Also on July 23, 1962: McNamara plans for phased withdrawal of U.S. forces, based on optimistic 1962 expectations. Source: The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition, Volume 2. Chapter 6, "The Advisory Build-Up, 1961-1967," pp. 408-514. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971)

July 24, 1962: Birth of Herbert Raymond McMaster, an Army officer who authored the book "Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, The Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies that Led to Vietnam." Source: Wikipedia

July 25, 1962: The United States Army formed its first armed helicopter company, using UH-1 Hueys. Source: Wikipedia

Also on July 25, 1962: Leonard S. Unger replaces Winthrop G. Brown as U.S. Ambassador to Laos. Source: Udorn Royal Thai Air Force BaseTimeline 1962

July 26, 1962: Cuban Missile Crisis: The first Soviet nuclear missies were unloaded in Cuba at the port of Mariel. Source: Norman Polmar, Spyplane: The U-2 History Declassified (Zenith Imprint, 2001) p183

Also on July 26, 1962: The Joint Chiefs of Staff formally directed Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC) to develop a Comprehensive Plan for South Vietnam (CPSVN) in accordance with the Secretary McNamara directives at the Honolulu Conference a few days prior. Source: The Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department History of US Decision Making on Vietnam, vol. II (Senator Gravel edn) (Boston 1971)

Also on July 26, 1962: Australia's initial commitment to supporting the American stance in Vietnam consisted of the deployment of a team of military advisers. On 26th July, 1962, the Minister for Defence announced Australia's intention to send 30 instructors to the Republic of Vietnam. Source: Australia's Military Involvement in the Vietnam War. Brian Ross, 1995

July 27, 1962: The Pentagon announced that the last 1,800 members of the Marine Corps unit in Thailand were being withdrawn. Source: MARINE CORPS HISTORICAL REFERENCE PAMPHLET. A Chronology Of The UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS 1947-1964, VOLUME III. HISTORICAL DIVISION HEADQUARTERS, U. S. MARINE CORPS WASHINGTON, D. C. 1971. P.57

July 28, 1962: The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend to Secretary of Defense McNamara to approve crop destruction through use of herbicides on Viet Cong occupied areas of South Vietnam. The operation would be conducted on a trial basis by Vietnamese personnel with U.S. support limited to technical advice and assistance. Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963. Volume II, Vietnam, 1962, Document 251. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (McNamara). Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 66 A 3542, Vietnam 1962, 380-385.

July 29, 1962: Final mission of BLACK WATCH, a reconnaissance mission over Laos, which included the deployment of two RB-26C aircraft specifically modified for night reconnaissance. Source: CPT Mark E. Smith. Project CHECO Southeast Asia Report. USAF Reconnaissance in Southeast Asia 1961-1966. 25 Oct 1966. pg 7.

July 30, 1962: The U. S. completed the withdrawal of the 5,000 Marines sent to Thailand. Source: MARINE CORPS HISTORICAL REFERENCE PAMPHLET. A Chronology Of The UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS 1947-1964, VOLUME III. HISTORICAL DIVISION HEADQUARTERS, U. S. MARINE CORPS WASHINGTON, D. C. 1971. P.57

July 31, 1962: DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) formally recommends the AR-15 be adopted as the basic weapon for all Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces as it is "more compatible with the light weight and small stature of the Vietnamese soldier", among other advantages. Source: 31 July 1962. Memo attached to Report of Task No. 13A, Test of Armalite Rifle, AR-15. Advanced Research Projects Agency

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August 1, 1962: President Kennedy signs the Foreign Assistance Act of 1962 which provides "...military assistance to countries which are on the rim of the Communist world and under direct attack."
Source: Title: Remarks on signing Foreign Assistance Act, 1 August 1962. Date(s) of Materials: 1 August 1962 . Digital Identifier: JFKPOF-039-021. JFK Library

Also on August 1, 1962: Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen Van Chau, Chief of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) Psychological Warfare Service, stated at approximately 2100 hours that he had been informed that President Ngo Dinh Diem had been warned of the possibility of a coup d'etat occurring on the night of 1-2 August 1962.
Source: Central Intelligence Agency, FOIA, PDF, "Warning to President Diem of a Possible Coup...", August 1, 1962.

August 2, 1962: Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rice) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Harriman)1

Washington, August 2, 1962.

SUBJECT
Crop Destruction

I am firmly opposed to letting crop destruction be tried out. The Task Force memo2 takes one over the jumps on a well-laid course: If the pros and cons were only those dealt with in the memo, I too would go along. They deal with an experimental first use—which would impose some costs—but do not deal adequately with the costs implicit in the wider use which probably would follow. If we make chemicals available for crop destruction we would not be able long to deny it to the world. This would hurt us everywhere:

The way to win a guerrilla war, basically, is to win the people. Crop destruction runs counter to this basic rule. The problem of identifying fields on which the Viet Cong depend is hardly susceptible to solution so long as the Viet Cong and the people are co-mingled. The Government will gain the enmity of people whose crops are destroyed and whose wives and children will either have to stay in place and suffer hunger or become homeless refugees living on the uncertain bounty of a not-too-efficient government.

Other people, who merely sympathize with them, will also hate the government for crop destruction. The use of strange chemical agents, to destroy crops, strikes at something basic implanted in human beings (even if the people do not—as many will—fear that the chemical agents are also directly harmful to people). Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962, Document 256

August 3, 1962: The first contingent of the Australian Army Training Team (AATTV) arrived in South Vietnam on 3 August 1962. It numbered just 30 men and was made up of a mixture of officers, sergeants and warrant officers under the command of Colonel F.P. ‘Ted’ Serong. Team members were deployed to South Vietnam for a 12-month tour of duty with the option of extending for an additional 6 months. The AATTV’s numbers grew, as did the range of ranks held by its members, over the ten years that it served in Vietnam, peaking at 224 in 1971, shortly before Australia’s withdrawal. Source: Australian Government, Department of Veterans' Affairs. Australia and the Vietnam War, "The Australia Army Training Team Vietnam" 2012.

August 4, 1962: A team of battle-hardened jungle fighters from Australia arrived in Saigon to train South Vietnamese in guerrilla warfare tactics. (4:3-5). Source: New York Times Chronology (August 1962), JOHN F. KENNEDY PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

August 5, 1962: 40 Megaton Blast Starts Red Nuclear Test Series

Uppsala, Sweden (AP) - The Soviet Union has launched a new nuclear test series with a super-bomb blast which Swedish scientists placed in the 40-megaton range, second only to the 50-megaton blast that Russians set off last October.

NEW BLAST

The blast Sunday, apparently touched off at Soviet atomic test grounds in Arctic Siberia, came as no surprise to the West. Premier Khrushchev had announced his forces would have to resume testing because of the U.S. Pacific tests now being concluded.

The U.S. State Department called the Soviet explosion a "somber episode" but made clear it will not halt U.S. efforts to get a nuclear test ban.

"The urgent problem before the world is not who tests last, but how we can rid the world of nuclear testing once and for all," said the department statement, referring to Soviet statements that they insisted on holding the last round of tests.

U.S. Ambassador Arthur H. Dean returned to the Geneva disarmament conference Saturday with new Western compromise proposals for a test ban treaty. No date has been announced for presentation of the proposals to the conference.

ESTIMATES

Estimates varied as to the size of the Soviet Explosion Sunday believed touched off on the island of Novaya Zemlya about 1,350 miles east of Uppsala.

Uppsala University's Seismological Institute classed it in the range of 40 million tons of TNT and said it occurred at a higher altitude that the Soviet series of 1961.

The Soviet foreign ministry refused to comment on the explosion, which appeared to have launched a new round of Russian military maneuvers in the far north. The Soviet government announced two weeks ago that maneuvers would begin Aug. 5, with the Soviet northern fleet, rocket troops and air force units taking part.

In Japan, only nation to have been hit by an atomic bomb, a government spokesman said the Soviet act "is regrettable for world peace." It also drew criticism from Dr. Kaoru Yasui, head of the Communist-dominated Japan Council against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs. Source: 40 Megaton Blast Starts Red Nuclear Test Series, Nashua Telegraph, August 6, 1962.

August 6, 1962: Chau Sen Cocsal Chhum becomes Camobodia's 40th Prime Minister. Chhum resisted both Japanese and French occupations. Source: Chau Sen Cocsal Chhum, Wikipedia

August 7, 1962: 260. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 1

Saigon, August 7, 1962, 4 p.m.

126. In course conversation with Richardson and me yesterday, Thuan reported following items:

1. A meeting at Ministerial level was held August 4 on Montagnard problem, attended by all concerned GVN ministries and agencies. Definite decision taken to encourage by all means possible exodus Montagnard population from areas controlled by VC to areas control by GVN. Montagnards would be encouraged to come to nearest suitable government-controlled areas, generally within their own provinces thus minimizing distances of evacuation. They would be resettled to provide (a) maximum security, and (b) maximum economic advantages. Where these principles conflicted, security comes first. Already substantial migration, plus expected increase resulting from news government relief and rehabilitation activities, impose necessity cutting back on certain agreed uses of counterpart fund in order to provide for Montagnards. It had been agreed by GVN to seek US concurrence; also to seek such direct aid as US might be able to provide. I said we would be quite willing to discuss financing, since we heartily endorse principle of encouraging Montagnard exodus from areas where they could not defend themselves, against being used by VC. In this connection, Thuan said that migration of Montagnards had already left many growing crops available for VC harvesting and use, and current plan to encourage movement would augment this. He urged again a favorable answer re selective use chemicals for spraying crops, emphasizing that month of August is harvest time for many crops in certain areas. I told him that this matter was still under consideration in Washington and that I would do my best to get policy decision promptly.

2. Referring to recent GVN military successes, especially by 7th division, Thuan said that available information from POW's, documents, etc. strongly reinforced his conviction that VC concentrating, both by regrouping within country and by infiltration for major large-scale offensive in central Viet-Nam (precise area uncertain) in order establish bridgehead for puppet liberation government. I expressed view that such an attempt might well play into our hands, since our side should command great superiority in pitched-battle type warfare. Thuan did not seem particularly reassured by this observation.

Nolting

Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962, Document 260

August 8, 1962: 261. Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)1

Washington, August 8, 1962.

SUBJECT
Situation in the Far East

Yesterday you asked what the particular trouble spots were in the Far East now that the immediate crises in Laos and Indonesia have been toned down. In order of their urgency, I should imagine that the following are the current problems.

South Vietnam

I have a hunch that the six months beginning after the end of the rainy season in November will be critical in South Vietnam. It is during this period that we will have a clearer indication of whether the steps we have taken in that country are, in the long run, going to be productive. The level of military activity will undoubtedly increase and, as a result, there will be more casualties—including Americans. Public opinion in this country will probably support such casualties if on balance it seems that we are getting somewhere. If, on the other hand, it looks as though our attempts to improve the military, economic and social situation at village level in South Vietnam are being frustrated by our own inefficiency or Diem's recalcitrance, we will be in for real trouble.
At the moment I suspect that our pressures on Diem are a little too slow acting and need to be stepped up even at some risk. Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962, Document 261

Also on August 8, 1962: 262. Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense (McNamara) to the President 1

Washington, August 8, 1962.

SUBJECT
Chemical Crop Destruction, South Vietnam

This memorandum recommends U.S. support of a pilot program for Vietnamese crop destruction operations against the Viet Cong. The direct operation itself would be carried out entirely by Government of Vietnam personnel using their own helicopters. President Diem has consistently advocated the use of herbicides, particularly for crop destruction. Ambassador Nolting stated at my Honolulu conference on July 232 that a major limiting factor on Viet Cong infiltrators into the country is how to keep them fed. On the basis of extensive evaluation, I am satisfied that crop destruction, even in sections of one province, could provide a substantial military advantage. Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume II, Vietnam, 1962, Document 262

read more..

August 9, 1962: 263. National Security Action Memorandum No. 1781

Washington, August 9, 1962.

TO
Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT
Destruction of Mangrove Swamps in South Vietnam

The President approved today the recommendation for initiation of an operational herbicide program for nine selected portions of the delta area of South Vietnam contained in the memorandum from the Secretary of Defense dated August 1, 1962 (SecDef Control No. 4654).2

The President's approval is limited to the herbicide operation described in the above-mentioned memorandum, and he has asked that every effort be made to avoid accidental destruction of the food crops in the areas to be sprayed.

The President also desires to have a report on the results of this operation as soon as they can be evaluated.

McGeorge Bundy

1 Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAMs. Secret. A copy was sent to the Director of Central Intelligence.

2 Document 254. Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962, Document 263

August 10, 1962: The SGA meets in Dean Rusk's office to decide on a course of action for OPERATION MONGOOSE following the intelligence collection phase scheduled to conclude in August. The SGA initially chooses a plan proposed by John McCone in which limited actions, including economic sabotage, would be used to force a split between Fidel Castro and "old-line Communists.” President Kennedy rejects the SGA’s recommendation in favor of a more ambitious plan aimed expressly at overthrowing Castro. During the meeting, the possibility of assassinating Castro is apparently raised. According to William Harvey: “The question of assassination, particularly of Fidel Castro, was brought up by Secretary McNamara. It was the obvious consensus at that meeting… that this is not a subject which has been made a matter of official record.” (Memorandum for Deputy Director (Plans), 8/14/62; (Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, 11/20/75, p. 147; Document 12, National Security Action Memorandum 181, on Actions and Studies in Response to New Soviet Bloc Activity in Cuba, 8/23/62; Schlesinger, p. 497) Source: THE BAY OF PIGS INVASION/PLAYA GIRÓN, A CHRONOLOGY of EVENTS. The National Security Archive, George Washington University.

August 11, 1962: Andriyan Nikolayev became the third Soviet cosmonaut, and the fifth man into space, when Vostok 3 was launched from Baikonur Cosmodrome.[25] Although the Soviets kept with the practice of not announcing the launch until after it had happened, live video of a Soviet cosmonaut in orbit was broadcast for the first time.[26] Source: Wikipedia, August, 1962

August 12, 1962: The Rose Bowl aircraft was scheduled for a flight to Saigon, but the pilot, 1st Lt. Ralph McGee, decided to make a reconnaissance run over the PDJ. Enemy 37 mm anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) shot his aircraft down over the PDJ on March 23, 1961. The AAA gun blew off the starboard wing. He flew too low, about 6,000 ft., and too close to Xieng Khoang airfield. The 37 mm gun would be a menace to EC-47s throughout Indochina. The only saving grace with it was that it was optically sighted instead of radar controlled.

Of eight aboard this mission, seven were reported killed, six airmen and one soldier. The eighth, Major Lawrence Baily, USA, from the Army Attaché Office, Vientiane, shown here, always wore his parachute and successfully bailed out. He was captured by the Pathet Lao and held for 17 months in a massive cave complex, which also served as the Pathet Lao headquarters, at Sam Neua. He was released on August 12, 1962 with two CIA Air American helicopter crewmen captured in May 1961 and a Green Beret POW. Source: Brief History of the Laos War, Talking Proud --- Military,
Electric Goons of “Naked Fanny," By Ed Marek, editor, March 28, 2011

August 13, 1962:

Washington

Dean Rusk believes that [Thai Prime Minister] Sarit would oppose withdrawal of the battle group from Thailand at this time. Therefore, I agreed to leave the group or its replacement in Thailand, at least for the present.1 However, we should be planning on withdrawing the personnel at the earliest possible moment.

Assuming that the North Vietnamese forces are withdrawn from Laos by the end of the 75 day period, we should be prepared to discuss with Sarit a “package deal” involving withdrawal of the battle group and its replacement with approximately 1700 construction personnel, periodic training exercises involving the introduction of combat personnel, the assignment to Thailand of counterinsurgency training teams, and the storage in Thailand of a complement of heavy equipment for a battle group.

Would it not be wise to defer the movement of the construction personnel to Thailand until Sarit has agreed to a plan providing for the withdrawal of the battle group?

Please discuss this entire subject with the State Department.

RMcN

* Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 65 A 3501, Thailand 334–384. Confidential.

1 At a meeting with McNamara on August 6, the JCS conceded that although there was no military requirement for the battle group in Thailand, they felt that political and psychological factors merited its remaining, especially given the situation in Laos. McNamara complained that Sarit and the Thais did “not have the slightest concept about the type of war going on in SEA and Thailand has no plan for this type of war which makes it difficult for our personnel to produce one.” McNamara decided to postpone temporarily a decision and discuss with Secretary of State Rusk the political and psychological factors involved. (Memorandum for the record by Heinz, August 6; ibid., Thailand 200–320.2). Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia, Document 461, Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, United States Department of State

August 14, 1962: “The basic U.S. objective of keeping the Republic of Viet-nam an independent and viable nation requires an integrated plan of action, including political, economic, military, psychological … operations in Viet-nam. These activities, both U.S. and Vietnamese, should be focused on five key problems which must be solved in order to achieve our overall policy objectives.” Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962, Document 264, Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, United States Department of State

August 15, 1962:

418. Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy¹

Washington, August 15, 1962.

Proposed Economic Assistance Program for Laos

The memorandum delivered to you this morning² proposes essentially a new approach to our economic assistance to Laos. In the past we have been supporting the Lao budget at very high levels made necessary by a disproportionately large army. We gave this support through cash grants with some very undesirable results. Local production of food stuffs in the country has fallen off, most of the imports purchased by our aid have been concentrated in the hands of relatively few people, and relatively little has gotten out into the country where it might have done some good.

The new aid program does not contemplate a significant reduction in total aid to Laos. It does, however, adopt as a goal our disentanglement from support of the Lao budget. Instead we would agree to finance imports into Laos, continue our project assistance, and, in extraordinary cases where necessary to preserve political stability and encourage the demobilization of the armed forces, we would be prepared to consider special purchases of kip for dollars.

The proposal recognizes the political strain which is bound to occur when the Laos are forced to grapple with their own budget without direct help from us; and consequently a great deal of authority is given to the Ambassador and Aid Director to apply the new program flexibly, especially in the first year.

You should note that this program does not ensure a significant reduction in dollar drain.³ Most imports into Laos come from non-dollar sources and cannot readily be switched to the U.S. Provision is made, however, for controls designed to ensure that our dollars are not used for purchases in bloc countries and that our local currencies do not go directly to the support of the Pathet Lao.

“FORRESTAL is trying to take the Laos economic program to the President this afternoon. Kaysen is supporting this program although he recognizes that it is both expensive and risky. It will cost somewhere between 30 and 40 million a year with about 10 million being in hard gold outflow. Bundy wished them luck, saying that 'old hard head,' referring to the President's attitude on gold outflow, would probably give them a very rough reception.” (Memorandum for the record by Ewell, August 15; National Defense University, Taylor Papers, White House Daily Staff Meetings, May to Sept. 1962, T–123–69)

1 Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Countries, Laos Security. 8/1/62–8/31/62. Secret. Drafted by FORRESTAL.

2 The undated memorandum is ibid., National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 8/1/62–8/22/62.

3 At the daily White House staff meeting, August 15, the issue of aid to Laos was discussed as follows: Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis, Document 418, Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, United States Department of State

August 16, 1962: Laotian reports shooting down of U. S. plane. (pg. 12) Source: New York Times Chronology (August 1962) JOHN F. KENNEDY PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

August 17, 1962:

269. Memorandum From the Vice President's Military Aide (Burris) to the Vice President¹

Washington, August 17, 1962.

RE: Vietnam

The program for South Vietnam which you delineated in your memorandum to the President in May of last year² continues to be the basis for U.S. effort in that area. Your program was modified only slightly by General Taylor's mission³ in three specific military areas, as follows: (1) improve intelligence, (2) improve communications, (3) provide air logistics. The net result of General Taylor's recommendations was to provide information as soon as possible on Viet Cong activities and to offer a means of transport whereby Government troops could move swiftly to attack the Communists.

In the economic field, your recommendations were augmented and amplified by the Staley Committee⁴, with which recommendations you are familiar. The recommendations of Dr. Staley were generally accepted and the measures which have been implemented have been generally successful.

The specific measures in your program have therefore been proven to be sufficiently comprehensive. The goals which were set remain essentially unchanged, and constant surveillance is maintained in State and Defense on the degree of achievement or accomplishments in each specific point or area (see attached memorandum).

On the practical side, there has been concern as to just what these measures have contributed toward winning the war, or at least toward reversing the trend sufficiently in favor of Government forces to permit victory in the foreseeable future. While the conditions described in the recent Newsweek article⁵ are rejected by State and Defense, it is virtually impossible to elicit specific replies from either of those Departments as to the degree of success or failure, particularly in the military field. While confidence in eventual victory is generally accepted, only General Harkins has said that “we are on the winning side”. Mr. Wood in State assessed the situation by saying that the trend against the U.S. in South Vietnam was halted last November, but presently we are just about holding our own and an upward trend in our favor is not yet clearly in sight.

Politically, Diem is, if anything, weaker than he was when you met him, but the U.S. is determined to work with him in the absence of a reasonable alternative. Economically, progress is being made through the excellent cooperation of the Vietnamese on the principles set down by the Staley Committee. Socially, much progress has been made in health measures, agriculture credits and improvements, education, and information. Great emphasis is being placed on these social activities because of the recognition that the real strength of Vietnam lies with the peasants and the Army and not with the central Government. Certain achievements here, however, are going to be more gradual. Militarily, such statistics as incidents, casualty rates, desertions, loss and capture of weapons, frequency and size of attacks, border infiltration, etc., do not reflect such a favorable picture. We are now in a period where the impact of U.S. training, supplies, assistance, doctrine and technique should soon be felt and yield results.

Mr. McNamara has held six conferences in Hawaii with the Ambassadors and principal military people from the area. While the voluminous transcripts of those conferences reflect great attention to detail in providing for optimum success of American effort, there is also a repetition of Mr. McNamara's philosophy that the United States must make an effective showing in Vietnam as quickly as possible or be misunderstood by the American people, Congress and indeed by the world. There is also motivation to avoid the charge of “too little, too late”.

With the settlement in Laos, great attention has been paid to the transfer of Viet Cong forces, but such an increase has not yet been detected. However, the border crossing problem, as it has long existed, remains practically unsolved. There have also been rumors that the Communists would seek a Laos-type settlement in South Vietnam, but such a settlement is currently ruled out because the South Vietnamese people will not willingly accept the kind of settlement imposed in Laos. While Mr. McNamara has pursued the military effort with a great sense of urgency, he has, for planning purposes, established a time factor to carry out the President's decision last year to seek the settlement in Laos and to defend South Vietnam. In addition to the elements of urgency described above, he has also set forth the assumption that the present effort will be maintained for three years. This is not to say that the effort will be terminated or phased out in this period, but rather it is a realistic expression of a reasonable period during which success must be achieved or at least be in sight. Under present circumstances we appear to be just about turning the corner.

More...

1 Source: Johnson Library, Vice Presidential Security File, Colonel Burris Reports. Secret.

2 See Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. I, Document 59.

3 For documentation on Taylor's visit to Saigon, October 18-25, 1961, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. I, Documents 169 ff.

4 The Staley Report on South Vietnam is not printed, but see the letter transmitting the report, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. I, Document 93.

5 Presumably a reference to Francois Sully's article in the August 20, 1962, edition of Newsweek.

Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962, Document 2, Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, United States Department of State

August 18, 1962:

88. Telegram From the Embassy in Cambodia to the Department of State

Phnom Penh, August 18, 1962, 6 p.m.

133. Department Telegram 82.1 We have no evidence to indicate that Son Ngoc Thanh enjoys any popular support or sympathy in Cambodia. While he may have backing of few scattered individuals, loyalists [loyalties] of Khmer people as a whole, including security forces, are firmly commanded by Sihanouk. Prince’s enormous popularity and prestige are, if anything, increasing, and his image as the symbol and indispensable leader and protector of Khmer Nation is being constantly reinforced.

In contrast, Thanh has become discredited in popular mind as agent of Cambodia’s historical enemies, Thailand and Vietnam. Any Thanhled campaign of armed dissidence would be linked with anti-Cambodian designs of neighbors and would rally nationalistic Cambodian people even more solidly behind Prince. Moreover, Cambodian belief that such campaign could not be launched without at least tacit approval of Western Powers, specifically US, could easily prompt Sihanouk to throw Cambodia into Communist camp in effort ward off what he is convinced is ultimate threat to survival of Khmer identity. There little doubt that if he reached such decision he could carry people with him.

For much same reason, assassination of Sihanouk by Thanh agents would produce serious anti-Western political repercussions. Popular feeling would be aroused against assassins and sponsors, and such situation obviously exploitable by Communists. Absence of any true successor to Sihanouk, in terms popular stature and appeal, could lead to political fragmentation from which Communists stand to benefit. Thanh himself could not hope supplant Sihanouk. Most likely immediate leadership would emerge from group of conservative (Old-Guard) leaders backed by throne and military, but even such leadership would be compelled recognize and to some extent yield to Leftist supported and stimulated popular resentment against West.

Important bear in mind that principal (though not immediate) threat to Sihanouk-centered Cambodian stability lies in increasing numbers of Western-educated intellectuals influenced by Communist doctrine and attracted to Communist techniques. Sihanouk has thus far been able to enforce their allegiance to him, no likely successor would be capable of exercising equally effective control.

Sprouse

* Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751H.00/8–1862. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Bangkok, Saigon, and Taipei.

1 In telegram 82, August 13, the Department informed the Embassy that it was disturbed at reports of Thai and South Vietnamese support of Son Ngoc Thanh’s plotting against Sihanouk. The Department concluded that Thanh had low-level contacts with Vietnamese, Thai, and Nationalist Chinese officials; that he was receiving limited funds from the Vietnamese and possibly the Thai; [text not declassified] and that Thanh had built up a small band of followers because of South Vietnamese support. (Ibid., 751H.00/8–1362) Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia, Document 88, Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, United States Department of State

August 19, 1962:

"On August 19, 1962, the last nail was driven into the domestic economy of South Vietnam:

SAIGON, Vietnam. Aug. 19 -- South Vietnam is ready to embark on a large-scale program of deficit financing to help pay for the increasingly costly struggle against Communist insurgency.

This was disclosed today by high United States officials here. They hailed the development as a heartening policy change that would shift the economy of the Southeast Asian country from peacetime to wartime footing.

The new policy is expected to inflate prices....

It was explained that the Government of South Vietnam for its part had undertaken new measures to increase its tax revenues to support its budget. But United States sources said that deficit financing would be necessary for at least two years.

Americans here observed that economists generally agreed that a certain degree of inflation, if kept under control, was desirable for an underdeveloped country. It was termed a stimulant to business." Source: JFK's Legacy and the Vietnam War, Jude Wanniski, Polyconomics Institute

August 20, 1962: A review of the free areas came when Vietnam’s strained relations with Cambodia worsened. Feeling threatened by both South Vietnam and Thailand, Cambodia on August 20, 1962, had appealed to President Kennedy for a neutral status like that of Laos. President Diem resented the implication that South Vietnam was an aggressor. He said there was little question that Viet Cong redoubts drew support from across the border. Vietnamese troops who carried out sporadic raids into Cambodia had captured communist weapons and ammunition destined for the Viet Cong. Source: The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia: The Advisory Years to 1965, Robert F. Futrell with the assistance of Martin Blumenson (1981). Page 93

August 21, 1962:

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume X, Cuba, January 1961–September 1962, Document 381
381. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence McCone to Attorney General Kennedy

Washington, August 21, 1962.

On August 14th I had a long discussion with Mr. Donovan concerning the ransom of Cuban prisoners. Donovan advised that he had made contact with the Cuban delegate to the UN and had received a response from a Castro confidant that Castro would receive him, Donovan, in Havana at any time.

Donovan is prepared to go to Havana in the interests of: (a) Reducing the Castro asking price now set at $62,000,000, and (b) Determining whether all or a substantial part of the final price can be paid for in food and medicine.

Donovan will not go to Havana unless he has an indication of the United States Government position in this matter, as he feels that there is a very definite risk involved in this negotiation if he is not prepared to “come to terms” if a final negotiation appears possible. The dangers, in his mind, are that Castro will probably attack him, and more particularly the United States Government, for a lack of sincerity, and this will have a most serious damaging effect on the Cuban community in Miami and elsewhere in the United States.

In a telephone call this morning Donovan stated that Castro has indicated that he, Donovan, must be in Havana prior to August 30th; that he is prepared to go if the above conditions are met, and that he would be available in Washington for a discussion with Mr. Hurwitch of State and the Attorney General on Thursday morning, August 23rd.

John A. McCone
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume X, Cuba, January 1961–September 1962, Document 381, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

August 22, 1962:

Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Thailand

Washington, August 22, 1962, 10:21 p.m.

305. Sihanouk announced August 20 press conference he sending letters to Geneva powers (less Thailand) calling for conference guarantee neutrality and territorial integrity of Cambodia in same manner as recent action on Laos. Letter addressed August 20 to President1 being repeated to all addressees. Letter refers in general terms to threat hanging over nation for years from neighbors, leading him fear international conflict in near future. Although letter not specific on this point, probable that immediate cause for Sihanouk’s action is recent incidents on Cambodian-Thai border.²

Dept believes reply to Sihanouk’s letter should be made promptly in light anticipated fast actions by communists. This requires urgent coordination US position with that of friends among Geneva recipients.

Accordingly action addressees requested inquire host governments’ reaction to Sihanouk’s proposal. Embassies London, Paris and Ottawa should convey US view that such conference should be last resort, and that it unnecessarily complicates fairly simple situation by involvement too many parties. Laos situation was far different, involving major confrontation between non-communist world and bloc for purpose seeking solution that would save Laos from externally induced communist subversion and insurgency. Present situation is a bilateral problem Cambodia–Thailand and to lesser extent related to Viet-Nam. Sihanouk may also be seeking to arrange international protection against communist side as he is known to fear that things may go sour in Laos and/or Viet-Nam.

FYI. We are opposed to conference chiefly because it likely encourage extension of conference concept to South Viet-Nam. End FYI.

UK may be able sound out Soviet views on Sihanouk proposal in its role of Geneva co-chairman. Although at this point we fairly certain Hanoi and Peiping likely support Sihanouk proposal, we are not convinced USSR will do so.³

Embassies Rangoon, New Delhi, Vientiane, Bangkok and Saigon should exercise extreme caution and to extent feasible should avoid disclosing our present negative view re Sihanouk proposal. We do not wish Sihanouk to become aware of our views prematurely. We note Indian Ambassador at Phnom Penh displeased that Sihanouk move taken without consulting India (Phnom Penh’s 154).⁴ Embassies Rangoon and Vientiane could perhaps encourage neutral disapproval by mere inquiry whether such consultation took place.

We tend agree with UK FonOff position that main problem will be how respond to Sihanouk without arousing him (London 712).⁵ We wonder whether French who have considerable experience in dealing with Sihanouk may not be able help on this score and hope Paris can obtain Quai’s views earliest.

Sihanouk tends be extremely stubborn about his own proposals and reaction likely be exceptionally bad if bloc responsive to his proposal while non-communist nations oppose. However opposition for conference might be made more palatable if some alternative equally tempting to Sihanouk’s desires be center of world attention can be devised. Any suggestions for alternatives would be welcome. FYI. Dept hopes UNSYG may be willing intervene along lines Phnom Penh 150⁶ and will not be diverted from this by Sihanouk’s precipitate initiative. Fact US has suggested SYG intervention should not be revealed. End FYI.

Another idea that has been advanced is that in response Sihanouk letter US offer make public declaration of its own intention to respect Cambodian neutrality and invite other countries to do the same. Such declaration probably extremely hard to sell to Thailand and SVN, but they might be persuaded if convinced this best way avoid international conference suggested by Sihanouk.

Request urgent comments.⁷

Rusk

* Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751H.00/8–2262. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Arzac; cleared in draft by Harriman and Rice and in substance by Anderson; and approved by Cleveland. Also sent priority to London, Paris, Ottawa, New Delhi, Saigon, Vientiane, and Rangoon and repeated to Phnom Penh, Moscow, Canberra, USUN, and Warsaw.

1 For text of the letter, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 1002–1003. President Kennedy’s answer, August 31, is printed ibid., pp. 1003–1004. Harriman and Carl Kaysen discussed the Sihanouk letter by phone on August 22 as follows:

“Mr. Kaysen said he showed the President the message and told him that the Department thought that the conference would be a mistake.

“Gov. Harriman said the Thais will not agree to a conference and the British are opposed to it.

“Mr. Kaysen said maybe we should try another approach—agree with Sihanouk to be neutral.

“Governor Harriman said Sihanouk wants guarantee from everybody. Does not know what he is really afraid of—hard to tell what he has in mind. I think I would sleep on this for awhile.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Telephone Conversations, June–Dec. 1962)

2 Cambodia charged that Thailand had invaded and overflown Cambodian territory as part of a long campaign of harassment by its two neighbors using U.S.-supplied weapons. Cambodia also requested information on how the United States planned to halt the illegal use of its weapons. (Telegram 167 and 168 from Phnom Penh, both August 26; Department of State, Central Files, 651H.51K/8–2662)

3 On August 25, Khrushchev sent a letter to Sihanouk agreeing to participate in an international conference to guarantee Cambodian territorial integrity and independence. It was released to the press on August 28. The translated text is in telegram 180 from Moscow, August 28. (Ibid., 651H.51K/8–2862)

4 Dated August 23. (Ibid., 651 H.92/8–2362)

5 Dated August 21. (Ibid., 751 H.00/8–2162)

6 In telegram 150, August 21, the Embassy suggested urging U.N. Acting Secretary–General U Thant to make a specific proposal establishing a U.N. presence in Cambodia and Thailand, possibly an Eastern European neutral with staff and necessary facilities. (Ibid., 651H.92/8–2162)

7 The Embassy in Bangkok reported that Thailand was opposed to the idea since it was tantamount to an admission that it had invaded Cambodia, which Thailand denied. (Telegram 336 from Bangkok, August 24; ibid., 751H.00/8–2462) The British Foreign Office was opposed to a conference, believed that the solution lay in Cambodia negotiating with Thailand and South Vietnam, but was prepared to guarantee Cambodia’s integrity. (Telegram 737 from London, August 23; ibid., 751H.00/8–2362) The French had the question under study. (Telegram 942 from Paris, August 23; ibid.) The Canadians received a similar letter and took a view of the conference similar to that of the United States. (Telegram 251 from Ottawa, August 25; ibid., 751H.00/8–2562) Souvanna Phouma believed that Sihanouk must be “given some satisfaction in his present difficult position.” (Telegram 287 from Vientiane, August 24; ibid., 751H.00/8–2462) South Vietnam planned to respond to Sihanouk’s letter in moderate terms with statements of respect for Cambodia’s neutrality and territorial integrity. (Telegram 205 from Saigon; August 27; ibid., 751J.00/8–2762) Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia, Document 89, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

August 23, 1962:

Washington

SUBJECT
Viet-Nam: Project for Crop Destruction (Secretary McNamara has submitted a memorandum recommending approval of this project.)²

Description

About six Vietnamese operated helicopters with Vietnamese air support would spray herbicide on 8 areas of land totaling 2500 acres as a part of the successful Hai Yen II operation now taking place in Phu Yen province. These fields are in the mountains. On the basis of ARVN intelligence Ambassador Nolting and General Harkins believe that these crops will, unless destroyed, nourish local Viet Cong. However, there is no first-hand evidence to prove that this riceland is primarily for Viet Cong use (Tab A³ ). Because of this operation there are resources in the province to care for any Viet Cong or Montagnards who may flee the area.

It is not feasible for ground troops to enter this area and destroy the crops.

If the operation is to be carried out, it should, to be effective, be done in August.

Disadvantages

(a) Although conducted by Vietnamese, there would be Communist propaganda attacking the use of U.S. aircraft and techniques for the destruction of Asian people's food.

(b) The way to win a guerrilla war, basically, is to win the people. Crop destruction runs counter to this basic rule. The problem of identifying fields on which the Viet Cong depend is hardly susceptible to solution so long as the Viet Cong and the people are co-mingled. The Government will gain the enmity of people whose crops are destroyed and whose wives and children will either have to stay in place and suffer hunger or become homeless refugees living on the uncertain bounty of a not-too-efficient government.

Other people, who merely sympathize with them, will also hate the government for crop destruction. The use of strange chemical agents, to destroy crops, strikes at something basic implanted in human beings (even if the people do not—as many will—fear that the chemical agents are also directly harmful to people).

(c) Use of United States aerial spraying techniques to destroy crops in Viet-Nam may give rise to Communist propaganda that the United States is embarking on chemical warfare in Asia. This could give rise to increased charges of use of poison gas and perhaps even of biological weapons against Asian population.

continued...

Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume II, Vietnam, 1962, Document 270, Memorandum From the Secretary of State to the President , Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, United States Department of State

August 24, 1962: 272. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam ¹

Washington, August 24, 1962, 5:45 p.m.

201. Department requests Embassy's views on line U.S. should take if Communist nations should launched concentrated campaign for conference on Viet-Nam at some future time.

Our present objective in Viet-Nam is to help GVN to achieve the strength necessary to exercise predominant and continued sovereignty over that part of its territory which lies below the demarcation line. There is nothing to negotiate until this minimum objective is achieved.

Having this policy objective the U.S. would, if there were a call for a conference, base itself on the position most recently set forth in President's letter of December 14² and in Secretary's press conference statement of March 1.³ (President Kennedy: “Our primary purpose is to help your people maintain their independence. If the Communist authorities in north Viet-Nam will stop their campaign to destroy the Republic of Viet-Nam, the measures we are taking to assist your defense efforts will no longer be necessary.” Secretary Rusk: “the United States is always prepared to talk about situations which represent a threat to the peace, but what must be talked about is the root of the trouble; in this case it is the Communist aggression against Viet-Nam in disregard of the Geneva Accords.”)

The following additional points could be made if necessary to meet a Communist campaign for a conference. However, the decision on whether and how to use them would depend on the circumstances since we will not voluntarily enter a lengthy public discussion on Viet-Nam.

1. It has been suggested Lao settlement provides model for Viet-Nam. International settlements, like forms of government, must be carefully tailored to situation of a particular country or they cannot be effective. The situations in Viet-Nam and Laos are certainly not the same. While the U.S. was willing to join in guaranteeing a policy of neutrality which was generally desired in Laos, it will not seek to impose neutrality on a nation which is fighting off aggression to keep its independence. The source of this aggression has been indicated in the most recent report of the International Control Commission for Viet-Nam.⁴

2. What can be gained by a conference on Viet-Nam now? Viet-Nam will not and cannot negotiate its freedom. Neither a man nor a nation can be asked to bargain for independence while facing an uplifted knife. Until aggression against Viet-Nam stops, all international actions should be designed to help this nation maintain its independence. Can other nations make peace for Viet-Nam? The United States is helping Viet-Nam fight for its freedom; we will not seek to persuade Viet-Nam to abandon its freedom at conference table. This is a Vietnamese war; there can be no lasting peace unless it is freely accepted by the Vietnamese.⁵

Ball

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/8-2462. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Wood and cleared by SOV. Repeated to CINCPAC for Polad.

2 Not printed, but see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. I, Document 322.

3 See Document 94.

4 See Document 208.

5 In telegram 202, August 27, the Embassy in Saigon concurred with the lines set forth in this telegram. (Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/8-2762) Source: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1961–1963, VOLUME II, VIETNAM, 1962, DOCUMENT 272 Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

August 25, 1962: 273. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State ¹

Saigon, August 25, 1962, 1 p.m.

191. Reference: Department's telegram 181.² Both Embassy and MACV consider as encouraging those indications of VC hardships in highland areas reported MACV message mentioned reftel. While we have had many reports that VC are short of medical supplies and are having growing difficulties in obtaining food in highland areas, MACV report referred to records first real indication health conditions of VC may be sufficiently serious to affect operational effectiveness. Therefore, believe it premature attempt now assess significance this report. As follow-up reference telegram, MACV requesting Senior Adviser II Corps to follow matter closely and to report regularly on reliability and numbers prisoners giving this kind of information. (Since above written, we have received from Thuan translations of captured VC letters, et cetera, strongly reinforcing evidence. These being analyzed and summary will be sent separately.)

Existing evidence sufficiently impressive to conclude VC in highland areas having real difficulties obtaining food and medical supplies. This evidence shows that such operations as Haihyen, combining “clear-and-hold” and Strategic Hamlet Programs, plus the Montagnard flights, are beginning pay concrete dividends. All these indications reinforce our conviction that carefully conceived crop destruction programs in clearly VC areas (see Embtel 171³ and previous) can be important weapon against VC. These operations must be mounted quickly if to be effective.

Nolting

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/8-2562. Secret. Repeated to CINCPAC for Polad.

2 Telegram 181, August 22, reported that a MACV message to the JCS on August 20 had stated that the VC in II Corps area were suffering from shortages of medical and food supplies. (Ibid., 751K.00/8-2262)

3 Telegram 171, August 21, reported that General Harkins had received a letter from Thuan requesting the release of 5,000 gallons of defoliant for an operation against VC crops in Phu Yen province. (Ibid., 751K.00/8-2162)
Source: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1961–1963, VOLUME II, VIETNAM, 1962, DOCUMENT 273, Office of the Historian, US Dept. of State

August 26, 1962: Today's Paper: Many US advisers in Viet Nam believe a Cambodian haven is an important factor in Viet Cong operations The United States already has stepped up supplies to the Cambodian army US officials do not discount the possibility that American service men might face other American servicemen in a border clash in a Cambodian unit and Thai or Vietnamese force U S advisers sometimes have accompanied Vietnamese units straying into Cambodia in pursuit of the Viet Cong. The border is unmarked. Sihanouk asserts that American advisers were with a Thai unit that recently clashed with Cambodian troops. Last week he ordered his army to fire on all military aircraft violating Cambodian airspace. Source: The Text Content on Page 2 of Jefferson City News And Tribune, September 2, 1962, Newspaper Archive

August 27, 1962: At a meeting in Guangzhou between China's Prime Minister Zhou Enlai and North Vietnam's Prime Minister Pham Van Dong, the People's Republic committed to supplying the Viet Cong, at China's expense, "with enough weapons to arm 230 infantry batallions". Source: Barbara Barnouin and Changgen Yu, Zhou Enlai: A Political Life (Chinese University Press, 2006) p211, August, 1962, Wikipedia

August 28, 1962: Capt. Robert L. Simpson, USAF, Detachment 2A, lst Air Commando Group, and Lt. Hoa, SVNAF, were shot down by ground fire on August 28, 1962 while flying Close Air Support (CAS). Neither crewman survived. Source: North American T-28 Trojan, Wikipedia

Full Name: ROBERT LEWIS SIMPSON
Wall Name: ROBERT L SIMPSON
Date of Birth: 6/27/1927
Date of Casualty: 8/28/1962
Home of Record: PANAMA
County of Record:
State: ZZ
Branch of Service: AIR FORCE
Rank: CAPT
Casualty Country: SOUTH VIETNAM
Casualty Province: BA XUGEN
Panel 1E, Row 10
Source: Vietnam Veterans Memorial Fund

August 29, 1962:

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis, Document 422
422. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, August 29, 1962.

SUBJECT
Meeting in the Cabinet Room, August 28, 1962, to Discuss Laos

PRESENT
The President, The Secretary of State, Mr. Harriman, Mr. Koren, Mr. Hilsman, Mr. Janow, Mr. Fowler, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], Mr. Nitze, Gen Clay, Admiral Heinz, Mr. Kaysen

Secretary Rusk opened the meeting by indicating that he had emphasized to the Canadians the importance of their role in the International Control Commission for a proper functioning of the Geneva Agreement.² He asked Mr. Hilsman to comment on the present situation in Laos in respect to troop movements and the carrying out of the Accords. Mr. Hilsman summarized briefly his memorandum of August 28 (attached).³ He said that it was too soon to form a definite judgment as to what was happening. The activity we observed, namely, a certain amount of staged withdrawal and a certain amount of real movement on the part of the North Vietnamese, was consistent with our expectations and consistent with a number of possible Communist strategies along the lines indicated in his memorandum. He sketched the availability, as a fall-back position for us, of a de facto partition under the umbrella of a non-functioning but still visible coalition government. Secretary Rusk asked whether there had been any change in the situation of infiltration from Laos to South Vietnam since the signing of the Geneva Accords. It was Mr. Hilsman's view that there still are no North Vietnamese in South Vietnam and that the infiltrators are returning southerners rather than Vietnamese of the northern origin. [1 line of source text not declassified] pointed out [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] that the Viet-Minh and Pathet Lao are proposing minimum compliance with the Geneva Accords. He also mentioned the continuing fighting that these two groups are engaged in with the Meos.

The President asked what we were doing about supplying the Meos. Mr. Harriman responded that we had an agreement with Souvanna that permitted us to get food supplies to the Meos. [1–1/2 lines of source text not declassified] They indicated that there were still U.S. advisers with the Meo, and that their presence would not constitute violation of the Geneva Accords until after October 6.

The President asked whether we had more requests for arms and whether we should accede to them if the other side were not in fact withdrawing their troops. Secretary Rusk thought that if we get no assurance from Souvanna of a genuine cut-off of help from the North, we should reserve freedom of action for ourselves. In response to the President's question, Mr. Hilsman emphasized that we don't know of any heavy movement from Laos to South Vietnam. In response to the other question of the President's, Messrs. Hilsman [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] indicated that we do have evidence that there is some genuine movement of Viet-Minh troops, as well as the staged withdrawals mentioned above. Further, there has been a sharp decrease in the Soviet airlift, with no Soviet movements observed in the last few days.

continued...

Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis, Document 422, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

August 30, 1962: "As the house of cards so laboriously constructed at Geneva was slowly collapsing in Laos, Diem carried on as best he could. His army had recovered from the setbacks suffered at the hands of the NLF in 1961, and the war was going better in 1962 and 1963. A big factor in this improvement was the strategic hamlet program launched at the start of 1962. This was designed to fortify villages and cut off the flows of recruits and food from them to the Viet Cong. The program was based not he theory that the Viet Cong depended on these flows and could not long survive without them. The numbers of strategic hamlets grew steadily, reaching 2,872 by [this date]." Source: The Indochinese Experience of the French and the Americans: Nationalism and Communism in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, Arthur J. Dommen, p. 501.

Also on August 30, 1962: (Year of the Tiger [Nham Dan]) (US Advisory): US Army helicopters airlift VNAF troops in to begin Operation Lam Son II. Source: Timeline, August 30th - The Patriot Files Forums SECOND INDOCHINA WAR

August 31, 1962: Eleven American soldiers and marines have been killed and 28 wounded in Vietnam up to Aug. 20. a Government spokesman said yesterday. Eight were killed in action, two died while imprisoned by the Viet Gong guerillas and one died after being wounded in action.... (51 words) Source: The Straits Times, 31 August 1962

June 1962 - July 1962 - August 1962 - September 1962 - October 1962
November 1962 - December 1962
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Current Month

September 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30

September 1, 1962: Special Forces Headquarters Established. Establishment of the Headquarters, U.S. Army Special Forces (Provisional) Vietnam, to oversee the growing Army Special Forces effort. Source: The United States Of America Vietnam War Commemoration

September 2, 1962: "The United States is considering major new military aid to assist neutralist Cambodia in battling Vietnamese Communist guerrillas infiltrating border areas. The aid would include helicopters and amphibious armored personnel carriers". Source: New York Times Chronology (September 1962), JOHN F. KENNEDY PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

Also on September 2, 1962: Cold War: The Soviet Union announced that it has signed an agreement on military and industrial assistance with Cuba, following an August meeting in Yalta between Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev and Cuban Economics Minister Che Guevara. Source: Wikipedia, "Soviet Announces Pact With Cuba For Delivery Of Military Equipment", Toledo Blade, September 3, 1962, p1.

September 3, 1962: Early Defolation Operation: Based on the recommendation of the evaluating team, the two remaining C-123s were modified to increase the flow rate to 1½ gallons per acre¹². Following these modifications, in August 1962, requests were approved for defoliation of six areas of the Ca Mau Peninsula, These further tests were conducted between 3 September 1962 and 11 October 1962. One additional C-123
was recalled to Vietnam to aid in these missions¹³, which were personally observed by the Comnanding General of the U.S. Army Chemical Corps. These tests were successful and resulted in approximately 90-95 percent increased visibility along the canals¹⁴. Source: HERBICIDE OPERATIONS IN SOUTHEAST, ASIA, JULY 1961-JUNE 1967, Charles V. Collins, Pacific Air Forces, APO San Francisco 96553, 11 October 1967, National Technical Information Service, U. S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

September 4, 1962: New York Times: A threat to request troops from Communist China, if no one else would guarantee Cambodia's frontiers against her neighbors, was made by Prince Norodom Sihanouk. He said Western recognition of Cambodian neutrality was not enough. Source: New York Times Chronology (September 1962), JOHN F. KENNEDY PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

Also on September 4, 1962: New York Times:L Cost of Cambodia aid project far above estimate. Source: New York Times Chronology (September 1962), JOHN F. KENNEDY PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

September 5, 1962: 275. Letter From the Counselor of the Department of State (Rostow) to the Ambassador in Vietnam (Nolting)¹

Washington, September 5, 1962.

Dear Fritz: There has been increasing interest in Washington in recent days in the political component of the effort against the guerrillas in Viet Nam. I know that this is, of course, also very much on your mind and I have been greatly encouraged to read the reports of the progress you have been making in this area as well as in other areas. We have also been encouraged by recent talks with Rufus Phillips about his explorations and activities relating to this problem.² At the same time I am sure that you would agree that we ought to canvass all possible avenues for improving the rate of progress.

While I have no illusions about the possibilities for ending the war quickly, I do have the personal feeling, based upon the indicators I have seen, that we may in the next few months be approaching the real turning point of the struggle. If this is true, it becomes particularly important that we explore every possible measure that makes any sense and that might help get us over the hump. Guerrilla wars—like battles for air supremacy—tend to come to a peak and spiral in one direction or another. I do not feel that this one is likely to spiral against us in the next six months; but it could—as seen from a great distance—spiral for us if the hamlet program, and all it stands for, takes hold. It is for that reason that those cheering your team on from Washington, may appear to be straining under circumstances which otherwise represent a very great accomplishment over the past nine months or so.

continued...

Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962, Document 275, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

September 6, 1962: 276. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Harriman) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric)¹

Washington, September 6, 1962.

Dear Mr. Secretary: In the attachment to your August 27 memorandum to Mr. Johnson ² (who is on leave), you outlined the assumptions on which the Secretary of Defense had based a recommendation to the President³ that he approve a trial program of chemical crop destruction in Viet Cong territory in Phu Yen Province. One of the two assumptions was that the Montagnards had abandoned the target area in recent months. Actually, our Embassy at Saigon has reported that very few refugees had come out of the mountains of Phu Yen, that most of those requesting assistance were ethnic Vietnamese, and that indications were lacking that they were from the proposed target area (Saigon's telegram 129, August 8⁴ ). Since this appears to negate a basic assumption underlying the DOD recommendation, you may wish to reconsider it.

We nevertheless posed to Ambassador Nolting the two numbered questions you listed, as well as the additional question as to whether the time is not passed when the operation could be successfully carried out against this year's rice harvest (Deptel to Saigon 212, August 27⁵ ). He has replied that it has indeed already passed (Saigon's 233, September 1⁶ ). In replying to your numbered questions, he indicated: (1) that the crops in question would importantly benefit the Viet Cong, but will still help support the Montagnards in the area, as the Viet Cong rarely confiscate the entire crop of any one plot; and (2) it is assumed that loss of its share of the crop would hurt the Viet Cong, but that not enough is known in detail about the Viet Cong's planned operations to say that this proposed crop destruction would have seriously set them back.

Continued...

Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume II, Vietnam, 1962, Document 276, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State.

September 7, 1962: Telegram From the Embassy in Cambodia to the Department of StateSource

Phnom Penh

221. Policy. This message represents our evaluation of present situation and concludes with our views as to courses of action open to US which would be designed meet in part Sihanouk’s desires without involving US in commitments we could not give nor in actions damaging to our relations with our Thai and South Vietnamese allies.

Sihanouk’s present insistent demands for “guarantees” of Cambodian neutrality and territorial integrity and his threat to ask for Soviet and Chinese Communist troops as last resort to protect Cambodian independence may be large-scale blackmail. Possibility always exists however, he may do just what he says in event “guarantees” or some kind of assurances affording partial, if not full, satisfaction his needs are not forthcoming. To the extent we ignore this possibility, we are heading on collision course leading to possible disaster.

Continued...

Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963,Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia, Document 90, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State.

September 8, 1962: 278. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations (Dutton) to Congressman Odin Langen

Washington

Dear Congressman Langen: I want to thank you for your letter of August 28, 1962, concerning queries by Mr. Richard S. Anderson, Box 69, Alexandria, Minnesota,² on our policies in South Viet-Nam.

The military operation in the Ca Mau Peninsula mentioned by Mr. Anderson was not a U.S. venture. It was conceived, planned, and executed by the Vietnamese Armed Forces. As in other operations, U.S. military personnel served as advisers and provided logistic and technical support which the Vietnamese lack. The operation should not be described as the brainchild of General Harkins. We would emphasize that the Vietnamese are planning and fighting their own war in defense of their independence.

Our military advisers do not regard the Ca Mau operation as a failure. Although it was so described in some press reports, we consider it an encouraging success. The Ca Mau operation was carried out in an area long under Communist control, large stores of food and equipment were destroyed, and the Communist forces were dispersed.

Continued...

Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume II, Vietnam, 1962, Document 278, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State.

September 9, 1962: New York Times: Speedy Congressional action is assured on President Kennedy's request for stand-by authority to call up 150,000 reservists for a year if the world situation warrants it. Administration spokesmen said Mr. Kennedy had no plans to invoke such authority now. Source: New York Times Chronology, JOHN F. KENNEDY PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM.

September 10, 1962: Memorandum for the Record

Saigon, September 10, 1962

SUBJECT
Meeting held at Gia Long Palace, Saigon, Vietnam, 7 Sept 62

ATTENDANCE
His Excellency Ngo Dinh Diem, President of the Republic of Vietnam
General Paul D. Harkins, Commander, Military Assistance Commands, Vietnam and Thailand
Mr. William C. Trueheart, Deputy Chief of Mission, American Embassy, Saigon

After the usual exchange of amenities, during which President Diem extended a particularly cordial welcome to his guests, General Harkins expressed to the President his pleasure with the splendid results of ARVNAF aggressiveness during the preceding month—especially in the III Corps area. He attributed these successes to the excellent cooperation of the various fighting arms: the Army, the Air Force, the supporting helicopter units and the River Forces. He said that, not only was he personally delighted, but that he was sure that General Taylor would be pleased with the progress which has been made since his visit to Vietnam in October of last year,² while the Delta area was in the throes of the flood disaster. Mr. Trueheart said that he had personal experience of the remarkable progress that had been made, since he had arrived in Vietnam at about the time of General Taylor's visit. General Harkins added that this progress was not restricted to the III Corps area but was evident throughout the country. He then told the President that the purpose of his visit was to present to him the concept of a plan which he thought that the President would like.

Continued...

Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962, Document 277, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State.

September 11, 1962: In a statement issued...through the Soviet news agency TASS, the Soviet Union warned that any attack by the United States on Cuba or upon Soviet ships bound for Cuba would lead to war between the United States and the Soviet Union. The statement accused President Kennedy of preparing for "an act of aggression" against Cuba when he asked Congress on September 7 for stand-by authority to order 150,000 military reservists to active duty. The statement cited Soviet nuclear capability and warned that no aggressor could expect to be "free from punishment." Source: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1961-1963, Volume X, Cuba, 1961-1962, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Washington

Also on September 11, 1962: 281. Memorandum From Robert H. Johnson of the Policy Planning Staff to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Cottrell)¹

Washington, September 11, 1962.

SUBJECT
Measuring the Extent of Progress in the Countryside in Viet Nam

This follows up on our conversation of somewhat over a week ago in which I discussed with you Mr. Rostow's and my ideas with respect to devising an objective means of measuring the trend of events in the countryside in Viet Nam. We are particularly interested in measures of the state of the relationship between the central government and the rural population. Our interest is stimulated by several factors. Perhaps because the population's sense of who is winning can be such an important factor in determining its attitude toward the struggle, once the tide begins to turn, there tends to be a multiplier effect. If this is the case, it is particularly important to obtain some measure of the way the tide is moving as a basis for pacing our own effort. Even more important, we need such information, of course, as the basis for adjusting U.S. and GVN activities to the changing situation.

We have also been impressed by the great disparities in impressions of observers as to the state of progress on attitudes and the state of government progress in the countryside. Probably much of this variation is caused by the fact that different observers see different parts of the country or different aspects of what is going on. It would be desirable, if at all possible, to establish a system which would regularize observations. Our thoughts on the subject seem to me to complement and carry forward the suggestion that you and Ben Wood have been developing for improving political reporting from the provinces.² Our suggestions are as follows: Continued...

Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963,Volume II, Vietnam, 1962, Document 281

September 12, 1962: Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Harriman) to Secretary of State RuskSource

Washington, September 12, 1962.

SUBJECT
Sihanouk’s Demand for Guarantees

As you know, Prince Sihanouk has made it plain he does not feel that a formal exchange of letters concerning his neutrality and independence would be sufficient without the inclusion of guarantees which we could not possibly give. He no longer holds to the necessity of a conference but as an alternative talks of adopting the 14-Power Lao Neutrality Declaration for his country, merely substituting Cambodia for Laos in the text. This would likewise give us impossible problems.

Accordingly we have been searching for some alternative which we could propose which might satisfy him and thus deflect another unfortunate initiative on his part. We have hit on an adaptation of the 1955 exchange of notes with Austria as the basis.

Continued...

Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia, Document 91, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State.

September 13, 1962: Telegram From the Embassy in Cambodia to the Department of State

Phnom Penh, September 13, 1962, 9 p.m.

256. Department pass White House for Ewell; DOD for Secretary McNamara and JCS for Lemnitzer. Bangkok pass General Taylor. Deptel 191.1 Following is account General Taylor’s one hour audience with Sihanouk at which I was present:

Audience was inhibited by presence for first ten minutes of two US correspondents and of several Cambodian press photographers during entire audience located within hearing range of Sihanouk’s audible exposition his views. General Taylor considered it desirable therefore to soft-pedal some points contained in Depreftel but in course general conversation covered most important aspects omitting only one point of real importance: That regarding US willingness to consult with RKG in event of actual aggression. (General Taylor did state US would view with grave concern actual aggression against Cambodia.) As US had not previously given assurances for consultation and as they seemed to conflict with assurances of consultation with UNSYG rep and RKG jointly envisaged in draft statement quoted in Deptel 177,² we considered it advisable pass over this point.

Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia, Document 92, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State.

September 14, 1962: Memorandum for the Record
Saigon
SUBJECT
Meeting with Special Advisor to the President of Vietnam, 11 September 1962
After an exchange of greetings General Taylor told Mr. Nhu that he was much encouraged by the progress which has been made in Vietnam since his visit to this country last year. Mr. Nhu said that he also was pleased with what had been accomplished and expressed the hope that much more would soon be done. Ambassador Nolting interjected a remark that in a few years he and Mr. Nhu should be able to resume their hunting trips. Mr. Nhu then said that the target date for the completion of the first phase of the Strategic Hamlet Program was the end of the year and that he felt that by that time it would be possible to plan for the exploitation of the gains which would have been made. General Taylor remarked that this situation resembled that which usually exists during any war. There is a period during which an impasse exists, and then, suddenly, a sudden surge to victory. Mr. Nhu then said that he wanted to explain to General Taylor what his ultimate views were concerning the value of the Strategic Hamlet Program and to review the general situation with him. He foresaw that the completion of the Strategic Hamlet Program would permit the government to switch from a counter-guerrilla concept to a genuine guerrilla operation against the enemy. At the moment the atmosphere is not set for aggressive guerrilla tactics. Until the Self Defense Corps and the Youth Movement become completely functional much assistance from the Americans would still be required.
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume II, Vietnam, 1962, Document 279, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State.

September 15, 1962: Cuban Missile Crisis: The first Soviet medium-range missiles were deployed in Cuba, a week after their arrival.[23] On the same day, American electronic intelligence detected that Soviet high-altitude surface-to-air missiles had become operational. An SA-2 (or S-75) Dvina missile had downed the U-2 spy plane flown by Francis Gary Powers in 1960, and the weapons, located near the port of Mariel, were capable of stopping further American attempts to verify a missile buildup.
Source: September 15, 1962, Saturday, Wikipedia

September 16, 1962: New York Times: " The United States has had little success thus far in efforts to persuade its Allies to do less business with Cuba and to withhold ships now being chartered for Soviet shipments to Cuba". Source: New York Times Chronology, September 16, 1962, JOHN F. KENNEDY PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

September 17, 1962: Post-Conflict Phase (June 13, 1962-April 26, 1964): The Declaration and Protocol on the Neutrality of Laos was signed by the participants of the 14-nation conference on July 23, 1962, which provided for the neutrality of Laos and the withdrawal of troops from Laos to be monitored by the ICSC-Laos II. U.S. troops began withdrawing from Laos on September 17, 1962...

Continued...

Source: University of Arkansas, Political Science Dept, Laos (1954-present)

Also on Sept 17, 1962: The Americanization of Saigon has increased markedly in the last year with the arrival of thousands of American troops to aid the South Vietnamese fight against Communist guerrillas. Source: New York Times Chronology, September 17, 1962, JOHN F. KENNEDY PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

September 18, 1962: U.S. Marine Corps helicopters flew a combat mission from Da Nang, South Vietnam, for the first time, airlifting South Vietnamese troops into the hills south of Da Nang. Source: Wikipedia, September 18, 1962 (Tuesday)

September 19, 1962: Cuban Missile Crisis: The United States Intelligence Board reviewed all available data on arms shipments to Cuba, and reporte to President Kennedy that there was no basis for speculation that nuclear missiles would be placed there. Source: Wikipedia, September 19, 1962 (Wedsnesday)  

September 20, 1962: Congress is expected to adopt today a joint resolution pledging the use of force if necessary to defend the Western Hemisphere against Cuban aggression or subversion. The text, approved yesterday by two Senate committees, was worked out by leaders of both parties and is acceptable to the Administration. The compromise resolution also pledges the nation to work with the Organization of American States and "freedom-loving" Cubans for the "self-determination" of Cubans. (1:3-5; Text, 14) Source: New York Times Chronology, September 20, 1962,  JOHN F. KENNEDY PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM. 

September 21, 1962: Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Harriman)

Washington, September 21, 1962.

SUBJECT
Laos
What do you think of our attempting shortly to engage Khrushchev's personal prestige on withdrawal of the Viet Minh from Laos and the use of the corridor by a personal message from the President? My thought is that, given the background, the President might send something to Khrushchev to the effect that we are scrupulously observing agreements but are highly concerned over the slowness of Viet Minh withdrawal and reports of Viet Minh fading into Pathet Lao units, and in effect ask for Khrushchev's personal assurance that all Viet Minh will be out and use of the corridor stopped by October 7. I do not know whether we have sufficient base on which to mention Chicoms in Phong Saly. Source: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1961–1963, VOLUME XXIV, LAOS CRISIS, DOCUMENT 423, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

September 22, 1962: Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹

Saigon, September 22, 1962, 1 p.m.

337. Reference: Department's telegram 327.² Below is summary General Taylor's conversation with President Diem September 11. Memo of conversation being pouched.³

In his opening remarks President Diem said that inability to form a valid estimate and pessimism prevalent in some circles, particularly the press, was result of failure to keep entire picture in mind at all times. Ambassador Nolting called his attention to recent objective New Yorker article by Shaplen. President next told General Taylor that VC had been forced revise their plans to overrun SVN and that present VC general plan is, in order of priority: Disrupt Strategic Hamlet Program, intensify propaganda vis-à-vis military, and give all out support to neutralist movement. In response query from General Taylor, President said he recognized value of helicopter support but stressed importance of artillery, pointing out role of his road building program to permit its deployment. The President next spoke of his recent directive to strike at heart of enemy, keep him on move and to plot and destroy all remote areas where VC could grow food or find safe havens.  Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962, Document 280, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State 

Also on September 22, 1962: The Soviet Union issued a new warning that any United States attack on Cuba would precipitate a nuclear war. The threat was made by Foreign Minister Gromyko in a tough and uncompromising policy statement to the United Nations General Assembly. (1:4; Excerpts, 2) Source: New York Times Chronology, September 22, 1962, JOHN F. KENNEDY PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM.

September 23, 1962: NY Times: The pentagon is considering increases in the regular armed forces to avoid future emergency calls on the military reserves. This possibility was mentioned in House testimony by Secretary of Defense McNamara, who said that in some ways the world situation was more critical today than at any time since the Korean war. (1:1)  Source: New York Times Chronology, September 23, 1962,  JOHN F. KENNEDY PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM. 

September 24, 1962: Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hilsman) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Harriman)¹

Washington, September 24, 1962.

    SUBJECT
    Laos—The Troop Withdrawal Question

As you requested, we have examined both (1) recent evidence tending to indicate Communist intentions toward troop withdrawal in Laos; and (2) the implications of these intentions for our own decision on withdrawal.²

Military Position in Laos

1. There is still no hard evidence on Viet Minh troop withdrawal except for 15 Viet Minh “technicians” certified to the ICC. Truck convoys and the Soviet airlift continue to operate into communist areas in Laos. Whether they are evacuating, regrouping, or resupplying is a matter of conjecture. Minor skirmishes continue.

2. Publicly, the communists continue to insist that no Viet Minh combat forces are present in Laos. Privately, both Souphanouvong and Quinim admit that there are, but say to US officials that the Viet Minh will be out before October 7. Souvanna takes the same position.

3. U.S. army intelligence estimates that since late July covert withdrawals may have reduced Viet Minh forces in Laos from around 9,000 to perhaps 7,500. Of the 11 Viet Minh battalions previously accepted, two are presumed to have returned to North Vietnam from the north and central parts of Laos. 

Continued...

Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis, Document 424, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State 

September 25, 1962: The House passed and sent to the White House the specially limited Reserve mobilization powers that President Kennedy had requested. The bill enables him to call up to 150,000 ready reservists and extend the active duty of servicemen, if he finds it necessary. (1:4)   Source: New York Times Chronology, September 25, 1962,  JOHN F. KENNEDY PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM. 

Also on September 25, 1962: Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam ¹

Washington, September 25, 1962, 3:54 p.m.

363. To preclude GVN taking one more ill-advised action outlined Embtel 349² which will further sour press relations and cause serious adverse reaction here in many quarters, you should make following points at highest levels. Suggest Counselor Nhu be included.

1. It would be great mistake for GVN to ban Newsweek giving clear impression GVN not strong enough to stand criticism and must resort to news blackout.

2. Impression in U.S. will be that GVN attempting to cover up. This will shake confidence in our present policy of strong support to Vietnam and bring into debate question whether U.S. policy is sound or unsound. As GVN knows, many are unconvinced and will seize this opportunity.

3. GVN can ill afford this reaction in U.S. and, on balance, it is perfectly clear from here that GVN best interests served by ignoring distasteful news stories and taking it in stride.

4. If GVN indulges its feelings of anger and bans Newsweek, they should clearly understand consequences described above. U.S. policy is firm in supporting the principle of a free press and we cannot overlook damage to this principle no matter how irritating or unfounded certain press reports frequently are.

5. Newsweek is sending Ken Crawford to Viet-Nam for approximately one month to survey situation. Crawford is former Washington Bureau Chief, is a senior seasoned reporter now a columnist, who can be expected do objective reporting. This may provide opportunity put GVN-Newsweek relations on better footings.³

Ball

Source:  Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume II, Vietnam, 1962, Document 293, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

September 26, 1962: NY Times: FAST COPTERS SENT TO VIETNAM HILLS; Tactical Shift by U. S. Puts Army Machines in Delta.

DA NANG, Vietnam, Sept. 26 In an effort to fit the aircraft to the terrain, the United States military command has replaced an army unit here with a marine squadron that has been flying faster and more powerful machines in the Mekong Delta. Source:  FAST COPTERS SENT TO VIETNAM HILLS,  DAVID HALBERSTAM,  The New York Times

Also on September 26, 1962: Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State ¹

Saigon, September 26, 1962, 8 p.m.

352. Deptel 364.² After careful study over past months (Embtels 302, 233³ and previous) General Harkins and I have jointly recommended approval of limited crop destruction operation in Phu Yen Province by spraying from air and in Phuoc Long Province by hand in conjunction ground operations. We are not yet prepared to recommend broad-scale crop destruction program until trial operations give basis for evaluating conduct such operations and results vis-à-vis Montagnard population and VC. Under GVN plans, spraying would be directed only against specific target areas which best intelligence available pinpoint as VC-cultivated or VC-controlled area. We have recommended test program in Phu Yen primarily because of obvious advantages in support operation Hai Yen II and Phuoc Long because crop destruction program currently being carried out by physical means-cutting and uprooting (Embtel 233). Admittedly there may be indirect impact on Montagnards as total food supply reduced but believe impact will be much greater on VC and Montagnards affected can be taken care of through other programs. Moreover, Montagnard letters described Embtel 302 provide evidence that at least some Montagnard groups would welcome destruction their crops in order deny assistance to VC. General Harkins and I continue be convinced by mounting evidence of VC food shortages in highlands that crop destruction can be effective weapon against VC. Without carrying out test operation we will never be able fully confirm efficacy this weapon or ability GVN to utilize it with limited indirect US assistance.

Continued...

Source:  Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962, Document 294, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State 

September 27, 1962: The House of Representatives completed Congressional action on a declaration of the United States' determination to oppose with force, if necessary, Communist aggression or subversion based in Cuba. The House approved the joint resolution as anger and concern mounted in Washington over Moscow's plans to help build a port in Cuba for Soviet fishing trawlers. (1:2)   Source: New York Times Chronology, September 27, 1962,  JOHN F. KENNEDY PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM. 

September 28, 1962: On September 28, 1962, JFK approved National Security Action Memorandum No. 189, which provided for the withdrawal of the remainder of the American advisory group, the maintenance of American combat troops in Thailand, extra money for the Souvanna government, and a special intelligence watch on the North Vietnamese.

The significant American subversion of the Geneva Protocol came not over the minutiae of troop withdrawals, but with the CIA paramilitary project that had created a large force of mountain tribesmen, who were the most effective fighters on the non-communist side. This initiative, Project Momentum, had begun under Eisenhower in 1960 and recruited an armée clandestine, a “secret army” that fought the Pathet Lao and its North Vietnamese allies on their own ground. Based primarily among the Hmong tribe and led by a Hmong RLAF officer named Vang Pao, by 1962 the secret army numbered about 17,000 troops, a force almost as large as the Pathet Lao.  Source:  LAOS: The Geneva Protocol And the Not-So-Secret War, BY JOHN PRADOS, The Veteran, Vietnam Veterans of America 

September 29, 1962: NY Times: Within hours after returning to Washington yesterday from a two-day inspection trip to Germany, Secretary of Defense McNamara hurriedly held a news conference. He solemnly warned that the United States was ready to use nuclear arms to protect its vital interests in Berlin. His statement was apparently intended to erase any doubts that Washington would hesitate to use force in a Berlin showdown. Source: New York Times Chronology, September 29, 1962, JOHN F. KENNEDY PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

September 30, 1962: The increasingly tense situation in Berlin and other international issues will be discussed today by President Kennedy and top United States and British officials. The President's luncheon guests at the White House will be Secretary of State Rusk; David K. E. Bruce, the United States Ambassador in London; Lord Home, Britain's Foreign Secretary, and Sir David Ormsby-Gore, the British Ambassador. The four will fly to Washington from New York, where they are attending the United Nations General Assembly session. Source: New York Times Chronology, September 30, 1962, JOHN F. KENNEDY PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

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Current Month

October 1, 1962: Letter From the Director of the Vietnam Working Group (Wood) to the Ambassador in Vietnam (Nolting)¹

Washington

Dear Fritz: I think Thuan's visit was very successful—particularly in terms of the press.

We have sent a round-up telegram and memos of his conversations with the President, the Secretary, the Attorney General and FOWLER HAMILTON.² He also had talks with the following:

Walt Rostow —Dr. Rostow was sympathetic and perhaps the most understanding of Thuan's interlocutors. He urged adoption of the amnesty program, pointing out that the most critical part of such a program was getting the signal through to the VC. Dr. Rostow made three suggestions in order to improve and strengthen relations between the Government and the villagers:

1. The organization of Vietnamese students from the towns to do civic action work in the villages, not only to help the villagers but to increase the students' understanding of the war which their country faces (this idea sounded particularly good to me).

2. A conscious GVN policy to encourage industries to manufacture goods needed by the peasants. This would help industry since “a rapidly growing industry must be based on the whole country, not just on the city”. It would also provide incentive goods for the peasants. Thuan agreed. He mentioned the problem of getting loans from the IDA and yen from U.S. Treasury accounts.

3. Train draftees whose terms of enlistment are ending so that they will have useful skills when they return to their villages. This has been done in Korea and some Korean experts might help in setting up such a program.

Continued...

Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume II, Vietnam, 1962, Document 295, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

Also on October 1, 1962: Four Soviet Foxtrot submarines, armed with nuclear torpedoes, departed bases on the Kola Peninsula in anticipation of a controntation with the United States over Cuba. Source: Wikipedia, (Monday) October 1, 1962

October 2, 1962: [Kennedy] authorized a "limited crop destruction program" in Phu Yen Provice by South Vietnam helicopters spraying U.S.-furnished herbicides. Source: JFK and the Unspeakable: Why He Died and Why It Matters,
By James W. Douglas

Also on October 2, 1962: The US Air Force uses Agent Orange to track Viet Cong trails during the Vietnam War.Source: 60s Timeline, October 2, 1962, UNC-TV

October 3, 1962: NY Times' David Halberstam's first operation: "a helicopter assault with a unit of the Seventh Division. During his day in the field, [he] learned a number of simple things: how to walk in the muck of a rice paddy, how to cross a canal on a bamboo pole, what kind and how many footgear to bring. But he also learned that the ARVN he observed was not interested in engaging the Vietcong, and that the American advisers and support troops in the field were quite discouraged. Source: Paper Soldiers: The American Press and the Vietnam War, by Clarency R. Wyatt, The University of Chicago Press, 1993, 1995

October 4, 1962: The State/Defense Departments authorized crop destruction in principal regarding the chemical defoliation program in Vietnam. But advised that 1) the program should only be implimented where stage of crop growth gives reasonable prospects of success; 2) targets should be selected in area where maximum damage is done to Viet Cong and minimal to non-communist peasants; and 3) consideration should be given to psywar aspects. Source: William E. Warren, "A Review of the Herbicide Program in south Vietnam" Scientific Advisory Group (Navy), August 1968. pg 6

Also on October 4, 1962: The first nuclear missile in Cuba was installed by the Soviet Union, as a warhead was attached to an R-12 rocket. Wikipedia, October 3, 1962

October 5, 1962: Died: Richard Leialoha K Ellis SP5 ARMY Aiea HI 10/12/34 - 10/5/62, Panel 1E, Row 11. Source: US Dept of Defense

Also on October 5, 1962: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Harriman) and the Deputy Director of the United States Information Agency (Wilson)¹

Washington

On LAOS (WAH held backgrounder 10/4/62)²

W— I am interested that you took it so easy on your backgrounder.

H —The press have blown this up, and also CIA & the Pentagon— that this is a great event: Oct 7. This is only one of the relatively important or relatively less important steps which have not been taken—one is to open the country up—there is an iron curtain or a jungle curtain between the two parts of the country; no real amalgamation of the govt; no steps in line with integration of forces & demobilization. There are have [sic] a dozen subjects of equal importance. We expected them to cheat about this. This isn't going to be cut and dried. We had 1600—665 are out. Thais still there. KMT still there. SVN still there. They are going to make a lot of accusations we cannot prove wrong and we are going to make a lot of accusations we can't prove right. The real question is Khrushchev. Point is, we haven't got any combat troops there. Our troops are in Thailand—that's the most important thing—in Laos, not important. There's been a lot of good news—we've been asked to continue to supply Phoumi, to supply the Meo—all these are good. But the point is we don't want to blow up domestically that Oct 7 is something of importance. We are going to make a lot of noise to the ICC and the Co-Chairmen. We want to make noise to the people that count. This is not the test of their sincerity. If this blows up, it will be because fighting starts up—not because of infringement of the Agreements. The conflict is political now— not military. It is going to be difficult, there is going to be a lot of sparring. What I have said privately is “It's going just about as badly as I expected but with some better news than I expected.” Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis, Document 42 , Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

October 6, 1962: The U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Navy suffered their first helicopter fatalities in Vietnam when a Marine Corps UH-34 Seahorse crashed 15 miles (24 km) from Tam Ky, South Vietnam, killing five Marines and two Navy personnel. Source: Wikipedia, October 6, 1962

Also on October 6, 1962: The last foreign military personnel, including advisers of the U.S. Special Forces, left Laos in accordance with the 75-day period specified in the July 23 "Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos". Source: Wikipedia, October 6, 1962

October 7, 1962: U.S. troops began withdrawing from Laos on September 17, 1962, and some 800 US military advisors and technicians completed their withdrawal from the country on October 7, 1962. Source: Laos (1954-present), University of Central Arkansas, Political Science

October 8, 1962: VIET-NAM: Decisions and Discussion at Honolulu Meeting, October 8, 1962²

This is an unofficial résumé of decisions and discussions on Viet-Nam at the Honolulu Meeting, October 8, 1962. This paper is written for the information of Messrs. Johnson and Rice and for the record.

I. Decisions

1. Get a B-26 unit flown by RVNAF into action as soon as possible.

2. Expand VNAF as fast as possible.

II. Discussions

General Harkins Briefing and Secretary McNamara's Comments and Decisions (At the Meeting)

General Harkins showed that VC battalion-sized operations had declined steadily. There were 8 in May, 1 each in June and July, and none in August or September. On the other hand, ARVN battalion-sized operations had increased from 156 to a high of 454 in August, down to 378 in September. VNAF sorties had increased from 150 in January to 628 in September. Ambassador Nolting commented that evidence from the VC showed that these operations were hurting them and that there was no evidence from the VC that they considered they were getting any propaganda advantages from them.

General Harkins and General Anthis pointed out that American pilots are flying 100 hours a month which could not be maintained and that more planes and personnel were needed now.

Continued...

Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962, Document 298, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

October 9, 1962: The New York Times prints David Halberstam's story, “Vietnam War: A Frustrating Hunt for an Elusive Foe". Source: Media History Monographs 15:1 (2012-2013) When Objectivity Works: David Halberstam’s Vietnam Reporting

October 10, 1962: Richard Tregaskis, Vietnam Diary. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963. 401 pp. Tregaskis, a veteran war correspondent, arrived in Vietnam October 10, 1962... Relatively favorable to the war effort. Source: Vietnam War Bibliography: Temporary Peace and Renewed War, 1954–1964, Clemson University

October 11, 1962: On the night of October 11, 1962, a wooden motorboat of Mission 759, disguised as a fishing boat carrying 30 tonnes of weapons, left the wharf K15 in Do Son (Hai Phong) to go to Ca Mau. This began the stormy journeys of the ships with no numbers on the legendary Ho Chi Minh Sea Trail. After 10 days, the boat landed safely at Lung Vam (Ca Mau). After that successful trip, President Ho Chi Minh sent a telegram to the soldiers of Mission 759 to compliment and encourage them. He advised them to draw from their experience to continue transporting weapons to the south so that the people could fight against the enemy, for North-South reunification.
After that first successful trip, to evade the enemies’ eyes and ears, most of the ships carrying weapons for the southern battlefield were disguised as fishing ships with non-fixed numbers and they constantly changed their routes. Hence the name “ships without numbers”. Source: Ho Chi Minh Sea Trail, by Vy Thao

Also on October 11, 1962: The Cold War: "…when Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) McCone brought Kennedy photographs of large crates thought to he Soviet-made IL-28 bombers, Kennedy asked that the information "be withheld at least until after the election."Source: Dereliction of Duty: Johnson, McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the ...
 By H. R. McMaster, Harper Collins

October 12, 1962: Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Harriman) to the Ambassador in Vietnam (Nolting)¹

Washington, October 12, 1962.

Dear Fritz: As you know I remain concerned about the dangers of over-optimism in Viet-Nam. I am well aware that things are much improved since last year and I want you to know again how much credit you and the other members of the Saigon Task Force deserve. Although the tide may be turning in Viet-Nam, there is a danger that certain very serious problems may not be receiving the attention and action which they deserve here in Washington. I think we are by far safer in carrying out the President's directive to save Viet-Nam if we lean in the direction of emphasizing our problems rather than our successes. In this connection I would appreciate your full and unvarnished views on the following matters which have come to my attention during and after the Honolulu Meeting.² Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962, Document 300, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

October 13, 1962: Letter From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Nolting) to the Vietnamese President's Political Counselor (Nhu)¹

Saigon, October 13, 1962.

Dear Mr. Counselor: I have already taken much time of your Government's officials, including the President, on the subject of relations with the Laotian Government, and I hope you will pardon my sending you this note on the subject to express once again my Government's strong hope that the Government of Viet-Nam will find a way to continue diplomatic relations with the Laotian Government. As undoubtedly reported to you by Minister Thuan, and as stressed by me to the President, President Kennedy personally has requested a reconsideration of your Government's position, in view of the stakes involved in this matter, not only of direct concern to the Government of Viet-Nam but also in the wider sense involving the position of the free-world countries in the Laotian affair. President Kennedy has made it plain to Minister Thuan and to me that, while he can guarantee nothing respecting the final outcome in Laos, the Free World Signatories of the Geneva Accords have chosen a course there best calculated, in his judgment, to benefit stability in Southeast Asia and eventually to protect the frontiers of Viet-Nam against Viet Cong infiltration. The success of this endeavor depends in great measure on the solidarity of the free countries signatory to the Geneva Accords in pressing by diplomatic means for the fulfillment of those Accords by the Communist Bloc countries and by the Government of Laos. President Kennedy feels that the United States has the right to ask for the continued cooperation of the Government of Viet-Nam in this matter. He also recognizes and appreciates the fact that your Government has gone along thus far even despite grave misgivings. He feels that it would be a great mistake to break diplomatic relations at this point, regardless of what the Laotian Government may do in recognizing the Hanoi regime.

Continued...

Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962, Document 301, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

October 14, 1962: Cuban Missile Crisis: Flying a U-2 spyplane over the area around San Cristóbal, Cuba, Colonel Steve Heyser took 928 photographs in the space of six minutes. The pictures would reveal that four mobile Soviet missile launchers, capable of firing the SS-4 medium range nuclear missile, had been placed in western Cuba. Source: Wikipedia, October 14, 1962

October 15, 1962: Letter From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Nolting) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Cottrell)1

Saigon, October 15, 1962.

Dear Cot: I have received your letter of September 112 which listed eleven questions asked by Ed Rice about Viet-Nam.

These are, as you know, some (but not all) of the complex and broad questions to which we are constantly seeking the answers and which we are attempting to cover as completely as possible in our reporting. The replies below are therefore but brief treatments of subjects which our reporting deals with in more detail. They are numbered to correspond with the numbers of your questions.

1. Because of the nature of a guerrilla warfare in which the enemy not only mingles with the friendly or uncommitted population but is frequently indistinguishable from such population in dress or manner, aerial bombing and strafing present recognized problems. The Operations Control Center uses the utmost care in selecting and cross-checking its targets against all available intelligence and we are constantly trying to refine these procedures. They are, in fact, as rigid and restrictive as any enforced in any combat area. Furthermore, there is no doubt in my mind that President Diem, the Vietnamese Air Force Commander and all others concerned are fully aware of the harmful effects, political, psychological, and military, of misdirected or inaccurate bombing. They are trying as hard as we to keep these to the absolute minimum.

Continued...

Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962, Document 302, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

October 16, 1962:

Memorandum From Robert H. Johnson of the Policy Planning Staff to the Counselor of the Department of State (Rostow)1

Washington, October 16, 1962.

SUBJECT
The Situa: U.S. President Kennedy and Secretary of State Dean Rusk met at the White House with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and Soviet Ambassador to the U.S. Anatoly Dobrynin. Gromyko told Kennedy that Soviet operations in Cuba were purely defensive, and Kennedy did not tell Gromyko that the U.S. had discovered that the Soviets had nuclear missiles in Cuba.  Source: Wikipedia, October 18, 1962 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/October_1962#October_18.2C_1962_.28Thursday.29tion in Central Vietnam

On Friday, October 12, I had an interesting talk with John Heble, the U.S. Consul in Hue, about the situation in Central Vietnam. The Consul in Hue has always gotten around the countryside much more than any other US diplomatic official in Vietnam. When I prepared my paper on the “Central Government and the Countryside”2 I found the reports of Mr. Heble and his predecessor among the most useful sources of information on the situation. Since his return to Washington, Mr. Heble's relatively pessimistic reports on the present situation in Central Vietnam have provoked a good deal of interest; Governor Harriman and Ed Rice have taken a personal interest in them. Following are the principal points made by Mr. Heble in his talk with me:

1. The situation in Central Vietnam can be characterized in general as one in which the rate of deterioration of the Central Government's position has been reduced but deterioration itself has not stopped.

2. In Central Vietnam the strategic hamlet program is mostly pure facade. Often creation of a so-called strategic hamlet involves nothing but a very inadequate fence around one-quarter of the hamlet. This in itself might not be so significant since, while the hamlet fences have become the symbol of the strategic hamlet program, other elements are of equal or greater importance. However, in Central Vietnam the “strategic hamlet” begins and ends with such a fence. There is no other effort to improve the defenses of the hamlet and nothing at all to improve the internal situation in the village in connection with the strategic hamlet program. In part this failure may be the result of differences between brothers Can and Nhu. Can is unconvinced as to the value of the strategic hamlet program. More generally, however, it reflects customary defects of Vietnamese administration-its basic inability to handle such a program, particularly with the speed that is presently being demanded. The result is failure combined with an effort to cover up failure through superficial compliance which can be reported to the Central Government as full compliance.

Continued...

Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962, Document 303, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

October 17, 1962: Letter From the Representative to the United Nations (Stevenson) to President Kennedy

Washington, October 17, 1962.

Dear Mr. President: I have reviewed the planning thus far and have the following comments for you:

As I have said I think your personal emissaries should deliver your messages to C and K. There is no disagreement as to C. As to K an emissary could better supplement the gravity of the situation you have communicated to Gromyko. And talking with K would afford a chance of uncovering his motives and objectives far better than correspondence thru the “usual channels.”

As to your announcement, assuming it becomes imperative to say something soon, I think it would be a mistake at this time to disclose that an attack was imminent and that merely reciting the facts, emphasizing the gravity of the situation and that further steps were in process would be enough for the first announcement.

Because an attack would very likely result in Soviet reprisals somewhere—Turkey, Berlin, etc.—it is most important that we have as much of the world with us as possible. To start or risk starting a nuclear war is bound to be divisive at best and the judgments of history seldom coincide with the tempers of the moment. Source:   Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XI, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, Document 25, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State  

October 18, 1962: U.S. President Kennedy and Secretary of State Dean Rusk met at the White House with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and Soviet Ambassador to the U.S. Anatoly Dobrynin. Gromyko told Kennedy that Soviet operations in Cuba were purely defensive, and Kennedy did not tell Gromyko that the U.S. had discovered that the Soviets had nuclear missiles in Cuba.  Source: Wikipedia, October 18, 1962

Also on October 18, 1962: Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam ¹

Washington, October 18, 1962, 8:24 p.m.

459. To Nolting from Harriman. Deptel 331, Embtel 438 and Vientiane's 620 repeated Saigon 173.² I must tell you frankly that it will be diplomatic defeat if Diem severs relations with Laos.

Diem cannot expect us to accept his refusal, in affronting disregard of request from the President, to stay in the fight to preserve Laos, Laos being on his own doorstep. This is a fight which he should be helping us wage with all vigor.

Diem's stubbornness and personal feelings are understood, but there comes a time when being a good ally requires laying them aside and cooperating to make joint policies work. This is such a time, and you should now put the matter to Diem in such terms.

Rusk  

Source:  Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962, Document 304, Office of the Historian, US Dept of  State  

October 19, 1962: President Kennedy met with the Joint Chiefs of Staff to discuss the military options for responding to the missiles in Cuba. USAF Chief of Staff General Curtis LeMay advocated bombing of the missile sites in Cuba, while Defense Secretary Robert McNamara recommended a blockade of ships approaching the island. [51] Ultimately, Kennedy, who would spend the day at scheduled speeches in Ohio and Illinois, would opt to blockade Cuba rather than to start a war.  Source: Wikipedia, October 19, 1962

October 20 1962: Both the United States and the Soviet Union conducted high-altitude nuclear tests, already scheduled, even as U.S. President Kennedy was deciding on a confrontation between the two nations over the missiles in Cuba. The US exploded a weapon 91 miles over the Pacific Ocean, and the USSR followed two days later with a blast 93 miles over Kazakhstan. The Joint Chiefs of Staff raised the nuclear alert status to DEFCON 3.  Source:  Wikipedia, October 20, 1962 

Also on October 20 1962: Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State ¹

Saigon, October 20, 1962, 10 a.m.

443. To Harriman from Nolting. Deptel 459.² It will be a diplomatic defeat if Diem severs relations with Laos. It will be something considerably worse if he breaks relations with Laos after approach in terms your telegram. I am convinced he will do so unless approach is coupled with threat of severe sanctions, and even then outcome would be doubtful. I do not believe that such sanctions are in the interests of the United States and I gather this is also Washington's position.

The further approach prescribed—which advances no arguments not previously put to GVN and to Diem personally, but which directly engages President Kennedy's prestige—would in my judgment undermine our future influence here, and, with it, the carrying forward of our program. Whatever success we have had to date rests in important sense on our ultimate respect for GVN sovereignty, including its right in final analysis to make decisions in field of foreign policy.

Within limits indicated above (respect for country's sovereign rights and no threats of withdrawal of US aid), we are doing everything we can on this issue. To take the position set out in your telegram would, in my judgment, defeat our purposes here—on an issue which in itself cannot compare in importance to the United States with that of maintaining an independent, non-Communist Vietnam.

Nolting 

Source:  Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962, Document 306  Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

October 21, 1962: Memorandum for the Record

Saigon, October 21, 1962.

    SUBJECT
    Meeting at Gia Long Palace, Saigon, Saturday, 20 October 1962

    ATTENDANCE
    Mr. Ngo Dinh Nhu, Political Advisor to the President
    The Honorable Frederick E. Nolting, Jr., United States Ambassador
    Admiral Harry D. Felt, Commander in Chief, Pacific
    The Honorable Edward J. Martin, CINCPAC Polad

Mr. Nhu met his visitors at the door to his office and, after everyone was seated, asked Admiral Felt how the SEATO meeting had progressed.² Admiral Felt answered that he thought that the meetings had been successful and had been concerned principally with the refinement of the latest plan. He commented that, of the four plans which had been prepared up to now, three of them concerned South Vietnam.

Mr. Nhu then asked the Admiral what he thought of the situation in Laos. Admiral Felt held up his crossed fingers and said that we must hope for the best. Ambassador Nolting explained that crossed fingers meant, in Vietnam, “nothing doing”. The Ambassador then said that the Phoumi charges concerning the locations of North Vietnamese Communist units had been delivered to the International Control Commission. He added that the forces which were working in Laos appeared to be driving Phouma more to the right. Admiral Felt agreed, and said, in confidence, that that very morning the Pathet Lao had launched attacks in direct violation of the Geneva Agreements.  

Continued...

Source:  Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962, Document 305, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State  

October 22, 1962: At 7:00 pm Washington time, U.S. President Kennedy announced in a nationally broadcast address that "unmistakable evidence has established the fact that a series of offensive missile sites" had been established in Cuba by the Soviet Union "to provide a nuclear strike capability against the Western Hemisphere". He announced "a strict quarantine on offensive military equipment under shipment to Cuba" and warned that any launch of a nuclear missile from Cuba would require "a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union." Kennedy implored, "I call upon Chairman Khrushchev to halt and eliminate this clandestine, reckless and provocative threat to world peace and to stable relations between our nations." Source: Wikipedia, October 21, 1962 

Also on October 22, 1962: Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam ¹

Washington, October 22, 1962, 4:06 p.m.

466. For Ambassador Nolting from Harriman. Your 443² indicates that you and I are not on the same wavelength. The President's position is already doubly engaged, not only by his personal letter to Diem,3 but also by Laos settlement which must be made to achieve US objectives as far as possible. In making settlement we have made it plain to all concerned that we consider it not as ending all conflict, but transferring conflict from military to political area. In this conflict we have a right to expect full support and assistance from GVN as ally as well as a signatory. From your messages I gained the impression that you do not consider Diem's attitude towards Laos of prime importance.

What happens in Laos will have substantial influence on South Viet-Nam and therefore I have asked you to make Diem understand the importance we place upon it...

Continued... 

Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962, Document 307, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

October 23, 1962: As the American blockade of Cuba from Soviet ships was set, the 450 ships of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet and 200,000 personnel prepared for a confrontation, including defense if the Soviets tried an airlift over the blockade. [62] The Soviet freighter Polotavia was identified as the first ship that would reach the quarantine line. Source: Wikipedia, October 23, 1962

October 24, 1962: Letter From President Kennedy to President Diem

Washington, October 24, 1962.

Dear Mr. President: As the Republic of Viet-Nam comes once again to celebrate its establishment and its independence, the United States of America sends greetings to the Vietnamese people and to their government.

In writing to you on this same occasion last year, Mr. President, I paid tribute to your country's heroic struggle against the campaign of terrorism, destruction and suffering by which Communism had responded to the progress which your young republic had achieved. In those dark days the American people joined with your compatriots in looking forward to a future October twenty-sixth when Viet-Nam would again know peace, and its citizens would begin to enjoy the freedom and prosperity which Communist subversion would deny them. That day is approaching. The valiant struggle of the past year, the sacrifices and sorrows of countless heroes and the introduction of new institutions such as the strategic hamlet to bring lasting social and economic benefits to the people in the countryside earn for Viet-Nam the world's admiration.

As Viet-Nam gains its victory over adversity and aggression, it will be in a position increasingly to devote its energies to achieving closer cooperation among the community of free Southeast Asian states. Each of these nations has its unique character and philosophy. In common they are confronted not only by grasping Communism but also by the chance to develop together. By sharing the development of their individual capacities they can multiply their mutual strength. Thus can Southeast Asia become unassailable and contribute to the stability of the world community. This task is as difficult as it is necessary. It will require a mutual submergence of differences and bold leadership. It will call upon those of vision to see a future of Asian peoples working for their common benefit in a harmony and freedom bequeathed them by their forefathers.

Mr. President, I again express my faith and that of the American people in Viet-Nam's future and I look forward with confidence to a year of increased momentum and progress leading to the restoration of peace, law and order, and a better life for the Vietnamese people.

Sincerely,

John

Source:   Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962, Document 308, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State 

Lydon Baines Johnson, President Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam, and Frederick Nolting, US ambassador to SV, at Independence Palace May 12 1961

October 25, 1962: Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State

Saigon, October 25, 1962, noon.

456. For Secretary Harriman from Nolting. References: Department's telegram 466 and previous. I used occasion of presenting President's message on Cuba to Diem to urge upon him again importance to GVN as well as us of his finding a way to continue diplomatic relations with Laos. I had previously worked again on Thuan and Nhu to this end. Thuan's previous cryptic word (Embassy's telegram 449) had been watered down by him in subsequent report to effect that GVN now seeking “middle position”. This turned out to be leaving of Laotian Embassy in Saigon and cutting back to consular representation in Vientiane in event DRV Ambassador accredited. I told Diem that this would not satisfy requirements as we saw them, since consular representative in Laos would not be in position to help with diplomatic influence on RLG and RLG would doubtless not leave its embassy in Saigon under these circumstances. I used President Kennedy's great and heavy responsibilities involving world peace, as reflected in decision re Cuba, as yet another reason why Diem as ally should support US and our President on Laos. I put this to him as strongly as I could without indicating any thought of withdrawal of support or infringement GVN sovereign right of decision. I asked Diem not to come to a decision immediately but to think it over yet again in the light of what I had said on instructions. He did not seem as adamant as previously, but did say that he thought that he had gone quite far, and as far as he could go, to accommodate our views. He added that he had no desire to undermine the agreement on Laos, although he had little faith in its outcome; but he also was determined not to undermine the will and rationale of the Vietnamese people by seeming to ignore an action on part RLG weakening to SVN relative to DRV. I cannot say what final result will be.

Nolting 

Source:   Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962, Document 309, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State  

October 26, 1962: 7th Anniversary of the formation of the Republic of Vietnam, and Ngô Đình Diệm's declaring himself Premier of South Vietnam, following the county's independence from France. Source: Wikipedia, October 26, 1962

Also on October 26, 1962: The development of ballistic missile sites in Cuba continues at a rapid pace. Through the process of continued surveillance directed by the President, additional evidence has been acquired which clearly reflects that as of Thursday, October 25, definite buildup in these offensive missile sites continued to be made. The activity at these sites apparently is directed at achieving a full operational capability as soon as possible.
    
There is evidence that as of yesterday, October 25, considerable construction activity was being engaged in at the Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile sites. Bulldozers and cranes were observed as late as Thursday actively clearing new areas within the sites and improving the approach roads to the launch pads.
    
Since Tuesday October 23 missile related activities have continued at the Medium Range Ballistic Missile sites resulting in progressive refinements at these facilities. For example, missiles were observed parked in the open on October 23. Surveillance on October 25 revealed that some of these same missiles have now been moved from their original parked positions. Cabling can be seen running from the missile-ready tents to power generators nearby.
    
In summary, there is no evidence to date indicating that there is any intention to dismantle or discontinue work on these missile sites. On the contrary the Soviets are rapidly continuing their construction of missile support and launch facilities, and serious attempts are under way to camouflage their efforts.  Source:  White House Statement on the Soviet Missile Sites in Cuba, The Public Papers of President John F. Kennedy, 1962, October 26, 1962, jfklink.com

October 27, 1962: At 11:19 am Washington time, USAF Major Rudolf Anderson became the only fatality of the Cuban Missile Crisis when his U-2 airplane was shot down by a surface-to-air missile while he was flying over Cuba. Soviet Army Major Ivan Gerchenov had been ordered to fire missiles, from a station near the city of Banes, at "Target Number 33". [74]The U.S. Joint Chiefs recommended to President John F. Kennedy that the USA should attack Cuba within 36 hours to destroy the Soviet missiles. At Washington, General Taylor recommended an air attack on the Banes site, but immediate action was not taken. [75] [76]

Hours later, the Soviet submarine B-59 was detected by U.S. Navy destroyers in the Atlantic Ocean, and one of the ships began dropping explosive depth charges to force the sub to surface. Thirty years later, a communications intelligence officer on the B-59, would report that the Captain Valentin Savitsky ordered a nuclear-armed torpedo to be armed for firing at the U.S. ships, and that the second-in-command, Vasili Arkhipov, persuaded Savitsky to surface instead. Source: Wikipedia, October 27, 1962

Also on October 27, 1962: Kennedy made a deal with the Soviets through his brother Robert under which the United States would yield to the Soviet demand for removal of U.S. Jupiter missiles from Turkey. One term of the deal, however, was that the deal had to remain secret. Only about half of Kennedy’s top U.S. advisers knew of that agreement.
The deal was kept secret for about 25 years, and thus most of the attentive world did not know that Kennedy, despite the many claims about his steady toughness, had actually “softened” to make a deal in order to achieve a U.S.-Soviet settlement. Even Lyndon Johnson, who, as Kennedy’s vice president, succeeded him as president after his assassination in 1963, was not aware of the deal. Source: Reconsidering the Perilous Cuban Missile Crisis 50 Years Later, by Barton J. Bernstein, Arms Control Association

October 28, 1962: Cuban Missile Crisis: At 5:00 pm Moscow time (10:00 am in Washington), Moscow Radio broadcast the text of the message from Soviet Prime Minister Nikita Khrushchev to U.S. President John F. Kennedy. "Dear Mr. President," Khrushchev's letter began, "I have received your message of October 27. I express my satisfaction and thank you for the sense of proportion you have displayed and for realization of the responsibility which now devolves on you for the preservation of the peace of the world." Khrushchev went on to say, "I regard with great understanding your concern and the concern of the United States people in connection with the fact that the weapons you describe as offensive are formidable weapons indeed. Both you and we understand what kind of weapons these are. In order to eliminate as rapidly as possible the conflict which endangers the cause of peace, to give an assurance to all people who crave peace, and to reassure the American people, who, I am certain, also want peace, as do the people of the Soviet Union, the Soviet Government, in addition to earlier instructions on the discontinuation of further work on weapons construction sites, has given a new order to dismantle the arms which you described as offensive, and to crate and return them to the Soviet Union." [78] In an agreement worked out by Khrushchev and Kennedy with the assistance of U.N. Secretary-General U Thant, the U.S. pledged not to invade Cuba, and to remove Jupiter missiles that had been placed in Turkey near its border with the U.S.S.R. Source: Wikipedia, October 28, 1962

Also on October 28, 1962: Excerpts from Letter From Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy: "I regard with respect and trust the statement you made in your message of October 27, 1962, that there would be no attack, no invasion of Cuba, and not only on the part of the United States, but also on the part of other nations of the Western Hemisphere, as you said in your same message. Then the motives which induced us to render assistance of such a kind to Cuba disappear.

It is for this reason that we instructed our officers—these means as I had already informed you earlier are in the hands of the Soviet officers—to take appropriate measures to discontinue construction of the aforementioned facilities, to dismantle them, and to return them to the Soviet Union. As I had informed you in the letter of October 27, 2 we are prepared to reach agreement to enable United Nations Representatives to verify the dismantling of these means." Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VI, Kennedy-Khrushchev Exchanges, Document 68, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

October 29, 1962: Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State
Saigon, October 29, 1962, 5 p.m.
466. Embtel 464. Trueheart and I spent hour and a half with President Diem this morning seeking persuade him change his position on expulsion of Robinson (NBC). Regret to report that Diem proved quite impervious to my arguments. He did agree, at my request, to allow Robinson to remain in Vietnam three more days but he gave us no reason to believe that he would use this period to reconsider the matter, still less to change his position.

In approach to Diem, I made it clear that I considered decision to expel Robinson was matter of utmost gravity which could only have highly adverse effects on our joint effort here—particularly coming after expulsion Sully and continued banning of Newsweek. Reminding him that what I was telling him was in large part repetition of what President and Secretary had told Thuan in Washington, I stressed that it was essential that American public, Congress and government not gain impression that GVN was seeking to conceal what was going on in Vietnam. I pointed out that press reporting on Vietnam had improved markedly in recent weeks and that this favorable development would be undermined by expulsion Robinson. I urged him to accept fact that press problem would cure itself, and could only be curbed, by manifest success in defeating Viet Cong. Finally, I told him calmly that his rationale for action against Robinson would not be understood or accepted by US Government or people. Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962, Document 310, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

October 30, 1962: "A VC assault battalion attacks Father Tong's Catholic Youth unit of the CIDG at Long Phu (also known as Tra Lang)". Source: Timeline, October 30, 1962, Vietnam, Conflict Posts, The Patriot Files Forum

Also on October 30, 1962: Letter From Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy
Moscow, October 30, 1962.
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT, I want to convey to you confidentially some considerations which, if you agree with them, could serve, in my opinion, our common cause, that is, prompt elimination of the remnants of the dangerous crisis which you and we have in the main liquidated. This would help to finalize the settlement more quickly so that life would resume its normal pace.
First of all, I would like to express a wish that you already now remove the quarantine without waiting for the procedure for the inspection of ships on which an agreement has been reached to be put into effect. It would be very reasonable on your part. You yourself realize that the quarantine will in fact accomplish nothing since those ships that are now heading for Cuba naturally, after we have agreed on the removal of our missiles from Cuba, do not carry not only any offensive weapons, but as I have already stated it publicly and informed you confidentially, any weapons at all. Immediate lift of the quarantine would be a good gesture. It would be appreciated both by us and world public opinion as a major step to speed up liquidation of the aftereffects of the crisis. For all practical purposes the quarantine is of no use to you, but being a manifestation of the crisis, it continues to poison relations among states, relations between you and us and Cuba and produces a depressing effect on world public which would like to see a complete relaxation. You would lose nothing but you would score a gain as far as public opinion is concerned. Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VI, Kennedy-Khrushchev Exchanges, Document 71, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

October 31, 1962: Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State
New York, October 31, 1962, 10 p.m.
1579. For Secretary from McCloy. Department pass White House. Immediately after I received from you President's instructions, Akalovsky at my request informed Kuznetsov along following lines:

1. In absence international inspection personnel, such as ICRC, US prepared make gesture re quarantine. While quarantine in full will start tomorrow, we prepared let ships pass on hail-and-pass basis, as in case Sov tanker Bucharest, i.e., no inspection on board vessels would be involved. We prepared use this procedure for a few days until more solid basis for inspection of ships is developed.

2. Re aerial surveillance, US believes it would be good for everybody if evidence were obtained that dismantling of relevant facilities has started, i.e., if we could show to world pictures attesting to that fact. We hope USSR would do everything to avoid incidents in connection our overflights, because any such incident would create gravest situation and would again put us face to face.

Continued…

Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XI, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, Document 128, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

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November 1, 1962: "South Vietnamese government troops, using 600 infantrymen supported by 12 U.S. troop-carrying and five armed escort helicopters launch a four-day assault near Vinh Long in the Mekong River delta, claiming heavy enemy losses (up to 250)". Source: Timeline, November 1, 1962, Vietnam, Conflict Posts, The Patriot Files Forum

November 2, 1962: November 2: President Kennedy announces that the missile sites are being dismantled. However, Kennedy insists that the U.S. Government does not plan to end its anti-Cuban political and economic policies even if all offensive weapons are removed. Source: The Cuban Missile Crisis: An In-Depth Chronology, Cuba and the United States, a Chronological History, by Jane Franklin, Rutgers University

November 3, 1962: Johnnie Gene Lee, Sgt, Army, Age 23, from Mashulaville, MS, dies as helicopter crashes in S Vietnam. Panel 01E - Line 14 Source: The Wall-USA

Sergeant Johnnie G. Lee was a crewchief/gunner on a UH1A gunship. Sergeant Lee died from wounds received when his aircraft was hit while providing fire support during a combat assault into a hostile landing zone in the delta near Can Tho, in November 1962. Johnnie is the first attack helicopter crewmember to be killed in Vietnam. Source: The Virtual Wall

Also on November 3, 1962: Alexis Johnson, receives Ambassador Nong Kimny, and reiterates in the “strongest possible terms” that “nobody in the U.S. Government was encouraging Thailand or Viet Nam to attack or threaten Cambodia in any way whatsoever.” Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia, Document 78, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

November 4, 1962: Garry Clayton McFetridge, PFC, Army, 19 yrs old, dies in S. Vietnam by enemy explosive device. Panel 01E - Line 14 Source: The Wall-USA

A terrorist hurls a grenade into an alley in Can Tho, killing one American serviceman and two Vietnamese children. A third Vietnamese child is seriously injured. Source: 11th Armored Cavalry's Veterans of Vietnam & Cambodia

November 5, 1962: Robert David Bennett, Cptn, Air Force & William Boyd Tully, 1Lt, Air Force die in crash in S Vietnam. Panel 01E - Line 14 Source: The Wall-USA

Top Secret Mission – Operation Farm Gate
Bill Tully was the navigator on a B-26 – the Pilot was Captain Robert Bennett.
They did not wear American uniforms and their aircraft had no American markings on it. Their B-26 was shot down on November 5, 1962 near Ca Mau, South Vietnam while they were on a Napalm run with a Viet Nam airman on board (who they were “advising”). Bill Tully took a .50 cal. round through the chest – aircraft was brought down by Viet Cong. Source: "Billy Boy,” by Daniel Brannen, 2008

Also on November 5, 1962: Telegram From the Public Affairs Officer of the Embassy in Vietnam (Mecklin) to the United States Information Agency
Saigon, November 5, 1962, 5 p.m.
Tousi unnumbered (by pouch). Bunce from Mecklin, Hi-lites October 21-November 1.
1) Press Relations
Feuding between GVN and American newsmen, for years one of unhappy facts of life in Saigon, this week appears to be expanding to unprecedented and undeniably dangerous proportions.
In past Mission has been able to preserve at least semblance of order, e.g. last spring when Ambassador persuaded President Diem to rescind expulsion orders against Homer Bigart (NY Times) and Francois Sully (Newsweek). When Sully was again ordered to leave early September, however, Mission appeal was rejected. Since then, as though reassured by relatively harmless reaction, GVN has been getting increasingly tough with press—despite Thuan's promise to DCM after Sully affair that effort would now be made to improve facilities and otherwise repair relations.
Newsweek has been wholly banned from SVN circulation since Sully affair, despite Mission representations to Thuan, Tao and other senior officials. Minister Hieu last week told PAO ban would remain in effect at least six months—though this may be softened if Kenneth Crawford of Newsweek's Washington bureau, visiting for month, maintains initial good impression. One-issue bans and delays of other American publications, notably Time, have become more frequent.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962, Document 311, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

November 6, 1962: "The US Army Concept Team is established in Saigon to study new methods of countering insurgency in actual combat. Its variety of projects include rotary and fixed-wing aircraft, communications, armored personnel carriers, logistics, and civic action tests". Source: Timeline, November 6, 1962, Vietnam, Conflict Posts, The Patriot Files Forum

November 7, 1962: Memorandum From the Officer in Charge of Cambodian Affairs (Arzac) to the Director of the Office of Southeast Asian Affairs (Koren)
Washington, November 7, 1962.
SUBJECT
White House Meeting November 8: Cambodia
General. Cambodia’s foreign policy stance, in particular its relationship with the United States, has reached a new turning point. The decision has been taken to seek to ensure Cambodia’s security through an international guarantee of its neutrality and territorial integrity. Such a guarantee will involve the withdrawal of the MAAG, which will in turn probably bring about a cessation of US support for Cambodia’s military budget and of our MAP. Cambodian leaders have made clear that if the desired guarantees are not forthcoming, Cambodia will call on the Bloc for protection, if necessary even abandoning its neutrality policy. The next few months are likely, therefore, to see Cambodia loom as a major problem for the US in Southeast Asia.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia, Document 94, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

Also on November 7, 1962: Paper Prepared in the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs
Washington, November 7, 1962.
THAILAND
Summary Statement
Thailand is an essential US operational base in Southeast Asia. Its continued cooperation is vital to success in Laos and to achievement of many of our other objectives in the. area. Despite friction on specific issues, the basic US-Thai relationship is sound and will probably remain so for the foreseeable future as long as Thailand is convinced of our determination to meet our obligations in Southeast Asia. The success of our efforts in South Viet-Nam and Laos will contribute significantly to conditioning Thai attitudes. During the past two years there has been a major increase in the size and tempo of US assistance to Thailand. We now have a significant investment in maintaining Thailand’s internal security and improving socio-economic conditions.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia, Document 471, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

November 8, 1962: (US Advisory): In a two-day battle, two ARVN battalions, air-lifted by U.S. helicopters, kill 64 Viet Cong in the Plain of Reeds, in Kien Phong Province, IV Corps. Source: Timeline, November 6, 1962, Vietnam, Conflict Posts, The Patriot Files Forum

November 9, 1962: Letter From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Johnson) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric)

Washington, November 9, 1962.

Dear Ros: I have seen a copy of the proposed memorandum from Secretary McNamara to the President which recommends that henceforth defoliation operations in Viet-Nam be conducted under the supervision of the Ambassador and General Harkins. I am agreeable to your indicating Department of State concurrence to the memorandum.

However, I suggest that we ask for regular reporting from Saigon on the effectiveness of the operation as weighed against the harm being done to United States interests by Communist propaganda on the subject.

If the President approves the memorandum, I suggest Saigon be informed by a joint State-Defense message.

Sincerely,

Alex

Source: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1961–1963, VOLUME II, VIETNAM, 1962, DOCUMENT 313, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

November 10, 1962: Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President KennedySource
Washington, November 10, 1962.
SUBJECT
Suggested Policy Line for Cuban Crisis

Assumptions

Until we have received a definitive Soviet answer regarding the IL-28s and a reliable report as to the progress of the Mikoyan-Castro discussions, we must be ready to proceed on any one of four assumptions:

Assumption A. That the USSR will remove the IL-28s and will arrange adequate ground inspection.

If the removal of the bombers is sufficiently assured and the inspection arrangements adequate, we could presumably regard the incident as closed and give some form of guaranty regarding the invasion of Cuba. These arrangements would, of course, need to include more than a provision for Second-Phase inspection by the five Ambassadors. But even that limited progress might indicate a sufficiently forthcoming attitude to make possible some Third-Phase solution through a nuclear-free zone or otherwise.

Continued...

Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XI, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, Document 169, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

November 11, 1962: "United States officials believe the Soviet Union has removed from Cuba most, if not all, of the long-range missiles that precipitated the Cuban crisis. More than half of an estimated 42 missiles are believed to be outbound aboard Soviet freighters, which are being inspected on the high seas by United States warships and helicopters. The Pentagon said the sixth interception took place yesterday. Washington believes there is a 50-50 chance that Premier Khrushchev also will order the removal of most of the Soviet bombers now in Cuba". Source: New York Times Chronology (November 1962), JOHN F. KENNEDY PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

November 12, 1962: Memorandum From the Aide to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Bagley) to the Chairman (Taylor)
Washington, November 12, 1962.
SUBJECT
Proposed Memorandum Concerning Viet Cong Attacks on Strategic Hamlets

1. There is considerable differences of opinion within the Executive Branch as to the progress being made in the strategic hamlet strategy. This is not unnatural during a period of transition, but resolution of opposing views is difficult because of a paucity of information. This problem is recognized in Saigon and effort is being made to get at the true facts by better administration and production of information on the GVN side.

In the meantime, it would be wise to evaluate the incomplete information available cautiously.
2. The doubters exist in the Pentagon, as well as State and in the White House in the person of Mr. Forrestal. Last week, Governor Harriman called General Krulak over for a general talk on our military efforts in SVN with emphasis on the security aspects of the strategic hamlet strategy. General Krulak allayed Governor Harriman's uneasiness, using the basic information contained in the attached draft memorandum to the Secretary of Defense.2 The provision of this information to the Secretary of Defense, and perhaps distributed in some form to other interested Departments, is probably intended by General Krulak to spread the gospel and offset opposing views in Washington. This will not be easy, however, because of information gaps and other factors, some of which are as follows:

Continued...

Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962, Document 314, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

November 13, 1962: “Up to his helmet in water but careful to keep his weapon dry, a South Vietnamese soldier struggles to regain footing while crossing creek during operation against communist Vietcong in the Darlac Plateau area, about 160 miles northeast of Saigon, Nov. 13, 1962. The sortie was carried out in heavy rain through thick jungle in effort to root Communist guerillas.” (AP Photo/Horst Faas) ID 6211130254 Source: AP Images

November 14, 1962: Memorandum From the President's Military Representative's Naval Aide (Bagley) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Taylor)
Washington, November 14, 1962.
SUBJECT
Situation in Laos
1. Attached at Tab A is a message from Ambassador Unger assessing the current unsettled situation within the coalition government of Laos. The message is not alarming, but acknowledges the possibility that the Souvanna government may fall in the near future, recognizes no clear alternate leadership to carry on a neutralist orientation is available, and suggests the US should continue to try to hold the Souvanna leadership in place. A follow-on message from Vientiane today quotes the French Ambassador Falaize as stating his views that the prospects of an early Souvanna fall are exaggerated.

Continued...

Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963,Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis, Document 435, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

November 15, 1962: Letter From President Diem to President Kennedy
Saigon, November 15, 1962.

Dear Mr. President,

I wish to thank you warmly for the message,2 so cordial and full of understanding, which you sent me for the people and Government of the Republic of Vietnam on the occasion of our National Day, Oct. 26.

As we celebrate the seventh anniversary of our Republic this year, we note with great satisfaction that our determination has overcome the difficulties which the enemy has heaped in our way, and that our efforts in the economic and social fields already bear the most promising fruits, raising the hope, as you kindly pointed out, that the day is approaching when the Vietnamese people finally enjoy peace, security and happiness again. I deeply appreciate the fact that you made a special reference to our strategic hamlets and described them as an institution designed to help us rapidly attain the essential objectives of our policy, which are respect for the human person, social justice and the creation of true democracy.

It is hardly necessary to add that the assistance of the United States, under your leadership, definitely contributed to the successes which we have scored, particularly during recent months. I bow with respect to the sacrifices of those American citizens who came and shared our trials and hardships and sealed with their blood the brotherhood of our two peoples. I want to renew here the expression of our gratefulness to these noble sons of America, to their families, and to the entire American people as well. Their sacrifices will not be in vain, as they show that the cause which the Vietnamese people are defending is just, one which deserves to be upheld by all peoples dedicated to freedom, and the more so by those directly interested in the maintenance of peace and stability in this part of the world.

In reaffirming the friendship of the United States of American and its faith in our future, your message is not only particularly auspicious but also really heartening to us.
Please accept, [etc.].

Ngo Dinh Diem

Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962, Document 316, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

November 16, 1962: Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense (McNamara) to the President
Washington, November 16, 1962.
SUBJECT
Defoliant/Herbicide Program in South Vietnam

Defoliant operations have been completed in the areas in South Vietnam that you approved 9 August 1962. The technical team charged with evaluating the program considers the results of the spray operations as excellent. The effectiveness of herbicides against the types of vegetation sprayed in previous operations is evaluated by General Harkins as follows:

Mangrove forest—90-95% effective
Evergreen forest—60% effective
Tropical scrub—60% effective

Continued...

Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962, Document 317, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

November 17, 1962: Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Taylor) to the Secretary of Defense (McNamara)
Washington, November 17, 1962.
CM-117-62
SUBJECT
Viet Cong Attacks on Strategic Hamlets
1. Although the Government of Vietnam publicly announced support of the Strategic Hamlet Program in February 1962, a national plan was not formally approved by the Government until early August. In the interim, the strategic hamlet idea expanded rapidly throughout the country, as a form of inter-province competition, with little planning and less coordination. Numbers appeared to be the prime objective. Many hamlets were improperly constructed and inadequately defended, and little attention was given to the psychological, sociological and economic preparation of the populace, or to the proper qualification of administrative personnel, with the result that a basically sound idea got off to a weak start.

Continued...

Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963,Volume II, Vietnam, 1962, Document 319, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

November 18, 1962: Sino-Indian Border Conflict escalates as "[a] brigade of Chinese troops, consisting 10,000 to 15,000 soldiers, launched a massive attack to capture the strategically located Chushul airfield. Though badly outnumbered, Kher and his troops chose to fight on, using the natural strategic advantage of the Gurung Hill Pass. 'From my post, out of 60 soldiers, only 14 survived,' said Kher, who retired as major general. 'From many other posts, nobody survived.' Kher's valour saved Chusul, while India lost Aksai Chin in Ladakh and Tawang in Arunachal Pradesh after China declared ceasefire on November 21, 1962.

Fifty years later, the debacle remains a subject many within the military establishment do not like to discuss. The internal inquiry, known as the Henderson Brooks report, which allegedly put the blame on poor equipment, unpreparedness and non-existent communication links, still remains a top secret. 'We lost because we were not prepared. We had this mistaken belief that an unprepared Indian Army could take on China. We had just four vintage AMX-13 tanks and six artillery guns to defend the whole of Ladakh,'" said Kher. Source: Winter of 62, by Syed Nazakat, The Week, October 13, 2012

November 19, 1962: Letter From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Nolting) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Harriman)
Saigon, November 19, 1962.

Dear Governor Harriman: I thank you for your letter of October 12 on the dangers of over-optimism here and on other matters basic to our operation. Your thoughts were most welcome, and, had we not had unfortunate difficulties relating to Laotian recognition, press problems and border incidents to try to deal with, I would have answered it earlier.

I agree with you that over-optimism is dangerous. I find it difficult at times to be optimistic at all, in face of setbacks, non-activation or poor execution of plans, dissensions among the Vietnamese, and a general stickiness which pervades this place. But, as General Harkins put it the other day, we must “whistle while we work”, for the sake of our own and everyone else's morale here. And we are making progress.

Continued...

Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962, Document 320, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

November 20, 1962: The first 800 of an eventual 2000 ARVN troops are airlifted by 56 helicopters into War Zone D for a planned three-week campaign. Source: Timeline, November 20, 1962, Vietnam, Conflict Posts, The Patriot Files Forum

Also on November 20, 1962: News Conference 45
President John F. Kennedy
State Department Auditorium
Washington, D.C.
November 20, 1962
6:00 PM EDT (Tuesday)
381 In Attendance

THE PRESIDENT: I have several statements.
I have today been informed by Chairman Khrushchev that all of the IL-28 bombers now in Cuba will be withdrawn in 30 days. He also agrees that these planes can be observed and counted as they leave. Inasmuch as this goes a long way towards reducing the danger which faced this hemisphere four weeks ago, I have this afternoon instructed the Secretary of Defense to lift our naval quarantine.

Continued...

Source: JOHN F. KENNEDY PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM

November 21, 1962: Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State
Saigon, November 21, 1962, 7 p.m.

In talk with Thuan at his request November 19, following matters discussed:

1. Progress Against VC Insurgency. Thuan briefed me on contents VC documents recently captured in An Lac operation. (We have copies of these, now being translated.) According Thuan, these documents, mostly letters from VC officers in high plateau area, describe a situation of severe lack of food, medicines, recruits; generally low morale, desertions, and fear of ARVN attack. Asked whether this was local condition around An Lac, or typical of larger area, Thuan said he thought it applied generally to high plateau (roughly GVN Second Corps area), but this not entirely clear from captured letters. He said President Diem, greatly encouraged by these reports, had briefed his military commanders on them, stressing necessity to keep up military pressure everywhere in highlands; necessity to enforce strict controls over drugs and food distribution; and feasibility of attacking areas like An Lac where ARVN had previously feared to go. I asked Thuan whether this picture of VC demoralization did not offer just the opportunity we have been looking for to start large-scale defections and surrenders by a well-organized country-wide amnesty program. I suggested something like Magsaysay's “all-out friendship or all-out war” program, tailored to Vietnamese psychology. He said this had been again discussed and that a program of this kind would be launched at Tet (late January).

2. External Relations. From discussion of above, I led into dangers to Viet-Nam and to progress achieved here from too narrow and inflexible a policy vis-à-vis Viet-Nam's neutral neighbors, especially Cambodia. I told him again of our deep concern re RKG's threat to invite ChiComs into Cambodia if Sihanouk's fears of aggression from Viet-Nam and Thailand were not calmed. I said I did not know what USG's position on proposed neutrality statute would be (since we had not seen text), but that GVN ought to be as concerned to find a way out of dilemma made by this move as we are—even more so. I said I felt GVN's handling of the issues with Cambodia (border incidents, notes, debt settlement, etc.), regardless of the rights and wrongs on specific issues, had been slow, unimaginative, and inept. If in fact their aim was to calm Sihanouk down and prevent his pushing his demands and threats too far, they should be more skillful in dealing with him.
Continued...

Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962, Document 321, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

Also on Novmeber 21, 1962: Beijing called a unilateral ceasefire and withdrew from India’s northeast, while keeping hold of barren Aksai Chin. Source: The Sino-Indian War: 50 Years Later, Will India and China Clash Again?, Ishaan Tharoor, Time, Oct 12, 2012

November 22, 1962: "When reporters attempted to verify information concerning a failed military operation involving US military personnel and equipment, they quickly discovered the extent of Diem’s news censorship. Military Information Officer Lieutenant Colonel James Smith stated, “There is nothing we may report on this operation. We have been told thi by the Government of South Vietnam” (Halberstam November 22, 1962). However, an anonymous American field officer disobeyed the directive when he stated:
“From the moment the 50 helicopters hit the target, the communists knew what was happening. Apparently the only people who were not supposed to know were the American and Vietnamese people” (Halberstam November 22, 1962).
This edict was a policy-defeating strategy. In reporting the operation to the public, the press concentrated more on the official acknowledgment of overt censorship rather than the military aspects of the maneuver (Hammond 2)." Source: The Media and Vietnam, Angie Dahm

Also on November 22, 1962: Laos: "On November 22, 1962 the US provided supplies and equipment to the Neutralist Army by plane. This created a problem that caused Col. Deuane Sounnarath, an avid communist follower, to dislike and disagree with the US assistance." Source: 3.1 The US involving in the secret war in laos, Unforgettable-Laos.com

November 23, 1962: “Australian help for Vietnam CANBERRA, Fri. Australia will send 25,000 Australian pounds of medicine, food, soap and technical equipment to help 130,000 refugees in South Vietnam, Minister of External Affairs Sir Oarfield Earwick announced yesterday.”  Source: The Straits Times, National Library Board Singapore, November 24, 1962

November 24, 1962: "...November 1962 interview in the Saturday Evening Post with the Hanoi leaders, the punch line of which was this:

'Americans do not like long, inconclusive wars, and this is going to be a long, inconclusive war. Thus we are sure to win.'" Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966, Document 232, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

November 25, 1962: "When we got back to the Saigon dock at 10:15 tonight, we heard that we had missed a good-sized story: An outpost had been attacked last night up in I Corps Area to the far north, near a place called Phuoc Chau. It seems that a battalion of VC troops made the attack during the small hours of the morning. The Arvin garrison had support from .105- and .155-mm. howitzers, and the approaches to the outpost were ranged and numbered. So when the VC began their attack, the artillery began to fire, and so did the garrison. The VC made a head-on attack and were caught flat-footed: There were 108 confirmed KIA's."

Continued…

Source: Vietnam Diary, by Richard William Tregaskis, p. 224, iUniverse.com

November 26, 1962: "I asked for orders to Danang so that I can catch the Air Force Mule Train (C-123) as soon as possible and get a look at the Phuoc Chau scene.

At the PI office, that center of late bulletins on all our military activity, I learned that the VC made an attack this morning on another outpost, Tra Vinh, about six kilometers west of Saigon. Here, as distinguished from the engagement of Phuoc Chau, we took a beating."
Continued…

Source: Vietnam Diary, by Richard William Tregaskis, p. 225, iUniverse.com

November 27, 1962: Air America flew a lot and suffered losses. The best known occurred on November 27, 1962, when a C-123 on one of the Souvanna-authorized flights, piloted by Fred Riley and Don Heritage, was shot down by neutralists while on final approach to the airfield in the Plain of Jars. Americans at first blamed the Pathet Lao. Ironically, the plane carried supplies for the neutralists—flights approved by JFK just three weeks before. Continued...

Source: Laos: The Geneva Protocol And the Not-So-Secret War, by John Prados, The Veteran, Vietnam Veterans of America

November 28, 1962: Memorandum From the President's Military Representative's Naval Aide (Bagley) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Taylor)
Washington, November 28, 1962.
SUBJECT

Shooting Down of Air America Plane in Laos

1. In my message summary of yesterday, I included the first report of the shooting down of an Air America plane in the Plaines des Jarres area, apparently by Pathet Lao forces. This was a flight duly authorized by Souvanna and had been cleared to land by the authorities at the Plaines des Jarres airfield. This incident occurred against the background of reported difficulties, including possible armed clashes, between PL and Kong Le forces in the Plaines des Jarres. The character and extent of this activity is not known. The latest information on the aircraft incident is a telegram from Vientiane attached at Tab A. This report indicates Souvanna is very concerned about the incident and understands the implications of such PL action within an area nominally under neutralist control. Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis, Document 437, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

November 29, 1962: Memorandum of Conversation
Washington, November 29, 1962, 4:40–7:55 p.m.
SUBJECT

Laos—Relations between the Soviet Union and the United States, Cuba

PARTICIPANTS
U.S.
The President
The Secretary
Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson
Mr. E.S. Glenn, LS
Miss N. Kushnir, LS
U.S.S.R.
Anastas I. Mikoyan, First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR
Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
Mr. Yuriy N. Vinogradov, Soviet Delegation to XVII General Assembly (Interpreter)
Mr. Igor D. Bubnov, Third Secretary, Soviet Embassy

The President said that he wished to raise another question before the end of the conversation. This was the question of Laos. It has been agreed that all foreign troops would be withdrawn from that country. American military advisers have been withdrawn but there are still North Viet Nam troops remaining. The Soviet Union also agreed to use its full influence to prevent Laos from being used as a channel to infiltrate South Viet Nam. Reliable intelligence indicates that approximately 500 Communists infiltrators are reaching South Viet Nam through Laos every month. Thirdly, an American plane carrying food at the request of Souvanna Phouma—the Prime Minister whom the Soviets wanted to see as head of the government—was cleared for landing by the airport tower. It was fired on at that moment by Communist units and two Americans were killed. Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis, Document 438, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

November 30, 1962: Telegram From the Embassy in Cambodia to the Department of State Phnom Penh, November 30, 1963, 7:20 p.m.

435. Dept for Harriman, Hilsman, White House pass Bundy. Bangkok for Ambassador. Saigon for Ambassador. From Forrestal.

Strongly urge we make immediate and intense effort locate and suppress KS radio and political activities Son Ngoc Thanh. Believe GVN willing cooperate, but we must make absolutely clear that this is our policy and in interest SVN and free world. Generals Kim and Don specifically asked Trueheart and myself that US make its position clear this point.
If cessation of jamming by RKG required in order locate transmitter, believe they will cooperate, but there must be very close coordination between Embassies Saigon and Phnom Penh in order avoid misunderstandings and failure of effort which could be dangerous. Would be ideal if radio could be located by other intelligence.

RKG going through extremely emotional and tense period brought about by accumulation of irritants. Trend must be reversed very soon to avoid unforeseeable consequences. Sihanouk’s ill-advised request for termination US aid is bound produce additional friction as implementing negotiations continue. Therefore it is essential that US begin immediately a series of actions designed provide continuing reminder our basic good will. Ambassador strongly concurs.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963,Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia, Document 123, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

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December 1, 1962: Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Thailand

Washington, December 1, 1963, 6:04 p.m. 863. In view of Cambodian proposal to UK and USSR of new conference on Cambodia

Department believes it important to commence process consultation with Thailand and South Viet-Nam on this subject. UK has solicited Department’s reaction to its proposed reply to RKG which would accede to Cambodian proposal of a conference. We have told UK that we wished to consult with RTG and GVN before they replied. We also pointed out that we could not participate as long as Cambodian charges against US remain outstanding, particularly in view of indirect repetition of charges in RKG note proposing conference.

Embassies Bangkok and Saigon are instructed approach RTG and GVN at appropriate high level conveying US views as indicated below and soliciting their reactions urgently:

1. While U.S. does not look forward to new conference we believe it will be difficult avoid conference at this time. British and French already
inclined agree and Communist Bloc will surely do so. India, Canada, Burma and Laos cannot be expected exert effective influence against conference.

2. Failure obtain some international statute at this time would probably be followed by rapidly increasing Cambodian reliance on Bloc which might give Cambodia Communist guaranty. Sihanouk’s precipitate actions and statements indicate feeling of desperation which motivates him. With termination US aid free world influence has declined.

3. It would be extremely dangerous risk free world security in SEA on a gamble that situation will change within Cambodia if left alone. Moreover, as indicated Deptel 837,2 free world has great stake in South Viet-Nam and Laos which would be undermined if Cambodia were left open to increasing Communist influence. Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia, Document 125, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

December 2, 1962: "After a trip to Vietnam at the request of U.S. President John F. Kennedy, U.S. Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield became the first American official to make a non-optimistic public comment on the war's progress". Source: Wikipedia, December 2, 1962

Also on December 2, 1962: Memorandum From Clifford L. Alexander, Jr., of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)

Washington, December 2, 1963.
SUBJECT
Cambodia

As events accelerate in Cambodia, there has been a fuzzing of a series of issues. Now it would make sense for us to separate out just what issues Snookie wants us to deal with and evaluate whether we are in a position to take action in a rational order of priority.

The following issues are of importance presently in our relations with Cambodia:

1. Khmer Serei radio broadcasts probably emanating from South Viet-Nam.
2. The presence of Son Ngoc Thanh in South Viet-Nam and the freedom he enjoys in propagating anti-Sihanouk propaganda.
3. The termination of our aid: (a) what aid can be terminated immediately; (b) what aid should be phased out in a three to six months period; (c) the removal of Americans from Cambodia who are connected with our aid program.
4. A new conference under the 1954 Geneva Agreement which would officially “neutralize” Cambodia and leave the supervision of the neutralization to the ICC.
5. Diplomatic and border relations with South Viet-Nam.
6. Diplomatic and border relations with Thailand.
We are dealing with someone who obviously is in an emotional state. Therefore, the order of our actions should be geared to lessening the emotional burdens on Sihanouk as he sees them. Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia, Document 126, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

December 3, 1962: "President Ngo Dinh Diem and other leading Vietnamese as well as many US officials in South Vietnam apparently believe that the tide is now turning in the struggle against Vietnamese Communist (Viet Cong) insurgency and subversion. This degree of optimism is premature. At best, it appears that the rate of deterioration has decelerated with improvement, principally in the security sector, reflecting substantially increased US assistance and GVN implementation of a broad counterinsurgency program.

The GVN has given priority to implementing a basic strategic concept featuring the strategic hamlet and systematic pacification programs. It has paid more attention to political, economic, and social counterinsurgency measures and their coordination with purely military measures. Vietnamese military and security forces--now enlarged and of higher quality--are significantly more offensive-minded and their counterguerrilla tactical capabilities are greatly improved. Effective GVN control of the countryside has been extended slightly. In some areas where security has improved peasant attitudes toward the government appear also to have improved".
Source: Roger Hilsman, "The Situation and Short-Term Prospects in South Vietnam," DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Research Memorandum, RFE-59, December 3, 1962, The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition, Volume 2, pp. 690-716

Also on December 3, 1962: "Editorial Note
On December 3, 1962, Roger Hilsman transmitted to Secretary of State Rusk research memorandum RFE-59, “The Situation and Short-term Prospects in South Vietnam,” which appraised the internal political situation in South Vietnam over the past year. Although the leaders of South Vietnam apparently believed that the tide was turning against insurgency and subversion, the memorandum concluded that this optimism was premature, and that at best the rate of deterioration had decelerated as United States assistance had increased. For text of RFE-59, see United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967, Book 12, Part I, pages 487-521".
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962, Document 324, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

December 4, 1962: “GUIDELINES FOR THE PLANNING OF CUBAN OVERFLIGHTS
This memorandum indicates the kinds of information the United States Government now needs to obtain with respect to the situation in Cuba, from the point of view of overall policy.
1. The United States Government has a high priority need for evidence of the deployment of offensive weapons systems in Cuba.
2. The United States has a priority need for continuing and reliable information with respect to the general order of magnitude, deployment and state of readiness of Soviet military units and installations in Cuba.
3. The United States Government has a need for continued information on the general situation in Cuba—political, military, and economic—but it is assumed that overflight contributions to this end will be by-products of missions undertaken in fulfillment of the needs in paragraphs and above.
4. The United States Government is prepared to use both low-level and high-level reconnaissance, but it is desired that where practicable, necessary intelligence be obtained by a regular schedule of high-level flights, with low-level missions called for on the basis of specific indications of a target of special interest.”
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XI, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, Document 232, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

December 5, 1962: "On our way back to Camau, we picked up another load of eight choppers heading for still another assault landing, and escorted the to a seacoast town where, like the last bunch, they were put down in mangrove puddles.

It was time to fuel again and go on stand-by for further troop lifts, so I sought out the senior American adviser on today's operations to see if I could get some world on what had happened.

He was tall, lean Col. Daniel Boone Porter (of Belton, Tex.) who looks for all the world like Gen. Bradley of World War II fame: respectfully gray-haired, with a a dry voice and a courteous manner.  He said there were no results yet of the action.  "I say some people running like basters, that was about all."

Another MAAG adviser, Maj. James Butler (of Redlands, Calif.), said he heard that one VC had been captured in the last lift.  It didn't sound like much of a bag, but then this is a godforsaken neighborhood, and the purpose apparently is mainly to try to intercept some of the smuggled goods being brought into this area quite regularly by the VC.  According to the stories, this is a shrimp-fishing area, and the VC smugglers pick up cargoes of dried shrimp, take them out, trade them for whisky, trade the whisky for arms, and bring the arms back to the VC's of the area."
Source: Vietnam Diary, by Richard Tregaskis, Popular Library, 1963, pgs. 249-250

Also on December 5, 1962: "In this military budget discussion in the White House on December 5, 1962, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara offers his recommendation for how many nuclear missiles are enough for the United States to have." - David Coleman

Robert McNamara:
But I think that there are many uncertainties in all of these estimates. And I would say that my recommendation to you on our strategic forces is to take the requirement and double it and buy it. Because I don’t believe we can under any circumstances run the risk of having too few here. So, I in my own mind, I just say, “Well, we ought to buy twice what any reasonable person would say is required for strategic forces.” And I think it’s money well spent. I said to some of the people present, I said—

JFK:
Will it deter?

McNamara:
It’s both—it’s principally to deter.

Source:  How Many Nuclear Missiles Are Enough?, The Fourteenth Day, JFk and the Aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis, by David Coleman  

December 6, 1962: "Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cambodia
Washington, December 6, 1962, 10:31 a.m.
393. Following is text of letter from the President to Sihanouk which you should deliver to Kanthol. In doing so request you make clear its confidential nature and that we do not expect its contents will be divulged or alluded to publicly.

'Your Royal Highness:
I have received Your Royal Highness’s letter of November 21, 1962, conveying to me certain proposals designed to ensure the independence, neutrality, and territorial integrity of Cambodia. This is a matter of high importance and one that deserves the most careful study by all the governments addressed by Your Royal Highness. I assure you that my Government and I will give these documents our urgent attention in order that the views of the United States may be communicated to the Royal Government of Cambodia as promptly as possible.'"
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963,Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia, Document, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

December 6, 1962: "Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy
Washington, December 6, 1962.
Cambodia
This is a follow up on our conversation yesterday about Sihanouk’s proposed declaration of neutrality.
I think our problem can be summed up as follows:
Sihanouk is terrified of Thailand and South Vietnam—and with some reason.
Sihanouk and the rest of the world consider that Sarit and Diem are “our boys”, that we can control them, but that we haven’t done so.
Sihanouk figures the more people he can get to underwrite his security, the better. He has therefore proposed a round robin declaration of neutrality to be signed by everyone he can think of which would, in effect, provide for (1) a guarantee of his borders and his neutrality by all the signers, including ourselves, the USSR, Red China, Thailand, and South Vietnam; and (2) withdrawal of all foreign military people except for a useless French presence. Continued... Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia, Document 100, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

Also on December 6, 1962: A Pocket Guide to Vietnam is published by US Dept of Defense as a pocket guide to assist those serving in Vietnam with understanding Vietnam and its People. DA Pam 360-411 - December 6, 1962
Source: Vietnam Pocket Book, DoD.  06 December 1962, Folder 01, Box 01, Robert Abbott Collection, The Vietnam Center and Archive, Texas Tech University. Accessed 3 Dec. 2012.

December 7, 1962: "Letter From the Director of the Vietnam Working Group (Wood) to the Ambassador in Vietnam (Nolting)
Washington, December 7, 1962.
Dear Fritz: This letter can be put aside and read later when you have fewer visitors.
We were very pleased here with Ken Crawford's cover story in Newsweek on Viet-Nam of December 10, 1962. If anything it was a bit optimistic, but we can use some balancing cheer in the public prints. I hope to get to the Saturday Evening Post people about the two poor articles in their November 24th issue. Bernard Fall's recommendations certainly follow very close to the neutralist, crypto-communist line. I don't think he is a communist, but his emotions have been so long wrapped up in Viet-Nam that his judgement is false. I must say I was surprised that the Post published it. The article on South Viet-Nam in the same issue by Harold H. Martin left one with the impression that all of the Americans are champing at the bit for more military action, but are being held back by a timid President Diem. This non-accurate assessment presumably reflects the many and galling frustrations under which all military advisors work in the field and is probably also connected with the fact that they can't know everything or even enough of what's going on in Saigon. Halberstam's articles also rely heavily on military sources." Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962, Document 325, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

December 8, 1962: "Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam
Washington, December 8, 1962, 2:02 p.m.
588. Embtel 567. In Department's view political considerations would suggest limiting use napalm to high priority targets which clearly VC installations. Assume this has been past policy and that similar discretion will be employed in future.
Also request Embassy report to Department on pros and cons use napalm in Viet-Nam with particular emphasis on question whether such use will damage GVN's eventual ability reestablish its influence in areas subjected to it.
In future, plans for using large amounts napalm in any one operation to be cleared with Department.
Rusk "
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962, Document 326, Office of the Historoian, US Dept of State

December 9, 1962: "This morning, it developed that Jones' Eagle flight was going to remain on stand-by while we Hueys and the H-21's had a chance at action, taking a battalion of Arvins into a village where they were supposed to find the VC headquarters and the radio station that we had located with high-powered monitor apparatus. The station was on the air today-- we were after it. We would land troops in a nearby village.

The fat-bellied H-21's, now pregnant with troops, were off at 8:35, and we followed one minute later. Today was to be a large effort, and our air armada was escorted as well by the sleek, fast-moving T-28's, which were weaving in figure 8's diagonally across our flight path. Today they would be on emergency call only, and we Hueys wold have the job of watching for VC opposition.

A few seconds before 0900, as the choppers settled in, we Hueys went beyond the LZ and flew down a broad canal the color of watery mud. By the time we were over the middle of the LZ, some of the H-21's were beginning to take off. There must have been a report of gunfire by radio, because Hanson suddenly flung our Huey into a low-level pass over the canal town beyond the LZ. We came in close enough to see several sampans drawn up on the bank and three others floating in the canal. In the rush of the pass, I couldn't make out any people in them. But there must have been some, because in a few seconds I heard the always-surprising blast of our machine guns. I saw the tracers striking into the water, and splashes along the edge of the canal, among the sampans.

… We made three more assault missions this A.M., including escorting Jones' Eagle flight in to a raid that was supposed to catch some VC off guard. But they were too smart for us. I saw Jones after we brought the Eagle Force back and asked him what he got: ‘Nothin'--not a soul.’” Source: Vietnam Diary, by Richard Tregaskis, Popular Library, 1963, pgs. 285-286

December 10, 1962: "Notes on Visits to Thailand, Laos, Vietnam, and Okinawa by the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)
Washington, December 10, 1962.
[Here follow reports on Johnson's visits to Bangkok and Vientiane.]

Saigon
In Saigon I had conversations with President Diem, Foreign Minister Mau, Defense Minister Thuan and several members of the Assembly. In addition to the Ambassador, I also met with selected members of the Country Team, particularly the CIA Station Chief and the DCM, Mr. Trueheart, and some U.S. military officers. I also visited two provinces in the highland area (Pleiku and the new province of Phu Bon) and one in the coastal area (Tuy Hao), as well as the new Pleiyit mountain commando school.

My general impressions and observations are as follows:

1. The spirit of the Vietnamese officials and the U.S. officials and advisers, and the relations between them, are very impressive. While there is a subjective tendency on the part of both to emphasize the positive and to minimize the negative, the undoubted gains are substantial. The negative factor for which it is difficult to find a satisfactory answer is that both the U.S. and Vietnamese estimates indicate a significant increase in organized Viet Cong strength during the past year. It is also difficult, even in the field close to the area, to obtain a clear view of the level and relative importance of present infiltration through Laos.

2. There is no basis for believing the 'war can be over' in another year. Thuan's most optimistic estimate is three years."
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962, Document 327, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

December 11, 1962: "Report by the Deputy Director of the Vietnam Working Group (Heavner)
Washington, December 11, 1962.
VISIT TO VIETNAM, OCTOBER 18-NOVEMBER 26, 1962

I. Recommendations

A. Continue to place top priority on the strategic hamlet program. Adopt and refine present plans and programs but prove out what we are now doing before turning to new plans or tactics. Set up evaluation machinery to determine the best means of establishing effective strategic hamlets.

B. Use our influence and resources to insure that hamlet authorities have adequate means and powers, including the control of separate hamlet budgets and the power to inflict minor punishments. Seek to increase the competence and prestige of hamlet authorities by training, publicity, and rewards.

C. Strengthen the SDC by more contact with American advisors, frequent on-spot retraining, and more emphasis on civic action training.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962, Document 328, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

December 12, 1962: "KENNEDY PRESS CONFERENCE, December 12, 1962:

Q: It was just a year ago that you ordered stepped-up aid to Vietnam. Seems to be a good deal of discouragement about the progress. Can you give us your assessment?

A: No, we are putting in a major effort in Vietnam. As you know, we have uh, have about ten or 11 times as many men there as we had a year ago. They are... We've had a number of casualties. We've put in an awful lot of equipment. We've been going ahead with the strategic hamlet proposal. In some phases the military program has been quite successful. There is great difficulty, however, in fighting a guerrilla war; you need ten to one, or 11 to one, especially in terrain as difficult as South Vietnam. But I'm, uh... so we're not, uh... we don't see the end of the tunnel; but, I must say, I don't think it's darker than it was a year ago -- in some ways, lighter."
Source: American Experience, PBS, Vietnam Online, WGBH

December 13, 1962: "Col. Murley, another former paratrooper, took me to a situation map in Col. Wilson's war room, and pointed out what he called 'the three basic concepts' of the campaign here. The first of those concepts, he said: 'To interdict the frontier.' The frontier here at II Corps is the juncture of the Laotian and Cambodian borders with Vietnam, a very popular supply route by which the communists from North Vietnam and China can send in arms, ammunition, and other war materials. Second on Murley's list: 'To secure the road nets,' and here he explained that many of the roads in this Corps Area have been opened up just in the last year. Before that, they were subject to ambush and were generally insecure. But air patrols and an abundance of well-armed convoy troops have changed this picture. And thirdly: 'To deny the VC supply points.' The colonel said that the VC still have some 'secret base areas,' which are more or less secure, where they can amass supplies and circulate more or less freely, and that there must be denied the enemy, or in more concrete terms, the VC must be driven out of the such areas." Source: Vietnam Diary, by Richard Tregaskis, Popular Library, 1963, pg. 303

December 14, 1962: The New York Times: United States is disturbed about the continued presence of the North Vietnamese troops said to be numbering 6,000 in the various parts of Laos. Source: New York Times Chronology, December 14, 1962, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library & Museum

December 15, 1962: Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State
Saigon, December 15, 1962, 6 p.m.

598. Ref. Deptel 588. Dept's assumption first para reftel correct as far as US Farmgate aircraft concerned. As reported Embtel 567, Gen. Harkins refused permit use of US aircraft to deliver napalm in Zone D operation because of absence hard evidence of VC concentrations sufficiently large to promise military benefits outweighing political and psywar risks involved. On other hand, GVN has in its possession quantity of napalm provided under MAP, and uses it on basis its own judgment of requirements and effects. Thus US does not have direct control of RVNAF's use of napalm on SVN territory any more than it controls use of any other weapon in RVNAF arsenal provided under MAP. At same time, however, RVNAF does not have air delivery capability for large quantities napalm and, as in case of Zone D operation, had to call on us for additional delivery capability. Thus, in terms use large amounts napalm, US in fact has control and is exercising it.

Zone D operation constitutes first time RVNAF has proposed employ large quantities of napalm. Question has not arisen in past and is unlikely arise often in future. Regarding effects of using napalm on GVN's ability gain support of populace, we aware reports that during Indochina War napalm considered here as white colonialists' weapon against yellow “natives”. However, we have no evidence of any kind suggesting this attitude has been transferred to GVN's use of napalm. Nor do we have any reason believe local people single out napalm or any other particular weapon used by GVN as reason for supporting VC or at least being anti-GVN. While it true that Hanoi from time to time accuses “US-Diem” of widespread and inhumane use of napalm, and other weapons no evidence this line we have has had effect in SVN or that it has been exploited outside SVN.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962, Document 329, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

December 16, 1962:
(The following is reproduced with original typos)
"PEKING NCNA IN ENGLISH TO ASIA AND EUROPE 1438 GMT
16 DECEMBER, 1962-
(INDUSTRIALISTS, BUSINESSMEN PUNISHED OR ARRESTED IN SOUTH VIETNAM)
(TZXT) HANOI, 16 DECEMBER--MANY INDUSTRIALIDOS AND BUSINESSMEN IN SOUTH VIETNAM HAVE BEEN ARRESTED AND DEPRIVED OF THEIR PRGPERTY BY THE NGO DINH DIEM CLIQUE BECAUSE THEY HAD FAILED TO PAY EXHORBITANT TAXES. ACCORDING TO A SAIGON REPORT.

ACCORDING TO A SAIGON PAPER TAN DAN ON FOUR 4, DECEMBER SAIGOM'S WEALTHY MERCHANT AND BILLIONAIRE NGUYEN DINH QIAT RECENTLY BECAME BANKRUPT. HE OWNED LARGE RUBBER PLANTATIONS IN BEIN HOAA AND THU DAU MOT PROVINCES IN SOUTH VIETNAM. IN APRILD 1961 NINETEEN SIXTYONE. HE HAD ENTERED ON A "PRESIDENTIAL" ELECTION CAMPAIGN. MGO DINH DIEM CONFISCATED ALL IS RUBBER PLANTATIONS AND PGOPERTY.

LE THI, WEALTHY MERCHANT IN SAIGOM, AND TWEMTY 20HOTHERS WERE THROWN INTO PRISON BECAUSE THEY FAILED TO PAY TAXES. TRAN TRONG LAC. MENAGER OF THE LARGEST DISPENSARY IN SAIGOM, WAS ALSO IMPRISONED FOR THE XAME REASOM.

ARART FROM IMPOSING HEAVY FINES ON THE INDUSTRIALISTS AND BUSINESSMEN, THE NGO DINH DIEM CLIQUE URGED THE MERCHANTS TO SELL THOSE U.S. GOODS WHICH WERE SUPPLIED AS "AID" TOHTHE CLIQUE SO THAT THE CLIQUE COULD DEFRAY ITS HUGE WAR EXPENDITURES. FAILING THIS. THE MERCHANTS WOULD BE HEAVILY FINED OR LOSE THEIR LICENSES.
Source: Captured Documents (CDED): Urgent Wire Relaying Information Of Intelligence Report,  16 December 1962, Folder 2429, Box 0162, Vietnam Archive Collection, The Vietnam Center And Archive, Texas Tech University

December 17, 1962: "...orders were received assigning the 18th Aviation Operating Detachment from Okinawa to Soc Trang per General Order 45, USASG, effective 5 December 1962. The 18th A.O.D. has the mission of facilitating all Army flight operations by providing flight information planning data, coordination of day, night and instrument flights, navigational aids, and Air traffic control for the aviation unit to whom it is attached. The 18th A.O.D. is established with 39 Enlisted Men and 5 officers to provide it services for handling a daily air traffic count of 50. At Soc Trang, the 18th A.O.D. normally handles as aircraft count of 103 daily.

In December the 93rd Transportation Company established another mile-stone and record by flying 1,017.2 hours in a single month in the Republic of South Viet Nam."
Source: Battalion History, 11 December 1961 To 2 April 1972

December 18, 1962: "330. Report by the Senate Majority Leader (Mansfield)
Washington, December 18, 1962.
SOUTHEAST ASIA—VIETNAM

We have problems of varying complexity with all of the nations in Southeast Asia. Clearly, however, the critical focus is south Viet Nam. Developments there in the next two or three years may well influence greatly the trends in the whole region for the following ten or twenty.
And at this point it is far from certain what will develop in Viet Nam. One thing is reasonably clear: From somewhere about 1956 or '57, the unusual combination of factors which had resulted in the establishment of the Republic under Ngo Dinh Diem began to lose its impulse. A drift set in at about that time, responsibility for which is only partially ascribable to the shortcomings of the Vietnamese government. Our aid programs, military and non-military, after all, were one of the principal sources of the origin and the continuance of that government's power and these were properly open to charges of being ill-conceived and badly administered. They did little with the time which was bought at Geneva in the sense of stimulating the growth of indigenous roots for the political structure in Saigon. That structure is, today, far more dependent on us for its existence than it was five years ago. If Vietnam is the cork in the Southeast Asian bottle then American aid is more than ever the cork in the Vietnamese bottle."
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962, Document 330, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

December 19, 1962: "Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State
Saigon, December 19, 1962, 6 p.m.

604. Deptel 603. All things are relative, and an “explosion” of the Vietnamese Armed Forces is not likely to take on the characteristics of a similar phenomenon occurring in the US military establishment. The word may be unfortunate but the objective, I think, is sound and essential: it is to get a relatively prompt return on the very substantial military investment that has been made here.

General Harkins and the rest of us have fostered and watched the really formidable build-up of Vietnamese military and paramilitary capabilities over the last year, and we are very conscious of the fact that these increased capabilities have not yet been fully used."
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962, Document 331, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

December 20, 1962: "Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) to the President
Washington, December 20, 1962.
SUBJECT
Augmentation of U.S. Air Unit in Vietnam

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and I have reviewed two requests from the Commander in Chief, Pacific, both of which are related to providing additional combat air capability in support of military operations in South Vietnam (SVN). The first is a request for early augmentation of Farmgate by 18 aircraft (5 T-28s, 11 B-26s, 2 C-47s) and 117 USAF personnel (95 combat, 22 air base support). Farmgate is the current code name of the Air Force Jungle Jim Squadron that you authorized on 11 October 1961 to be introduced into Vietnam.4 The second request is for approval to initiate talks with the Government of Vietnam (GVN) on the subject of the use of Chinese Nationalists as Vietnamese Air Force C-47 pilots.

2. A review of operations by the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) and paramilitary forces for the past six months shows that practically all ground actions now are coordinated with some air support effort. This has resulted in continually increasing requirements for air support. Appreciation of the role of air support by the Vietnamese is evidenced by the increasing numbers of combat missions flown the past several months in support of convoys, strategic hamlet defense, heliborne assault, interdiction, conventional ground operations, and paramilitary operations. In September 1962, the Vietnam Air Force (VNAF) fighter aircraft flew 620 combat sorties as compared with 150 combat sorties the previous January. This increase dramatically illustrates the growth in the number of air support sorties. The impact of these increasing requests for air support has been so great that requirements exceed the combined capabilities of the VNAF and Farmgate. In fact, CINCPAC states:

“We are daily losing opportunities to destroy Viet Cong due to inability of VNAF to answer valid requests for air strikes. This situation results primarily from VNAF pilot shortage. Farmgate pilots are being overflown averaging 100 hours per month and cannot fill the gap.”
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962, Document 333, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

Also on December 20, 1962: “Where the war effort seemed to be going well, or where there seemed to be a story of heroism in the battle against Communism to report, Times reporters often wrote about it glowingly. On December 20, 1962, for instancee, Halberstam reported from a Green Beret outpost:

Dak Pek is a far outpost of the non-Communist world, a small, knobby patch cut out of rugged mountains better suited for a tourist showplace than a military stronghold….

Here a handful of tough United Stated Special Forces men day after day live a precarious existence training several hundred Montagnards, or mountain tribesmen….

The Americans…know…that the Communists know and observe everything they do…yet they seem completely indifferent to danger.

'I am a fatalist about things like this,' said Capt. George Gaspard of Orlando, Fla., leader of the team, a Marine veteran of Okinawa and Iwo Jima and a Sliver Star winner during the Korean War. 'We've got a job to do and we do it.' According to Lieut. Pete Skamser of Covina, Calif., executive officer, every man on the team is willing to die for Dak Pek.”
Source: The Uncensored War: The Media and Vietnam, By Daniel C. Hallin, University of California Press

December 21, 1962: Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to the President
Washington, December 21, 1962.
INCREASE IN U.S. AIR FORCE IN SOUTH VIETNAM

I attach a memorandum from Secretary Gilpatric to you recommending an increase in the U.S. air capability in South Vietnam.

The memorandum also recommends an investigation of the possibility of obtaining Chinese Nationalist pilots to fly C-47 aircraft for the GVN. I understand that they are to be used only on transport missions thus releasing the SVN pilots now so engaged for combat. Although there are a number of Chinese Nationalists working for the GVN, none are pilots.

Despite his worries about increasing U.S. military presence in South Vietnam at this time and the use of air power for strategic attacks on targets which are not clearly identified as solely Viet Cong, Governor Harriman approves Secretary Gilpatric's proposal. Governor Harriman believes that the proposal is justified, because close-in air support to the increased activities of the ARVN in defending strategic hamlets is essential to the success of the program.

We are still very sensitive to the necessity of assuring that air strike targets are selected so as to minimize the adverse political consequences of killing uncommitted peasants. This is one of the problems which Roger Hilsman and myself will try to look into during our visit to South Vietnam.

MVForrestal
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962, Document 333, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

December 22, 1962: "It was Dec. 22, 1962, when the Western Union telegram came to Charles 'Dayton' and Ethel Holloway’s DeLeon Springs home.

Three weeks after their oldest son, Charles Edward Holloway, was deployed to Vietnam, he was shot in the head while on a helicopter mission, and died.

His sister, Ethelyne Ensor, talked about her brother and about what it was like to lose a family member to war. She talked about the monument to her brother in Vietnam, and the American monument that will soon be dedicated.

'He was born in 1931, the second of six children,' Ensor said. 'All six of us went to school and graduated right here in DeLand.'

Charles joined the Army in 1949 at the age of 18.

Charles had served for 12 years when the Vietnam War started. He was a career military man, and he was married with five children under the age of 10.

'He left here and was going to have to do his one-year tour of duty,' his sister said. 'He got to Vietnam Dec. 1, 1962.'

Three weeks later, the telegram came to their parents’ house.
'It was a shock to the whole family,' Ensor said. 'It was like he couldn’t be gone; we had just seen him.'

Ensor shared the details the family was given.

'He was coming in for a landing, dropping off Vietnamese, when he was shot. His co-pilot had to take over.'"
Source: The Vietnam War — Camp Holloway Memorial Wall Dedication will take place Nov. 8, By Jennifer Horton, West Volusia Beacon

"CWO Charles E. Holloway was mortally wounded on 22 December 1962 during an assault on a Viet Cong strong hold at Van Hoa, north of Tuy Hoa in Phu Yen Province.  He was flying a CH-21 Shawnee helicopter at tree top level heading toward the LZ.  The helicopter was the eighth in line of twenty nine CH-21s carrying ARVN troops into the landing zone when they began drawing heavy enemy ground fire.  CWO Holloway who was at the controls in the right hand seat was hit by the deadly rounds.  He went into shock and had to have his feet moved off the controls by the crew chief in order for the other pilot to gain control of the aircraft.  He suffered a severe head wound which was bandaged and he was evacuated to the hospital at Tuy Hoa.  He died that afternoon as the doctor tried to keep his heart beating with an injection but it didn't do any good.  He had been in Vietnam for only twenty eight days; he and his wife had five children.  His brother and brother-in-law identified the body in the closed casket two weeks later at his wife's request just to avoid any mistakes before his burial. The following photos are from the 4 July 1963 ceremony dedicating the airfield in CWO Charles E. Holloway's name."
Source: "Vietnam Military Lore: Legends, Shadows, and Heroes" by Ray Bows

December 23, 1962: “Captain Colin Powell left Birmingham for Vietnam after driving his wife to her hometown to spend the next year living with her parents. The farewell was difficult, more so because Anna was pregnant.” Source: The Defining Generation - Defining Human Rights, HomeofHeroes.com

December 24, 1962: "Cuba released the last 1,113 participants from Brigade 2506 in the Bay of Pigs Invasion to the U.S., in exchange for food worth $53 million. The final flight for Operation Ransom arrived at the Homestead AFB at 9:00 pm" Source: Wikipedia, December 24, 1962

December 25, 1962: "Christmas Day was bright and sunny, a novelty in Danang at this season. I was down at the flight line at 6:30, waiting for today's helicopter business, which---bless the Marines---will go on as usual, Christmas or not.

I noted that the briefing room had been reorganized and systemized somewhat since my last visit here. Maj. Bob Rick, who was to lead the first group of four birds taking off today, told his pilots that the mission will be a transfer of troops from one base to another, a relatively routine job. He said, 'I'll find out at Tam Qui where we're going---in case anything should happen to my bird.'

The armor-vested pilots trooped out at 8:08, and I stayed behind, because Lt. Joe Baranowski, the OOD, told me there would be a later flight out to 'Shotgun Alley,' the 'shot-'em-up' area around the post at Ashau, to deliver some hot chow and a Christmas cake to the Americans stationed there.

Two birds made the flight to Ashau and several intermediate stops. We delivered everything as scheduled and, as fas as we know, didn't get shot at. I shared the belly compartment with Cpl. Mike Shrouf, another Marine who like Eric Coady has a high sense of responsibility. Shrouf's father was also a military man, and he died on Formosa, with the American MAAG.

Back at the camp, there were Christmas services this afternoon conducted by Cardinal Spellman, who had arrived in Vietnam for a whirlwind tour of the American bases. The old man seemed unsteady on his feet, but he stayed around to bless everyone who wanted it, and I heard from his retainers that he had shown this same dedication to duty in all of his stops here.

On the military grapevine I heard bad news about the 81st Transportation Company, the new H-21 outfit I had flown with, out of Pleiku. On an air-phibious assault, they had suffered their first casualty, a pilot killed by a bullet in the head. It was Charlie Holloway, a new pilot (with five children) who was on his first assault mission. I had once flown with Holloway from Plei Mrong to Pleiku. I made a mental note to get down to Saigon at least, and possibly all the way to Pleiku, with Ralph Davis, who'll be flying the R4D that way tomorrow.

Tonight, at his barracks room, I saw Bob Rick conked out for the night inside his mosquito bar, reading a paperback Whodunit. A good general's-aide type (he had recently been a general's aide) Rick is always clean-cut, military, well disciplined, and alert. After the day's mission of moving Vietnamese troops around, his flight of four birds had also been assigned the job of an emergency medical evacuation: flying a dead Arvin battle casualty back to Danang---grisly enough duty for Christmas Day.

I asked Rick about the title of the pocketbook he was reading

He said, 'I don't know, I just picked it up.' But I looked at the cover and I saw that it had an ironical title: These Lonely, These Dead, by Robert Colby.

'You've had a helluva Christmas Day,' I said.

'It passed the time,' he said, noncommittally."

Source: Vietnam Diary, by Richard Tregaskis, iUniverse, p 337-8


December 26, 1962: "The afternoon was wearing out when I finally reached Pleiku and found my way to the 81st company, to get the story on CWO Holloway and his recent death in action.

I checked in with Maj. George Washington Aldrich, Jr., the CO of the company. A capable and experienced veteran of infantry action in the Korean war, Aldrich had been out on this recent mission when the outfit got shot up. He gave me a clear, calm account of what had happened.

'It was a joint mission with the 8th [Helicopter Company, flying out of Quinhon]. They had 15 [H-21's], and we furnished 15. We got down there with 14---so it was 29 [troop-carrying helicopters] all together.

'There were six different LZ's, and there was no prestrike in the LZ's---not much more than a map reconnaissance.' Aldrich made note of that fact without editorial comment, but I gathered as I talked to him later in the evening, that one reason his birds had been so badly shot up was that there had been no softening-up attack. Here again was the question of whether the troop-carrying helicopters should come in to a hostile LZ without any preparation and take it by surprise---and risk being shot up in the process---or follow on the heels of a preliminary bombardment by some fighter aircraft, T-28's or Hueys.

'We went on the first lift. We operated [staged] out of Tuy Hoa. We went up to 2,000 [feet] until 10 or 12 miles north of Tuy Hoa, then to treetop level.

An L-19 marked the LZ with red smoke, and he [the L-19] said there was ground fire in the area.

Holloway was flying in ship F8, the eighth ship on our flight, with Gressang [CWO Daniel Gressang of La Pintada, Panama].

As soon as we got into the area, about 300 yards from touch-down, there was a tremendous volume of [VC] ground fire. Our aircraft machine guns started firing.

The first three aircraft didn't get hit. It was the fourth, eighth and tenth. And three of the aircraft from the 8th [Helicopter Company] got hit.

Holloway's ship got hit in the forward rotor housing, one went past Gressang's left ear, and one hit Holloway through the forehead; Five rounds came through the door, and three of them hit the fuel cell [tank], and two exited.

Gressang got Holloway back to Tuy Hoa and put him onto a medical evac helicopter. He died about 35 minutes after he was hit.'

I asked Aldrich if I could see Gressang and get his account of the episode, and the CO said yes but warned, 'He is still upset.'

It was much later in the evening, in the tent that serves the 81st as an O Club, that I found Gressang.

Aldrich had told me that he had kept Gressang flying steadily after the assault mission on which Holloway was killed, to keep the pilot's nerve up. Aldrich told me that the death had been 'very messy. The blood was running out of the plane into the blister. They couldn't get Holloway's foot out of the cockpit. Also, there was a big hole in his head.'

But Gressang's nerves were extended even farther than I had expected. He looked at me blankly and answered my questions mechanically, with the shortest replies, as if he were functioning only as a machine." Source: Vietnam Diary, by Richard Tregaskis, iUniverse, p 338-9

December 27, 1962: "Memorandum for the Files by the Deputy Director of the Vietnam Working Group (Heavner)
Washington, December 27, 1962
SUBJECT

Senator Mansfield's Reactions After Visiting Viet-Nam

According to Frank Meloy, who accompanied Senator Mansfield on his recent visit to Viet-Nam, the Senator's chief impressions of the Viet-Nam situation are as follows:

1. Senator Mansfield still believes that Diem is personally incorruptible. He sees no alternative to Diem, and feels we must continue our present policy. However the Senator was disappointed by Diem's two and one-half hour monologue during which the Senator got the impression that Diem is a good deal older and more withdrawn from reality than when he last saw him. The Senator was a little miffed because Diem insisted upon recounting the whole history of his regime as though the Senator were a stranger to the Viet-Nam situation. The Senator also got the impression that the Nhu's now had more real power than ever before, and he considers this unfortunate.

2. Senator Mansfield had an overall impression of having faced the same problems and the same kind of situation in 1954 and 1955. He feels we are in a sense back again in the beginning.

3. The Senator feels that in the years from 1955 through perhaps 1959 Diem failed to get rice roots support among the peasants, and that the early drive and enthusiasm which characterized his government was somehow lost. He believes the key to winning the present struggle is not just extending the authority of the government but the extension of popular support and acceptance of the government. The government must be closer to the people.

4. The Senator was extremely critical of the past AID program. He directed his criticism in particular against former USOM Director Arthur Gardiner, whom he regards as a “disaster”. The Senator feels that part of the blame for the lost opportunity during the years 1955 to 1959 rests with our misguided AID program and our misdirected military training effort. (He feels the military training effort was misdirected in that it was aimed exclusively at meeting the threat of overt invasion from the north rather than the threat of guerrilla warfare.)

5. Nevertheless the Senator feels that the thrust of our present AID and military effort is right. He feels the strategic hamlet program may well succeed. He thinks we must continue our present efforts in pretty much their present form.

6. At the same time the Senator was dismayed by the prospect of huge and endless aid expenditures for Viet-Nam. He was not impressed by General Harkins estimate that the war can be won in one year—in fact, he was apparently annoyed by Harkins “undue optimism.”

7. If the present effort in Viet-Nam fails, Senator Mansfield believes our only alternative is to attempt to neutralize the whole area."
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962, Document 334, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

December 28, 1962: ..."U.S. intelligence detected the presence of a radio transmitter along with a sizable force of National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NLF/Viet Cong) soldiers, reported to number around 120 in the hamlet of Ap Tan Thoi in Dinh Tuong Province, home of the ARVN 7th Infantry Division. To destroy the NLF, the South Vietnamese and their American advisers planned to attack Ap Tan Thoi from three directions by using two provincial Civil Guard battalions and elements of the 11th Infantry Regiment, ARVN 7th Infantry Division. The infantry units would be supported by artillery, M-113 armored personnel carriers and helicopters." Source: Wikipedia, Battle of Ap Bac

December 29, 1962: "Saigon announces success of strategic hamlet program

Saigon announces that 4,077 strategic hamlets have been completed out of a projected total of 11,182. The figures also stated that 39 percent of the South Vietnamese population was housed in the hamlets. U.S. officials considered these figures questionable.
The strategic hamlet program was started in 1962 and was modeled on a successful British counterinsurgency program used in Malaya from 1948 to 1960. The program aimed to bring the South Vietnamese peasants together in fortified strategic hamlets to provide security from Viet Cong attacks. Although much time and money was put into the program, it had several basic weaknesses. There was much animosity toward the program on the part of the South Vietnamese peasants, who were forcibly displaced from their ancestral lands. Also, the security afforded by the hamlets was inadequate and actually provided lucrative targets for the Viet Cong." Source: History.com, This Day In History, December 29, 1962

December 30, 1962: "Between 28 and 30 December 1962, the division had received reports that a PLAF radio station was operating in the vicinity of Ap Tan Thoi, a small village several kilometers to the northwest of My Tho. These intercepted transmissions, when paired with the additional reports of some 50 to 60 sampans moving toward the area, indicated to Colonel Dam that a reinforced company of roughly 150 guerrillas guarded the station. Acting on the division commander's estimate, on 30 December a small American-Vietnamese joint planning staff began developing the operation's concept around an expected enemy strength of one company. The Staff's reliance upon a doctrinal template (an estimate based upon the enemy's doctrine, his past activities, and the staff's experience and intuition) illustrated the covert nature of the war and the difficulties in painting an accurate portrait of the PLAF, its actives, and its intentions. As with so many other operations, the division staff did not know how many of the elusive guerrillas were on the ground, nor did they know how they were deployed. This nagging inability to fix the enemy's disposition, composition, and strength with any certainty plagued both the American and South Vietnamese efforts…"
Source: The Battle of Ap Bac, Vietnam: They Did Everything But Learn from It, by David M. Toczek, p. 71, Naval Institute Press, 2007

Also on December 30, 1962: "In November 1962, the National Liberation Front's Military Region 2 ordered the Viet Cong 261st Battalion and the 514th Battalion, the home battalion of Dinh Tuong Province, to destroy the strategic hamlets in their region and at the same time to attack South Vietnamese sweeping operations.[13] Between December 28 and 30, 1962, an American aircraft equipped with eavesdropping equipment located a Viet Cong radio transmitter.[14] It intercepted radio signals in the hamlet of Ap Tan Thoi in Dinh Tuong Province where the ARVN 7th Infantry Division was headquartered. The radio intercept and other information obtained by Jim Drummond, Vann's intelligence officer, indicated that the Viet Cong were using Ap Tan Thoi as a headquarters location.[14] Furthermore, South Vietnamese and American intelligence personnel believed the Viet Cong had deployed a reinforced company of about 120 men to protect the transmitter. Certain that the Viet Cong unit was no larger than the reported number, the ARVN 7th Infantry Division was instructed to attack Ap Tan Thoi.[15]

An operational plan suited for an attack on a small enemy formation was drafted by Ziegler, who was an adviser to Dam and the command staff of the 7th Infantry Division. Ziegler's plan, codenamed Operation Duc Thang I,[16] called for the South Vietnamese to assault Ap Tan Thoi from three different directions; three rifle companies from the 11th Infantry Regiment, 7th Infantry Division, to move from the north; the Dinh Tuong Civil Guards Regiment[note 1] to march northward from the south in separate columns; and a company of 13 M-113 armored personnel carriers with an infantry company on board from the southwest.[17] The M-113 carriers and the infantry company could act as both a mobile reserve and a reaction force, so it was positioned where it could be shifted to the contact area if the Viet Cong began to retreat. In addition, Dam would also deploy two rifle companies at Tan Hiep airfield, which could be brought onto the battlefield by helicopters from the U.S. Army 93rd Transportation Company.[18]

On previous occasions, U.S. intelligence had tracked down the location of Viet Cong radio transmitters, but those were often relocated before the South Vietnamese launched their attacks, so Ziegler privately questioned if the Viet Cong had as many as 120 soldiers in Ap Tan Thoi." Source: Wikipedia, Battle of Ap Bac

December 31, 1962: The Year in Numbers for Southeast Asia:
US Deaths Reported (all causes): 60
ARVN Deaths Reported: 4,457
VC/NVA Deaths Reported: 21,158
Source: Comparative National Casualties - Southeast Asia
1960-1970, Summary: Selected Nations

Total US Military Personnel in Vietnam: 11,500
Source: Escalation of the War, GlobalSecurity.org

June 1962 - July 1962 - August 1962 - September 1962 - October 1962
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January 1, 1963: "After the planners ironed out he operation's final details and the difficulties with the helicopters, the American advisors received their full briefing concerning Operation DUC THANG 1 at seven in the evening on 1 January. The 7th Division's mission was straightforward and reflected once agin the American advisors' offensive mindset. The ARVN unit was to attack at 0630 on 2 January 1963 'to seize or destroy a VC radio and a VC company in the vicinity of' Ap Tan Thoi. The staff's concept to achieve this mission was simple. A provisional regiment of CG units would attack from the south to north, oriented on Ap Tan Thoi; an ARVN infantry battalion would move by helicopter to an LZ to the north of Ap Tan Thoi and then attack south; and a mechanized company would attack from the west. To help prevent guerrillas from escaping the cordon, two CG companies would establish a blocking position almost 5 kilometers to the west of the village, and a ranger company would establish another such position along the Ba Beo Canal to the north. " Continued… Source: The Battle of Ap Bac, Vietnam: They Did Everything But Learn from It, by David M. Toczek, p. 71, Naval Institute Press, 2007

Also on Janualry 1, 1963: Jack McBride Lisle, 39, SFC, Army, of Tallahassee, FL, dies of illness/disease while serving in South Vietnam.
Source: Vietnam Veterans Memorial Fund

January 2, 1963: "Memorandum for the Record by the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hilsman)

Saigon, January 2, 1963.
SUBJECT

Country Team Meeting on Wednesday, January 2, 1963

Present were the heads of all the agencies there. The first item on the agenda was the planned operation beginning today which was a very large scale sweep operation directed against a headquarters in Tayninh Province. This is a very large scale affair and, of course, comes very close to the Cambodian Border which aroused Forrestal because of the implications of the Cambodian problems. The result was to impress those peasants with Washington's concern about the relationships with Cambodia.

General Harkins raised the question of this desire to overfly Laos in order to get photographs of Tchepone and the buildup which he suspects is taking place there. He also wants permission to probe in Laos.

Another agenda item was the operation in the Ca Mau Peninsula in which two Marine battalions will be landed. This is a VC stronghold which the government has been unable to enter since 1945. “ Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 5, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

Also on January 2, 1963: "Editorial Note

On January 2, 1963, regular army and civil guard forces of the Republic of Vietnam engaged a Viet Cong battalion at the village of Ap Bac in Dinh Tuong province, 35 miles southwest of Saigon in the Mekong Delta. The South Vietnamese forces enjoyed a 4-1 numerical advantage in the battle, and, unlike the Viet Cong, were supported by artillery, armor, and helicopters. Despite the disparity of numbers and weapons, the Viet Cong battalion inflicted heavy casualties on the government forces and escaped with minor losses. Three American advisers were killed in the fighting and five helicopters were shot down.

The United States Army Command in the Pacific reported the battle to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as 'one of the bloodiest and costliest battles of S. Vietnam war' and noted that the battle “will provide enemy with morale-building victory”. Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 1, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

Also on January 2, 1963: The following US Servicemen were killed today:

Donald Leon Braman, SP4, Army, of Mystic, CT, 8/1/1941 - 1/2/1963

William Leander Deal, SGT, Army, Mays Landing, NJ 11/15/1927 - 1/2/1963

Kenneth Newlon Good, Capt, Army, San Marino, CT 11/30/1930 - 1/2/1963
Source: Vietnam Veterans Memorial Fund

Also on January 2, 1963: "AP BAC - 2 January 1963, on 2 January 1963 the 93rd Transportation Company started the new year on a tragic note. While supporting the 7th Infantry ARVN Division from a staging area located at a small dirt strip at Tan Hiep, the entire flight of the CH-21, U.S. Army helicopters from the 93rd Transportation Company was ambushed by an entrenched hard-core Viet Cong reinforced Battalion on the fourth assault rifle lift committing the reserve forces. In the final stage of the approach from contour level, heavy machine gun and automatic rifle fire was received. Without regard for personal safety, the ten helicopters proceeded past the armored personnel carriers and the main advancing body to land their troops in the designated landing zone. Not one helicopter aborted or failed to complete its mission of getting the troops into the landing zone.

Although hit by ground fire the first four aircraft were able to make successful take-offs from the area. The fifth aircraft, however, was shot down due to heavy ground fire. The crew of the sixth helicopter unhesitatingly diverted their take-off and attempted to pick up the crew of the downed aircraft and were immediately shot down also. The landing zone was untenable due to enemy fire which prevented further rescue attempts. The remainder of the flight departed for the staging area although the second aircraft had to make a force landing due to damage from the ground fire received. The downed crews were left to fend for themselves in the rice paddies ahead of the main attacking force, where they remained under enemy fire for the next eight hours. One man was dead and five had been wounded by enemy fire.

Upon return to the staging area, assessment of damage to the seven remaining helicopters revealed only two were flyable. Approximately one hour later information was received from ground troops in the area that firing had subsided and evacuation of the downed crews could be made. The rescue aircraft was landed despite sporadic ground fire and damage to the aircraft. When the loading of the wounded and crews was attempted, the tempo of enemy fire increased and a heavy volume of fire entered the cockpit wounding the pilot. This forced the aircraft to make an immediate take-off leaving the wounded and crews behind. The aircraft was flown out of the landing zone, but 1/2 mile away a forced landing had to be made due to damage from enemy fire. Meanwhile, at the staging area, two other helicopters had been rapidly repaired from parts of other downed aircraft. For the remaining hours of the afternoon, ammunition and medical evacuations were flown by these ships into the first three landing zones.

Approximately eight hours from the time they were shot down, the crews and their wounded were finally picked up by ARVN armored personnel carriers. Then they had to ride for approximately two hours through attacks with the armored personnel carriers until an area was reached where they could be evacuated by helicopter.

At the days end, nine Americans had been wounded and one killed in action, Sgt William L Deal of the UTT in support of the 93rd Trans Co. Of the ten helicopters committed on the mission, all ten had been hit by enemy fire, four had been shot down and only three helicopters were flyable to return to the airfield.

On 2 January 1963, Sergeant William L Deal was the first UTT man to be fatally wounded. It was realized that the effectiveness of helicopters against prepared positions was limited. Source: Battalion History, 11 December 1961 To 2 April 1972

Also on January 2, 1963: "Memorandum for the Record by the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hilsman)

Saigon, January 2, 1963.

At this point some thirty-six hours after having arrived in Saigon, I have the impression that things are going much much better than they were a year ago, but that they are not going nearly so well as the people here in Saigon both military and civilian think they are. They have a concept in the strategic hamlet program. They have aid and they have lots of people and this inevitably gives a sense of movement and progress. The trouble is, however, that the progress and the movement is highly uneven. One would wish that this is the fault of the Vietnamese, and it is to a considerable extent. But I am afraid that a great share of the responsibility belongs with the Americans. We have the impression that any one of these programs such as the strategic hamlet program or really any of the others requires precise and efficient coordination of the different activities of many different American agencies. And you also have the impression that this coordination is not really being accomplished. One example is the failure to provide a police program that even remotely is phased in with the provision of wire for the strategic hamlets and radios for the strategic hamlets. Thus you have strategic hamlets going up enclosing Communists inside their boundaries with no provisions for wrinkling [winkling?] out those Communists. Other things are similar. You have also the impression that the military is still too heavily oriented towards sweep-type operations. There is still the same emphasis on air power as there was before. Almost every operation so far as I can tell still begins with an air strike which inevitably kills innocent people and warns the Viet Cong that they should get moving for the troops will be coming soon. I think it justifies [signifies?] that the Americans are as much to blame for this as the Vietnamese. That MACV has requested an augmentation of the Farmgate group. Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 2, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

Also on January 2, 1963: "Memorandum for the Record by the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hilsman)

Saigon, January 2, 1963.

Conversation with Major General Edward L. Rowny

“...Rowny has been on some 20 operations. He describes the typical one as follows. The troops are scheduled to move at a certain hour in the morning. Usually there is a considerable delay waiting for a previous air strike. The air strike is then made on a village at which the Viet Cong is reported to be ensconced. The helicopters then move out, the troops are landed outside the village and they start forward. After a little while there is a flurry on the right and someone drags a peasant out of a rice paddy where he had been hiding. The peasant is bound and taken prisoner as a “suspected Viet Cong.” They then proceed up the road towards the village. Some time later another flurry appears on the left and a man runs towards the jungle. He is shot and killed and marked down as a Viet Cong since he ran.

They then proceed to the village which is deserted except for an old man or perhaps an addlepated girl—an Ophelia and [as?] Rowny describes her. Under interrogation the senile old man or addled girl points toward some spot in the jungle, or some cellar or something. The troops go there and drag out a man who is hiding who is then bound and captured as a 'suspected VC.' The operation has now reached noon. Everyone sits down, cooks their rice and meal. Patrols are sent out and around finding nothing and then an hour or so later the helicopters come to pick the troops up and take them back to their regular billets.” Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 4, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

January 3, 1963: “The battle of Ap Bac was reported in the press in the United States as 'a major defeat' in which 'communist guerrillas shot up a fleet of United States helicopters carrying Vietnamese troops into battle'. (The Washington Post, January 3, 1963...” Continued...
Souce: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 1, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

Also on January 3, 1963: “With the PLAF already gone from the field as 3 January 1963 dawned, and the ARVN policing up its dead and wounded, the Battle of Ap Bac ended. This fight was not the most costly battle of the Second Indochina War, but it was certainly the most significant up to that point in the conflict. At Ap Bac, whether by mistake or design, for the first time the PLAF stood its ground successfully against an air assault, artillery and CAS, and APCs. Vann later claimed three American KIA and six WIA; 63 ARVN KIA and 109 WIA; and five helicopters to an estimated 100 PLAF KIA while the PLAF offered significantly higher estimates of ARVN and American casualties.49 One thing that both the American advisors present at Ap Bac and the PLAF agreed upon was that the battle was, in Vann’s words, ‘[a] miserable damn performance.’” Source: “A Miserable Damn Performance”: The Battle of Ap Bac, 1963, by Major David Toczek, United States Military Academy, West Point

January 4, 1963: "There's been a big flap today about the press coverage of the Battle of Ap Bac. Some of the news stories of that defeat for our side have charged that all sorts of mistakes were made by the Arvin high command in the conduct of the campaign. Probably there were many mistakes---there always are in a battle.

One of the younger and brasher correspondents wrote an excited, emotional story about the fact that during the Ap Bac engagement the Arvin artillery killed three of their own troops and wounded 11 by mistake. I talked to Galfund about it and reminded him of the old artilleryman's slogan: the V-sign, given with two fingers, to indicate that in an artillery barrage, 2 per cent of our own troops will be hit by shorts. That doesn't mean that artillery couldn't always be better, but people get hurt in a war, like it or not.

I'm afraid the critical news dispatches about Ap Bac will do a lot of harm in the U.S. Ap Bac was a defeat for us, yet it really was very little except the Phuoc Chau victory in reverse. At Phuoc Chau, as noted earlier, we beat up the VC and left 127 dead, at a very small cost to us in casualties At Ap Bac, the VC apparently a very well-disciplined and well-dug-in outfit did it to our side---but not quite as badly. That's the way war goes, a bloody business any way you look at it."
Source: Vietnam Diary, by Richard Tregaskis, p. 363, Popular Library, 1964

Also on January 4, 1963: "Halberstam identified the importance of the battle in the lead to his January 4 story: 'Communist guerrillas, refusing to play by their own hide-and-seek rules in the face of Government troops, stood their ground and inflicted a major defeat on a larger force of Vietnamese regulars yesterday and today'

'What made this defeat particularly galling to the Americans and the Vietnamese alike was that this was a battle initiated by the Government forces in a place of their own choice, with superior forces and with troops of the seventh Vietnamese Division, which is generally considered an outstanding one in the country.

'Today the Government troops got the sort of battle they wanted and they lost. An estimated total of 300 Communists withstood awesome air attacks, [and] turned back several charges by the Vietnamese armored personnel carriers. The Vietcong simply refused to panic and they fired with deadly accuracy and consistency. The Vietnamese regulars, in contrast, in the eyes of one American observer, lost the initiative from the first moment and never showed much aggressive instinct and consequently suffered heavier casualties than they might have had they tried an all-out assault on the Vietcong positions.'"
Source: Halberstam, “Vietnamese Reds Win Major Clash,” New York Times, January 4, 1963

January 5, 1963: “By 1963, Air America’s presence in South Vietnam had grown a little bit. Initially, aircraft that were normally based in Laos or Thailand would come to South Vietnam for a short period, that is TDY. One of the pilots involved was Joe Hazen. He recalls: 'On/about 5 January 1963, Fred Walker, Ed Dearborn and I, as captains, Leroy Letendre and Howard (Howie) Carroll as co-pilots, went from Vientiane to Danang to check-out several strips for future Air America operations... The other places we went to were Dalat, Ban Me Thuot, Kontum, Qui Nhon, possibly Cam Ranh Bay, Nha Trang and a few others.'”
Source: Air America in South Vietnam, From the days of CAT to 1969, by Dr. Joe F. Leeker

Also on January 5, 1963: “On 11 October 1962 the MAAGV chief requested four civil affairs mobile training teams (each to consist of nine officers and four enlisted men) for 180 days TDY to provide training, advice, and assistance to South Vietnamese personnel in conducting programs for 'clearing and holding provinces from Viet Cong forces.' Three of the teams arrived on 15 December 1962 and the fourth on 5 January 1963. Each South Vietnam Army corps received one team in order to provide specialized assistance to the Strategic Hamlet Program, advise Vietnamese civil affairs teams, assist in the medical civic action program, and to assist Operations Mission field representatives.” Continued...
Source: Chapter II, The Crucial Years, 1960-1964, Civil Affairs

January 6, 1963: "There were still some tag ends to be pursued on the Ap Bac battle story. Estimates of VC casualties now range as high as 50. We had more than 100 killed and wounded, of these 40 killed. As usual, the VC evacuation and medical teams apparently carried off many of the wounded ---several bloody field operation sites were discovered---but in all, a total of nine bodies recovered. The VC troops managed to fade into the civilian population, as usual.

Through my Army aviation friends, I got a ride down to the Delta this morning, on the trail of Col. Vann. I flew in to Tam Hiep and found him at his headquarters, still occupied with getting the last wreckage of the shot-down helicopters out of the Ap Bac LZ. Vann had been on the griddle for two days, being questioned by the high American brass on the subject of the Ap Bac engagement. He moved nervously, he seemed to have lost weight, and his blue eyes were bloodshot. He ripped, as usual, to the heart of the matter with a vigor that disregarded connective tissue:

'They [the brass] want to know, why did I change the fourth LZ? It was not changed. It was chosen because of the tactical needs of the time.

'The asked, "Why did you land them so close to the enemy?" [My answer is:] I'm delighted when I get a chance to get at the enemy.'

'Everybody is trying to jump to conclusions about what this proves and doesn't prove. The loss of at least the additional helicopters was [because of] an admirable and questionable policy of landing and evacuating the downed crews. This had been a point of issue before. Every helicopter lift that goes in, I have an adviser with. It would be easy for the helicopter crew to climb out and take cover. It's not so bad for them to be on the ground. The advisers are [on the ground].'

Col. Vann, still roaring mad, went on to say that the Ap Bac operation bogged down because of all the downed helicopters. He felt the whole question of sending in choppers to pick up the crews of helicopters shot down in a LZ should be reviewed. However he backed off a little. He said that the Ap Bac situation was special: 'It [the use of helicopters to rescue chopper crews] was justifiable, because there were badly wounded Americans.'" Source: Vietnam Diary, by Richard Tregaskis, pgs. 369-370, Popular Library, 1964

January 7, 1963: "Report by an Investigative Team Headed by the Chief of Staff, United States Army (Wheeler), to the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Washington, January 1963.
JCS TEAM REPORT ON
SOUTH VIETNAM
JANUARY 1963
I. General

1. At their meeting on 7 January 1963, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that General Earle G. Wheeler, who had twice postponed a scheduled visit to Southeast Asia, should lead a team of senior Service and Joint Staff representatives to South Vietnam. The team was asked to provide the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense with an up-to-date assessment of the situation in South Vietnam. It was composed as follows:

Joint Chiefs of Staff Representative:
General Earle G. Wheeler, USA

Team Chief

Joint Staff Representative:
Major General Victor H. Krulak, USMC

U.S. Army Representatives:
Lieutenant General Theodore W. Parker
Lieutenant Colonel Bill G. Smith

U.S. Navy Representative:
Rear Admiral Andrew McB. Jackson

U.S. Air Force Representatives:
Lieutenant General David A. Burchinal
Major General William W. Momyer
Colonel Robert M. Levy
Lieutenant Colonel Harry M. Chapman

U.S. Marine Corps Representative:
Brigadier General Norman J. Anderson

Assistants to the Chief of Staff:
Colonel George I. Forsythe
Major Louie W. Odom
Sergeant Major George E. Loikow

2. The team's mission was to obtain information for use by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in making an assessment of the counter-insurgency program in South Vietnam. The team was asked to form a military judgment as to the prospects for a successful conclusion of the conflict in a reasonable period of time. Specific appraisals were requested on the effectiveness of the present military program to meet United States objectives in South Vietnam, to include: the command and control arrangements of the United States and indigenous military forces in Southeast Asia; effectiveness of employment of United States and indigenous aviation; the quality and validity of military intelligence; and the readiness of plans to meet contingencies in the area. The team was to submit recommendations for modifications to our program which appeared to be desirable. Because the current counterinsurgency program in South Vietnam is largely the result of an appraisal made by General Maxwell D. Taylor in November 1961, the team used his report as a point of reference in reaching its conclusions." Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963,Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 26, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

January 8, 1963: "At the Bipartisan Legislative Leaders Meeting on January 8, 1963, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara assesses Vietnam, stating, 'there are a number of disquieting indications of possible trouble to come.' He had recommended that General Earle Wheeler visit Vietnam and report back to the President." Source: News Release: Kennedy Library Opens 15 More Hours of JFK Recordings Tapes Offer Insights on Vietnam and US Relations with Europe, John F. Kennedy Library & Museum

Also on January 8, 1963: "...Bo received a nicely typed letter from Capt. George W. Ingraham, Medical Corps, United States Army. He was then with the 94th Medical Detachment and flew about Vietnam in old CH-21C helicopters. We'll let him tell his story by quoting from the letter than Bo received and kept filed away.

'I recently found a copy of your catalog here and began to cogitate on a knife especially designed for helicopter pilots and crew members here in Vietnam. Our problem is, in case of going down in the jungle, quite a large one as far as survival is concerned. Most of the men carry issue survival knives, various types of commercial knives, etc.

An airman going down in the jungle here has the problem first of getting out of the aircraft, then of constructing shelter and finding water, possibly hand-to-hand combat..., and finally of signaling rescue aircraft which come to search for him.

I believe that the knife best suited to this task would be a somewhat radical modification of you Model 14 'Attack' Knife as follows:

1. Into the top of the blade, saw teeth should be cut or filed, to cut aluminum, Plexiglass, etc., in freeing personnel from aircraft wreckage. I have seen one knife with this feature in the possession of an air force pilot here.
2. The 1/4" brass guard could be extended to form a full half-circle to serve as a 'knuckle duster' for close combat.
3. The trickiest part of the modification would be the handle. I have illustrated the handle in the enclosure, and you will note that it features a screw-on butt plate, hollow handle of brass or copper pipe, silver-soldered or brazed to the tang of the knife blade. The compartments in the handle would be used for matches, water purification tablets, Dexedrine pills..., and possibly Demerol tablets for severe burns, etc. Leather rings could be sandwiched in the usual manner for the grip.
4. A sheath similar to the model C -- or the model C as illustrated -- should be used.'" Source: Randall Made Knives: The History of the Man and the Blades, by Robert L. Gaddis, pp. 198-203

January 9, 1963: “The Air Force has announced that success of Commando Operations in South Vietnam has prompted the Air Force to increase its Air Commando Training operations.” Source: New York Times Chronology, January 9, 1963, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library & Museum

January 10, 1963: "Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam
Washington, January 10, 1963, 4:21 p.m.
670. Joint State-Defense message. Re: Paramilitary Personnel: Interdepartmental committee charged with study feasibility increased use third-country personnel in paramilitary operations needs country team views ASAP in outline on:
1. Efficacy present use and desirability increasing numbers and roles any of third-country nationals already being used in South Vietnam [2 lines not declassified]. Comment on major contributions and problems encountered.
2. Uses personnel of other third-countries not now participating, which you consider desirable and feasible.
3. Auspices and organizational devices under which additional personnel could be used with USG, GVN and country of origin approval (e.g. Under unilateral third-country auspices, or US; possible non-attributable control; civilian contract, or overt military).
In formulating views, exclude third-country personnel engaged in essentially economic-social work; include those directly employed in other aspects counter-insurgency operations or supporting them, whether military or civilians.
The source text does not have the usual stamped signature." Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 9, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

January 11, 1963: "Current Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Office of Current Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, January 11, 1963.
[document number not declassified]
SUBJECT
Current Status of the War in South Vietnam
1. Though the South Vietnamese government probably is holding its own against the Viet Cong and may be reducing the menace in some areas, the tide has not yet turned.
2. South Vietnam has made some military progress in its struggle with the Viet Cong due largely to extensive US support. The Viet Cong, however, continue to expand the size and effectiveness of their forces, and are increasingly bold in their attacks. Furthermore, Diem's political improvements have not kept pace with purely military achievements.
3. Various statistics indicate government progress against the Viet Cong during 1962, but these can be misleading as a basis for a conclusion on who is winning. For instance, Viet Cong casualties during 1962 were reported at more than 30,000 including some 21,000 killed in action. Yet current Viet Cong strength is estimated at 22,000-24,000 regulars, as opposed to an estimated 17,600 last June. This suggests either that the casualty figures are exaggerated or that the Viet Cong have a remarkable replacement capability—or both. Continued... Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 11, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

Also on January 11, 1963: "Saigon, January 11, 1963, 7 p.m.
664. CINCPAC for POLAD. Dept pass USIS. Ref: Embtel 627, Tousi 138, and A-369. GVN apparently intends proceed surrender program at Tet. As reported ref messages first phase of program will apparently last until July 7 (anniversary Diem taking office) then continue in phase two until March 1964. Civic Action Minister Hieu in meeting with DGI Tao, Psywar Director Gen. Oai, and US reps Jan 9 said President would make pre-recorded radio proclamation (which would also be filmed) January 25 (Tet). GVN will attempt provide us with tape and film of proclamation (which reportedly to be submitted for President's approval today) prior Jan 15.

Hieu described three aspects of program: philosophy, techniques, and organization.”
Continued... Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 10, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

January 12, 1963: “The United States and the Soviet Union will begin another round of private talks about a nuclear test ban treaty in New York next week.” Source: New York Times Chronology, January 12, 1963, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library & Museum

January 13, 1963: “Operation Da-Da was staged at Chuong-Thien, Phong-Dinh, and Vinh Long from January 11 to January 13, 1963, to "clean up" guerrillas in the region. The operation involved 17 helicopters (H-21 and HU-IA). The result of the operation was: 102 Viet Cong dead, 37 prisoners, and a large number of weapons captured.“ Source: Analysis Of The Long-Range Military, Economic, Political And Social, Effects Of The Strategic Hamlet Program In Viet Nam, by Chung, Pham, New Mexico Univ Albuquerque Dept Of Economics, Advanced Research Projects Agency, Washington

January 14, 1963: Excerpt from JFK’s State of the Union Address: "In short, let our adversaries choose. If they choose peaceful competition, they shall have it. If they come to realize that their ambitions cannot succeed--if they see their 'wars of liberation' and subversion will ultimately fail--if they recognize that there is more security in accepting inspection than in permitting new nations to master the black arts of nuclear war--and if they are willing to turn their energies, as we are, to the great unfinished tasks of our own peoples--then, surely, the areas of agreement can be very wide indeed: a clear understanding about Berlin, stability in Southeast Asia, an end to nuclear testing, new checks on surprise or accidental attack, and, ultimately, general and complete disarmament.” Source: Excerpts from President Kennedy's Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union, January 14, 1963, The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition, Volume 2, pp. 815-816

January 15, 1963: "Dispatching the Wheeler Mission
President Kennedy met with his senior military advisers immediately preceding their departure on a fact-finding trip to Vietnam. The Wheeler Mission, named for Army Chief of Staff Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, had been proposed by the Joint Chiefs the previous week following the Battle of Ap Bac, the first major confrontation between South Vietnamese and Vietcong forces. The ensuing Wheeler Report would be the third such review that Kennedy would receive in the span of a month. In late December, Sen. Mike Mansfield (D-MT) had toured Indochina and provided Kennedy with a pessimistic account of progress in the war. The State Department's Roger Hilsman and White House aide Michael Forrestal had also visited South Vietnam and had criticized the military's preference for engaging the Vietcong with conventional tactics." Source: Dispatching the Wheeler Mission - Miller Center, University of Virginia

Also on January 15, 1963: "Report to the Special Group for Counterinsurgency
Washington, January 15, 1963.
THIRD COUNTRY AID TO SOUTH VIET-NAM

Early in 1962 the U.S. undertook to canvass DAC members and certain other Free World nations on increased economic aid to Viet-Nam with emphasis on commercial import which could provide local currency for assisted projects. Preliminary soundings by Ambassador Riddleberger and Tuthill in Paris indicated that while most countries agreed on the political importance of Viet-Nam's struggle, they were somewhat reluctant to come forward with increased aid; especially of the grant commercial import variety.

By mid-year a consensus had been reached that a proposed aid coordinating group for Viet-Nam should be handled outside DAC since at this stage of DAC's evolution, a group on a hot point in the cold war could compromise DAC's economic character. We then proposed the formation of an informal Saigon group outside DAC which would have no connection with the OECD body and would for the present receive no publicity." Continued... Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 12

January 16, 1963: "Memorandum From the Director of the Vietnam Working Group (Wood) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Harriman)
Washington, January 16, 1963.
SUBJECT

Jets for the Government of Viet-Nam

Background: Secretary Thuan has asked Ambassador Nolting if the U.S. would supply four T-33 jets. Nolting proposes to reply subject to the Department's concurrence to the effect that jets are not warranted in Viet-Nam at this time. We have asked for DOD approval of a telegram concurring in Ambassador Nolting's refusal.

However General Taylor has approved a recommendation that the Vietnamese be given four RT-33 (photo-reconnaissance) jets and two T-33 (training) jets. Bill Bundy will decide whether to approve this recommendation before sending it to Secretary McNamara. I have asked that Bundy call you for your views before making a decision. If Bundy and McNamara approve there will be a letter from Secretary McNamara to Secretary Rusk."

..."Conclusion:

Giving jets to the Vietnamese now would not increase their military potential or shorten the war; it would significantly increase the risks of international incidents and repercussions. It would to a significant degree change the terms of the limited war which are now quite well understood on both sides in Viet-Nam.

Recommendation:

That we oppose giving jets to the Vietnamese at this time.”
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 13 Office of the Historian, US Dept of State


January 17, 1963: "Minutes of a Meeting of the Special Group for Counterinsurgency
Washington, January 17, 1963, 2 p.m.

PRESENT
Mr. Johnson, Mr. Bell, General Taylor, Mr. McCone, Mr. Dungan, Mr. Wilson vice Mr. Murrow, Mr. Bundy vice Mr. Gilpatric
Mr. Koren and Mr. Wood were present for the meeting

1. Southeast Asia Status Report
[Here follows discussion of Thailand.]

South Viet-Nam

Mr. Wood in discussing the situation in South Viet-Nam observed that the recent helicopter episode in which three Americans were lost was more serious from the political viewpoint than militarily. Mr. Dungan pointed out, however, that should such episodes be repeated, and coupled at the same time with public criticism from Vietnamese exiles in this country, it could result in difficulties with Congress.

The Group discussed at length the question of relating press coverage in South Viet-Nam to the positive side, as compared to the current predilection for articles critical of the Diem Government, and those which reflect the more adverse circumstances. Mr. Wilson will meet with the public relations officers of the several departments concerned, and try to develop ideas for improving the situation. In the meantime, General Wheeler will be notified that he should be prepared for a public appearance when he returns from his present trip, such as discussing the South Viet-Nam situation on 'Meet the Press' or some similar television program. It was also agreed that it might be desirable to arrange background briefings for key members of Congress in the hope of heading off adverse reaction to the newspaper articles."

Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 14, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

Also on January 17, 1963: "The A Shau Outpost

Finally, on January 17 [1963], at Quang Tri, I boarded a Marine H-34 helicopter loaded with ARVN [Army of the Republic of Vietnam] replacements, bags of rice, and live chickens and pigs. We darted and bounced through thunderheads and showers over dense jungle terrain and plopped down onto a crude perforated-metal airstrip stamped out of the jungle. . . .

ARVN soldiers trotted out to the helicopter and began unloading. An American Soldier came up, saluted, and introduced himself as Sergeant First Class William Sink. Sink led me through a barbed-wire gate into the compound where a Vietnamese officer saluted and put out his hand. 'Captain Vo Cong Hieu, commanding 2nd Battalion,' he said in passable English. . . .

Directly behind A Shau, a mountain loomed over us. I pointed towards it and Hieu said with a grin, 'Laos.' From that mountainside, the enemy could almost roll rocks down onto us. I wondered why the base had been established in such a vulnerable spot.

'Very important outpost,' Hieu assured me.
'What’s its mission?' I asked.
'Very important outpost,' Hieu repeated.
'But why is it here?'
'Outpost is here to protect airfield,' he said, pointing in the direction of our departing Marine helo.
'What’s the airfield here for?' I asked.
'Airfield here to supply outpost.'

From my training at Fort Bragg, I knew our formal role here. We were to establish a 'presence,' a word with a nice sophisticated ring. More specifically, we were to engage the Viet Cong to keep them from moving through the A Shau Valley and fomenting their insurgency in the populated coastal provinces. But Hieu’s words were the immediate reality. The base camp at A Shau was there to protect an airstrip that was there to supply the outpost.

GEN Colin Powell, My American Journey"
Source: Introduction to the Principles of War and Operations, pgs 180-181

January 18, 1963: "South Viet Nam: The Strain of Constant Combat

After a week of major battles, furious fighting and heavy casualties (TIME, Jan. 11), the war in South Viet Nam settled back last week into its normal pattern of vicious, hide-and-seek, hit-and-run engagements. One band of Communist Viet Cong guerrillas beheaded a government provincial district chief northwest of Saigon, and another knocked over a strategic hamlet in the northeast, capturing enough U.S. weapons to equip an entire Red company. With U.S. helicopter crews working overtime, government troops killed and wounded 75 Viet Cong and captured tons of supplies in a sweep through a redinfested area near the Cambodian Border."
Source: Time Magazine, Friday, January 18, 1963

Also on January 18, 1963: "...Krulak, now a major general, returns to Vietnam with a JCS team of six generals with the question, ‘Are we winning or are we losing?’ Harkins convinces the team chief, an Army general, that the U.S. is winning. The final report of Ap Bac attributes the report of the South Vietnamese defeat to misguided media reporting (Sheehan, 298-304).”
Source: The Bridges of Vietnam: From the Journals of a U.S. Marine Intelligence Officer, by Fred L. Edwards, University of North Texas Press, August 2000

January 19, 1963: David Halberstam reports “on complaints of U.S. helicopter pilots about the quality of their equipment.”
Source: The "Uncensored War": The Media and Vietnam,  by Daniel C. Hallin, Oxford University Press, 1986


Also on January 19 1963: “Memorandum From Robert Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy
Washington, January 19, 1963.

‘...in Southeast Asia, why spend billions containing Communist pressures on the mainland while leaving the Communists a free hand in the rich archipelago behind?’”
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VIII, National Security Policy, Document 124


Also on January 19, 1963: “The first COMUSMACV [Commander, U.S. Military Advisory Command, Vietnam] CPSVN [Comprehensive Plan for South Vietnam] [is] floated [today]. It envision[s] MAP [Military Assistance Program] for FY 1963-1964 at a total of $405 million. The total for FY 1965-1968 [is] $673 million. The RVNAF force level [is] to peak in FY 64 at 458,000 me . U.S. personnel in SVN [are] to drop from a high of 12.2 thousand in FY 65 to 5.9 thousand in FY 66, bottoming out in FY 68 at 1.5 thousand (Hq MAAG ) [Military Assistance Advisory Group]. No sooner was this first CPSVN cranked into the policy machinery than it conflicted with similar OSD/ISA [Office of the Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs] planning. This conflict between lSA/OSD guidance and COMUSMACV/Joint Staff planning was to be continued throughout the life of the CPSVN.”
Source: The Pentagon Papers, Pentagon-Papers-part-IV-B-4.pdf, p 8

Also on January 19, 1963: “Memorandum From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Harking) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Felt)
Saigon, January 19, 1963.

SUBJECT
Comprehensive Plan for South Vietnam

1. References:
a. JCS Msg 5455, DTG 262318Z Jul 62.
b. CINCPAC Msg DTG 140428Z Aug 62.
c. OSD Wash DC Msg DTG 082316Z Jan 63.
d. CINCPAC Msg DT-G 100910Z Jan 63.

2. In compliance with instructions contained references a. and b., an outline Comprehensive Plan for South Vietnam (CPSVN) covering the period FY 63-68 is hereby provided.

3. In view of the close relationship between this plan and the Military Assistance Plan, they should not continue to be treated as separate entities.

4. Consideration of the source and method of funding Switchback has been included in the plan, as well as the relationship of the CIDG [Civilian Irregular Defense Group program, pronounced "sid-gee”] Program to the GVN military and paramilitary forces.

5. It is recommended that:
a. The Comprehensive Plan for South Vietnam (CPSVN) be approved as the basis for preparation of the FY 64-69 MAP for South Vietnam.
b. Funding of Switchback in FY 64 and future years not be funded by the Vietnam MA Program.
c. Funds to support Switchback be administered through DA channels.

6. The US Ambassador concurs.
Paul D. Harkins

[Subenclosure]
COMPREHENSIVE PLAN FOR SOUTH VIETNAM

1. Requirement
During the Secretary of Defense Conference of 23 July 1962 in Hawaii, action was directed to develop a Comprehensive Plan for South Vietnam (CPSVN), looking ahead for three years and covering requirements in all categories of Government of Vietnam (GVN) military personnel, training and equipment. The plan was to be designed to meet the GVN military needs on an orderly basis so that, as US special military support assistance is withdrawn, the GVN would have developed the skills and the means to assume the total military responsibility."
Continued... Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 18, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

January 20, 1963: David Halberstam, Saigon. "Communist guerrillas trying to subvert this country admit to having underestimated the depth of United States intensions, according to an important captured document, and have had to move back their timetable for victory.
Source: The "Uncensored War": The Media and Vietnam, by Daniel C. Hallin, Oxford University Press, p 54

Also on Januray 20, 1963: John Duarte, PFC, Army, age 22, from San Antonio, TX, died in South Vietnam. Cause of death classified as non-hostile. His name is on Panel 1E, Row 17
Source: Vietnam Veterans Memorial Fund & The Virtual Wall

January 21, 1963: "Viet Reds See American Indecision Key to Victory
by Malcolm W. Browne
Saigon, South Viet Nam, (AP)

--A captured document indicates the Communists hope to wrest eventual victory in Viet Nam through what the Reds call indecision in Washington of the scale of American intervention."

"… The document says that the United States is afraid of committing large numbers of troops because that would invite intervention by the Communist bloc of nations and bring about a world war."
Source: Viet Reds See American Indecision Key to Victory, by Malcolm W. Browne, Amsterdam Evening Recorder and Daily Democrat, Amsterdam, NY

Also on January 21, 1963: "Document 2: Galbraith’s Published Journal Entry Account of the Conversation with Rapacki and Michałowski in New Delhi, 21 January 1963

January 22 – New Delhi

The Polish Foreign Minister, [Adam] Rapacki, has been visiting here. Last night I got word that he wanted to talk to me about Vietnam. I met him, along with the Secretary-General of the Polish Foreign Office [Jerzy Michałowski], at M.J. Desai’s house. They told me that while we [the United States] probably couldn’t lose in South Vietnam, we couldn’t win. Meanwhile we are forcing North Vietnam to look more and more to the Chinese for protection. This is bad. Why not get a liberal government in South Vietnam which all could support? In return, Ho Chi Minh would call off the insurrection. I had to improvise for, of course, I was without instruction. So I countered by asking why not call off the insurrection for six months and with this manifestation of good faith, we could then withdraw. They said that North Vietnam could not get peace in the south so long as Diem was in charge. They said (approximately), “You know enough of Marx yourself to know about popular movements.”¹⁴ I responded, “But you should be good enough Communists to know about the international leadership of the Communist movement.” They replied that, under present circumstances, given the split between Russia and China, any reference to international leadership was to a myth. I noted that if it were easy to throw out leaders such as Diem, we would have thrown out Castro. But we weren’t that powerful.¹⁵

14 The reference is to my American Capitalism: The Concept of Countervailing Power (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1952, 1956), which is regarded by some Marxian scholars as showing enlightened Marxist influences.

15 This conversation was, of course, promptly reported. It was ignored by the State Department but picked up from the cables by President Kennedy. He told [Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern W. Affairs Averell] Harriman to have me pursue the matter as he was much interested. By the time his instruction came, Rapacki had departed.

[Source: John Kenneth Galbraith, Ambassador’s Journal: A personal Account of the Kennedy Years (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1969; New American Library/Signet paperback ed., 1970), p. 466.]"
Source: Poland and Vietnam, 1963: New Evidence on Secret Communist
Diplomacy and the "Maneli Affair," by Margaret K. Gnoinska, Cold War International History Project, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

January 22, 1963: "Record of the 508th Meeting of the National Security Council

Assistance to Foreign Countries

The President said he wanted to make clear that we are giving aid to foreign countries in order to increase the security of the United States—not primarily for humanitarian reasons. AID programs should be tested against the contribution they make toward improving our national security. Recalling that the military could always get Congress to appropriate funds for military assistance, the President asked that Defense Department officials help sell Congress on economic assistance. Some Congressmen will try to cut the heart out of the AID program. Should they succeed, we would be in real danger. A major effort is required to prevent this. We must make every effort to keep countries out of the Communist bloc. Once a country is in, we know from experience that it is very difficult to get it out. We cannot risk the possibility of four or five countries suddenly turning Communist just because we did not give them economic and military aid. An outside group is now reviewing the existing AID program for the purpose of ensuring that our assistance to foreign countries will best serve our own national interest.” Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VIII, National Security Policy, Document 125, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

Also on January 22, 1963: "The 19th Quartermaster Detachment (Petroleum Quality Surveillance) was assigned 22 January 1963 in support of the 18th Aviation Company (FWLT) at Nha Trang" Source: 45th TRANSPORTATION BATTALION HISTORY, 1 JAN - 30 JUNE 1963

January 23, 1963: “16. Letter From the Counselor of the Embassy in Vietnam (Manfull) to the Director of the Vietnam Working Group (Wood)
Saigon, January 23, 1963.

Source: Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 67 D 54, Def-19 Milit Assist-3rd country. Secret; Limit Distribution; Official-Informal.

DEAR BEN: During Admiral Felt's recent visit, one of the subjects discussed at some length was the augmentation of Farmgate. Some time prior to Admiral Felt's arrival, MACV, without clearing it with the Embassy, requested that Farmgate be augmented by 10 B-26's, 5 T-28's and 2 C-47's. By the time we found out about it, the JCS had already approved it. During Admiral Felt's visit the Ambassador pointed out this lack of coordination to General Harkins, who expressed surprise that the Embassy had not been consulted and said he would ask his staff to coordinate with the Embassy on such matters in the future. Because the Farmgate augmentation in question was of limited size, and therefore appeared to have no serious political implications, the Ambassador concurred in it ex post facto.

At the same time, we learned that MACV had informed CINCPAC that it was considering requesting a second, whopping Farmgate augmentation to meet the requirements of the "National Campaign.'' MACV wanted to request:

1 sqn of B-26's (25 aircraft)
1 sqn of T-28's (25 aircraft)
2 sqns of C-123's (16 aircraft each)
1 company of Caribous (25 aircraft)
3 sqns of L-19's (22 aircraft each)

Admiral Felt pointed out to General Harkins that such a request would mean that the GVN in fact was unable to achieve victory over the VC without a significantly increased US commitment in Viet-Nam. The Admiral also informed MACV that, in endorsing the latter's first Farmgate augmentation request, he had felt obliged to state to the JCS that there would be no additional similar requests. He asked MACV to study the matter further in light of his views, and to tailor its request accordingly. He agreed to receive the request but did not commit himself to it.” Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January-August 1963, Released by the Office of the Historian, US Dept of State Documents 1 through 18

January 24, 1963: "Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam
Washington, January 24, 1963, 1:31 p.m.

Joint State/USIA. WG/VN for TF/Saigon. Request your frank, general, and confidential evaluation overall job being done by U.S. newsmen in reporting war in Viet-Nam to U.S. public. Context our concern as follows:

1. We are still getting adverse play in daily press; somewhat better coverage in weekly publications (e.g. Newsweek Jan 28, Life Jan 25). In general war in Viet-Nam going better than being reported to U.S. public.
2. Poor relations between U.S. press reps and GVN not likely be significantly improved.
3. Realize wire service correspondents have difficulty in leaving Saigon, where they in contact with home office, to go into country.
4. If correspondent has time, how difficult is it for him to get transportation a, to cover military operations, b) to go into countryside to cover strategic hamlets and other rural activities?

In general is it TF view that, given local obstacles and problems, U.S. correspondents are doing adequate or inadequate job of covering war?

Would appreciate your carefully weighed overall view this long vexed question and would welcome any suggestions as to how we may assist or encourage them to do better job either here or in Saigon.

Rusk"
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963,Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 17

January 25, 1963: “Memorandum From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Felt) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Honolulu, January 25, 1963.

CINCPAC 3010 Ser 0079

SUBJ
Comprehensive Plan for South Vietnam (CPSVN)

REF
(a) CINCPAC Record of Sixth Secretary of Defense Conference of 23 July 1962, dtd 26 July 1962 (Item No.2)
(b) JCS Msg 5455, DTG 262318Z July 1962
(c) OSD Msg DEF 923923, DTG 222243Z January 1963

ENCL
(1) Comprehensive Plan for South Vietnam

1. Pursuant to directives in references (a) and (b), subject plan has been prepared to provide for bringing the counterinsurgency effort to a successful conclusion, withdrawing U.S. special military assistance, and developing within GVN a capability to defend against the continuing threat in Southeast Asia.

2. The primary limiting factor in developing this plan was the GVN capability to provide necessary trained personnel within a short period of time to efficiently assume those special functions now being executed by U.S. military personnel. Shortages of junior leaders, pilots and personnel with special skills will exist to some extent into FY 65. However, such shortages are not considered of sufficient magnitude to affect the feasibility of the plan."
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 18, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

Also on January 25, 1963: "At the Indian Government's request, United States, Britain, Canada and Australia are studying plans to move interceptive squadrons into India for her air defense in case of another attack by Communist China." Source: New York Times Chronology, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library & Museum, January, 1963

Also on January 25, 1963: "Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hilsman) and Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to the President
Washington, January 25, 1963.

A REPORT ON SOUTH VIETNAM

The war in South Vietnam is clearly going better than it was a year ago. The government claims to have built more than 4,000 Strategic Hamlets, and although many of these are nothing more than a bamboo fence, a certain proportion have enough weapons to keep out at least small Viet Cong patrols and the rudiments of the kind of social and political program needed to enlist the villagers' support.

The program to arm and train the Montagnards, which should go far toward choking off the infiltration routes, has also made progress. There are 29 U.S. Special Forces teams training Montagnards (as well as certain minority groups in the Delta), with eleven more teams on the way. By mid-autumn training camps had been set up in all the provinces bordering Laos, and a system of regular patrolling started that hopefully will one day cover the entire network of trails in the mountain regions. Under this program over 35,000 Montagnards have been trained, armed, and assisted in setting up their village defenses, the eventual goal being one hundred thousand.”

“...A decision has been reached to transfer from CIA to the Army the training of certain paramilitary groups including the Montagnards. This is known as “Operation Switchback”. The Agency is making a sincere effort to carry out this decision, but serious difficulties are arising from the Army's rather inflexible budgetary and personnel procedures. These programs require unconventional disbursements of local currency, rapid air delivery of specialized equipment and rapid construction of storage facilities. The Army may eventually work these problems out; but in the meantime the program should not be allowed to slacken at this critical point. “Operation Switchback” should be extended, if necessary.”
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 19, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

January 26, 1963: “The first official Government of Vietnam (GVN) reference to Chieu Hoi came in... President Ngo Dinh Diem’s Tet or Lunar New Year speech of 26 January 1963. An official Vietnamese decree of the following April out-lined the basic elements of Chieu Hoi, which remain, interestingly enough, little changed to this day. The broad purposes of the effort were much like those of the surrender program in Malaya, reflecting the assistance and experience afforded the United States Mission and the GVN by British and Australian veterans of that emergency. Most notable of this group is, of course, Sir Robert Thompson, who has served as a special adviser in Saigon for several years. Stated very generally, the Chieu Hoi surrender program is intended to

· weaken the Viet Cong as an effective fighting force
· create dissension and mistrust within the guerrilla political-military organization
· gather useful intelligence about guerrilla personnel, supplies, and techniques
· build an image of the Government of Vietnam that is firm but benevolent
· reintroduce the returnee into the mainstream of life under the GVN.”
Source: CHIEU HOI: THE SURRENDER PROGRAM IN VIETNAM, by Garry D. Brewer, Phuoc Tuy, 10 November 1966

January 27, 1963: "On 21 November 1962, the Office of the U.S. Secretary of Defense approved the recommended U.S. Medical Civic Action Program (MEDCAP) for Republic of Vietnam. The program was implemented 27 January 1963."
Source: Military Medicine to Win Hearts and Minds: Aid to Civilians in the Vietnam War,  by Robert J. Wilensky, Texas Tech University Press, 2004

January 28, 1963: "Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to the President
Washington, January 28, 1963.
SOUTH VIETNAM

You asked for a list of actions which you might take to follow up on Roger Hilsman's and my report on South Vietnam.

General Wheeler is returning to Washington on Wednesday. I suggest you meet with him, Secretary McNamara, Governor Harriman, Director McCone and General Taylor on Friday to hear his report. At that meeting you might keep the following points in mind for discussion and action:

1. Start looking for a successor to Fritz Nolting, whose tour comes to an end in April unless he is reappointed. More vigor is needed in getting Diem to do what we want.

2. Review of the command relationship between CinCPac and Harkins. Ideally Harkins should report to the JCS directly. If you don't want to go this far right away, you might ask General Taylor to discuss with CinCPac the strategy of the war in South Vietnam and perhaps suggest less interference in the tactical aspects of General Harkins' job.

3. The press problem needs attention. You might ask Governor Harriman and the press people to review our own policies. I think we have not been candid enough with them and consequently have generated suspicion and disbelief. The USIA chief in SVN, John Mecklin, has recommended that the U.S. begin giving our newsmen briefings, including a limited amount of classified information whether the GVN likes it or not. He further suggests that our people in the field be instructed to ignore any efforts by the GVN to prevent them from cooperating with U.S. newsmen.

4. You might also ask General Wheeler whether he is satisfied that enough emphasis is being placed upon clear and hold operations' as distinguished from large scale hit and run strikes involving a possible over-use of U.S. helicopters.

5. You might ask John McCone to see if his people think “Operation Switchback” (the shift of responsibility for paramilitary training from CIA to the Army) should be delayed at least until the Army can assure its continuity.

Before your meeting on Friday I will supply you with a check list to remind you of these and other questions you may want to raise.
A National Security Action Memorandum has gone out to the Departments concerned directing them to clear all VIP trips to South Vietnam with Governor Harriman.
MV Forrestal”
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 21, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

January 29, 1963: "Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Vietnam Working Group (Heavner) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Harriman)
Washington, January 29, 1963.

SUBJECT
Contacts with Vietnamese Opposition Parties

During your discussions with Mr. Forrestal and Mr. Hilsman following their return from Viet-Nam, the question of adequate contact with Vietnamese oppositionists was raised. As I recall, Mr. Forrestal indicated his feeling that we are not sufficiently aware of opposition activities. I said that State Department personnel are not permitted to maintain contacts with known oppositionists, [2 lines not declassified].

[1 paragraph (4 lines) not declassified]

I am not sure that the policy of no contact with lower level State Department officers is necessarily the right policy. However, this has been the policy for the last five years to my knowledge. A change now would almost certainly be interpreted by Diem as an effort to undermine his regime.” Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 22, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

January 30, 1963: "Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the United States Information Agency (Wilson) to the Director (Murrow)
Washington, January 30, 1963.

At the January 17 CI meeting there was a long discussion about U.S. press coverage of Viet-Nam. The feeling of the group was that, although our policies were correct in Viet-Nam you would never know it from the press coverage of Viet-Nam in this country. I was charged by the CI group to ask Pierre to hold a meeting on the problem and see what solutions might be devised. A meeting was held on January 21 with Bob Manning, Secretary Sylvester, Ralph Dungan and myself in Salinger's office.

We agreed that there are two layers to the problem:

1. Past U.S. policy of laying back and letting the Vietnamese take the lead in dealing with the press must be reviewed. John Mecklin's memorandum was read and discussed at some length. It was the opinion of all of us that Mecklin's memorandum goes in the right direction. Salinger said that he would give the memorandum to the President and send it back to us with the President's reactions. Unfortunately, the President still has the memorandum and he has not reacted, although I have jogged Pierre a couple of times. Apparently there isn't much Pierre can do about it, since he knows the President has the memorandum and has asked him about it at least once since the meeting.

2. Devise means whereby favorable accounts of the situation in Viet-Nam can be given to the right press men under the right circumstances. Under this approach, two things have happened:
a. Admiral Felt will hold an on-the-record press conference this week.

b. General Wheeler will issue a statement next Tuesday, upon his return, and then hold an on-the-record press conference. It is also hoped that he can be teed up for a subsequent National Press Club luncheon but early optimism on this has faded somewhat.

Meanwhile, Governor Harriman reacted so favorably to the Mecklin memorandum that he sent a letter to Ambassador Nolting in which he suggested three areas of improvement which Nolting should explore: Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 23, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

Also on January 30, 1963: "Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Harriman) to the Ambassador in Vietnam (Nolting)
Washington, January 30, 1963.

Dear Fritz: I can imagine that the flood of unfavorable news stories about the helicopter operation of January 2-3 has given you as much pain as me, particularly those stories alleging that American military spokesmen made such statements as, “It was a miserable damn performance.” I know that press relations is one of your biggest headaches.

The purpose of this letter is to explore with you what further steps can be taken in Saigon & Washington to improve the situation. I realize that a great deal has been done by you and your able PAO, John Mecklin, but more objective reporting in the U.S. press is of great importance. I know I don't have to emphasize to you the need for support and understanding at home for the expensive, continuing and sometimes dangerous programs which we are carrying out in Viet-Nam.

I suggest we take a look at the problem under three heads: the handling of foreign journalists by the Vietnamese Government; critical statements made by American advisers in the heat of battle; and the amount of news that American officials themselves should make available to U.S. journalists in Viet-Nam.

As to Vietnamese briefings of the press and restrictions on the press, there does not seem to be much chance of an adequate improvement. You have done a great deal to encourage the Vietnamese to tell their story of their war and should continue to do so. However, since this is also a war which involves very important American policies, commitments and risk to American personnel, the American public has a right to the best possible American information even if this does offend Vietnamese sensitivities. It is for you to decide whether this should be explained to the Vietnamese or whether we should simply take the initiative to increase our briefings and contacts." Continued... Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 24, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

January 31, 1963: "Memorandum From the Director of the Vietnam Working Group (Wood) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Harriman)
Washington, January 31, 1963.

SUBJECT
Comments on Senator Mansfield Report

The following comments are keyed to the pagination of the report:

Page 1: Our aid programs were “ill conceived and badly administered.”
Comment: Our old military aid program was ill-conceived since it was designed to repel overt invasion. This concept was changed in late 1959. Our old economic aid program was well-conceived but badly administered.

Page 2: American and Vietnamese officials speak of success in a year or two.
Comment: Only General Harkins says this and we have repeatedly suggested to the military that he be dissuaded from voicing such an estimate. The guerrilla wars in Greece, Malaya and the Philippines each lasted the better part of a decade. If we can win in five years we will be doing twice as well as was done in the others. The British knew they would win in Malaya in 1951 but did not achieve preponderant control for four years. We will be doing well if by the end of 1963 there are enough indications for us to say we can win.

Page 3: The growth of Viet Cong strength during 1962.
Comment: Our own strength also grew during 1962. The ratio of Vietnamese military and paramilitary to Viet Cong military and paramilitary (i.e., all forces of both sides) was 2-1/2 to 1 in our favor at the end of 1961. It has now grown to 3-1/2 to 1 in our favor, still a narrow margin in terms of the 10 to 1 or 20 to 1 cited as being necessary in the textbooks. However, our side has tremendous strength in men and equipment.

Page 3: Road travel and rice as indicators of improvement.
Comment: The change from a near panic shortage of rice to large exportable stocks during 1962 was more than an indicator. Perhaps the most important indicator was that the VC were unable to escalate the size and number of their attacks during 1962. If guerrilla forces are unable to steadily increase the size and number of their attacks they lose momentum. When a force which is inferior in size such as the VC once loses momentum it is extraordinarily difficult for it to regain momentum.

Page 4: The Viet Cong tactics can change.
Comment: Viet Cong tactics and our own change constantly. As guerrillas the Viet Cong strategy of living off the peasants while attempting to gain their support cannot change. They have no other major source of supply which is easily available and if their revolution is to succeed they must have peasant support. Strategic hamlets are designed to make the sea of Vietnamese peasants an inhospitable element for the VC fish.

Do the peasants support the Viet Cong merely out of fear or indifference?
Comment: No one really knows what the Vietnamese peasants think. However we believe it wise to assume that they will align themselves with whichever side appears stronger and more capable of benefiting them. This provides a reasonable basis for our programs.

Page 6: Can we win with Diem?
Comment: For a year we have increasingly shifted the emphasis of our programs to the province level.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 25, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

Also on January 31, 1963: Leon Joseph Kramer, Age 29, Capt, Army, of Trenton, NJ, is killed.
Casualty reason: Ground casualty, gun or small arms fire. Location: Quang Ngai Province, South Vietnam.
Sources: Vietnam Veterans Memorial Fund & The Virtual Wall

June 1962 - July 1962 - August 1962 - September 1962 - October 1962
November 1962 - December 1962
January 1963 - February 1963 - March 1963 - April 1963 - May 1963
Current Month

February 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28

February 1, 1963: “General Wheeler [meets]with the President to report on this trip. General Wheeler recommends that the US maintain the current general level of support for the South Vietnamese government. He also tells the President and his advisors that:

"the Vietcong are not bleeding in this war. The South Vietnamese are bleeding… in other words, they are suffering sizable losses, but the losses suffered by the Vietcong are negligible. Out of the 20,000-odd Vietcong that were killed last year…I would say that not more than a half a dozen that Ho Chi Minh could care--gives a damn--about. The rest of them….are fellows with the Vietnamese equivalent of the name 'Joe' -- and he can get plenty more of them and does."

Later in the meeting Wheeler recommends a policy to: "let the blood that we feel needs to be let in order to make Ho Chi Minh recognize that he can’t fight this war for free." [Tape #71]“ Source: John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, 2003

Also on February 1, 1963: "Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to the President
Washington, February 1, 1963.
SOUTH VIETNAM

You are meeting this afternoon at 4:30 p.m. with Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, Mr. Gilpatric, General Taylor, General Wheeler, Governor Harriman, Director McCone, Mr. David Bell and Mr. William Bundy. The announced purpose of the meeting is to give you an opportunity to hear General Wheeler's report on his trip to South Vietnam.

As a means of stimulating action, you may wish to put some of the following questions:

1. Should General Harkins report directly to the JCS instead of CinCPac?

2. In view of Ambassador Nolting's completion of his two-year extension in South Vietnam in mid-April, should we consider a new appointment?

3. Have we been as firm as we should with the GVN in putting our views across on our military, domestic and foreign policy?

4. Is U.S. air power (“Farm Gate”) being used effectively to support our guerrilla war strategy, i.e.:
(a) Is enough emphasis being: placed on close air support and liaison capabilities as against air strikes and interdiction?
(b) Has it been resolved whether the Army or the Air Force will provide liaison and quick response to calls for help from our Special Forces people in exposed and isolated training camps?
(c) Are we paying enough attention to the problem of quick reinforcement of strategic hamlets by ground and air when they are attacked?

5. Why do we have such a bad press from South Vietnam? Should we be more forthcoming with the U.S. press in Saigon despite GVN objections?

6. Does Director McCone feel that “Operation Switchback” (the transfer of paramilitary training [less then 1 line not declassified] to Army Special Forces) is progressing smoothly, or should it be stretched out to allow the Army more time to work out its funding procedures?

7. Have we thought about the danger of creating too many separate and disorganized paramilitary organizations? Is this an efficient use of manpower? Has any thought been given to providing a police force to control the movement of peoples and goods in areas which have been cleared by government forces?
MF"
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 27, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

Also on February 1, 1963: "Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Director, Pacific and Far East Division, United States Information Agency (Moore) to the Deputy Director (Wilson)
Washington, February 1, 1963.
SUBJECT
Press Relations in Viet-Nam

Governor Harriman said in his staff meeting this morning that General Wheeler would make a very strong report on the sad condition of GVN relations with the press. Governor Harriman has urged the Secretary to make a public statement deploring GVN treatment of press. (At his press conference this morning the Secretary said: “But let me say quite frankly that we have not been satisfied with the opportunities given to the press in Viet-Nam for full and candid coverage of this situation there, and we are discussing this matter from time to time and most urgently with the Government of Viet-Nam.” The Governor continued in substance that we must start calling some of the tunes and Diem must take our advice. This issue good one for test of wills.

Comment:
Although a public statement here could make John Mecklin's idea of unattributed U.S. press briefings a matter of direct confrontation with GVN; depending on how it played in Saigon, such a statement could serve only to strengthen Embassy's hand and put GVN on notice to acquiesce quietly to our projected press program.

The Governor stressed that statement necessary for U.S. consumption.”
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 28,Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

February 2, 1963: "SUPPORT UNITS ATTACHED
In consonance with its missions, three direct support units were attached to the 114th to accompany it overseas. The first of these was the 544th Transportation Detachment (CHFM), commanded by Caption J.C. Droke, Transportation Corps. The 554th, with an authorized strength of one officer, one warrent officer, and 75 enlisted men, was attached on 2 February 1963."
Source: BATTALION HISTORY, 114th AIR MOBILE LIGHT (1963)

February 3, 1963: "Detachment 2A of the 1st Air Commando Group was located at Bien Hoa Air Base and flew several different types of aircraft - B-26s, T-28s, and C-47s - in support of the South Vietnamese. On 03 Feb 1963, B-26 tail number 44-35692 was shot down while conducting a strafing run against a Viet Cong unit in the Mekong Delta. All three crewmen were killed in the crash:"
(Source: The Virtual Wall)

John Peter Bartley, Findlay, OH
Capt - O3 - Air Force - Reserve
Length of service 8 years
In Military Region 4, South Vietnam
Hostile, died while missing, Fixed Wing - Pilot
Air Loss, Crash On Land
Body was recovered
Panel 01E - Line 18

John F. Shaughnessy, Houston, TX
Capt - O3 - Air Force - Reserve
Length of service 8 years
Casualty was on Feb 3, 1963
In Ba Xugen, South Vietnam
Hostile, died while missing, Fixed Wing - Crew, Co-Pilot
Air Loss, Crash On Land
Body was recovered
Panel 01E - Line 18

RVAF observer, name and rank unknown

Source:
The Vietnam Veterans Memorial Wall, The Wall-USA

Also on February 3, 1963: Robert W. Barnett is appointed Deputy Assistant Secretary Far Eastern Economic Affairs

February 4, 1963: "Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to the President
Washington, February 4, 1963.
SOUTH VIETNAM

The meeting with General Wheeler on Friday was a complete waste of your time for which I apologize. It was intended to provide you an opportunity to initiate action on some of the problems in South Vietnam described in the Eyes Only Annex to Hilsman's and my report. The rosy euphoria generated by General Wheeler's report4 made this device unworkable.

The problems remain, however, and I would suggest another technique to solve them. If you approve, Governor Harriman and I will start a quiet campaign in the appropriate departments for the following objectives:

1. to get General Harkins a direct line of communication to the JCS, or, alternatively and less desirably, to persuade CinCPac to delegate more responsibility to Saigon;

2. to look for a replacement for Fritz Nolting when his 2-year term is up in April;

3. to encourage our civilian and military people in Saigon to put across more forcefully to the GVN U.S. views on fighting the war and on foreign policy;

4. to develop gradually a more independent posture for the U.S. in South Vietnam and very carefully to dissociate ourselves from those policies and practices of the GVN of which we disapprove with good reason;

5. to stimulate Defense to examine more carefully whether our Special Forces camps and the strategic hamlets are getting effective close air support when they are attacked;

6. to make a rapid and vigorous effort to improve press relations in Saigon, even at some cost to our relationship with the Diem Government;

7. to determine, before any slack occurs, whether the transfer of paramilitary training [less than 1 line not declassified] to the Army should be stretched out:

8. to get the field to consider whether we are supporting too many paramilitary organizations and overlooking some of the specific needs, such as a police force for movement control.
I don't think we should start on such a campaign of persuasion without your knowledge and approval. You may prefer simply to tell me to go ahead, or perhaps you would prefer to speak with Averell on these subjects.
MV Forrestal"
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 29, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

February 5, 1963: "Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State
Saigon, February 5, 1963, 1 p.m.

726. CINCPAC for POLAD. Task Force message. Deptels 729,² 731.³ Quality of reporting by US newsmen here is probably as good as average reporting of stateside story like earthquake or Hollywood divorce. Difference between Vietnam and that kind of story is not only that accurate information more difficult to come by (and accuracy far more important), but also that balanced judgment on extraordinarily complex and mixed situation in this country is inherently difficult to reach. Latter is in fact perhaps too much to hope for from young reporters with limited facilities for coverage and research.

We do not think, either, that newsmen here now are deliberately trying to undermine US effort (though their work can certainly have that result).

There was no malice for example in early Agency report that Captain Good was killed at Ap Bac while trying futilely to get Vietnamese to fight. Newsmen got this version from American advisors who believed it true themselves at time and were understandably bitter. Impact on US public opinion apparently was incendiary, with damage irrevocably done when correct version was available next day. Withholding an angle like this to major highly competitive story to take time for difficult double-checking requires very high degree reportorial restraint and judgment-which it not realistic to expect from average Agency reporter-rests in fact that major US news organizations like UPI, AP and NY Times use men (average age 27) with approximately same experience to cover Vietnam as they do routine stateside police beat. These three, furthermore, are only US organizations that consider story important enough to station full-time staff correspondent in Saigon. Other outfits use part-time stringers and sporadic visits by staffers stationed elsewhere, usually Hong Kong or Tokyo.” Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 30, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

Also on February 5, 1963: "Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam
Washington, February 6, 1963, 1:10 p.m.

771. Embtels 644, 686. After weighing all factors concerned and taking into account your views and those DOD, it is Department's view that we should not commit ourselves at this time to turn over jets (RT-33 and T-33) to GVN.

Recognize need for increased reconnaissance capability and desirability of having GVN embark on this task as part of overall long-term policy giving GVN increasing responsibility for its own defense. However, due to overriding political considerations, involving escalation from US-controlled to GVN-controlled jets as this might affect NVN, Laos situation and Cambodia, we cannot afford take unnecessary international risks now.

You should, therefore, inform Thuan in terms you think appropriate that we are not prepared to turn over jets at this time. FYI. We are prepared to review this question periodically and propose to do so next in March. End FYI.
Rusk"
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 31, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

February 6, 1963: "U.S. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara appeared at a nationally televised press conference from the White House to show proof, with photographs from U-2 spy planes, that all offensive missiles had been removed from Cuba” Source: Wikipedia, February 6, 1963

Also on February 6, 1963: KIA: "James Raymond O Neill
Maj - O4 - Air Force - Regular
Length of service 18 years
Casualty was on Feb 6, 1963
In Pleiku, South Vietnam
Hostile, died while missing, Fixed Wing - Pilot
Air Loss, Crash On Land
Body was recovered
Panel 01E - Line 18
Source: The Vietnam Veterans Memorial Wall, The Wall-USA

February 7, 1963: "Minutes of a Meeting of the Special Group for Counterinsurgency
Washington, February 7, 1963, 2 p.m.
PRESENT

Mr. Johnson, The Attorney General, Mr. Bell, Mr. Murrow, Mr. Forrestal, Mr. Bundy vice Mr. Gilpatric, General Krulak vice General Taylor, Mr. Colby vice Mr. McCone
Mr. Wood was present for Items 1 and 2

1. Report by General Krulak ² on the Situation in South Viet-Nam
General Krulak prefixed [prefaced?] his remarks with the comment that he believes real progress has been made in the struggle against the Viet Cong since the occasion of his last visit during the summer of 1962. There has been a continuous improvement in intelligence activities and apparent modest gains in the economic area. Vietnamese military operations are moving in the right direction, although more urging is required by U.S. advisors to maintain this momentum.
On the negative side, General Krulak stated that the MAAG and the Assistance Command could be drawn closer together. Coordination of air operations should be improved. Reaction time for air support must be reduced, greater rapport must be established with the Vietnamese in order to obtain advance information on planned operations. Rules of engagement should be modified to permit U.S. armed helicopters to fire upon the Viet Cong without having to wait to be fired upon.

Relative to these rules, the Attorney General suggested that an early decision should be sought as to whether or not this would be desirable. General Krulak will follow through on this. General Krulak continued by stating that Vietnamese morale is good, and suggested that Viet Cong morale is deteriorating. The latter judgment was based on increased defections, the difficulty in retaining personnel, and their demonstrated need to capture supplies, especially medicines."
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 32, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

February 8, 1963: "Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Harriman)
Washington, February 8, 1963.
SUBJECT
Contacts with Vietnamese Opposition

In our report Roger and I did suggest that consideration be given to expanding the contacts between U.S. personnel in Saigon and noncommunist elements of the Vietnamese opposition.
There are, I think, two major reasons for doing this. First, it would be part of a carefully designed program to establish a somewhat more independent U.S. position in SVN. Second, it should eventually increase our alternatives in the event of an accident which results in a shift in the government.

I agree with Fritz Nolting that there are dangers in raising old suspicions in the mind of President Diem and his family about U.S. intentions. But I think that the risks in remaining too closely tied to Diem's government will increase rather than decrease as time goes on." Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 33, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

February 9, 1963: Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Harriman) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Taylor)¹
Washington, February 9, 1963.

Dear Max: I had a good talk this morning with General Wheeler about his trip,² and touched on the question of whether General Harkins should report direct to the Joint Chiefs, rather than CINCPAC. This was raised by the President and the Secretary of State in our meeting last week.

To cite detailed complaints would obscure the main issue which is that if we are to win in Viet-Nam, our people there must have the fullest possible authority with clear lines of responsibility. This is a war of constant, small incidents and innumerable daily problems of every kind. We must leave these decisions to those in the field and permit them to act as quickly as necessary. Continued…
Source: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1961–1963, VOLUME III, VIETNAM, JANUARY–AUGUST 1963, DOCUMENT 37

Also on February 9, 1963: Memorandum of Conversation Between the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Harriman) and the Chief of Staff, United States Army (Wheeler), Department of State¹
Washington, February 9, 1963, 11:30 a.m.

During his call on me on Saturday, February 9, General Wheeler spoke of General Harkins' difficulties with Diem, and said:

1. General Harkins has been urging Diem to end the small self-defense units which are in static posts. He believes self-defense units should be in larger units, with active patrols laying ambush for Viet Cong.

2. General Harkins feels Diem has been overly cautious in offensive actions in engagement with the Viet-Cong. Diem doesn't want losses. Officers involved in action should be told not to be afraid of blame on account of losses. At the present time, they are afraid if they attack they will be criticized for losses that are sustained. Continued…
Source: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1961–1963, VOLUME III, VIETNAM, JANUARY–AUGUST 1963, DOCUMENT 36

February 10, 1963: "AP Interview [with Robert S. McNamara]

Question: What is your assessment of the prospects in South Vietnam a year after this country started its big drive to help the pro-Western government stamp out the Communist guerrillas?

Answer: You may recall that while I have expressed satisfaction on several occasions during the past year with the progress of the operations in South Vietnam, I have on each occasion cautioned against the conclusion that the progress is leading; toward a near-term victory. On each occasion I have indicated that a period of years would be required to wipe out the Communist aggression in that country. Progress has been made, however, during this past year, I can cite some of the factors that lead me to make that statement - - - I cite these as favorable factors indicating. that we believe the South Vietnamese government and we have made progress during this past year. But I don't wish to indicate to you that that progress has resulted or will result in the near future in defeat of the Viet Cong. We have-blunted the attack, but we haven't defeated it."

Source: Extracts of Statements By Robert S. McNamara On The Outlook In South Vietnam, The Harold Weisberg Archive, Digital Collection

February 11, 1963: Killed In Action:
Bernard Leroy Gray
SFC, Army, MAAGV 134th Med Det
Length of service 16 years
Casualty Area: South Vietnam
Non-Hostile, Helicopter - NonCrew
Air Loss, Crash on Land
Body was recovered
Panel 01E - Line 18
Source: The Vietnam Veterans Memorial Wall, The Wall-USA

Also on February 11, 1963: "A U.S Army sergeant was killed...in a freak accident at an airfield south of Saigon, [raising] to 69 the number of [Americans] who have died in South Viet Nam since the States stepped up aid in 1961. A spokesman said the sergeant had jumped out of a helicopter after serving as a crewman on a mission when a machine gun¹ mounted in the door was discharged accidentally by another crewman² Source: 1: Newspaper Archive, San Mateo Times, Tuesday, February 12, 1963, p 6, 2: Newspaper Archive, Bakersfield Californian, Tuesday, February 12, 1963, p 9

** While Bernard Leroy Gray was the only Sergeant killed so far this February, we have yet to locate a source linking him with this reporting. If you know of available documentation, please forward it to us here and we'll work to incorporate the information into this date. Thank you.

Also on February 11, 1963: "Americans Rescued After 'Copter Crash - SAIGON, South Viet Nam (UPI) —A U.S. Army helicopter crashed Monday in Communist-infested jungle mountains north of Saigon but Vietnamese ground patrols rescued all six Americans aboard, military sources reported today. The sources said the Americans apparently escaped without injury in the crash of the helicopter near the Laotian border about 210 miles north of Saigon, pause of
the crash was not known." Source: North Tonawanda NY Evening News, Tuesday, February 12, 1963, p 15

Also on February 11, 1963: "The following [is a case history] of [a] North Vietnamese [soldier] sent by the Hanoi regime into South Viet-Nam. [His is] only an [illustratrion]. [It, and others, show] that the leadership and specialized personnel for the guerrilla war in South Viet-Nam consists in large part of members of the North Viet-Nam armed forces, trained in the North and subject to the command and discipline of Hanoi.

1. Tran Quoc Dan Dan was a VC major, commander of the 60th Battalion (sometimes known as the 34th Group of the Thon-Kim. Battalion). Disillusioned with fighting his own countrymen and with communism and the lies of the Hanoi regime, he surrendered to the authorities in South Viet-Nam on February 11, 1963.

At the age of 15 he joined the revolutionary army (Viet Minh) and fought against the French
forces until 1954 when the Geneva accords ended Maj. Tran Quoc Dan. the Indochina War. As a regular in the Viet Minh forces, he was moved to North Viet-Nam. He became an officer in the so-called People's Army.

In March 1962 Major Dan received orders to prepare to move to South Viet-Nam. He had been
exposed to massive propaganda in the North which told of the destitution of the peasants in
the South and said that the Americans had taken over the French role of colonialists. He said later that an important reason for his decision to surrender was that he discovered these propaganda themes were lies. He found the peasants more prosperous than the people in the North. And he recognized quickly that he was not fighting the Americans but his own people.
With the 600 men of his unit, Major Dan left Hanoi on March 23,1962. They traveled through
the Laos corridor. His group joined up with the Viet Cong First Regiment in central Viet-Nam.
The 35-year-old major took part, in 45 actions and was wounded once in an unsuccessful VC
attack on an outpost. As time passed he became increasingly discouraged by his experience as a VC troop commander. Most of all, he said, he was tired of killing other Vietnamese. After
several months of soul-searching he decided to surrender to the authorities of the Republic of
Viet-Nam. He has volunteered to do "anything to serve the national cause" of South Viet-Nam
Source: Items-in-Peace-keeping operations - Vietnam - documents, created 23/09/1963, United Nations

February 12, 1963: “SAIGON—U.S. Embassy officials in South Vietnam have denied reports that President Kennedy has been asked for permission to launch raids into North Vietnam and Laos. They also denied that U.S.' officers were taking over operational control of South Vietnamese-troops.” Source: Daily Princetonian, Volume 87, Number 7, 12 February 1963

Also on February 12, 1963: “After the arrival in Vietnam of the advance Special Forces team and its designation as Headquarters, U.S. Army Special Forces (Provisional), Vietnam, in September 1962, the headquarters remained at Saigon, sharing administrative tasks with CAS Saigon until 12 February 1963. The new headquarters then moved to Nha Trang, a more central location from which to control and logistically support the CIDG Program.” Source: VIETNAM STUDIES, THE DEVELOPMENT AND TRAINING OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE ARMY, CHAPTER II, The Crucial Years, 1960-19641950-1972,by Brigadier General James Lawton Collins, Jr., DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, Washington, D. C., 1991

Also on February 12, 1963: "In an act very unusual in Laotian politics, assassins murdered Ketsana. On that very day Souvanna and Pholsena left Laos with the king to tour all the countries that had signed the Geneva Protocol." Source: LAOS: The Geneva Protocol And the Not-So-Secret War, by John Prados

February 13, 1963: KIA: Robert Burgert, Age 32, SGT, Army, Cause of Death:
Non-Hostile - Died of Other Causes - Suicide, Country of Casualty: South Vietnam
Source: U.S. Military - Deaths, All Causes, Southeast Asia

Also on February 13, 1963: "Vietnamese civilians from strategic Hamlet of Ap Than Tho, fill a barrel with water to be used for drinking." Source: Fold3.com, Photo by SP5 Lyle V. Boggess, US Army Sp Photo Det, Pacific

February 14, 1963: "Letter From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Nolting) to the Vietnamese Secretary of State at the Presidency and Assistant Secretary of State for National Defense (Thuan)
Saigon, February 14, 1963.

Dear Mr. Secretary: My Government has carefully considered the request for four T-33 jet aircraft contained in your letter to me of December, 10, 1962.² We appreciate your Government's desire to be come better equipped to counter any threat to South Viet-Nam posed by unauthorized incursions into Vietnamese air space. We understand, however, that there has been no actual confirmation of such incursions and that there is insufficient evidence to concluded that a threat of this kind exists at the present time.

My Government's position in this matter rests essentially on the following considerations. The delivery of jet aircraft to your Government could open our two Governments to charges of violating the specific prohibition against jet engines contained in Article 17 of the Geneva Accords. It could also lead to the acquisition of jet aircraft by the North Vietnamese regime, thereby enhancing the threat which that regime poses to South Viet-Nam.” Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 38, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

Also on February 14, 1963: "Craig Benton Wolford, SFC, Army, Regular, Special Forces, died in [Quang Tin Province], South Vietnam. Cause classification: Non-Hostile, died of illness/injury, Ground Casualty - Accidental Self-Destruction.
Panel 01E - Line 19
Source: The Vietnam Veterans Memorial Wall, The Wall-USA

"COLUMBUS JUNCTION An Iowa GI was killed in a mine field accident in Viet nam Thursday his mother said. Mrs Charles Wolford widowed mother of 10 children said she had been notified of the death of her son SFC Craig Wolford 37.”
Source: Mason City Globe Gazette, Saturday, February 16, 1963, Newspaper Archive

February 15, 1963: "Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam¹
Washington, February 15, 1963, 6:20 p.m.

807. Embtel 749.² Agree that reporters cannot be prevented from observing Farmgate operations but Embassy and MACV should insure that Farmgate cover maintained to extent that there are no stories or publicity on Farmgate given out by US sources. We concerned by news reports US air combat role because (1) this is clear violation Geneva Accords; (2) we have stated repeatedly in public that no US combat forces as such in Viet Nam and these stories give lie to all high officials who have made statement; (3) these stories also give substance to Commie charge this is US war on VN people; (4) combat role US forces may raise demand for Congressional action, since we have repeatedly stated their role limited to advisory logistic.

We also concerned by stories on US jets doing photo reconnaissance work. We note Feb 7 AP story quotes General Anthis directly on this subject. Policy on jets remains that we will not accuse ourselves of violating Geneva Accords nor give Commies any excuse for overt escalation by admitting that we have introduced jets into Viet Nam.
Rusk"
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 39, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

February 16, 1963: "Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (McNamara)¹
Washington, February 16, 1963.
JCSM-137-63
SUBJECT
Rules of Engagement for US Helicopters in Vietnam

It came to the attention of General Wheeler's team during his visit to Vietnam, that under local interpretation of JCS instructions, all US aircraft other than Farmgate are precluded from using their weapons until they are actually fired upon even in the case of clearly identified enemy personnel discovered during the progress of combat. This prohibition is more restrictive than the Joint Chiefs of Staff had intended and seriously limits effective self-defense. Accordingly, CINCPAC has been authorized to permit all helicopters to fire on clearly identified Viet Cong elements which are considered to be a threat to the safety of the helicopters and their passengers.²

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Maxwell D. Taylor
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff”
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 40, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

February 17, 1963: The following text has been scanned from its original source and includes occasional inconsistencies. If you have access to the original text and can help us fill in the gaps, please send your contribution here. Thanks.

"Pushed Vietnamese Paper - US Press SAIGON - Times of Viet Nam Saturday attacked the American press and demanded that Washington consider censoring American correspondents in South Viet Nam. In an editorial the paper accused American correspondents in Viet Nam of aiding the communist Viet Cong and being for the loss of US and Viet by publishing tary security information. The paper which reflects Vietnamese government opinion also criticized remarks by US [? Amb a to RUSK] Viet Nam Frederick Nolting Jr and Secretary of State Dean Rusk. It accused Rusk of indirectly aiding the Viet Cong by [? ng] American reporters in Viet Answer to [? peech] The editorial was in answer to a speech last week by Nolting calling for greater understanding between South Viet Nam and the US and claiming the press of both countries often distorts the respective situations. The paper accused the ambassador of doing an injustice by equating the presses of both countries misunderstanding squarely on the American press. The Times also lashed out at American papers for allegedly publishing editorials calling for tbe overthrow of President Ngo Dinh Diem's government. [ ?Seen] The solution, the Times said, is for the American press to censor itself in order to improve the torturous and faulty bridge of understanding between the two countries. If the American press will not do this then it is the right and responsibility of the authorities at both ends of the bridge to command and supervise the reconstruction, it said. In a very strong charge which some observers here speculated may preview the expulsion of more American correspondents from Viet Nam the paper claimed US reporters here were giving security information to the Comunists. It claimed one military operation here had to be postponed because a correspondent published the battle plans in advance. The paper did not name the countries and laid the blame [? for any respondent or the operation.]" Source: Wisconsin State Journal, Newspaper Archive, February 17, 1963

February 18, 1963: Colin Powell: “On February 18, we came upon a deserted Montagnard village. The people had fled at our approach, except for an old woman too feeble to move. We burned down thatched huts, started the blaze with Ronson and Zippo cigarette lighters.” Source: My American Journey, By Colin L. Powell, Joseph E. Persico, Random House

Also on February 18, 1963: An excerpt from a letter to President Kennedy from Bobbie Lou Pendergrass regarding the loss of her brother:

"Dear President Kennedy:

My brother, Specialist James Delmas McAndrew. was one of the seven crew members killed on January 11 in a Viet Nam helicopter crash.

The Army reports at first said that communist gunfire was suspected. Later, it said that the helicopter tragedy was due to malfunction of aircraft controls. I've wondered if the "malfunction of aircraft controls" wasn't due to "communist gunfire". However, that's neither important now, nor do I even care to know.

..."Please, I'm only a housewife who doesn't even claim to know all about the international situation -- but we have we have felt so bitter over this -- can the small number of our boys over in Viet Nam possibly be doing enough good to justify the awful number of casualties? It seems to me that if we are going to have our boys over there, that we should send enough to have a chance -- or else stay home. Those fellows are just sitting ducks in those darn helicopters. If a war is worth fighting -- isn't it worth fighting to win?"
Source: Bobbie Lou Pendergrass Letter (typed version) to President Kennedy February 18, 1963, 02/18/1963, The U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, OPA - Online Public Access

Also on February 18, 1963: Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara: "Victory is in sight." Source: A People's History of the United States, by Howard Zinn

February 19, 1963: Senate Armed Services Committee:
"Senator Stennis: Mr. Secretary, I have noticed a release of a statement by you in relation to Vietnam in which you said in substance it would be a long hard struggle. Could you specify a little more, you are not expecting any victory or any accomplishment there or termination of goals or anything like that for several years, is that right? That is what I inferred from your statement anyway.

Secretary McNamara: I hope for a gradual strengthening of the control of the Government over the activities of that nation, and a gradual weakening of the influence of the Viet Cong. I think this will go on, I hope it will go on, for a substantial period in the future. I can't really put a number on the years involved, but I think it would be maybe 3 or 4 years.”
Source: EXTRACTS OF STATEMENTS BY ROBERT S. McNAMARA ON THE OUTLOOK IN SOUTH VIETNAM, The Harold Weisberg Archive

February 20, 1963: "Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy¹
Washington, February 20, 1963.
Laos

Recent intelligence reports have indicated that Kong Le's military position in the Plaines des Jarres may become critical in the coming weeks. Both Pathet Lao and Viet Minh forces are said to have taken up positions around the Plaines and the Embassy in Vientiane has speculated that the PL may intend to crush Kong Le quickly in the event he cannot be disposed of by defecting his forces.

Kong Le is, as you know, Souvanna Phouma's only domestic military support. We have been informed that Kong Le may only be able to hold out for a few days in the event the PL decide on a full scale attack. We feel it would be in our interests to put him in a position to hold out somewhat longer in order to give the West a chance to take the diplomatic offensive under the Geneva Accords. Later we might want to do more, depending upon the circumstances.

There are two courses Governor Harriman proposes. First, orders should go to the Embassy, JUSMAG Bangkok, and CINCPAC directing them to expedite the flow of supplies to Kong Le through channels which are approved by Souvanna Phouma. They should also be directed to determine what types of arms and ammunition should be provided to Kong Le in order to permit him to hold out for a reasonable period of time against the Pathet Lao assault.

Second, CINCPAC, JUSMAG Thailand, and the CIA should be directed to cooperate with the Embassy in Vientiane in preparing means to deliver materiel (including arms and ammunition) on an emergency basis to the Plaines des Jarres in the event fighting breaks out suddenly. These means might involve direct flights from Thailand to Plaines des Jarres if the situation got out of hand.²

No action other than preparation would be taken under the second proposal without your express authorization; but it does seem prudent to ensure that we be in a position to act if the necessity arises.

Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis, Document 443, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

Also on February 20, 1963: The Daily Princetonian reports: “SAIGON, South Vietnam—The government news agency has re-ported two clashes in Vietnam. In one battle about 300 imiles north of Saigon five communists and four Vietnamese militia trainees were reportedly killed. Seven communist guerillas were also killed in a clash south of Saigon“ Source: The Daily Princetonian, February 20, 1963

Also on February 20, 1963: "Memorandum of Conversation¹
Washington, February 20, 1961.
SUBJECT
Laos

PARTICIPANTS
The Secretary
J. Graham Parsons, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs
Christian G. Chapman, Officer in Charge of Laos Affairs
His Excellency Mikhail A. Menshikov, Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Nikifor Levchenko, Second Secretary of the Soviet Embassy

The Secretary requested the Soviet Ambassador to come to the Department to discuss Laos. The Secretary introduced the topic by stating that Laos was one of the situations to which the new Administration had to turn its attention immediately after taking office. While obviously concerned that the fighting might spread and the activities of the various powers might lead to dangers which all wished to diminish, the Administration still thought that there were elements for a reasonable solution as we understood the long-range objectives of both sides. The Secretary made clear the desire of the new Administration to see Laos “independent, a genuine neutral unaligned in its international relations but free to exercise its sovereign right to manage its own affairs and provide for its national integrity.” The Secretary explained that he had called the Ambassador in because he wanted to let the Soviets know right away our reaction to two developments which had occurred over the weekend:

1. The King of Laos had issued a declaration² insisting on the neutrality of his country and offering guarantees of this neutrality by inviting Southeast Asian countries to form a Commission to bear witness to the neutrality of Laos.

2. The Soviet Government had replied to the British by proposing that the Chairman of the ICC be approached to reactivate the ICC and a conference be called to work out a settlement.³
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis, Document 17, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

February 21, 1963: President John F. Kennedy to Press: "We’ve had very limited success in managing the news, if that’s what we’ve been trying to do.”
Source: John F. Kennedy in His Own Words, by Eric Freedman, Edward Hoffman, Citadel Press, p 108

Also on February 21: "Flying Support Cover for Operation Guy Phoung (9) in the vicinity of Phu-Thu
Photo by SP5 Charles E. Sparrow 21 Feb 1963
Source: Warbird-Central.com

Also on February 21, 1963: "A pensive South Vietnamese soldier photographed onboard an American CH-21 helicopter of the Utility Tactical Transport Helicopter Company during Operation GUY PHOUNG, 21 February 1963. Photo: US Army official photographer
Source: Imperial War Museums, THE VIETNAM WAR 1962 - 1975

February 22, 1963: An excerpt from a Letter from John Fanning, Advisory Team 21:
...”On Vietnam. I am located in Pleiku, a small (10,000) town in the central highlands, about 250 miles north of Saigon. I am part of the advisory team for the II Vietnamese Army Corps. They have the country divided into four corps areas (starting at the top). Each corps controls three or four divisions, and has a certain land area to cover. The overall army an staff organization is much like ours. I am one of the advisors to the Corps G-2. We have a major and two lieutenants, with one sergeant, and more to come. The major is a good man, with some background in intelligence. The other lieutenant is a lawyer, interestingly enough, a graduate of the Harvard Law School, he prefers artillery to law, and is in the army for good. He has no background in intelligence, but some personnel person realised (properly, I think) that law is a good background for this type of thing, and sent him to the G2 advisor section at II Corps. He wants artillery, but is doing an excellent job in this business.

We don't do as much advising as we should. This is partially due to certain political factors here (Do you think General Upham would want a British colonel as advisor to him, with an office in the same building) but it comes principally from American reticence in associating easily with people from a different background. Language presents some difficulties. I confess myself very guilty of all of this. But we are trying to improve things. We are trying to associate a little more with our "counterparts" as they are called. This is a peculiar type of war, and the usual approaches don't work. The principal effort must be a civil and psychological one. This war will not be won unless the rightful Vietnamese government wins "the minds and hearts of the people." Civil action programs must be a big part of even the military effort. We have some Americans (like army doctors, teachers and sanitation people) helping us with this. Tactically, of course, is is very different from what we are in the habit of thinking about. There are no front lines; the troops travel around, and may or may not be near the enemy, and you usually don't know until someone shoots at you. Intelligence comes in different ways, although IPW is of some help, as in conventional war. There is no regular contact with the enemy, along a fixed line. On the other hand, let me note one thing that some people may not realise: The VC are organized into regular troop units. They are not merely part-time guerrillas, but fairly well-orgainised units, with regular training sites and son on.

On Americans here. You made some mention of my torturing some innocent in a rice paddy. This is not the case. If you know of any such instance, send me the date, coordinates, and so on, and I will look into it. The Americans here are really advisers. This is not just a euphemism, like technicians, or volunteers. It is true that there are some regular units here, but they are rather specialised outfits like the signal battalion which supports the US advisor teams, and the helicopter units, which do participate in actual military operations. It is also true that an occasional battalion adviser shoots back when he is shot at, but this is far from regular; the one or perhaps three or four Americans with a battalion cannot be said to add much firepower. Hopefully, they are adding some technical skill and knowhow. I'm not quite sure how all this comes over in the US press"...
Source: Letter from John Fanning, Advisory Team 21 TO Colby - re: Upcoming Marriage, School, and Activity in Vietnam,  22 February 1963, Folder 01, Box 01, John P. Fanning Collection, The Vietnam Center and Archive, Texas Tech University. Accessed 17 Feb. 2013. <http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/items.php?item=20890101004>

February 23, 1963: "Letter From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Harkins) to President Diem ¹
Saigon, February 23, 1963.

Dear Mr. President:

This is a report on progress as I see it in our common drive to put down the Communist Insurgency in the Republic of Vietnam. I feel that this report is particularly timely as we implement the National Campaign Plan.

I am convinced that we have taken the military, psychological, economic and political initiative from the enemy. We have kept steadily mounting pressure on him in all phases of the war to return the loyalty and control of the people to the Government of Vietnam. The next four to eight weeks will tell us all whether or not my conviction is true.

As you know, the Communists' capabilities confronting the Government and people of the Republic of South Vietnam remain very formidable indeed. Capturing the initiative and winning a decisive victory are two very different objectives. Victory is not attainable, if we do not exploit our hard-won initiative. Victory can be delayed indefinitely or never won if we do not act decisively, while applying ever increasing pressure on the enemy in all areas of the conflict.

The VC are still everywhere. They still have much of their relatively secure strategic base structure. If the pressure which we have gradually developed everywhere is allowed to level off or decrease, we will lose the initiative. We have the means to increase this pressure on all fronts beginning now.” Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 41, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

February 24, 1963: " (1st day of the 2nd month, Year of the Hare [Quy Mao]) (US Advisory): One U.S. soldier is killed as Viet Cong ground fire shoots down two of three U.S. Army H-21 helicopters airlifting South Vietnamese troops about 100 miles north of Saigon (VHPA)

“American aid to South Vietnam totals $400 million. (IWC)” Source: Second Indochina War, Timeline, February 24th - The Patriot Files Forums

Also on February 24, 1963: KIA: Charles Wayman McCary,
PVT, Army, Selective Service,
MAAGV,
South Vietnam,
Hostile, Helicopter - Crew, Air Loss, Crash On Land,
Panel 01E - Line 19
Source: The Wall-USA

February 25, 1963: U. S. Set to Shoot First in Viet Nam
By NEIL SHEEHAN ~
SAIGON, Viet Nam (UPD—The United States has decided to permit its soldiers to shoot first in the Vietnamese guerrilla war without waiting to be fired on by the Communists, it was reported today.

The move is aimed at checking the mounting U.S. casualty rate in the undeclared jungle war, according to informed sources.

Another American died Sunday. A young machine gunner was killed when two U.S. Army H21 helicopters were downed by Communist Viet Cong ground fire.

The machine gunner, a private first class, was not identified. His death brought to 52 the number of Americans killed in combat since the United States began its military buildup in South Viet Nam in 1961.

Informed military' sources said I the new "rules of engagement" will permit the U.S. Army's new HU1 gas turbine helicopters to open fire on "positively identified" guerrillas without waiting to be fired on first as heretofore.

The sources said the effectiveness of the heavily armed craft, known by their crews as "Hueys," in protecting the more vulnerable H21 troop carrying helicopters is expected to increase under the new rules.

The Hueys now will be able to precede the H21's into a troop landing zone and keep the guerrillas busy while the troop-carrying helicopters unload assault forces and then get away.

U.S. military observers in Saigon feel that if the Hueys had been able to follow this procedure during the battle of Ap Bac last month, the Viet Cong would not have been able to shoot down so many helicopters. Two Americans were killed and several others wounded in the process.

U.S. officials denied press reports that the United States might withdraw its Air Force combat units form South Viet Nam.

The reports claimed the withdrawal was under consideration because of changes that heavy villages suspected of harboring Viet Cong were turning the population against the government.

U.S. diplomatic and high-ranking military officials, including military assistance command chief Gen. Paul D. Harkins, said to the best of their knowledge, no such decision was under consideration.

Gen. Emmet (Rosie) O'Donnell, U.S. Air Force Pacific commander, indirectly denied persistent reports that many innocent civilians are being killed in air strikes against the Viet Cong.

O'Donnell said Vietnamese air force tactical fighters and bombers "have been able to locate positively and destroy targets, and I mean small fleeting targets, under difficult conditions.
Source: The Citizen-Advertiser, Auburn, N.Y., Monday, February 25, 1963

Also on February 25, 1963: A four-man Senate study group headed by Senator Mansfield warned that the struggle for Vietnamese independence was fast becoming an "American war" that could not be justified by present United States security interests in the area.” Source: New York Times Chronology, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library & Museum, February 25, 1963

Also on February 25, 1963: "Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam¹
Washington, February 25, 1963, 12:19 p.m.
822. Ref Saigon's 771.² Herewith principal points re Viet-Nam in Senate Foreign Relations Report “Viet-Nam and Southeast Asia”:³

I. Letter of transmittal (Mansfield to Fulbright).

(1) Focus report is Viet-Nam.
(2) Mansfield expresses “great admiration” for Diem, but voices deep concern over trend in VN in seven years since last Mansfield visit. “Viet-Nam now appears to be, as it was then, only at the beginning of a beginning in coping with its grave inner problems.”

II Body of report.

(1) During lull in struggle (1955-1959) considerable constructive work undertaken, but in past three years these achievements overshadowed by resumption guerrilla war.
(2) By 1961 total collapse in VN dangerously close. A joint US-VN re-evaluation undertaken. Vietnamese themselves devised new strategic theories to meet situation.
(3) Strategy three-fold: to win Montagnards in order to render hazardous VC supply lines, to enable ARVN seize initiative, and to regroup rural population into strategic hamlets.” Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 42, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

February 26, 1963: Letter From the Director of the Vietnam Working Group (Wood) to the Minister-Counselor of the Embassy in Vietnam (Trueheart)¹
Washington, February 26, 1963.

Dear Bill: It would help my relations with the Governor if you could give me information on the following points concerning Task Force Saigon's relations with U.S. press. The Embassy's previous telegrams have been very useful.

I know that with about 12,000 military men in Viet-Nam, it is hopeless to expect that they will all see the overall picture and phrase their remarks accordingly when they talk to newsmen. Nonetheless, the impression persists here that the lack of perspective which has been characteristic of news reports from Viet Nam springs at least in part from inadequately informed American military sources. Could you give me a brief rundown on what is being done to insure that official Americans in Viet-Nam understand why we are in Viet-Nam, what our role there is, and how, in general, the war is going? How are they briefed? Is it possible to give MAAG advisers in the field a regular news picture of how the war is going (beyond their own bailiwick)? Any chance of increasing the coverage of the Armed Forces radio? We have survived guerrilla war between the GVN and the reporters, but public criticism between U.S. and ARVN brothers in arms can be more serious.” Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 44 ,Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

February 27, 1963: Letter From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Nolting) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Harriman)¹
Saigon, February 27, 1963.

Dear Governor: This is in response to your letter of February 18² outlining Mike Forrestal's thoughts about more contacts between American personnel in Viet-Nam and non-Communist members of the Vietnamese opposition.

I am sorry that Mike didn't voice these thoughts while he was here. We could then have filled him in on what is done in this regard on a regular basis and with the knowledge of the GVN. In fact, I should have been glad to introduce him to dozens of non-commie members of the Vietnamese opposition at our home. These might have included a wide assortment of Vietnamese friends—bankers, businessmen, labor leaders, landowners, layers, doctors, university professors-who would doubtless have had a field day criticizing the government in varying degrees and from various angles. But what good this would have done—outside of demonstrating a point and possibly stimulating a coup—I don't know!

I must confess to being somewhat astonished by the implication that we are living in cocoons here, dealing only with GVN officials and deliberately cutting ourselves off from other Vietnamese elements. This has never been the case since I have been here. One of the first things I did upon arrival was to tell President Diem personally that I intended to see and talk with members of the opposition; that I wanted him to know this and trusted that he would not consider it as plotting or as throwing doubt on US support of South Viet-Nam through its duly elected government. Continued...
Source: Office of the Historian, US Dept of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 45

Also on February 27, 1963: "Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam¹
Washington, February 27, 1963, 5:24 p.m.

828. Deptel 807² and Embtel 749.³ News accounts of American combat role continue. Recent stories quote informed American military sources in Viet-Nam as stating US personnel now authorized to “shoot first”,⁴ state that most combat missions are flown by Americans. We wish reiterate our concern over such stories and reasons for concern as stated Deptel 807. These news reports very damaging both here and abroad and we must do everything possible prevent them in future.

Our policy remains that American role Viet-Nam strictly limited to advisory, logistic, training functions. Any activities such as Farmgate which may be construed as American combat role are not to be discussed with newsmen. This policy set at highest level at time of initiation increased aid to Viet-Nam. It has not changed.

Request all official Americans be instructed above policy still in force and they expected observe it rigorously.

This message approved by White House.
Rusk”
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 46, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

Also on February 27, 1963: Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam¹
Washington, February 27, 1963, 8:37 p.m.

Aidto 1658. Joint State/AID/Defense message. Subject: Counter Insurgency Measures.

Measures to deny VC sources of supply have received considerable Washington attention recently. Realize CT has considered subject, and that with respect to proposals for control of movement of goods and people, a public safety pilot project being undertaken Phu Yen and that a PROHAB committee established to study subject.

Also realize this is complex subject related to total anti-commie effort on which fully integrated CT judgment must be brought to bear. Recognize this subject also element of recently submitted Comprehensive Plan and plans for intensified national effort this year. We anxious be kept informed your plans and developments in this regard and without attempting second-guess CT, would appreciate your views on following:

1. Desirability of not augmenting planned number of men under arms for above supply denial function, but rather drawing needed personnel from already existing paramilitary organizations.

2. Desirability of establishing clear responsibility for movement control as primary mission of force charged therewith.

3. Importance of assigning local personnel to movement control functions as to give appearance of indigenous control effort rather than of imposing outside control.” Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 47, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

February 28, 1963: Memorandum From the Director of the Vietnam Working Group (Wood) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Harriman)¹
Washington, February 28, 1963.
SUBJECT
Status of Strategic Hamlets

1. 5,000 strategic hamlets, with a population of 7 million (58% of the rural population) have now been built. Of these 5,000 the VC attacked 9 and gained entry into 5 during the week of February 13-20.

2. There are three basic problems connected with the hamlets:

(a) Their defense. DOD is finding out urgently about what is being done to train village militia.

(b) Their administration. Far too few existing strategic hamlets have trained officials. AID is sending out a very capable man, Gus Herz, who with 5 assistants, will work full time to speed training of those Vietnamese who will in turn train hamlet chiefs and their subordinates. Herz has just returned from a 30-day survey in Viet-Nam. He reports that the Vietnamese Government recognizes the serious need for training hamlet officials and is most willing to cooperate with Herz and his people in speeding up and improving these training programs.

(c) Their cost. The 10 million dollars with which we bought piasters to finance the strategic hamlet program will soon be expended. We believe that the Vietnamese can assume this burden from their own funds, but time is growing short. We are preparing a draft telegram which will contain a suggested letter from you to Secretary Thuan on this subject. It will also review the whole problem of financing the strategic hamlets. Our thought is to ask Fritz in the telegram whether such a letter from you to Thuan would give him the support he needs in the difficult negotiations which will be required to persuade the Vietnamese to increase their own expenditures.

3. Risks of Interdiction Bombing of Populated Places. I have talked with Mike about this yesterday and he agrees that we should try to stop, or at least severely curb, this practice which will probably cost us more in good will than it is likely to achieve in destroying VC installations. We recently bombed a strategic hamlet by mistake. I will try next week to get Bill Bundy's support and will keep you informed.”
Source: Office of the Historian, US Dept of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 48

Also on February 28, 1963: Died: Odes Winston Jeffers,
SP5, Army,
Special Forces, South Vietnam,
Non-Hostile, illness/injury, Ground Casualty, Vehicle Crash,
Panel 01E - Line 19
Source: The Wall-USA

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March 1, 1963: Operation Shotgun Commence[s] The 25th Infantry Division, based in Hawaii, began deploying soldiers to Vietnam on a temporary duty basis as door gunners on helicopters in Operation SHOTGUN. Source: Interactive Timeline | Vietnam War Commemoration

Also on March 1, 1963: Letter from Charles W. Petterson:
Bac Lieu, March 1, 1963: “Happy birthday to Erik and Gay! I’ll try to send them a present as soon as I can find something suitable. Have to clean my carbine now. Not enough light to do it at night. Source: Letters from my Father, By Gay L Inskeep

March 2, 1963: Long ride home for a wounded Vietnam fighter
By Steve Stibbens
Stars and Stripes
Published: March 2, 1963

Maj. Robert M. Campbell, right, an American adviser from Fayetteville, N.C., points the way to a helicopter that will bring a wounded Vietnamese ranger, at center, to a hospital. The soldier lost part of his right hand to a Viet Cong booby trap.
Steve Stibbens/Stars and Stripes

The ticket for that long ride home doesn't come cheaply in the Republic of Vietnam. This man, a Vietnamese ranger, gave his right hand.

All morning he had chased the Viet Cong guerrillas through the muddy swamps and rice paddies. Twenty had been killed and six captured. Everything was going well.

He sat on the edge of a canal to have a smoke. Relaxed, he pushed his hand against a concealed booby trap. There was a muffled explosion. Powder and smoke blinded him for a moment.

Then he looked down and saw only the stump of what was once his hand. It didn't even hurt — at least for a few minutes.

A call for help went out and soon an H-21 helicopter from the 57th Light Helicopter Transport Co., was circling overhead.

The wounded man was carried 100 yards up a canal in a sampan to a strategic hamlet where a helicopter waited to take him to a hospital.

The veteran ranger stood proudly, smiled momentarily — then collapsed. He was carried to the waiting helicopter — and the long ride home from the war.”
Source: Stars and Stripes archives

Also on March 2, 1963: Message From the Charge in the Republic of China (Clough) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Harriman)
Taipei, March 2, 1963.

[document number not declassified] Reference: [document number not declassified].¹ Pass following to Dept of State for Governor Harriman from Clough:

1. President's letter² and proposal concerning C-123's appear to have been received very well by President Chiang and Chiang Ching-kuo. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] I believe ill-feeling aroused by C-123 issue has been substantially removed and that arrangements for use of three of these aircraft in Vietnam can be made without too much difficulty. Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXII, Northeast Asia, Document 170, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

Also on March 2, 1963: ...[Nguyen Thanh] Trung says that at six in the morning on March 2, 1963 something happened that changed his life and the course of history. It would take more than ten years before the whole world would know why, says Trung (formerly known as Dinh Khac Chung) as we meet in the Vietnamese capital Hanoi.

Trung was then a schoolboy of 15. Three hours after the event he was in shock. A classmate had told him that South Vietnamese soldiers had shot his Communist sympathiser father, dragged his body along a road, and finally dumped it into the mighty Mekong River.

“It's not so much that they killed my father...” says Trung, now 52. “There was a war going on, after all, and there were victims on both sides.” What enraged him is how they treated the body. The schoolboy decided to seek out those responsible and take revenge...” Continued...
Source: Captain Trung “ended” the war - now he helps tourists in Vietnam, Helsingin Sanomat, International Edition, Weekly

March 3, 1963: Letter from Charles W. Petterson:
Bac Lieu, March 3, 1963: I traveled to most of the remote (advisory) teams yesterday in a CH-21C helicopter. We were only shot at once so it was an easy trip. We were the first visitors in 2 weeks. We brought pay, mail, water, gas, candy, etc. They really live under rough, primitive conditions here. Source: Letters from my Father, By Gay L Inskeep

March 4, 1963: Janie A. Makil, the daughter of Missionary Gaspar Alfonso Makil, was shot in an ambush, in Dalat. Janie was five months old.
Source: American Women Who Died in the Vietnam War, www.VirtualWall.org

-----Related-----

SAW HUSBAND SHOT DOWN SAIGON, Viet Nam (AP)--An American missionary's wife told...of watching Communist guerrillas kill her husband and another missionary and the latter's baby girl.

The Viet Cong Reds stopped their land rover at a roadblock about 70 miles northeast of Saigon Monday. All the Passengers got out at the guerrillas' request for identity papers.

"Suddenly they fired," Mrs. Elwood Jacobsen related. "There was no reason. It was all over so quickly…Then they slipped back into the jungle."

Filipino missionary Gaspar Alfonso Makil, 35, ...died on the spot. The baby, Janie Makil, 4 months old, died in a Saigon hospital. A Vietnamese also was killed.
Source: The Lewiston Daily Sun - Mar 6, 1963

Also on March 4, 1963: "Telegram From the Embassy in Cambodia to the Department of State
Phnom Penh, March 4, 1963, 7 p.m.

644. CINCPAC for POLAD. Deptel 529.¹ Conveyed to SecState FonAffairs Sambath this afternoon points outlined final two paragraphs Embtel 639² re plot by Cambodian dissidents against Cambodia, stressing particularly US awareness Sihanouk role in unification and stability of country, recalling former Ambassador Trimble’s similar approach to Sihanouk in June 1962³ and making clear I was acting under instructions my government.

When I first introduced subject, explaining I was doing so because press was implying US complicity, Sambath said he had not considered US involved in this affair. He thanked me for my approach and said he would report it to Sihanouk. When I said I would be willing make similar statement to Sihanouk during audience now scheduled for 11:30 a.m. tomorrow⁴ if Sambath thought it desirable, latter quickly said that he thought it sufficient I had made these statements to him, which he would pass on to Sihanouk. It was clear he thought preferable for me not to raise matter with Sihanouk.

Sprouse
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia, Document 102, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

March 5, 1963: "Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Bundy) to the Secretary of Defense (McNamara)¹
Washington, March 5, 1963.
I-21382/63

Problem: To act on a JCS recommendation for increase of the GVN paramilitary force levels that are authorized MAP support.²

Discussion: The GVN paramilitary force levels now authorized for MAP support are compared below with those proposed 21 Feb 63 by the JCS:

The increases recommended by the JCS will support the planned intensified national effort, meet the time-phased requirements of “clear and hold” operations, and support the strategic hamlet program in South Vietnam. The main objective in increasing the paramilitary strength to the proposed levels is to ensure permanent control in areas secured as the national campaign progresses. The proposed levels were developed by applying a formula that allows, for example, two squads of SDC for each secure village, one platoon for each village not under government control, one platoon for each group of three villages, and one platoon for each training center. Requirements developed in this manner were 2500 platoons and 1600 squads. Civil Guard requirements were estimated by province in a parallel manner. It is anticipated that the Junk Force will be a continuing paramilitary operation that should be regularized to a status comparable with the SDC. CINCPAC foresees the future and continuing requirement to be 4,600 junk sailors to man 644 junks. The actual strengths on 15 Jan 63 were Civil Guard—77755 and SDC—99797.

A related consideration is the Comprehensive Plan for South Vietnam (CPSVN) that has been proposed by CINCPAC to provide for bringing the counterinsurgency effort to a successful conclusion, withdrawing U.S. special military assistance, and developing within the GVN a capability to defend against the continuing threat in Southeast Asia. The JCS are currently preparing recommendations as to the CPSVN, and the ensuing force levels for FY 64 and subsequent years. The FY 63 force levels that would be approved if the attached memorandum is signed are compatible with the force levels proposed by CINCPAC in the CPSVN.

The proposed increases for FY 63 can, according to the JCS and CINCPAC, be accommodated within the currently approved FY 63 MAP funding ceiling.

Recommendation: That you sign the attached memorandum.³
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 49, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

March 6, 1963: "President Kennedy replies to Bobbie Lou Pendergrass’s February 18 letter about the loss of of her brother. “Dear Mrs. Bobbie Lou Pendergrass: I would like to express to you my deep and sincere sympathy in the loss of your brother. I can, of course, well understand your bereavement and the feelings which prompted you to write...

...If Viet Nam should fall, it will indicate to the people of Southeast Asia that complete Communist domination of their part of the world is almost inevitable. Your brother was in Viet Nam because the threat to the Viet Namese people is, in the long run, a threat to the Free World community, and ultimately a threat to us also. For when freedom is destroyed in one country, it is threatened throughout the world.”

Source: Letter of Condolence From President Kennedy to Mrs. Bobbie Lou Pendergrass, 03/06/1963, The U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, OPA - Online Public Access

Also on March 6, 1963: President Kennedy's News Conference, March 6, 1963, Public Papers of the Presidents, Kennedy, 1963, p. 243:
* * *
Q: "Mr. President, the Mansfield committee, sent at your suggestion to the Far East and Europe, has recommended a thorough security reassessment in the Far East and a clamp down, if not a reduction in our aid to that part of the world. Would you have any comment on this, sir?"

THE PRESIDENT: "I don't see how we are going to be able, unless we are going to pull out of Southeast Asia and turn it over to the Communists, how we are going to be able to reduce very much our economic programs and military programs in South Viet-Nam, in Cambodia, in Thailand.

"I think that unless you want to withdraw from the field and decide that it is in the national interest to permit that area to collapse, I would think that it would be impossible to substantially change it particularly, as we are in a very intensive struggle in those areas.

"So I think we ought to judge the economic burden it places upon us as opposed to having the Communists control all of Southeast Asia with the inevitable effect that this would have on the security of India and, therefore, really begin to run perhaps all the way toward the Middle East. So I think that while we would all like to lighten the burden, I don't see any real prospect of the burden being lightened for the U.S. in Southeast Asia in the next year if we are going to do the job and meet what I think are very clear national needs."

Source: Excerpts from President Kennedy's News Conference, March 6, 1963

March 7, 1963: "Memorandum From the President's Special Representative and Adviser on African, Asian, and Latin American Affairs (Bowles) to the President ¹
Washington, March 7, 1963.
Secret.
SUBJECT
Recommendations for a Fresh Approach to the Vietnam Impasse

I hesitate to play the role of Cassandra again in regard to Vietnam and Southeast Asia. However, I remain deeply concerned about the outlook there, and having talked to Mike Mansfield about his Report and the rather fragile nature of our present position, I feel that I should frankly express my misgivings to you.

I see nothing in the present course of events to dispel my conviction, expressed to you and the Secretary on several occasions, that this situation may ultimately prove to be as troublesome as Cuba in its effects on the Administration's position at home and abroad.

Although the general outlook here in Washington and in Saigon now seems to be cautiously optimistic, it may be worthwhile to remind ourselves of the confident assumptions of the Eisenhower Administration in a somewhat similar situation during the winter of 1954.

Thus on February 19, 1954, Congressman Walter Judd told the New York Times that Admiral Radford, in testimony to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, reported 'the development by the French and Vietnamese commanders in Indo-China, supported by United States financial and military assistance, of a broad strategic concept which within a very few months should insure a favorable turn in the course of the war … ² Communist prospects of achieving any decisive immediate successes are slight while their prospects for ultimate victory are non-existent.'

One month later, on March 22nd, following a White House conference with President Eisenhower, General Ely, and Defense Secretary Charles Wilson, Admiral Radford was again reported in the New York Times as saying that he planned to take up with General Ely the question of U.S. participation in training the Vietnamese army.³ 'The French are going to win,' the Admiral was quoted as saying. 'It is a fight that is going to be finished with our help.'
Six weeks later, on May 8, 1954, came the surrender of the French garrison at Dien Bien Phu, and the collapse of the entire French position in Southeast Asia.

Nine years have passed, and now it is we who appear to be striving, in defiance of powerful indigenous political and military forces, to insure the survival of an unpopular Vietnamese regime with inadequate roots among the people. And now, as in 1954, many able U.S. military authorities are convinced that the situation is moving in our favor and that victory can be foreseen within two to three years." Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 52, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

Also on March 7, 1963: "Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (McNamara)¹
Washington, March 7, 1963.
JCSM-180-63
SUBJECT
Comprehensive Plan, South Vietnam

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the attached Comprehensive Plan for South Vietnam (CPSVN), submitted 25 January 1963 by CINCPAC ² for approval in response to your directive set forth during the 23 July 1962 Honolulu Conference.

2. This comprehensive plan provides the special military assistance and equipment the Government of Vietnam will require to carry on an adequate and effective counterinsurgency program with essentially no help from US personnel after Calendar Year 1965.

3. To attain its objectives, the CPSVN is dependent upon the success of the parallel development of many mutually supporting national plans and programs such as the National Campaign Plan, the Strategic Hamlet Program, and the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) Program. For example, the Strategic Hamlet Program, which normally is conducted in areas controlled by the Government, is perhaps the greatest single factor in the all-important effort of the Government to reach the people. In close support is the CIDG program which will provide security initially in those areas where the inhabitants do not identify themselves with the Government. It is intended that the successful prosecution of these two mutually supporting national programs will result in 90 per cent of the population pledging allegiance to the Government of Vietnam. The attainment of such a goal is inseparable from the success of the CPSVN. Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 51, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

March 8, 1963: "Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Harriman)¹
Washington, March 8, 1963.
SUBJECT
Conversation with Ambassador Tran van Chuong of Vietnam

I had lunch today with Ambassador Tran van Chnong. After lunch the Ambassador said he had something very important and private to tell me.

He began by saying that he had great difficulty in assessing the political importance of the Mansfield report. He said that his own estimate of public opinion in the United States was that it was 99% against the Diem Government, and that sooner or later the political effect of this report would be felt on U.S. efforts in South Vietnam. The Mansfield report, he believed, was just another manifestation of this feeling, and it would no doubt be followed by worse reports.

He then said that he had been in this country for eight years and. under normal circumstances would have resigned as Ambassador a long time ago. The reason he didn't was that he did not see how he could return home as a private citizen and live in any security. He said he did not dare even to write to his brother, who is still living in Vietnam.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 54, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

Also on March 8, 1963: Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹
Saigon, March 8, 1963, 6 p.m.

800. CINCPAC for POLAD. Dept pass Defense and AID. Aidto 1658.² Control of movement of goods and people is indeed complex subject which enters into every phase of counterinsurgency. Necessary reemphasize this because tendency exists consider it separate field of action. PROHAB Committee studying means supplement the principal measures for control of movement and denial of support to VC, which are Strategic Hamlet program and military action against VC. Recognizing this, and the necessity to ensure that additional measures are worth the cost in terms of financial and personnel resources and in possible adverse popular reaction, committee is still engaged in seeking to evaluate possible additions to, or possible expansion or improvement of activities currently in progress.

To this end, committee has instituted province-by-province survey to determine (a) what controls are presently in existence; (b) who is carrying them out; (c) how effective are they; (d) present critical VC commodities; (e) present VC source supply (f) present VC methods of movement of commodities. In addition two pilot projects (in Binh Duong and Quang Ngai) using existing military and paramilitary forces especially trained this work by National Police and USOM PSD are expected provide essential practical experience.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 53, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

March 9, 1963: RADIO HAVANA (short wave radio) - News commentary regarding accusation of U.S. chemical warfare in "oppressed" South Vietnam.
Source: The VIETNAM WAR: U.S. Involvement & Escalation ,Collector's Choice Archival Television Audio

Also on March 9, 1963: The Soviet Union charged today that the United States was using poison gas against civilians in South Vietnam and that hundreds of persons had perished. "The world has become the witness to another monstrous crime," wrote the official organ of the Russian Defense Ministry. "The American interventionists have again used poison substances in South Vietnam and many people and cattle have died."
Source: 10 Years Ago, Watertown, NY Daily Times, March 9, 1963

Also on March 9, 1963: ...an Army OV-1 Mohawk twin-engine light reconnaissance plane crashed at the an altitude of six thousand feet in the central highlands. The marines at Da Nang (HMM-163 having relieved HMM-362) dispatched two UH-34s with a four-man American-Vietnamese rescue team to the site.

Unable to find a landing spot, one helicopter tried to lower the team by hoist, but its engine stalled, sending the high-hovering helicopter plunging to the ground, where it burst into flames. The pilot and the Vietnamese hanging from the hoist when the engine quit were killed.
Source: Leave No Man Behind: The Saga of Combat Search and Rescue, By George Galdorisi, Thomas Phillips, Zenith Press, pg. 218

March 10, 1963: (continued from March 9) The next morning, a second UH-34 trying to land rescue personnel for the survivors of the crashed helicopter suffered the same fate and crashed while in a hover, cause unknown; however, trying to hover over tall trees at six thousand feet was probably beyond the power available in the UH-34.⁶ High altitude was not the only environmental issue for helicopter operations in Vietnam, but it was a significant factor over much of the terrain.
Source: Leave No Man Behind: The Saga of Combat Search and Rescue, By George Galdorisi, Thomas Phillips, Zenith Press, pg. 218

Also on March 10, 1963: Killed In Action: James Hiroshi Ishihara
CWO - W3 - Army - Reserve
MAAGV
In South Vietnam
Hostile, Helicopter - Noncrew
Air Loss, Crash On Land
Panel 01E - Line 19

Killed In Action: David Webster
Maj - O4 - Marine Corps - Reserve
In South Vietnam
Non-Hostile, Helicopter - Crew
Air Loss, Crash On Land
Panel 01E - Line 19

March 11, 1963: Telegram From the United States Information Agency to the Embassy in Vietnam¹
Washington, March 11, 1963, 8:25 p.m.

Usito 235. Joint State/USIA/Defense message. Embtel 497, Deptel 516.² As Saigon undoubtedly aware, Communist bloc propaganda on “poison gas” in Vietnam apparently is to be massive effort comparable with Korean germ warfare campaign. If Mission concurs, we feel situation calls for action vis-à-vis free world press considerably beyond limits set by reftels. Our thinking is that news dispatches with Saigon datelines telling whole story [of] exactly what is happening would be helpful.

Suggest accordingly, if Mission has not already done so, that newsmen there, including all available third country correspondents, be called in and told in complete detail everything about both crop destruction and defoliation operations. This preferably should be done by GVN but if this not feasible, Mission itself should conduct briefing on non-attribution basis.

Briefing should particularly accent extreme precautions being taken to spray only crops which are established beyond doubt as part of Communist food supply. It should include details on provisions for compensation of damage done unintentionally to innocent peasants, and copious anecdotal background on such advance preparations among population as sacrificial animals for Montagnards. Note that these chemicals widely used in US.

Point should be clearly made that operations are being conducted exclusively by Vietnamese planes and personnel with US only supplying chemicals. If Mission finds it feasible, perhaps plane could be provided to fly newsmen over sprayed areas.

Principle applicable here, in our opinion, is fact that extraordinary precautions have indeed been taken to limit spraying to unquestionably legitimate military requirements, that denial of food and ambush sites is wholly normal procedure in counter-insurgency warfare, and that neither US nor GVN has anything to hide about this. It is essential to achieve necessary credibility, especially in uncommitted third countries, that every possible detail (short of compromising future operations) be given to newsmen on scene. Harriman, Sylvester, Mecklin concur.
Advise action taken.³
Murrow
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 55, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

Also on March 11, 1963: Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (McNamara)¹
Washington, March 11, 1963.
JCSM-190-63
SUBJECT
Air Augmentation

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed two requests from CINCPAC, both of which recommend that the US air commitment in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) be augmented. The expanded air effort would be temporary in nature, required until the success of the forthcoming national effort is assured. In addition to recommending that the pilots and maintenance personnel strength of Farmgate be doubled, a requirement for 111 aircraft and about 1,200 personnel was established, consisting of:

2 squadrons L-28 (or equivalent) aircraft (44 a/c)
2 photo reconnaissance aircraft, RF-101
1 squadron C-123 aircraft (16 a/c) with a second squadron to follow if need is confirmed by CINCPAC
1 company CV-2B (Caribou) aircraft (16 a/c)
1 platoon U-1A (Otter) aircraft (8 a/c)
15 0-1 aircraft (L-19)
10 UH-1B helicopters
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963,Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 56, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

March 12, 1963: Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam¹
Washington, March 12, 1963, 3:44 p.m.

856. Joint State/DOD/AID. References: 1) Embassy Airgram A-417;² ) Embtel 800.³ The Joint Chiefs of Staff have recommended that the Comprehensive Plan for South Viet-Nam (CPSVN) be approved as the basis for refinement of the FY 64 MAP and development of the FY 65-69 Military Assistance Plan for Viet-Nam.⁴ Require ASAP specific Country Team recommendations concerning the CPSVN in view of following factors:

(1) Imminence presentation FY 64 MAP to Congress (estimated April). If State/DOD/AID decide accept CPSVN, presentation may be affected.

(2) Fact that most significant cost increase under CPSVN (approximately $75 million) over dollar guidelines occurs in FY 64.

(3) Fact that detailed review of 64 Program is scheduled at CINCPAC in April.

(4) Stated urgency some of the requirements for activations under the increased FY 64 force levels proposed in CPSVN.

(5) Likelihood that to attain objectives of the CPSVN requires parallel development of other mutually supporting national plans and programs. To enable State/DOD/AID expedite decision whether accept CPSVN for planning, request Country Team views or estimates concerning following:
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 57, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

March 13, 1963: Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Harriman)¹
Washington, March 13, 1963.
SUBJECT
Defoliation and Crop Destruction in South Vietnam

The President would like an up-to-date report on the results of defoliation and crop destruction carried out by the ARVN.

The report might contain brief statements on the following:

1. Defoliation Activities. Number of miles of lines of communication cleared. Estimate of military effectiveness of the operations. Proposed plans for future operations.

2. Crop Destruction. Location and number of acres of crops destroyed. Estimate of amount of food denied to Viet Cong. Evidence of significant military results. Future plans.

3. Political Effects inside and outside South Vietnam. Reaction of local populace to defoliation and crop destruction operations. Estimate of success of psywar measures by AE{VN. Description of international Communist propaganda and estimate of its effect on the United States posture before international opinion. Effectiveness of measures taken by the United States to counter adverse propaganda.

4. Recommendations. Should the defoliation operations or crop destruction operations or both be suspended? Should any changes in the operations be made in the field either to improve their effectiveness or to minimize adverse political reaction? If it is desirable to continue or expand these operations, are there any additional propaganda measures which the United States should take to minimize adverse international reaction?

I would suggest, if you agree, that Ben Wood should try to coordinate the views of the JCS and Ed Murrow's shop into a single paper for the President.²

Mike
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 58, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

March 14, 1963: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group for Counterinsurgency¹
Washington, March 14, 1963, 2 p.m.
PRESENT
Mr. Johnson, the Attorney General, Mr. Gilpatric, Mr. Murrow, Mr. Forrestal, Mr. Janow and Mr. Wolf vice Mr. Bell, General Krulak vice General Taylor, Mr. Karamessines vice Mr. McCone
Mr. Koren was present for Items 1 and 2

[Here follows discussion of Thailand under item 1, “Southeast Asia Status Report”.]
South Viet-Nam

General Krulak observed that Viet-Cong activities during the last six months have been at a level 50% less than last year. It is not known whether this means they are regrouping for a greater effort, or if their capability has been reduced.

Mr. Murrow stated that our press relations in Saigon suggest to him the need for a single U.S. spokesman, to represent both civilian and military officials, under close direction from Washington. Mr. Murrow was asked to develop this idea and to again bring it up for. discussion.

The members agreed to re-examine the military justification for continued use of defoliants.
[Here follows discussion of items 2, “Progress Report on the Internal Defense Plan for Cambodia”; 3, “Review of Counterinsurgency Programs in Venezuela”; and 4, “Military Mobile Training Teams”, and “Miscellaneous Items” which do not relate to Vietnam.]

James W. Dingeman
Executive Secretary
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 59, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

March 15, 1963: Memorandum From the Counselor and Public Affairs Officer of the Embassy in Vietnam (Mecklin) to the Public Affairs Adviser in the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs (Manell)¹
Washington, March 15, 1963.
SUBJECT
Saigon Reaction to Mansfield

Further to Governor Harriman's request, here are my recollections of the reaction in Saigon to Senator Mansfield's recent report on his visit to Southeast Asia.² I assume you will pass them on to the Governor if appropriate.

As you know, there was a considerable difference between the tone and content of the initial U.S. news agency stories and of the report itself. As is, unhappily, so often the case, the news stories accented its negative comment on the Diem regime.

Reactions thus came in two parts: dismay initially, a degree of reassurance when the full text of the report arrived. As far as I know, neither the U.S. Mission nor the GVN was given an advance copy of the report. If this had been done, some of the damage inflicted by incomplete press dispatches could have been averted. It would be useful to distribute advance copies to the parties concerned in future release of papers of this sort.

There was no coverage at all of the report in the Vietnamese press, and thus no editorial comment. This in itself is significant, in my opinion, of a rather chastened mood (however privately bitter) inside the GVN as a result of such recent reminders of sensitive U.S. public opinion as the press uproar over Ap Bac and Secretary Rusk's public criticism of the lack of adequate facilities for newsmen in Viet-Nam. In previous cases of this sort, the GVN often has printed severe foreign criticism in its controlled press, in order later to counter-attack. There was a CAS report³ that one group inside the GVN wanted to use this technique on Mansfield, but was overruled by the palace. Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 60, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

March 16, 1963: Terrorists hurl a grenade into a Saigon home where an American family is having dinner, killing a French businessman and wounding four other persons, one of them a woman.
Source: VIET CONG USE OF TERROR, Revised and Updated March 1967, US Mission in Vietnam, Saigon- Vietnam

Also on March 16, 1963: Walter Preston Gorham Dies of Heart Attack
MAJ - O4 - Air Force - Regular
In Gia Dinh, South Vietnam
Non-Hostile, Ground Casualty
Panel 01E - Line 20
Source: The Vietnam Veterans Memorial, The Wall-USA

March 17, 1963: ...Ngo Dinh Diem, President of the then Saigonese administration in an interview with the Voice of America, March 17, 1963 said "the sprayings of toxic chemicals constitute a very effective means of war that the under- developed countries may experiment on what the communists called the liberation war". The chemical warfare under the cloak of a defoliation and crop-destruction program was approved by the U.S President J. Kennedy on November 10, 1961.
Source: CONSEQUENCES OF CHEMCAL WARFARE IN VIETNAM, by PROF. DR. TRAN XUAN THU, Vice-President and Secretary General, The Vietnam Associatiori for Victims of Agent Orangeldioxin

March 18, 1963: Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹
Saigon, March 18, 1963, 7 p.m.

820. For Harriman. Deptel 871.² I have not yet had opportunity to read subject GAO report, although I understand a draft of it has reached USOM. I would like, however, to make a preliminary comment based on contents reftel.

For many months this Mission has been reporting steady and encouraging progress in the slow and difficult counterinsurgency and pacification effort here. At the same time, we have pointed out that the general situation, though improving, is still fragile and subject to dangerous deterioration, physical and psychological. We are not out of the woods yet; the favorable trend is not irreversible. Any sign of weakening could well result in another attempt to overthrow the government. The predictable result of such an attempt—whether successful or not—would be, in my judgment, a bonanza for Hanoi. As it now stands, continued foreign press criticism of the GVN and US policy here, followed by the Mansfield report and signs of reluctance and disillusionment on the part of certain segments of US opinion, have without doubt encouraged coup plotting, have made the govt here tighten up rather than liberalize, and have encouraged the enemy. I do not think in these circumstances we can afford a public chastisement of the GVN (and/or our own policy) by a US agency. This is not said in an attempt to stifle criticism. It would, however, be totally incredible to the Vietnamese people (government and non-government, friendly and hostile) that the US could sustain a position with one hand and publicly slap it down with the other. They would certainly interpret this as foreshadowing change of US Govt policy here. In this connection, it seems to me pertinent to recall the first commandment of our task force instructions issued two years ago.³ To build confidence in US intentions to support this country through its duly-elected government, and to use that confidence to improve and underpin the entire situation. These basic instructions have not been changed to my knowledge. We have made, and continue to make, measurable progress under them. I have a strong feeling that publication of the GAO report as summarized and as suggested in reftel would gravely undermine this progress. I do not believe that its publication in any form would provide us leverage in negotiations with GVN.

It is, therefore, my strong recommendation that US Government consult with Congressional leaders with view to deferring publication of GAO report indefinitely. Executive branch should of course, undertake investigate and correct any specific deficiencies USOM operation brought out by report.

Nolting
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 62, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

Also on March 18, 1963: Letter From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Nolting) to Secretary of State at the Presidency and Assistant Secretary of State for National Defense Thuan¹
Saigon, March 18, 1963.

Dear Mr. Secretary: I refer to Mr. Brent's letter of January 14, 1963,² and to our subsequent conversations on the subject of a piaster fund to finance the local currency component of the jointly agreed priority economic program. The high priority accorded the strategic hamlet program and the total counterinsurgency effort by both our governments, in addition to the recognized need for adopting procedures of implementing such programs in an extraordinary and expeditious manner compatible with the extraordinary demands of counterinsurgency, are the factors prompting the proposal to establish a new fund.

Mr. Brent's letter communicated to you a proposal worked out at the staff level in broad terms. These proposals are elaborated below in more specific terms which I hope you will find acceptable on behalf of the Government of Viet-Nam. The proposal consists briefly of the following points:

I. Total Requirements
At the staff level, a total piaster requirement for the economic program has been agreed to on the order of 2.3 billion piasters. The Directorate General of Budget and Foreign Aid and USOM have been: working on the details of this program, and while they have not reached agreement on all details, the differences are small enough that it has become, I am sure, a relatively minor problem. The breakdown of this requirement, prepared by the USOM, is attached for your convenience.

II. Sources of Financing
Sources of financing for the Fund in 1963 would be (a) the unexpended balance of “purchased” piasters (approximately 635 million as of January 1, 1963); (b) the unobligated balance of 1962 counterpart (approximately 200 million piasters as of January 1, 1963); (c) all newly generated counterpart not committed by agreement to the military budget; (d) other GVN piasters, including VN$300 million “earmarked” in the National Budget for counterinsurgency, VN$100 million from the Lottery, and additional amounts as required to make up the deficiency between the total agreed program, on the one hand, and the total of (a), (b), and (c) on the other.” Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 61, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

March 19, 1963: S. Viet Nam Revolt Predicted - PHNOM PENH, Cambodia (AP) --Two Vietnamese exiles who led attempts to overthrow President Ngo Dinh Diem predicted today that South Viet Nam's chief of state will be ousted this year.

The two men, former officers in he South Vietnamese armed forces, said their anti-Communist opposition movement is gaining strength in Saigon and has the backing of many officers and officials of Diem's administration.

They claimed a grenade incident in Saigon several weeks ago was the work of their organization, not the Viet Cong, as the Saigon government had said.

The grenade a low-power device, exploded in a small Saigon park and spread anti-Diem leaflets around the park. The leaflets were signed by Pham Huy Co, exile leader of the movement who lives in Paris.

The exiles in Phnom Penh are ex-Col. Nguyen Chanh Thi and ex-Lt Nguyen Van Cu.

Thi commanded a brigade of paratroops that seized control of Saigon on Nov 11 1960. He fled to Cambodia two days later when the revolt fell apart.

Cu, 29, was one of two pilots who bombed and strafed the presidential palace in Saigon on Feb. 27 1962. One wing of the palace was damaged, but Diem and his family escaped.

One pilot, Lt Pham Phuc Quoc, was shot down and is in a prison. Cu crashlanded in Cambodia. After several months of internment, he was released.

Thi, 40, a graduate of St. Cyr Military Academy in Paris, spends much of his time reading. Cu who learned fluent English during two years of pilot training in America, gives English lessons to Cambodian and Vietnamese residents. "As long as Diem is in power, Viet Nam and America have no chance of winning against the Viet Cong," Thi said.

"Diem has no popularity with the people and you can go on fighting a war like that forever. American aid has given government forces magnificent equipment but it has not imparted the will to fight. The Vietnamese air force, for example, gets better equipment every month. But remember, during the Indochina war, France had a good air force here too, and the Viet Minh had no airplanes at all. I ask you to remember who won that war. I was there, fighting in the French army, and I have wounds to show for it. The will to fight is everything, and the Vietnamese army will never have it with Diem as president." Source: The Tuscaloosa News, March 19, 1963, P. 3 Google News Archive Search

March 20, 1963: Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State ¹
Saigon, March 20, 1963, 11 a.m
.
824. Reference: Deptel 872.² Emb A-480 and A-5 19³ gave evaluations respectively of Phuoc Long crop destruction and Ca Mau defoliation operations. Evaluation of defoliation operation Rt 1, Phu Yen and Binh Dinh provinces being pouched. Interim evaluation Thua Thien crop destruction operation will follow shortly. In brief, latter operation, carried out with hand-sprayers on ground, proved difficult from point of view logistics and security. Terrain, isolation of area, and VC response made it difficult for chemicals to be transported to target sites and to be applied to crops. Out of 120 hectares planned to be sprayed, only 12 were attacked with herbicides, additional 20 destroyed by hand. Also, psywar effort reportedly not wholly satisfactory. TF/Saigon currently attempting obtain further details on which base evaluation this operation.

As will be seen from airgrams referred to above, it extremely difficult obtain precise, statistical results defoliation and crop destruction operations, particularly in terms specific military impact and reactions local people. We must rely on judgments and to some extent our conclusions have had to be based more on absence adverse evidence rather than on positive evidence. Similarly, we have drawn conclusion about military effects which are general but which, on basis available evidence, we consider valid. [continued...]

Regarding Department's paper, our records indicate trial defoliation operations began August 1961 (Rt 13, Chon Thanh), and that thirteen specific areas have been hit. Regarding crop destruction, as noted above only about 12 hectares sprayed with herbicides in Thua Thien, bringing total chemical crop destruction efforts to 312 hectares. As for military effectiveness defoliation, would prefer see it described as appearing have general impact on security situation although no statistical results can be isolated. Again, with crop destruction, evidence of military effectiveness may never be conclusive in wholly measurable terms but believe Phuoc Long operation validates general conclusion that VC in Zone D hurting for food and that whatever done to deny them food will add to their problems.

Nolting
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 63, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

Also on March 20, 1963: Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs' Special Assistant (Jorden) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Harriman)¹
Washington, March 20, 1963.

SUBJECT
Infiltration in Viet Nam

(This memorandum is based on a study of the above subject conducted during a visit to Viet Nam from February 21 to March 14.)

Problem. To demonstrate the continued use of Laos as a channel for introduction of Viet Cong personnel and war material into South Viet Nam, particularly since October 7 by which date all foreign military personnel were to have been withdrawn from Laos under the Geneva Agreement.

Procedure. Before departing Washington, I read all available information on this subject. In Saigon, I reviewed more recent data with the Embassy and CAS. The subject was discussed in detail with the G-2 section of MAC/V. The latter has just completed a study of infiltration and has submitted it to the JCS.

Then, working through contacts in the Vietnamese Government I was able to look over the evidence in the hands of ARVN/G-2 and other intelligence agencies. This evidence consisted of captured weapons and supplies, interrogation reports of VC prisoners and defectors, captured diaries and documents. Finally, I visited a number of posts near the border and talked with Vietnamese and American officers who are concerned with border control and the infiltration problem.

Findings. Infiltration from North Viet Nam into South Viet Nam occurred through the first eight months of 1962. It is possible to demonstrate that the territory of Laos and Cambodia was used for this purpose. In addition, external support for the Viet Cong effort can be demonstrated in the increasing quantity of arms and equipment captured in South Viet Nam which originated from bloc sources. These include weapons and ammunition, particularly of Chinese origin, and medical supplies from Communist China, North Viet Nam, Hungary and East Germany.

It is not possible, however, to prove any significant movement of personnel through Laos and into South Viet Nam since September, 1962. As of the date of my departure from Saigon, no VC prisoner or defector had come into GVN hands who admitted entering South Viet Nam after October 7. Informants in the Highlands and other areas have reported Viet Cong moving over trails and through or near villages from the direction of Laos in recent months. But hard evidence is lacking.

Conclusions. We cannot now prove a clear violation of the Laos Agreement by demonstrating that foreign military personnel crossed into South Viet Nam from Laos since October 7, 1962. Nor, in fact, is there hard evidence that the elaborate program of infiltration from North Viet Nam into the South continued during the past five months on any significant scale.

I question, therefore, the utility at this point of producing a follow-up report on this subject along the lines of the Department's earlier white paper, “A Threat to the Peace.”² Nor do we have in hand the kind of material that would make possible an effective protest to the Soviets in their role as co-chairman of the Laos settlement.

It appears virtually certain, however, that the kind of evidence we seek will become available within a reasonable time. Officials in Saigon, both Vietnamese and American, are alert to the problem and can be expected to report promptly any significant new evidence that becomes available.

Some Observations on Infiltration.

Problems of control—the people.

Control of Viet Cong infiltration into South Viet Nam depends on control of the Highlands. This, in turn, means winning the confidence and cooperation of significant numbers of the Highland tribes who inhabit most of the area. A start has been made by the handful of able and talented Special Forces teams now operating in the area. More, much more, must be done if this problem is to be met even half-way.

A major disadvantage in this effort is the contempt in which most Vietnamese hold the tribal peoples. This sentiment is reciprocated by the Montagnard. Moreover, the Viet Cong have devoted considerable effort to winning Montagnard support by both promises and threats. Some Vietnamese understand the problem perfectly well and are working to overcome the residue of distrust and dislike that has prevailed. But it is going to take a major effort to convince the average Vietnamese soldier, officer and government official of the necessity for treating the tribesmen as something more than sub-human.
Continued...
Source: Office of the Historian, US Dept of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 64

March 21, 1963: Floyd Robert Davis
Pfc - E3 - Army - Regular
MACV
Length of service 0 years
Casualty was on Mar 21, 1963
In , SOUTH VIETNAM
NON-HOSTILE, HELICOPTER - CREW
AIR LOSS, CRASH ON LAND
Body was recovered
Panel 01E - Line 20
Source: TheWall-USA.com, The Vietnam Veterans Memorial, The Wall-USA

Also on March 21, 1963: Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs' Special Assistant (Jorden) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Harriman)¹
Washington, March 21, 1963.

SUBJECT
Press Reporting from Viet Nam

Problem

There is, I think, a serious misunderstanding of what has come to be called the “press problem in Viet Nam.” The impression has gained currency in official circles that “the real story” is not being told. The press has been described as negative, biased, naive, or worse. Some officials believe that American reporters in Viet Nam concentrate on criticism and pay slight attention to some of the promising and encouraging developments.

Periodically, a story appears from or about Viet Nam which causes official embarrassment. Often our reaction is to try to discover the source and plug the “leak,” to order our people not to talk about the subject concerned, and to think in terms of how we can “balance” the account.

Blame is variously ascribed—to the GVN's lack of capability and skill in handling information problems, to the GVN's official policy of regarding anything critical of itself as treasonable or pro-Communist, to the immaturity or irresponsibility of the American press, to the alleged proclivity of the press toward the sensational, the negative, and the critical.
Some Observations

1. The Viet Nam story is one of great complexity and with infinite shadings and nuances. There is considerably more gray than there is black or white. In any situation as complicated as this, we have to expect reporting—whether official or in the press—that is good and bad, fair and unfair, balanced or one-sided, accurate or in error. We are getting far more of the former of each of these pairs than of the latter.

2. To ignore the many negative features of the situation in Viet Nam is to dangerously delude ourselves. There is a vast multitude of problems and only by recognizing them can we hope to do something about them. A reporter who exposes such a problem may well be opening the door to its solution.

3. The quality of reporting by American newsmen from Viet Nam is, in my opinion, exceedingly good. They are young, it is true. And they are still learning their trade. But they are doing so with energy and seriousness of purpose. They spend a considerable amount of time in the provinces and the villages and with the military forces in the field. They have both better information and a better feel for the situation than many military officers and officials in Saigon. Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 65, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

Also on March 21, 1963: Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State ¹
Vientiane, March 21, 1963, 7 p.m.

1311. Deptel 888,² ARMA CX–42³ and Embtel 1265.⁴

Accumulated experience of past eight months when analyzed against background of our general understanding of Communist tactics and intentions suggests that for present and probably for some time to come, Pathet Lao will not permit any significant moves toward integration or reunification of Laos. I find this assumption being ever more widely held among Lao of conservative and neutralist tendencies as well as foreign observers. Virtually no one expects a sudden aggressive bid for power by Pathet Lao but rather an effort on their part to maintain all their assets intact and free of any outside influences so that they can thoroughly organize and control their own zone, while they seek through propaganda, infiltration, pressure, bribery, etc., to expand their influence.

Not possible to guess when this Communist strategy will change and what will be its new look but for present they appear ready tacitly to accept autonomy of each tendency within its zone (always hoping to expand their zone at expense of other two) under umbrella of internationally sanctioned and supported Government of National Union and giving lip service to Geneva Accords. Since Communists, in my view, want Laos to be example of successful “neutral” international solution which they can cite in urging same approach for So. Viet Nam, I do not foresee their upsetting present situation now. We should of course not assume that gradual freezing status quo would be distasteful to General Phoumi or for that matter that it would even be actively opposed by Souvanna Phouma. Phoumi probably sees same advantages for himself as Pathet Lao see for themselves while Souvanna may well already have concluded, in spite of his optimistic statements, that he must live for long time with present situation; he is not likely be attracted by rigorous struggle he would have to lead if real unification were to be achieved. Generally speaking, Lao tend feel they have been treated as international pawns and Government National Union with Troika and Geneva Accords have had to be accepted by them for peace among the nations. They maintain, however, that solution has no relation to political realities within Laos. Instead of trying to make impossible Troika work for internal affairs there are undoubtedly many who would prefer retain what would be in effect a partition of country for purposes of internal administration. Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis, Document 446, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

Also on March 21, 1963: Take War to Guerrillas-- SAIGON, Viet Nam (AP)—U.S. Air Force C123s dropped two battalions of Vietnamese paratroopers over the Wain of Reeds today in a raid on guerrilla emplacements.

Another paratroop battalion waited at Saigon Airport to reinforce the operation if resistance was encountered.

The target area, in Ken Tuong Province about 60 miles southwest of Saigon, was just south of the scene of a similar pararroop operation launched late last week. Results of that operation have not been announced.
Source: Kingston Daily Freeman, Kingston, NY, Thursday Evening, March 21, 1963, p. 22

March 22, 1963: Jimmy Richard Griffin
Sgt - E5 - Army - Regular
MAAGV Advisors
Length of service 8 years
Casualty was on Mar 22, 1963
In , SOUTH VIETNAM
NON-HOSTILE, GROUND CASUALTY 
Panel 01E - Line 20
Source: TheWall-USA.com, The Vietnam Veterans Memorial, The Wall-USA

Also on March 22, 1963: Airgram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam ¹
Washington, March 22, 1963, 5:13 p.m.
CA-1036²

Subject: Interdiction. For Nolting from Harriman. The use of air power in counterinsurgency operations in Viet-Nam has been subject to continuing study and refinement. The Country Team, and particularly the military members of the Country Team, are to be commended for their constant efforts to increase the effectiveness of our air advantage in Viet Nam.

However, we must never forget that this is a political war and since more than a year has now passed since we began our expanded assistance to Viet-Nam, we feel that we must now undertake a careful evaluation of the future use of both American and Vietnamese air power against the Viet Cong.

There appears to be no doubt of the great value of the increased mobility which transport planes and helicopters have conferred on the RVNAF. Relief by air power of units, posts, and hamlets under attack has proved very important. Reconnaissance by air is also most valuable. In the case of close air support for Government-initiated offensive operations, the picture is not so clear, however, and further study seems in order. But we are particularly struck by the difficulties of assessment with regard to interdiction missions.

In an effort to clarify the value of air interdiction missions and place them in proper perspective, we have drawn up the following balance sheet. We are aware that our information is incomplete. The great difficulty here is that, basically, any evaluation of the usefulness of air interdiction tends to become an evaluation of the temper of the Vietnamese people. The difficulties of assessment do not make it any less important, however. We therefore request that the Country Team consider the following statement of the problem, give us their comments, and wherever possible, provide us with more complete information.

Problem
We understand that U.S. piloted combat fixed-wing aircraft now fly about 1,000 sorties monthly. Of these, about 530 are in direct support of ground actions. Over 300 of the remainder are interdiction missions. These, as we understand it, are independent air strikes against ground targets believed to be Viet Cong positions or bases.

Targets for interdiction missions are often inhabited. Given the Viet Cong dependence upon the people, it is believed likely that many Viet Cong bases and installations include numbers of persons who are not hard core Communists, who are less than wholehearted supporters of the Viet Cong, or who may even be basically anti-Viet Cong. Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 66, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

Also on March 22, 1963: Memorandum From Thomas A. Parrott to President Kennedy¹
Washington, March 22, 1962.

In accordance with General Clifton's request, listed below are some of the more important actions taken in recent weeks in the general field of counter-insurgency. There has not been time to coordinate this paper with the members of the Special Group (Counter-Insurgency); however, it has been distributed to the Group today, and any significant comments or additions will be forwarded to you.

A. Organization

1. The Special Group (Counter-Insurgency) was established by NSAM 124, 18 January 1962.² The regular members are:
General Taylor, Chairman
The Attorney General
Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
Deputy Secretary of Defense
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Director of Central Intelligence
Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Administrator, Agency for International Development.
Other key officials are invited to meetings as appropriate. Meetings are held weekly³ and last a minimum of two hours, usually considerably longer.

2. The Group has brought Laos, Vietnam and Thailand under its direct cognizance. Cambodia was considered carefully and it was decided that that country was not appropriate for the specific attention of the Group. At the request of the State Department, the Ambassador has written a comprehensive survey of conditions in the country. Colombia is currently being examined, and the Group will meet with the Ambassador. The Yarborough Report on Colombia⁴ has been reviewed.

B. Specific Subjects Considered by the Special Group (CI)

1. Training
a. General Taylor visited the following schools, to stimulate reorientation of their curricula toward counter-insurgency: National War College; Special Warfare Center, Fort Bragg; Strategic Intelligence School; Military Assistance Institute; Foreign Service Institute; CIA Training Center.
b. NSAM 131, “Training Objectives for Counter-Insurgency,” was issued on 13 March 1962.⁵ Appropriate departments and agencies were directed to establish adequate training for their officers of junior, middle and senior grades, with provision for cross-training.

c. Preliminary plans for a “Modernization Institute” have been discussed with you. Details, and alternatives, are being developed by the Bureau of the Budget. Interim summer courses have been approved. Emphasis is being placed on the development of “political sophistication” in military officers, in connection with the approach to counter-insurgency training.

2. Vietnam
a. Weekly reports of the inter-agency Task Force⁶ are reviewed by the Special Group at each meeting. Corrective action along counter-insurgency lines is directed by the Group on a continuing basis. Special attention has been focused on: improvement of the military command structure; prisoner of war interrogation; provincial surveys; and Border Ranger Forces. The economic programs in South Vietnam have been under review to assure that they are properly oriented toward counter-insurgency.

b. The Hilsman Report⁷ was reviewed and a copy sent to General Harkins. Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VIII, National Security Policy, Document 74, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

March 23, 1963: Lavester Lee Williams
Capt - O3 - Army - Regular
MAAGV/5th SF
Length of service 8 years
Casualty was on Mar 23, 1963
In SOUTH VIETNAM
Non-Hostile, died missing,
GROUND CASUALTY
DROWNED, SUFFOCATED
Body was recovered
Panel 01E - Line 20
Source: TheWall-USA.com, The Vietnam Veterans Memorial, The Wall-USA

March 24, 1963: Each cargo helicopter company of the 45th Transportation Battalion will receive 20 enlisted personnel and one officer which are assigned as gunners on temporary duty status to be rotated every ninety days. These personnel are assigned from USARPAC . The first 2 1/2 platoons arrived Today.
Source: 45th TRANSPORTATION BATTALION HISTORY, 1 JAN - 30 JUNE 1963, (edited)

CH-21C Shawnees of the 57th Transportation Company (Light Helicopter) [45th Transportation Battalion] approach a landing zone at Bau Cham, fifty miles northwest of Saigon, to off-load troops of the 1st Battalion, 9th Regiment, ARVN 21st Division, on March 24, 1963. Set alight and cratered by VNAF airstrikes, such landing zones were potentially hazardous to helicopter operations. (US Army)
Source: Vietnam Choppers (Revised Edition), Helicopters in Battle 1950–1975, Osprey Publishing, August 2003

The 45th Transportation Battalion was deployed to provide command, control, staff planning and administration supervision over the employment of several army transportation (CH-21) light helicopter companies and one aviation company composed of U-1A Otter aircraft. Besides the planning and supervisory duties, it also was responsible for overseeing maintenance, logistical and medical service for its assigned and attached units.Source: Vietnam Order of Battle, by Shelby L. Stanton, Stackpole Books, p. 225

March 25, 1963: Transcipt of debate at House of Commons, Parliament, UK:

VIETNAM (TOXIC CHEMICALS)
HC Deb 25 March 1963 vol 674 cc950-1 950

52. Mr. Harold Davies asked the Lord Privy Seal what reply he, as co-chairman of the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indo-China, proposes to make to the protests sent to him by the Foreign Minister of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in a Note dated 22nd February, 1963, about the use of American aeroplanes to spray toxic chemicals on the vegetation and rice fields in North Vietnam.

Mr. Heath: I have received no communication regarding the use of toxic chemicals in North Vietnam. As regards the use of chemical defoliants in South Vietnam, I understand that the Government of North Vietnam has made a number of complaints to the International Control Commission. It is for the Commission to decide whether these complaints fall within its competence.

Mr. Davies: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that over the years since the 1954 Conference hon. Members both sides have complained of what some of us believe to be the Government's lack of acceptance of responsibility as co-chairman of the Geneva Conference? Will the Lord Privy Seal publish for the House reports of the International Control Commission on the conditions which it has found as the result of the use of these toxic chemicals, supplied by the United States, against North Vietnam and the price in vegetation and life and limb to the people of this tragic little country?
951
Mr. Heath: I will certainly see what reports are available on the subject from the International Commission. I know that the hon. Member follows these matters closely. He will realise that the purpose of these defoliants is to remove leaves from the trees without damaging the trees or the ground beneath so that the guerillas cannot hide there.

Mr. Warbey: In view of the fact that the Americans have for three years been carrying on an undeclared intervention in the civil war in South Vietnam, employing 12,000 armed men of their own and using methods of which some of us would not approve if they were used in British territories, is it not time that we at least took the step of withdrawing the British Police Mission from Saigon, thus at least relieving ourselves of co-responsibility in this dirty war?

Mr. Heath: No, Sir, certainly not. The main illusion in the last three years seems to have been that of the hon. Member that North Vietnam had nothing whatever to do with this.
Source: House of Commons Debate, March 25, 1963, UK Parliament

Also on March 25, 1963: How the War is going.

Thompson said that on the military side statistics showed that things were moving in our favor. He cited particularly the increased number of defectors (from an average of 15-20 a week in early 1962 to 148 for the week ending March 25, 1963).
Source: Vietnam War: The Documents - 3, April 1963 White House meeting with Britisher R.G.K. Thompson

Also on March 25, 1963: Central Intelligence Agency Information Report
Washington, March 25, 1963
[document number not declassified]
SUBJECT
Security Situation in Thailand (Situation Appraisal as of 23 March 1963)
APPRAISAL
Commentary

...4. [4-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] the Chinese Communists consider Thailand the key to Southeast Asia. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], other than the Chinese there are three principal movements in Laos targeted against Thailand: the Pathet Lao, the Vietnamese and the Thai Exiles Association (TEA), the latter [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] a weak puppet-type organization. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] present plans call for a continuation of organizational activities but no hostilities during 1963. While Thailand is divided into five areas for purposes of Communist organizational activities and control, the north and northeast have (portion garbled—being serviced) equal priority. Influential persons among the farmers, youth, teachers and governmental authorities are to be recruited and trained during this organizational period. From 600 to 1,000 Thais will be trained in Phong Saly in Laos and Dong Hoi in North Vietnam for a period of six months in political indoctrination and guerrilla warfare prior to being returned to Thailand as cadres. Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia, Document 474, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

March 26, 1963: Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State ¹
Saigon, March 26, 1963, 7 p.m.

844. CINCPAC also for POLAD. Reference: Department telegrams 856,² 857.³ Country Team message.

1. Recommend State/DOD/AID accept CPSVN as basis for MAP planning CPSVN developed by MACV/MAAG in response specific directive by SecDef last July to develop military plan which looked ahead three years and covered requirements to meet GVN military needs on orderly basis so that, by end three-year period, GVN could take over increasingly greater share of internal security responsibility and US special assistance could begin be phased out. Basic assumptions to this exercise were that VC insurgency would be under control by end three-year period and that extensive US support would be required during period to do this. In process its development, plan realistically related to MAP planning and requirements National Campaign.⁴ Within this context, plan represents best military judgment on how to bring insurgency under control and meet SecDef's objective. Accordingly, I gave my concurrence to CPSVN as basis for MAP planning, subject review annually as normally occurs with MAP. It of course impossible guarantee that CPSVN will bring US out of woods by end three-year period, or that its major assumption that VC will be brought under control by then will be borne out. Present progress is encouraging and holds prospect of continuing in same vein, but nonmilitary aspects this war can not easily be quantified or put into time period. Thus, there are risks in tying ourselves to time limit for bringing insurgency under control and defining phase-out special US military assistance to GVN. However, as stated para 4 of Plan, CPSVN represents best estimate military requirement to permit GVN to defeat current insurgency by end CY 65, defeat any new insurgency threat that may arise after withdrawal special US military assistance and put up initial defense against overt invasion. Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 67, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

Also on March 26, 1963: As printed in Tonawanda News:
Vietnamese Troops Kill 33 Guerrillas
SAIGON, South Viet Nam (UPI)
--South Vietnamese troops killed 33 Communist guerrillas and captured a number of weapons Monday in fierce fighting near Ap Bac hamlet, a U.S. military spokesman said...

Ap Bac, 35 miles south of Saigon, was the scene of a costly government defeat at the hands of the Viet Congs last January.

The spokesman said … that 18 government troops were killed and 14 wounded.
Source: Tonawanda News, North Tonawanda, NY, March 26, 1963

March 27, 1963: First Lieutenant George Quamo, United States Army, while serving as Assistant Battalion Advisor to the 3d Battalion, 33d Regiment, 21st Infantry Division, Army of the Republic of Vietnam. On 27 March 1963, during the 21st Infantry Division Operation DUC THANG 8/42, Captain Quamo accompanied the lead left company in which was part of the Battalion Task Force attacking south to close with and destroy the Viet Cong. The Viet Cong had been forced into a holding position by the attacking 3d Battalion, plus Division forces that were blocking and/or attacking from the west and south. Forced to hold, the two Viet Cong Battalions, plus a new and partially reorganized Battalion, attempted to draw the 3d Battalion into the area and then encircle and destroy it. Closing into the area, the 2d Company, which Captain Quamo accompanied, was pinned down by heavy enemy fire. The 2d Company placed a .30 Caliber machine gun into a forward firing position which gave supporting fires for all of the maneuvering companies. This was the only forward employed machine gun and Captain Quamo observed that the gun was out of operation despite the efforts of the gun crew. Realizing this would leave the company without supporting fires and would jeopardize the maneuvering of the other two companies, Captain Quamo, with complete disregard for his own personal safety, moved through heavy enemy fire to the forward machine gun and remedied the machine gun failure, putting it back into action. Later, when the companies were ordered to attack, the Company Commander was hesitant in making a bold move forward against heavy enemy fire, whereupon Captain Quamo persuaded him to rally the 2d Company. The Company Commander was inspired by his courage and moved the company rapidly forward. Captain Quamo's sound knowledge of military tactics and weapons, his heroic and quick actions and his steadfast advisory efforts during this engagement while the Battalion was under constant heavy fire for four hours won for him and the United States advisory effort very favorable recognition through Vietnamese channels.
Source: Valor awards for George Quamo, Military Times Hall of Valor

Also on March 27, 1963: As printed in Columbus Daily Telegram:
Rebels wipe out militia post at Saigon
SAIGON UPI
-- Communist rebels struck in a pre-dawn raid today wiping out a government militia post 75 miles south of Saigon.

A U.S military spokesman said the Red guerrillas apparently captured 19 militiamen as well as 22 weapons and a radio. It was the third such raid by the Viet Cong Communists this week.

The three strikes against government outposts have netted the Viet Cong enough government weapons to arm an entire company. The series of successful Red raids took the edge off news of government victories in other areas.

Twenty-two Communists were reported to have been killed in two skirmishes with the loss of only one government soldier. The U.S spokesman said 15 guerrillas were killed in artillery and air strikes Tuesday in a government operation in Kien Phong Province near the Cambodian border.

In a skirmish near Ca Mau […day] government troops claimed to have killed eight Communists losing only one killed and 10 wounded of their own.
Source: Columbus Daily Telegram, Wednesday, March 27, 1963, Newspaper Archive

March 28, 1963:Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State ¹
Saigon, March 28, 1963, 8 p.m.

852. CINCPAC for POLAD. Deptel 869,² Embtel 790.³ Went to day to prod Thuan on counter-insurgency fund. Ran into what has proved to be serious trouble. Thuan first raised certain questions and objections of relatively minor nature which he said had been raised by Director of Budget and Department of Interior. Discussing these, I suggested that we get our experts together in next day or two to iron out any remaining differences so that proposed letter could be signed and matter concluded.

Thuan then said (asking me not to report) that agreement in principle that he had previously gotten from Ngo Dinh Nhu had been withdrawn. I asked him whether President Diem had also reneged, and he said no, that Nhu was the trouble. I asked him why, and he said in effect that Nhu had been frightened off from close collaboration envisaged in this counter-insurgency proposal by the “atmosphere” now prevailing in US-GVN relations. In discussing this, Thuan repeatedly referred to the doubts and misgivings engendered by the Mansfield report, by editorial and press pressures against the GVN in America, by what appeared to Nhu to be indications of US uncertainty in continued support of GVN. In this connection he referred to Washington Post story about Nguyen Ton Hoan and upcoming visit of Warren Unna, whom he characterized as incurably prejudiced against GVN. In short, he said that Nhu particularly was disturbed about entering into a commitment of this sort (both procedural and financial) at a time when he thought he saw signs of a possible shift in US policy. Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 68, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

March 29, 1963: Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam ¹
Washington, March 29, 1963, 1:04 p.m.

911. Embtel 852.² We most concerned by report GVN apparently drawing back from commitment to continue successful rural CI social economic programs which we view as heart of effort to win support of VN people and isolate VC. If our figures correct, funds remaining for these programs will be exhausted in about one month. Firm GVN commitment therefore appears most urgent matter. In negotiating with Nhu and Diem you therefore authorized at your discretion stress great importance we attach to these programs and state Washington also views their continuation as test of mutual confidence. If GVN unwilling trust us to extent of continuing successful and vital CI programs under proven machinery, difficulties of working together for common goals will be greatly increased.

You are also authorized tell Nhu and Diem that you instructed assure them US policy remains full support of Diem's government in its efforts defend VN against VC attack and bring better life to VN people. Mansfield report does not mean change in US policy of support for GVN against Communist threat. This connection you may wish quote President Kennedy's March 6 press conference remarks on Mansfield report.³

''I don't see how we are going to be able, unless we are going to pull out of Southeast Asia and turn it over to the Communists, how we are going to be able to reduce very much our economic programs and military programs in South Viet-Nam in Cambodia, in Thailand.

''I think that unless you want to withdraw from the field and decide that it is in the national interest to permit that area to collapse, I would think that it would be impossible to substantially change it particularly, as we are in a very intensive struggle in those areas.'' (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963, pp. 243-244)

With regard Warren Unna visit you may wish tell Nhu that Thompson had long talk with Unna last night and Unna appeared impressed by Thompson's positive views VN situation.
Rusk
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 69, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

March 30, 1963: Telegram From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Harkins) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Felt)¹
Saigon, March 30, 1963, 2:05 p.m.

MACJ00 1870. 1. My comments on State to Saigon 22 March² follow. Before making specific comments I want to set the stage first. There are no hard facts here to support general theme that aerial interdiction is an indiscriminate killer. Second, recognize fully that the war in Vietnam is political as well as military. In fact, this point was one of the essential elements in the National Campaign Plan. How ever at this stage of the game the 30,000 VC casualties on the one hand and 13,000 RVN on the other for 1962 would indicate it has a distinct military flavor. Third, political attacks by the VC are possible only because of the active participation of their military forces. For this reason, destruction of the VC political organization, which is essential to GVN efforts to regain control and support of the people, requires application of force against the VC military capability which enables it to flourish. In many cases air delivered munitions are the only type of force which can presently reach some of the VC strongholds. Fourth, to consider the VC as merely a political adversary in spite of the vicious manner and means that he employs to subvert the populace is inviting disaster and accepting a degree of procrastination which puts time on his side.

2. Specific comments in the area of statement of the problem follow:

a. U.S. supported offensive sorties though increasing have not reached the tempo cited. Actual statistics for U.S. fixed wing aircraft for the past 6 months reveal a total of 2450 offensive sorties for an average of 480 per month of which an average of 100 were interdiction. 183 (Farmgate) interdiction missions have been flown thus far in March 1963 which is indicative of the increase in this area.

b. The first paragraph should state that these air strikes are based upon confirmed intelligence. Additionally, Vietnamese military personnel are on board U.S. aircraft when ordnance delivery missions are flown.
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 71, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

March 31, 1963: Excerpt of Letter from John Fanning, Advisory Detachment 21 To John:

Most of the people here in the central highlands are Montagnards (mountain people, obviously enough) who are not Vietnamese, and who have not gotten along too well with the Vietnamese. They are probably of some kind of Pacific island background. They are fairly sharp, and there are substantial efforts underway to employ them militarily. They like us, and they liked the French. Their position among the Vietnamese might be compared to that of the American Indian. Last week I went with some friends to one of their villages nearby, and took pictures and gave out candy, as Americans are supposed to do. We also gave out clothing.

On religion. Today is the first day we have off since arrived. Up until now we worked Seven days a week. Now we shall have sundays off. Previously we went to Mass at 6 p.m. in the Catholic Church in town. The sermon was in Vietnamese, but of course the text of the service is equally unintelligible throughout the world, and that was helpful. Now we have a US Army chaplain who comes on Sunday afternoons from another US Army detachment about 50 km away. He was here for the first time last week, and his sermon was terrible. It was childish, and I pass over in silence the fact that it was theologically inaccurate. We might be better off going back to the Vietnamese Church downtown. The lack of leisure (up until now at least) tends to slow up religious thought and activity. Perhaps things will improve now that we have Sundays off. I did buy a couple of volumes (in French) of the 20th Cent. Encyclopedia of Catholicism, as they were only about 90 cents in Saigon. I think I will be able to get through them with the aid of a dictionary.
Source: Letter from John Fanning, Advisory Detachment 21 TO John,  31 March 1963, Folder 01, Box 01, John P. Fanning Collection, The Vietnam Center and Archive, Texas Tech University. Accessed 30 Mar. 2013

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April 1, 1963: Quinim Pholsena, 47, the Foreign Minister of Laos, was assassinated by a soldier assigned to guard him. Quinim and his wife had returned home from a reception with the King, when Lance Corporal Chy Kong fired a machine gun at the couple. Minister Quinim was hit by 18 bullets, after which the guard "finished him off with a shot through the head". Source: Wikiedia, Monday, April 1, 1963

Also on April 1, 1963: The Republic of Vietnam prints a “MONTHLY PUBLICATION OF PSYWAR DIRECTORATE OF NATIONAL DEFENSE DEPARTMENT” entitled “WHY VICTORY IS OURS”.

Inside is a quote beneath a full page image of President Diem:

I DO NOT SEE ANY OTHER PEOPLE INVOLVED IN WAR FOR 21 YEARS WITHOUT INTERRUPTION AND REMAINING AS AGGRESSIVE IN COMBAT AS THE VIETNAMESE SOLDIERS ...

PRESIDENT NGO-DlNH-DIEM

Source: The Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces - Why Victory is Ours, April 1, 1963,  01 April 1963, Folder 09, Box 01, Joseph Drachnik Collection, The Vietnam Center and Archive, Texas Tech University. Accessed 30 Mar. 2013

Also on April 1, 1963: Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State¹
Washington, April 1, 1963, noon.
SUBJECT
Situation in Viet-Nam

PARTICIPANTS
Governor W. Averell Harriman
Mr. R.G K Thompson, Head, British Advisory Mission to Viet-Nam
Mr. Michael V. Forrestal, NSC Member
Mr. William H. Sullivan, Asst. to Undersecretary for Political Affairs
Mr. Chalmers B. Wood, Director, Working Group/Viet-Nam

There follow the chief topics in the conversation between Governor Harriman and Mr. Thompson:

1. Confidence. Thompson emphasized the necessity of building confidence on the part of the GVN and in Washington. This was a matter of making it clear that we were determined to see this through. The Governor asked whether it was possible to build Vietnamese confidence in Diem. Thompson replied that where you needed confidence most was in the villages and that it was increasing there. An index of this confidence was the fact that so much rice was getting through from the villages to Saigon. The GVN might be able to export 300,000 tons during 1963. The Mansfield Report had a depressing effect, particularly because it complimented Sihanouk. The Governor wondered whether Senator Mansfield knew this.

2. Press Relations. The Governor felt that the chief responsibility for improving press relations rests with the GVN President Diem and that everything possible had been done in Washington. Thompson said that he had strongly emphasized the importance of this matter to President Diem and to Thuan.

3. U.S. Forces Level. Thompson said that Secretary McNamara has asked him about the advisability of reducing U.S. forces. He had replied that if progress during 1963 continued good, and if it were possible to have a white area during the summer, it might be wise to reduce U.S. strength by a significant amount, say 1,000 men. This would take the steam out of Viet Cong propaganda and it would reaffirm the honesty of American intentions.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 73, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

Also on April 1, 1963: Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam ¹
Washington, April 1, 1963, 5:40 p.m.

910. State/AID/Defense message. Embtel 860.² Concur with your plan tell Nhu and Diem further procurement and shipment hamlet kit materials, PL-480 and AID dollar procurement items for hamlets not justified unless there adequate piaster fund and agreed procedures for piaster use.

You may further wish indicate that new approvals are currently pending in AID/W for additional funds for direct counter-insurgency procurement and for additional Title II PL-480 commodities. We may hold up these approvals pending resolution piaster issue. FYI, we will continue processing papers assuming satisfactory outcome your negotiations End FYI.

Rusk
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 74, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

April 2, 1963: Memorandum for the Record by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Taylor)¹
Washington, April 2, 1963.
SUBJECT
Meeting with Under Secretary Harriman with regard to Command Relationships between CINCPAC and COMUSMACV

1. I introduced the discussion by describing the review of command relationships made by the JCS which culminated in the recent discussion with Admiral Felt. I showed him General Harkins' “Eyes Only” to the Chairman (MAC 566)² in which General Harkins recommends no change in the present command setup. I also called Mr. Harriman's attention to General Harkins' directive,³ in particular to paragraph 2a which gives Harkins broad responsibilities in the fields of US military policy, operation, advice and assistance to South Vietnam.

2. I explained to Mr. Harriman that the Chiefs had gone over this paragraph 2a with Admiral Felt and all were in agreement that this language gave Harkins adequate authority to deal with local incidents, and to conduct the campaign as he saw fit without further specific authority from higher headquarters.

3. With regard to establishing a direct channel of communication between the JCS and General Harkins, I explained the practical difficulties of such a change and the disadvantages from the point of view of the JCS.

4. Mr. Harriman appeared reasonably well satisfied with my explanation but reserved the right to reopen the matter if the present arrangement, in his judgment, does not work well.⁴ I asked him to take a look at the POLAD situation in Honolulu as the State representation there should keep CINCPAC abreast of political and economic issues. Mr. Harriman indicated that he would talk to Minister Martin, the present CINCPAC POLAD, and would consider what changes, if any, might be made.

5. In the course of the conversation, Mr. Harriman indicated that Admiral Jerauld Wright would succeed Admiral Kirk as Ambassador to Taipei and that Nolting had requested relief from Saigon effective this coming May. Thus far, no successor has been designated.

MDT
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 75, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

April 3, 1963: Memorandum From the Director of the Vietnam Working Group (Wood) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Hilsman)¹
Washington, April 3, 1963.
SUBJECT
Jets for Government of Viet-Nam

I thought it might be useful for you to have in writing our reasons for opposing the proposal to supply the GVN with four RT-33 and two T-33 jets at this time:

(1) Giving the Vietnamese jets would be a small but significant escalation of the war in Viet-Nam. We would lose the ability to remove jets from Viet-Nam at any time that the international situation might make it in our interest to do so. The fact that these are unarmed jets will be overlooked by Bloc propagandists. Such a move would give the Bloc an excuse for escalation. If the GVN is doing as well against the VC as many of us believe, the DRV and the Bloc may well be looking for such an excuse.

(2) The fact that Cambodia will receive MIGs from the Russians should not be a reason for giving jets to Viet-Nam.

(3) There appears to be no need to give jets to the Vietnamese in order to get the job done. In fact, the job would admittedly be done better if we continued to use only American piloted aircraft. The reason for this is that the T-33 is not as good for reconnaissance as the F-101 which American pilots are now using. Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 76, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

April 4, 1963: Memorandum of a Conversation, White House,
Washington, April 4,1963,10 a.m (1)
SUBJECT
Situation in Viet-Nam

PARTICIPANTS
The President
The Honorable David Ormsby Gore, British Ambassador
Mr. R.G.K. Thompson, Head, British Advisory Mission to Viet-Nam
Mr. Chalmers B. Wood, Director, Working Group, Viet-Nam

The following are the principal points touched on between the President and Mr. R.G.K. Thompson:

1. Diem. Thompson emphasized that Diem had much support in the country where it counted and that he had written off the Saigon intelligentsia. In reply to a question from the President, he said that the quality of the political opposition was very poor. He said that if Diem disappeared there would be a risk of losing the war within six months since there was no other leader of his caliber available. (After the meeting with the President, he qualified this remark by saying that as a result of the war effort there was a continuing increase in the number of competent and experienced Vietnamese officials.)

2. How the War is going. Thompson said that on the military side statistics showed that things were moving in our favor. He cited particularly the increased number of defectors (from an average of 15-20 a week in early 1962 to 148 for the week ending March 25, 1963). He cautioned that the pattern of the war would not change much, that there would be no major victories on our side, and that we had to expect as a part of the fortunes of war occasional reverses, such as the one at Ap Bac.

3. Infiltration. The numbers were not large but the quality of the cadres infiltrated was high. The Viet Cong did not possess the food and equipment necessary to absorb a large quantity of infiltrators and they wished to keep North Viet-Nam's role in the war at least semicovert.

4. The President asked why the Viet Minh were able to defeat the French. Thompson replied the French never had any hope of getting the people on their side and that the strategic hamlet program, which had gone much better than anyone had expected, provided a degree of security in the countryside which the French had never been able to achieve.

5. American Military Personnel. Thompson said that the American military personnel that he had observed, particularly the MAAG Advisers in the provinces, were very good. He was also impressed by the good behavior of the American military in Saigon.

6. Favorable contrast between the Government of Viet-Nam and Viet Cong controlled territories. Thompson said that things had now progressed to a point where an observer in a plane could distinguish, on the one hand, GVN-controlled territories where roads and bridges were repaired and strategic hamlets built, and, on the other hand, VC territory where the bridges were generally down and the roads cut.

7. Defoliants. Thomson doubted that the effort involved in defoliation was worthwhile on the grounds that even when the foliage was dead, sufficient branches and twigs remained to provide hiding places for the Viet Cong. He also cited the automatic aversion of the Asians to the use of unknown chemicals. As to crop destruction, he believed this should only be carried out in a situation where it was clear that the Viet Cong had no sources of supplies other than the areas to be destroyed. The President asked that the defoliation and crop destruction programs be reviewed again.
Source: Vietnam War: The Documents - 3, April 1963 White House meeting with Britisher R.G.K. Thompson

April 5, 1963: ... a famous meeting of the Special Group was held, in which [Wiliam] Jorden, after spending three months in Vietnam, reported that “we are unable to document and develop any hard evidence of infiltration after October 1, 1962.” Evidence prior to that date strongly indicated the absence of infiltration. At the same meeting, [Britain's] Robert Thompson attempted to counter Jorden’s pessimistic appraisal of Viet Cong activity by forecasting that “US forces are adequate. By the end of the year, troops can begin to be withdrawn.”
Source: A Special Supplement: Kennedy’s Private War, July 22, 1971, by Ralph L. Stavins, The New York Review of Books

Also on April 5, 1963: Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State ¹
Saigon, April 5, 1963, 7 p.m.

882. CINCPAC for POLAD. Embtels 852,² 790; Deptel 869.³ Herewith a report of failure to persuade or move Diem on counterinsurgency fund issue. In the past, he has been known to change his mind after digesting some hard facts. He may do so this time, but I rather doubt it. Certainly he gave no indication of so doing in course of three and one-half hour discussion Thursday evening.⁴ In writing this, I am gravely concerned and perplexed. I believe I used all the ammunition and personal persuasion I had, without apparent result. He seemed stoically prepared to accept all consequences of his decision, was relatively relaxed and rather philosophical throughout, and gave the impression of one who would rather be right, according to his lights, than President. He was evidently braced for this session, well prepared on details, courteous but immovable.

Several previous talks with Thuan had revealed increasingly stubborn objections by Diem, stimulated by Nhu, to our long-standing proposal which had, according to Thuan, previously received Diem's approval in principle. I insisted on carrying matter to President after Thuan finally reported his failure to convince him and after discussion of issue and my instructions with Harkins and Brent.

I shall try to give essence of long discussion with Diem as accurately as possible, since I believe situation now confronting us represents another perplexing turn in GVN policy with far reaching implications for American policy. I have considered possibility of his having misunderstood either proposal itself or consequences of his refusal, and I do not believe he is under any misapprehension or misunderstanding. He is apparently sincerely convinced (though erroneously in my judgment) that Americans, particularly at lower levels and in all branches of GVN activity, are, by their very number and zeal, creating within the governmental structure of the GVN and among the population the impression of assuming an American “protectorate” over SVN. He recognized repeatedly that this is neither our aim nor our desire and expressed great gratitude for American generosity and intentions, but stuck to his conviction that having so many Americans here is creating the impression of a U.S. protectorate. Relating this to our present proposal for counter-insurgency fund, he insisted that our proposal would perpetuate too close a relationship in financial and procedural matters, particularly on the civil side, would undermine the authority of his government and its ability to make unimpeded decisions, and thus play into the hands of the Communists.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 81, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

April 6, 1963: 7 HELD IN VIET NAM
SAIGON, South Viet Nam (AP)
Cambodia accused Viet Nam of new aggression today. It announced the arrest and imprisonment of seven Viet Nam troops charged with violating Cambodian territory.
Source: Lancaster Eagle Gazette, Saturday, April 06, 1963, Newspaper Archive

Also on April 6, 1963: TUNG AND NU’S FIFTH CHILD AND THIRD daughter was born on April 6, 1963. She was given the name Phan Thi Kim Phuc. Phuc means “happiness” (if a male, the meaning is “blessing”). Phan was her father’s family name, Thi signifies a female, and Kim, meaning “golden,” was a name she shared with her two sisters. To her family, she was known as Phuc.

Source: The Girl in the Picture: The Story of Kim Phuc, the Photograph, and the Vietnam War,  by Denise Chong

April 7, 1963: Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State ¹
Saigon, April 7, 1963, 1 a.m.

888. CINCPAC for POLAD. Embtel 882.² In assessing Diem's rejection of our proposal for counter-insurgency fund, most significant point is that grounds advanced for rejection approach repudiation of concept of expanded and deepened U.S. advisory effort, civil and military. This concept was fundamental element our agreement with GVN in December 1961 on greatly stepped up U.S. assistance effort. Progress made since that date would not have occurred, in our view, without massive advisory effort, nor do we believe it can be maintained if drastic reduction made at this stage in number of advisors, particularly in provinces and with smaller military formations-which are precisely areas where Diem seems to find most difficulty. We would not deny that some advisors may, on occasion, have acted in way to cause complaint or that their number and zeal have reached point where, to those who want to see it that way, there are similarities with a “protectorate” situation. Point is we don't think GVN can win without U.S. advisors in roughly present density for the next year at least.

We also gravely doubt that momentum of strategic hamlet program can be maintained and, especially, gains already made consolidated without piastre fund of roughly size we have proposed and procedures for its use as effective as those we have had for purchased piastres. Although Diem says GVN will make necessary funds available, he is probably thinking of much smaller sum than we are (very likely the 400 million piastres already earmarked by GVN vs 1300 million in our proposal) and it is clear that he is not thinking of procedures which would give us satisfactory voice in use of GVN funds. (He probably wants to revert to former unsatisfactory GVN procedures.) In short, we conclude that unless we can get something comparable to what we have proposed, there is grave risk that strategic hamlet program will founder. Without successful strategic hamlet program, it will take longer to get insurgency under control.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 82, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

April 8, 1963: Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam ¹
Washington, April 8, 1963, 8:06 p.m.

943. Paris SEATO for Hilsman and Felt. Embtels 882 and 888.² Your recommendations receiving full review here. Meanwhile suggest you hold off requesting explanatory letter from Diem and from reducing counterpart support to GVN military budget.

1. What is your judgment as to probable GVN actions if support to GVN military budget were revised downward as suggested reftel?

2. If these revisions made what likelihood that GVN would agree use these funds for CI Program?

3. Why do you believe that GVN will not make 1.3 billion piasters available for CI?

4. Do you expect GVN could be persuaded to make their piasters available under acceptable procedures?

5. Would GVN likely agree to provincial advisers continuance and joint CI fund if funded (a) with U.S. owned Sec 104 (c) PL-480³ piaster proceeds; (b) with more purchased piasters?

6. What is your estimate amount needed carry on non-CI economic projects and fund USOM operating expenses for remainder CY 63?

7. What is possibility at this time or in near future of altering the proposed counterinsurgency joint fund to give GVN greater voice in planning and control of operations, and at same time continue an effective CI effort?

Request reply Tuesday COB Washington time.⁴

Ball
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 84, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

Also on April 8, 1963:
Jerry Alan Campaigne
U.S. Air Force Reserve
O3 / CAPT
South Vietnam
Hostile - Died While Missing
Aircraft Loss / Crash Not at Sea
Air Casualty - Fixed Wing - Other Aircrew

Andrew C Mitchell III
U.S. Air Force
O3 / CAPT
South Vietnam
Hostile - Died While Missing
Aircraft Loss / Crash Not at Sea
Air Casualty - Fixed Wing - Pilot
Source: U.S. Military - Deaths, All Causes, Southeast Asia, 1963, DCB Software

April 9, 1963: New York Times: The United States took a strong stand against "a serious violation of the cease-fire" in Laos. Also, there were "indications" that Communist North Vietnamese troops were supporting attacks by the pro-Communist Pathet Lao movement against the neutralist Government's army. The Soviet Union balked at a British suggestion to join in counseling the neutralist leader.
Source: New York Times Chronology - John F. Kennedy Presidential Library & Museum, April 9, 1963

Also on April 9, 1963: Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State ¹
Saigon, April 9, 1963, 7 p.m.

893. Paris for SEATO for Secretary Hilsman and Felt. CINCPAC for POLAD. Deptel 943, Embtels 882 and 888.² GVN seems to be giving ground on this issue. On Monday, I sent personal letter to President Diem ³ requesting written reply to my letter to Thuan of March 18⁴ on counter-insurgency fund. Today, Thuan asked me to see him and what he had to say after talks with Diem and Nhu encourages our hope for reasonable and effective compromise. We went very thoroughly into matter. Thuan, while unable to guarantee Diem's position, made following points and proposals which he thought, on basis conversation with President after our talk, could be made acceptable to GVN:

Thuan's first point was that GVN did not want to alter fundamentally relationship with U.S. He said this meant that GVN does not desire a reduction of U.S. advisory-support effort. I asked, what about reduction of U.S. advisors? Thuan replied he thought Diem did not want a reduction in number of U.S. advisors, but only more “political sensitivity” on the part of certain advisors especially in rural areas.

Thuan specifically stated that Diem had agreed that relationship and working arrangements between GVN Inter-Ministerial Committee on Strategic Hamlets and U.S. Province Rehabilitation Committee should remain as is.

(There is an ambiguity here which will require further detailed discussion.)
On the question of financing the rural counter-insurgency program, Thuan stated that the GVN is prepared to contribute piasters from its own resources, on the basis of the list of projects attached to my letter of March 18 (Toaid A-2874) up to 2.3 billion piasters. Questioned closely on this, he said that Diem had not specifically agreed to the amount, but he felt that he could persuade him to state this in terms. I asked, under what procedure would GVN's contribution be expended. Thuan replied, under special fund set up for this purpose, not subject to bureaucratic red tape, for allotment to province chiefs in manner similar to that employed in Phu Yen Province prior to establishment of U.S. special fund. (We believe this can be made to work, but will require further negotiation and effective understanding.)

In general diagnosis of Diem's position last week and reasons therefor, Thuan said that President was emotionally worked up by a number of reports (some true, some partly true, and some false) concerning Americans' activities coming to him at the same time. Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 85, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

April 10, 1963: New York Times: SEATO wants to bring pressure on the North Vietnamese forces that have joined the Pathet Lao's fight against the, neutralists.
Source: New York Times Chronology - John F. Kennedy Presidential Library & Museum, April 10, 1963

Also on April 10, 1963: Telegram From the Delegation at the SEATO Council Meeting to the Department of State ¹
Paris, April 10, 1963, 2 p.m.

Secto 19. GVN FonMin Mau at his request called on Secretary April 10.² At latter's request Mau described situation his country, referring to evidences of success in military and economic fields and pointing to prospect in few months of assembly and local elections. Secretary expressed pleasure at progress, but warned of need to maintain momentum and to guard against our common efforts being sapped by inevitable frustrations.

Mau then launched into review his government's viewpoint on problems confronting it. After alluding to difficulties posed by Viet Minh infiltration through Cambodia and Laos, Mau warned against danger of bloc efforts to divide the free world. For instance, the idea of neutralization for SVN originates with the Communists but is supported by “certain organs of French Government”, which hope see both bloc and US depart leaving a French presence in SVN. Example of difficulties facing Souvanna, a “creature of French,” is particularly instructive. Mau stated, however, he wished to concentrate on more delicate question of three problems cropping up between US and GVN which derive from principle of freedom:

1) Press: US press often does not understand nature of situation in SVN, seeks sensational aspect, and has deleterious effect on US public opinion. Furthermore unrestricted freedom of press can jeopardize security of military operations.

2) Vietnamese oppositionists: 75 to 80 percent of those claiming be opposition political elements have proved be “creatures of French” and undesirable elements, such as Tran Van Huu, tend to gather in Paris where they do not observe non-political role appropriate for political refugees (such as Bidault). GVN can't understand why USG permits such persons, who obtain French travel documents, to come to US. Such visits give unfortunate impression of US support.

3) General policy: GVN, which is locked in struggle with VC, cannot accept 100 percent democracy.

Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 86, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

April 11, 1963: New York Times: New U.S. helicopters aid Vietnam raid. (pg. 5)
Source: New York Times Chronology - John F. Kennedy Presidential Library & Museum, April 11, 1963

Also on April 11, 1963: Stars and Stripes Newspaper: 2 U.S. Pilots Dead in Vietnam Crash

SAIGON (AP) -- A Vietnamese ground rescue party evaded enemy machinegun fire Tuesday to reach a mountainous site where a two-engine fighter crashed while making a strafing run Monday.

The party found both the American pilots and a Vietnamese observer dead.

The Americans were identified as Capt. Andrew C. Mitchell III, 34, and Capt. Jerry A. Campaigne, 27. Mitchell was a pilot and Campaigne a navigator.

An observation plane and the ground force reported that they had been under communist machinegun fire Monday night, but no casualties were reported.

Although the party of 48 troops and old men reached a point only 500 yards from the crash before dark, they were unable to move during the night.

The ground party said the Viet Cong had not ben able to reach the crash site, and government forces salvaged all guns from the downed B-26. A B-26 carries six or eight .50 caliber machineguns.

The B-26 went down in mountains about 200 miles north of here while making a strafing run. This was the third fatal B-26 crash in Vietnam so far this year.

There was no indication whether there plane was shot down or crashed for other reasons. A board of inquiry was sent to the site. One of the earlier B-26 crashes was caused by engine failure.

Source: Pacific Stars and Stripes (Newspaper), Thursday, April 11, 1963, Newspaper Archive

Also on April 11, 1963: ...almost a year after the program’s official launching, it was reported that 5,917…hamlets had been built, housing 8,150,187 inhabitants out of a total [South Vietnamese] population given as 13,813,066.
Source: “It is Their War”: JFK, Diem, and the Vietnamese Peasantry

April 12, 1963: 4 Die

Donald Scott Carson
SSGT
Air Force
San Francisco
CA
DOB: 11/3/1931

RAYMOND E DOYLE JR
1LT
AIR FORCE
MERION
PA
DOB: 7/3/1936

RICHARD L HATLESTAD
1LT
AIR FORCE
SEPULVEDA
CA
DOB: 12/22/1939

STANLEY E TRUESDALE
SSGT
AIR FORCE
SAN DIEGO
CA
DOB: 8/31/1934
Source: The Vietnam Veterans Memorial Fund

Also on April 12, 1963: ... a C-123 Provider (tail number 56-4380) crashed on take-off from the still-under-construction airfield at Nakon Phanom, Thailand, killing the three crewmen and two Thai civilians on the ground. While the aircraft and the two pilots were assigned to the 777th Troop Carrier Squadron temporarily based at Don Muang Airfield, Bangkok, the US Air Force casualty list indicates Staff Sergeant Truesdale was assigned to the 776th Troop Carrier Squadron. The three men were: 1LT Raymond E. Doyle, Merion, PA, 777th TCS 1LT Richard L. Hatlestad, Sepulveda, CA, 777th TCS SSGT Stanley E. Truesdale, San Diego, CA, 776th TCS ------ Source: TogetherWeServed.com

Also on April 12, 1963: New York Times: U Thant pointed an accusing finger at those nations that had promised to maintain Laotian neutrality but were still sending arms to the warring faction. (1:5) Source: New York Times Chronology - John F. Kennedy Presidential Library & Museum, April 12, 1963

April 13, 1963: Mr. Dobrynin was told that Washington opposed the reconvening of the 14-nation Laotian peace conference as a means of restoring peace in Laos. (1:6)
Source: New York Times Chronology - John F. Kennedy Presidential Library & Museum, April 13, 1963

Also on April 13, 1963: American military advisers cast doubt on the will of the South Vietnamese Army to press Communist rebel forces in combat. (4:3)
Source: New York Times Chronology - John F. Kennedy Presidential Library & Museum, April 13, 1963

Also on April 13, 1963: Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State ¹
Saigon, April 13, 1963, 1 p.m.

909. For Hilsman. For your information Harkins, Brent and I have declined on grounds press of work previously accepted invitation from Madame Ngo Dinh Nhu to spend several days next week at GVN villa in Dalat. Real reasons for this action, which I shall pass to President Diem orally at first opportunity, stem from recent directive from Madame Nhu to Women's Solidarity Movement urging members not to show gratitude for foreign (i.e. American) aid (UPI has filed story on directive this week and Time correspondent has cabled translation much of text). Directive seriously impugns motives of givers of aid, charging that some of latter believe their position gives them right to destroy “our customs and habits and healthy laws” and that they are using their position “to make lackeys of Vietnamese and to seduce Vietnamese women into decadent paths”. Notwithstanding likelihood adverse but unpredictable reaction from Madame Nhu, do not believe that we can afford to let this directive go unnoticed. Nor do I and my colleagues feel that senior members of mission should be in position of publicly accepting rather lavish hospitality from Madame Nhu immediately following this outburst.

I hope that leaks on this matter do not occur but, if they do, felt you should know background.

Nolting
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 89, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

April 14, 1963: United States Marine Corps UH-34 Seahorse transport helicopters based at Da Nang, South Vietnam, airlifted 435 South Vietnamese troops to attack a suspected Viet Cong stronghold in mountains along the Thu Bồn River. For the first time, Marine Corps helicopters received an attack helicopter escort, in the form of United States Army UH-1B gunships.
Source: Wikipedia, April 13, 1963 (Saturday)

Also on April 14, 1963: Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State ¹
Vientiane, April 14, 1963, 6 p.m.

1453. In present fluid state of affairs difficult make any firm judgments as to what exactly is Communist game in their recent stepping up of pressures and aggressive acts against neutralists PDJ and other isolated areas northern Laos. Second question is whether there is reason believe Communists are not following what we have up till now believed to be their strategy on Laos, namely to pay lip service to Geneva Accords and avoid actions entailing serious risk of upsetting those Accords, at same time holding on to all their assets and banking on development of the situation which would in due course permit them take over Laos without a fight.

Since last fall it has become increasingly clear Communist objective has been to weaken, divide and eventually disintegrate Kong Le neutralist forces at same time building up “progressive” neutralists who at strategic moment would be proclaimed as only true neutralists. Unclear what has been Russian role although until issues were sharpened over recent weeks, very much doubt that Russians did anything to oppose these efforts and probably gave them some support.

In February and March we saw beginnings of intensified efforts, using “progressive” neutralists as front to weaken Kong Le and present his with superior military posture on PL side, backed by terror (e.g. Ketsana murder), bribery and psychological threat posed by increasingly evident presence Viet Minh in background. Believe Communists were increasingly taking advantage, among other things, of extended absence Souvanna Phouma from local scene, and of his unwillingness take firm stand when in Vientiane.

Quinim assassination undoubtedly has disarranged Communist time-table. On one hand major political instrument lost and direction and cohesion of “progressive” neutralists threatened. Too early now to say what will emerge from current confusing picture among Santiphab and other dissident currents. On other hand believe assassination, which militarily put conservative neutralists at least temporarily on defensive, gave Communists propaganda advantage and perhaps also some emotional push which led them to step up their time-table against Kong Le.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis, Document 453 ,Office of the Historian, US Dept to State

April 15, 1963: Washington, April 15, 1963, 8:12 p.m.
964. Ref: Embtel 1453.²

Appreciate very useful assessment contained reftel as well as excellent reporting Embassy has sent in during present Laos crisis. Recognize that this has been accomplished in face great difficulties and obviously required full cooperation all elements C.T. Following are Department's views on policy questions we see arising from PDJ situation:

Our objective in respect to KL is to: (a) preserve his presence on PDJ with enough force to give Souvanna appearance of having some independent military support and (b) keep KL strong enough so that PL must mount full-scale overt attack to overcome him. We do not believe that KL's can win if PL open up such all out attack with VM help. However, if KL has enough strength to require heavy PL/VM assault, international attention will again be directed toward clear evidence communist violation and thus preserve maximum number US options.

At this juncture preservation of cease-fire with international help offers KL best chance for survival on PDJ. We are concerned that any overt move no matter how justifiable morally, such as effort to retake XK with Meo help would blow up cease-fire and turn international effort around to stopping KL. Therefore we believe that KL should concentrate on strengthening his defensive position and that he and FAR/Meo should avoid initiating attacks.

Appears to us two main problems affecting KL's morale are: (1) Lost territory such as XK and Khang Khay which cease-fire leaves in PL hands and (2) Deuane's rise in status to point where he is receiving international attention and is, as pointed out Reftel, making claim to speak as “true” neutralist commander. Actions by Souvanna appear to be key to both problems and require essentially according Kong Le absolute status as chief neutralist military leader in PDJ. Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis, Document 454 ,Office of the Historian, US Dept to State

April 16, 1963: Telegram From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to the President, at Palm Beach, Florida ¹
Washington, April 16, 1963, 3:42 p.m.

The telegram was sent in response to telegram PBWH07 from Captain Shepard to McGeorge Bundy, sent from Palm Beach at 2 p.m. April 16, which reads: “The President asked for a report on the use of the chemicals in RVN. What good did they do? Stop any further use until there has been an analysis.” (Ibid.)

CAP 63195. Only chemicals which have been used in Vietnam are ordinary weed killers similar to those in common use in the United States. Report on their effectiveness both as defoliants and to destroy crops has been in preparation by Defense and State for the past three weeks and will be available by week end. Since last December no further crop destruction has been authorized and none may be authorized without your approval. Except for clearing of railroad right of way no defoliation is planned within the next few weeks. Suggest you review matter after seeing report on your return.
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 90, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

April 17, 1963: Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State ¹
Saigon, April 17, 1963, 3 p.m.

920. CINCPAC for POLAD. Deptel 952;² Embtel 909.³ Saw President Diem at my request yesterday morning for a 2-hour session. Believe our talk eased situation further and perhaps paved way for satisfactory resolution of problem of counter-insurgency fund, although this remains to be seen.

Told him first of Department's instructions received Sunday⁴ re my home leave and return.

Then repeated reasons for our continued concern to settle promptly question of adequate Counter-Insurgency Fund and procedures to go with it, so that other important financial segments of U.S. support could move forward without interruption. Diem said letter we had requested was being prepared by Thuan and said he would act on it promptly. I told him thing which concerns us most were reasons that he had given for turning down our proposal. These seemed to amount to desire substantially to reduce American advisory effort in Vietnam. I hoped that upon reflection he would agree that time was not yet ripe for curtailment of advisory effort in any sector. I said we understood his problems, had already looked into some of complaints he had made, and would look into them all on case-by-case basis. I had certain procedures to suggest for remedying these matters. What we could not agree to was a wholesale reduction of advisory effort at this juncture while continuing large [scale] physical and financial aid, although nothing would please us more than to arrive at a stage as soon as possible when reductions of U.S. advisors would be possible without loss of momentum. Diem has evidently backed off considerably from his original position and, after some conversation, made it clear that he now does not insist upon withdrawals of U.S. personnel, but rather upon a concerted effort to make advisory system work better. He went into several new types of complaints from GVN officials, concerning both military and civilian matters, which I will not detail here. I suggested that we should work out with Thuan, for submission to him, possible remedial measures: A small group to look into such complaints on a case-by-case basis; frequent or regular meetings between himself and me or General Harkins (or both) to take up matters before they reached a crisis stage; perhaps a directive to all of our advisors in the field and to all their counterparts in Government of Vietnam detailing certain responsibilities and other matters to clarify relationships and functions. He thought these suggestions were good, and we will proceed to work them out with Thuan. My guess is that we can continue to take the heat out of this matter. We will, of course, have to see to what extent he will in fact drop his previous demands and work out satisfactory compromise on counter-insurgency funding and procedures.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 91, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

Also on April 17, 1963: Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (McNamara)¹
Washington, April 17, 1963.
JCSM-302-63
SUBJECT
Defoliation and Crop Destruction in South Vietnam

1. Reference is made to a memorandum by Mr. Michael Forrestal of the White House Staff for the Honorable W. Averell Harriman, dated 13 March 1963,² which stated that the President would like an up-to-date report on the results of defoliation and crop destruction carried out by the Armed Forces, Republic of Vietnam. He suggested that the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this subject be coordinated into a single State/Defense/US Information Agency paper for the President. Certain guidelines were furnished which have been followed in this memorandum.

2. Two separate herbicide programs have been in progress during the past year and a half in the Republic of Vietnam. In order to increase visibility and deter Viet Cong ambush, a total of 87 miles of roads, canals and areas bordering military installations were sprayed with defoliants. Trial crop destruction operations were conducted against Viet Cong crops in two areas, 750 acres of Phuoc Long Province and 29 acres in Thua Thien Province.

3. As in other weapons systems, a precise statistical determination of the military effectiveness of defoliant operations in terms of enemy losses or as a deterrent to his operations is difficult. Technical reports received from the field thus far, however, provide ample evidence that they do give us a degree of military advantage. Specifically, defoliation facilitates clearing of rights of way along rail lines, retards jungle growth, and thereby makes enemy concealment more difficult while improving our reconnaissance and ability to see the enemy. The Joint Chiefs of Staff conclude that defoliation contributes to the improvement of the security situation and that it is one tool of many in the counter-insurgency kit.

4. Crop destruction operation in Phuoc Long Province adjacent to Viet Cong War Zone D is estimated to have resulted in the destruction of over 700,000 pounds of rice or roughly enough to feed 1,000 Viet Cong for one year. Militarily and technically, the results were excellent. The actual operation was conducted entirely by Vietnamese. This operation was a military success in that it increased the Viet Cong food problems in the area and concurrently added to over-all logistic difficulties in the Viet Cong Zone D area.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 93, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

Also on April 17, 1963: National Intelligence Estimate¹
Washington, April 17, 1963.
NIE 53-63
PROSPECTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

The Problem
To assess the situation and prospects in South Vietnam, with special emphasis upon the military and political factors most likely to affect the counterinsurgency effort.

Conclusions
A. We believe that Communist progress has been blunted and that the situation is improving. Strengthened South Vietnamese capabilities and effectiveness, and particularly US involvement, are causing the Viet Cong increased difficulty, although there are as yet no persuasive indications that the Communists have been grievously hurt. (Paras. 27-28)

B. We believe the Communists will continue to wage a war of attrition, hoping for some break in the situation which will lead to victory. They evidently hope that a combination of military pressure and political deterioration will in time create favorable circumstances either for delivering a coup de grace or for a political settlement which will enable them to continue the struggle on more favorable terms. We believe it unlikely, especially in view of the open US commitment, that the North Vietnamese regime will either resort to overt military attack or introduce acknowledged North Vietnamese military units into the south in an effort to win a quick victory. (Paras. 29-31)
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 94, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

April 18, 1963: Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam ¹
Washington, April 18, 1963, 6 p.m.

970. Joint State/AID/Defense. Embtel 920.² Gratified atmosphere continues improve. You have done excellent job making Diem face funding issue without upsetting joint effort. Concur your view expressed to Thuan (Embtel 893)³ that heart of matter may revolve around whether or not peasants should be given boots so they can have straps to pull on. Certainly this has been one of your longstanding problems. Given success of US-GVN cooperation during past 15 months we would hope avoid crisis our relations with GVN, but continue dialogue thru frequent letters and meetings. Following offered for your consideration in attempting maintain reasonable degree flexibility in negotiating subjects which GVN has put on table.

A. U.S. Military and Civilian Advisers

1. Completely concur with your suggestion to Diem that specific cases raised by GVN could be discussed as suggested reftel. We prepared fully support you in seeking recall and personnel whose presence, in your judgment, may jeopardize US-GVN cooperation.

2. Suggest you and TF/Saigon consider whether we should offer substantially reduce number U.S. military advisers in any province within say 90 days after it declared “white”?

3. DOD actively studying Comprehensive Plan which will be discussed at Honolulu. Meanwhile it should not be discussed with GVN.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 95, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

Also on April 18, 1963: Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State¹
Washington, April 18, 1963.
SUBJECT
Chemical Defoliation and Crop Destruction in South Viet-Nam

1. Defoliation Activities
Defoliation trials have been carried out in thirteen localities, beginning in August of 1961 (see attached map² ). About 87 miles of communication lines have been cleared plus a number of areas around military installations. The purpose of these operations is to increase visibility, thus providing better fields of fire and reducing the possibility of ambushes.

The military effectiveness of defoliation is difficult to assess. Some statistics suggest curtailed Viet Cong activity as a result of defoliation operations, but the evidence is inconclusive. Saigon reports that these trials appear to have a general impact in the security situation, but no statistical results can be isolated. While visibility is without question improved by defoliation, R.G.K. Thompson and some of our own military say the remaining tree trunks, limbs and twigs often provide quite adequate cover.

It is our understanding that ambushes generally make use of terrain features rather than foliage for cover in any event. Moreover, hand cutting would seem simpler, more effective, and probably less expensive in those areas where it is important to clear fields of fire. Thus defoliation appears to be a useful tactic only in those instances where very special terrain features justify it, and we anticipate that such situations are and will be rare.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 96, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

Also on April 18, 1963: Memorandum From the Director of the Vietnam Working Group (Wood) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Hilsman)¹
Washington, April 18, 1963.
SUBJECT
American Military Personnel in Viet-Nam

At the July meeting in Honolulu, Secretary McNamara requested a plan to reduce the American military in Viet-Nam to about 1500 by FY68. MACV made several plans which were rejected as being too expensive and finally submitted a Comprehensive Plan for SVN which was endorsed by Embassy Airgram A-417 and in later messages (enclosed).² The objective was to “assure the capability of the GVN to exercise permanent and continued sovereignty over SVN at the end of CY 65 without the need for continued US special military assistance”. Reductions in military personnel would not start until FY 65. The cost of the Plan, which involved additional training for the Vietnamese forces so that they could take over more quickly, was estimated at $168 million above already planned expenditures for the period through FY 68. The additional cost for FY 64 alone was planned at $88 million. The plan also required additional expenditures by the Vietnamese of about 800 million piasters (the equivalent of $10.9 million at 73 to 1). This would require deficit financing by the GVN in addition to the deficit financing needed to pick up the costs of the strategic hamlet and counterinsurgency programs. All above figures subject to change without notice.

As you know Bob Thompson suggested while in Washington that if one or two provinces became genuinely “white” by July or August this year, and if the GVN continued to make good progress, the US should seriously consider pulling out a significant number of men, say 1,000, by the end of calendar 1963.

The Comprehensive Plan described above, which has been approved by Admiral Felt and JCS as well as by the Embassy, has been under study in Defense since early February. Quite clearly DOD will not be able to make the funds required by this plan available.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 97, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

Also on April 18, 1963: 2 New York Times Pieces:

1) Pro-Communist troops in Laos were said to have opened a road for Red troops all the way from the North Vietnamese border to Pathet Lao military headquarters.

2) President Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam has qualified his offer of clemency to Communist guerrillas who lay down their arms. He believes that card-carrying Communists must be destroyed.
Source: New York Times Chronology - John F. Kennedy Presidential Library & Museum, April 13, 1963

April 19, 1963: Memorandum for the Record¹
Washington, April 19, 1963.
SUBJECT
Presidential Conference on Laos

Secretary McNamara, Governor Harriman, Messrs. Nitze, Hilsman, Colby, McGeorge Bundy, FORRESTAL and General Carter met with the President at 4:30 p.m. today to discuss the current situation in Laos.²

General Carter presented an intelligence estimate of the situation on the Plain of Jars. Kong Le may have retired behind the last line of defense (the airport at Muong Phanh) and re-grouped his forces in the hills. The Meo may be able to salvage Kong Le's predicament by harassing PL supply lines. It is probable that the Communist wish to gain control of the Plain of Jars fait accompli and are doing so with North Vietnam artillery and cadre support.

Souvanna has accused the Pathet Lao of trying to destroy the neutralists but is afraid to take further steps. The French are also afraid to take the issue any further.

Mr. Hilsman said that the British have made several approaches to the Soviets and have suggested that we avoid public pressure on them. Hilsman pointed out that although the Soviets have made a show to cooperate through their Ambassador in Vientiane, they have not really moved to correct the situation. Mr. Hilsman said that the Department was considering sending Secretary Harriman to Moscow to determine whether Premier Khrushchev is prepared to honor his Vienna commitments. Before doing such a visit, however, the military options available to the United States should be examined. Mr. Hilsman said that Governor Harriman should be able to raise the possibility of U.S. military re-involvement in Laos with Premier Khrushchev.³

The Attorney General also expressed the same notion but noted the connection between Cuba and Laos.

The President said that this connection should be borne in mind, since we can take more aggressive action in Laos than we were taking in Cuba.

The President asked for a National Security Council meeting at 11 a.m. tomorrow morning⁴ at which the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff will report upon military options available to counter Vientiane and Pathet Lao pressures in Laos.⁵The Department of State will consider the parallel diplomatic steps which can be taken to show serious concern with the situation.

The President asked that Ambassador Thompson be called from the west coast to attend the meeting in the morning.
Michael V. Forrestal⁶
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis, Document 457, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

Also on April 19, 1963: Another summary of same meeting: Memorandum From the [text not declassified] Directorate of Plans (Colby) to Director of Central Intelligence McCone ¹
Washington, undated.
SUBJECT
Presidential Meeting on Laos, 19 April 1963

PARTICIPANTS
The President, The Secretary of Defense, The Attorney General, Undersecretary Harriman, Assistant Secretary Hilsman, Assistant Secretary Nitze, Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Mr. Michael Forrestal

General Carter, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Mr. Colby

1. General Carter gave a briefing on the situation in Laos.

2. In answer to the President's question, Mr. Hilsman stated that the present difficulty comes from an escalation of the tension between the Pathet Lao and the neutralists.

3. The President asked what diplomatic action was in course or contemplated. Governor Harriman and Assistant Secretary Hilsman stated that we had gone to both the British and ICC and had supported Souvanna Phouma in placing clear responsibility for the present situation on the Pathet Lao. They stated that the Department is considering a direct approach to the Soviets, including possibly the dispatch of Governor Harriman for a personal discussion with Chairman Khrushchev, but they want to be very sure what pressure points we have to apply to the Soviets before sending him. They pointed out that the Soviets themselves have very slight leverage on the DRV and the Pathet Lao, as they are currently giving them little aid. The major danger from the Soviet and the Communist point of view is one of reinvolvement of the United States in the situation and they consider that this possibility could be suggested to the Soviets. The President asked whether we would not appear to be bargaining from a weak position by sending Governor Harriman, to which the answer was the contrary, that the Soviets would take this as an indication of our strong feelings. Also brought in was the importance of taking some action which indicated to our friends and the neutralists that they were supported, in order to maintain their morale.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis, Document 458, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

April 20, 1963: National Security Council Record of Action No. 24651
Washington, April 20, 1963.
U.S. Policy Toward Laos

a. The Council discussed the deteriorating situation of the neutralist military forces in the Plaine des Jarres and its effect on the Geneva Accords.
b. The President approved the following political actions:

(1) Ambassador Unger will discuss with Souvanna military measures which the United States is prepared to take in support of him and the neutralist forces, including airdropping arms and supplies prepositioned in Thailand and action by Meo guerrillas.

(2) A strong diplomatic approach will be made to the French Foreign Minister reminding the French of their commitment to support Souvanna and urging them to back him now by encouraging him to take a firm stand against the Pathet Lao military attacks, urging the King to use his prestige in the present situation, strengthening the French military mission's approach, and making appropriate use of the French mission in Hanoi.

(3) Ambassador Kohler will raise the subject of Laos with Khrushchev during his April 24 interview on another matter, subject to other arrangements which may be made in connection with the Harriman visit.

(4) Governor Harriman will leave at once for London and later Paris to discuss Laos with the British Government as co-chairman of the ICC and with the French Government. Depending on the reply to the current British approach to the Russians, Governor Harriman will proceed to Moscow to discuss the situation with the Soviet Government as the other ICC co-chairman.
(5) Secretary Rusk will call in today the Ambassadors of the ICC member states to discuss the current situation.

c. The President approved the following military measures:
(1) A carrier task group and Marine battalion afloat will be ordered to sail tomorrow from Subic Bay into waters off South Vietnam, remaining south of the 17th Parallel. The task force departure is not to be announced, but it is intended that it will become known indirectly to the Russians and the North Vietnamese. The task force will sail earlier if the Russian response to the British demarche in Moscow is unsatisfactory.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis, Document 461, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

April 21, 1963: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between President Kennedy and the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman)¹
Washington, April 21, 1963, 12:10 p.m.

The President called the Governor. He asked am I talking to the architect of the Geneva Accords. Governor Harriman said I have been willing say that and if it goes down, to take the blame for it. The President said I have a piece of it. The Governor said I want to protect you. Governor Harriman said in all seriousness I think this is the moment to talk. We are now supporting Souvanna and Kong Le and we have every right to demand that he live up to his agreement. If Kong Le gives up and Souvanna goes to Paris, then we have nothing to talk about. This is the one moment when we must go and demand he do something. The Governor said possibly it will not do any good but it won't do any harm. The President agreed and said perhaps he could find out something of what is going on. The President said he thinks if he gets into discussion of Cuba, Governor Harriman can make a point of all the difficulties we are having trying to carry out a policy, and we think he should make a comparable effort in carrying out a policy in Laos. Governor Harriman said the Secretary suggested his saying what the President is doing here, all he is doing, going against public opinion. The President asked didn't Governor Harriman think he s hould have a letter to Khrushchev saying he has sent Governor Harriman. Governor Harriman said yes he thought so. The President asked Governor Harriman to talk to Mr. Bundy about the letter. The President asked what do we do, send a wire to see if he would receive you. The Governor replied Yes. The Governor referred to Gromyko document to Home which accuses us of being the trouble. The President asked why are we the trouble. The Governor replied they say we have been supporting the Meo's and the Meo's create trouble. Governor Harriman said none of our people have fired a single shot. He said he thought there would be some value in confronting him with Hanoi rumors. Governor Harriman said he suggested to Mr. Bundy that Mike Forrestal accompany him. He speaks Russian, very level-headed, through the years has been very helpful and thinks he will be of help now. President said good. At the end of the conversation Governor Harriman repeated that he may not achieve anything but he guaranteed he wouldn't do any harm. President said I think you ought to do it.

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Chronology File, Telephone Conversations, February to April 1963. No classification marking. Transcribed in Harriman's office. A note on the source text indicates that Rusk, Ball, Thompson, U. Alexis Johnson, and Hilsman were to see it.
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis, Document 462, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

Also on April 21, 1963: New York Times: Some intelligence experts believe there may be 30,000 to 40, 000 Soviet troops in Cuba--about the same number as last fall. The estimates reinforce assertions by Senator Keating of New York that the troops are being rotated, not withdrawn.
Source: New York Times Chronology - John F. Kennedy Presidential Library & Museum, April 21, 1963

April 22, 1963: Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to the President ¹
Washington, April 22, 1963.

CHEMICAL DEFOLIATION AND CROP DESTRUCTION

I attach a memorandum prepared by the Department of State and a paper prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff² on the subject of chemical defoliation and crop destruction in South Vietnam. Both papers come essentially to the same conclusions and recommendations, which are best summarized on page 8 of the attached State paper. If you accept these recommendations, you will, in effect, be continuing present policy with one important exception: both State and the JCS wish to give blanket authority to Saigon to decide when and where crop destruction operations will be carried out. At present such blanket authority has only been given for defoliation (weed killing operations). Permission to destroy crops by chemical means still must come from Washington.

It seems to me that, having started on this type of operation, we have already reaped the propaganda whirlwind. If we stop now the propaganda will probably continue, and we would be denying ourselves whatever military effect the use of herbicides have. Both Roger Hilsman and I felt, when we were in South Vietnam, that under certain special conditions which will occur more and more frequently as the Viet Cong are driven into more remote base areas, the use of chemicals to destroy crops from the air has a definite military value in denying food for the fighting cadres of the Viet Cong. Under these circumstances it would seem to me unwise to cancel this program at this time; but I do think you should not grant blanket authorization to Saigon for crop destruction activity. It is hard to conceive of a situation where there would not be time to explain a project to Washington and obtain authorization from here.
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963,Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 98, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

Also on April 22, 1963: Central Intelligence Agency Information Report¹
Washington, April 22, 1963.
TDCSDB-3/654,285
SUBJECT
Indications of Government of Vietnam Plan To Request Reduction of American Personnel in Vietnam

By mid-April 1963 a considerable amount of tension had developed between the Government of Vietnam and the U.S. Government over operations in South Vietnam. Both Diem and Ngo Dinh Nhu were concerned over recent “infringements” of Vietnamese sovereignty. MAAG was cited as a violator in this connection, but the U.S. Special Forces were singled out as the main irritant. Diem is allowing additional time for further blunders and, after building up a strong case, he plans to confront Ambassador Nolting and USMACV Chief General Harkins with irrefutable evidence of U.S. responsibility, demanding a reduction in the number of U.S. personnel in South Vietnam on the basis that the force is too large and unmanageable.

2. Some Vietnamese involved in close working relationships with Americans were being questioned in detail by Presidency Staff members as to U.S. activities. Some of the individuals questioned had indicated to the Presidency that the U.S. military, and particularly the U.S. Special Forces, although generally well motivated, did not seem to understand the necessity for coordinating their activities with appropriate Vietnamese authorities.
3. Field Dissem. State (Ambassador Nolting), USMACV (General. Harkins), MAAG (General Timmes), CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF.
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963,Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 99, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

Also on April 22, 1963: Secretary Rusk's Address, "The Stake in Viet-Nam," Before the Economic Club of New York, at New York, April 22, 1963

Source: The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition, Volume 2, pp. 819-821

Secretary Rusk's Address Before the Economic Club of New York, at New York, April 22, 1963, "The Stake in Viet-Nam," Department of State Bulletin, May 13, 1963, p. 727:
* * *
"Viet-Nam is a narrow strip along the South China Sea, nearly as large as California, with a population of some 30 million people-about 16 million in the North and 14 million in the South.

"With Cambodia and Laos, Viet-Nam formed what was formerly known as French Indochina. During the Second World War, the Vichy regime yielded control of French Indochina to the Japanese. In the spring of 1945 the Japanese proclaimed the independence of Viet-Nam. And in August of that year they permitted the Communist-oriented Viet Minh to seize rule.

"In the Indian subcontinent and in Burma and the Philippines, Western countries recognized at war's end that national demands for independence would have to be met promptly. But this was not the case with Indochina. Instead, we ourselves were somewhat at a loss for a policy with regard to that particular part of the world. So our people in charge of war plans in 1944 sent a colonel out there who sent a cable back to the Joint Chiefs of Staff saying 'Request policy guidance on American policy toward Indochina, because we are beginning to get military access to that country and we need direction.'

"Well, there ensued a vast silence which lasted for months. We sent staff officers back to try to find the answer. We sent cables out there, and after about 6 months the reply came and it said, 'When asked by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for a statement of American policy toward Indochina, the President'--that was President Roosevelt--'replied, I don't want to hear any more about Indochina.'

"Well, now the result of no significant Allied policy at that point was that the French did return and take over where they left off at the time of the Japanese occupation, and they encountered therefore a militant resistance movement. For 8 years, with material help from the United States, they sought to pacify the country. At the same time they granted increasing autonomy to non-Communist Vietnamese. But the Viet Minh, reforms in Japan and on Taiwan, was pressed forward--123,000 heads of families became small landowners. A comprehensive system of agricultural credit was set up. Thousands of Vietnamese were moved into the highlands to raise industrial crops. Rubber production rose, and new plantings of better varieties promised still higher production for the future. Sugar production doubled in 1958. South Viet-Nam was soon producing enough rice to resume exports on a rising scale. Various small industries were established. Textile production rose from near zero to near self-sufficiency. Electric power nearly doubled. Per capita national income rose by 20 percent.

"Thousands of new schools were built. Between 1956 and 1960, enrollment in the elementary schools rose from 400,000 to 1,500,000. The expansion of health facilities included new hospitals and 3,500 village health stations. Rail transportation was restored. Roads were repaired and improved, and three new major highways were built.

"The Communists were not completely eliminated--especially along the land and sea frontiers, where they could be supplied--but most of South Viet-Nam became, for a period, safe for travel.

"Although North Viet-Nam inherited most of the industry of Viet-Nam, and although its population is larger, it fell rapidly behind South Viet-Nam in food production, the number of children in school, and in standards of living. While per capita food production rose 20 percent in the South, it fell 10 percent in the North.

"This was competition which the Communists apparently could not endure. Very likely it was one of the reasons why they decided in 1959 to renew their assault on South Viet-Nam. And in 1960 the Lao Dong Party-that is, the Communist Party-ordered the 'liberation' of South Viet-Nam.

"According to Communist propaganda, the war in South Viet-Nam is a civil war, a local uprising. The truth is that it is an aggression organized, directed, and partly supplied from North Viet-Nam. It is conducted by hardened Communist political organizers and guerrilla leaders trained in North Viet-Nam, who, upon their arrival in the South, recruit local assistance. This has been done in a variety of ways, including terror and assassination. Schoolteachers, health workers, malaria eradication teams, local officials loyal to the Republic--these were the first targets of the assassins. But many ordinary villagers who refused to cooperate with the Communist guerrillas likewise have been ruthlessly killed.

Strategic Importance of South Viet-Nam

"This assault on South Viet-Nam was a major Communist enterprise, carefully and elaborately prepared, heavily staffed, and relentlessly pursued. It made headway. In 1961 President Diem appealed for further assistance and President Kennedy responded promptly and affirmatively.

"The strategic importance of South Viet-Nam is plain. It controls the mouth of the Mekong River, the main artery of Southeast Asia. The loss of South VietNam would put the remaining states of Southeast Asia in mortal danger.

"But there are larger reasons why the defense of South Viet-Nam is vital to us and to the whole free world. We cannot be indifferent to the fate of 14 million people who have fought hard against communism-including nearly 1 million who fled their former homes to avoid living under Communist tyranny. Since we went to the aid of Greece and Turkey 16 years ago, it has been the attitude of the United States to assist peoples who resist Communist aggression. We have seen this form of attack fail in Burma, Malaya, and the Philippines. The South Vietnamese are determined to win their battle, and they deserve our help.

"Critics have complained that South Viet-Nam is not a full constitutional democracy and that our aid has been subject to waste and mismanagement. Let us be clear that these criticisms are not merely alibis for inaction. For in passing judgement, let us recall that we are talking about a nation which has been responsible for its own affairs for less than a decade, about a people who have had no peace since 1941 and little experience in direct participation in political affairs. Their four national elections, their thousands of elected hamlet councils, and their forthcoming village council elections show steady movement toward a constitutional system resting upon popular consent."
Source: Documents Relating to American Foreign Policy, Vietnam, Mt Holyoke College

April 23, 1963: Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union ¹
Washington, April 23, 1963, 5 p.m.

2274. Eyes only Ambassador and Harriman. Following are Governor Harriman's² instructions:
As soon as you have received word that you will be received by Khrushchev, you should proceed to Moscow to consult with Foreign Minister Gromyko and the Chairman on the situation in Laos. You should recall to the Chairman the mutual commitments exchanged in Vienna and express the President's firm belief that unless these commitments and the subsequent Accords reached at Geneva can be effectively implemented, it is difficult for the President to see how any other agreement can be successfully reached and carried out. Re Deptel 5543³ you should explore with the Soviet authorities specific measures for reestablishing the situation in Laos to permit fulfillment of the Geneva Agreements and should engage in such conversations as will enable you to make a judgment whether the Soviets are still willing and able to carry out the Vienna commitments. You should make clear that the United States is determined to give full support to Souvanna Phouma and the Geneva Agreements and that any attempt by the Pathet Lao, with or without outside help, to dominate Laos by force would be unacceptable. Our purpose is, and we believe the Soviet purpose should be, to ensure the independent and neutral Laos that was agreed upon. These instructions may be modified in the light of any developments that take place before your appointment with Khrushchev.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis, Document 464, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

April 24, 1963: President Kennedy's View of the "Domino Theory," News Conference, April 24, 1963

Source: The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition, Volume 2, pp. 818-819

President Kennedy's News Conference, April 24, 1963, Public Papers of the Presidents, Kennedy, 1963, p. 343:
* * *
Q: "Mr. President, on Laos again, several years ago we heard a great deal about the 'falling domino' theory in Southeast Asia.

"Do you look upon Laos in terms of that country alone, or is your concern the effect that its loss would have in Thailand, Vietnam, and so on?
"Would you discuss that?"

THE PRESIDENT: "That is correct. The population of Laos is 2 million and it is scattered. It is a very rough country. It is important as a sovereign power. The people desire to be independent, and it is also important because it borders the Mekong River and, quite obviously, if Laos fell into Communist hands it would increase the danger along the northern frontiers of Thailand. It would put additional pressure on Cambodia and would put additional pressure on South Vietnam which in itself would put additional pressure on Malaya.

"So I do accept the view that there is an interrelationship in these countries and that is one of the reasons why we are concerned with maintaining the Geneva Accords as a method of maintaining stability in Southeast Asia. It may be one of the reasons why others do not share that interest."
Source: Documents Relating to American Foreign Policy, Vietnam, Mt Holyoke College

Also on April 24, 1963: Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam ¹
Washington, January 24, 1963, 1:31 p.m.

729. Joint State/USIA. WG/VN for TF/Saigon. Request your frank, general, and confidential evaluation overall job being done by U.S. newsmen in reporting war in Viet-Nam to U.S. public. Context our concern as follows:

1. We are still getting adverse play in daily press; somewhat better coverage in weekly publications (e.g. Newsweek Jan 28, Life Jan 25). In general war in Viet-Nam going better than being reported to U.S. public.

2. Poor relations between U.S. press reps and GVN not likely be significantly improved.

3. Realize wire service correspondents have difficulty in leaving Saigon, where they in contact with home office, to go into country.

4. If correspondent has time, how difficult is it for him to get transportation a, to cover military operations, b) to go into countryside to cover strategic hamlets and other rural activities?

In general is it TF view that, given local obstacles and problems, U.S. correspondents are doing adequate or inadequate job of covering war?

Would appreciate your carefully weighed overall view this 1ong vexed question and would welcome any suggestions as to how we may assist or encourage them to do better job either here or in Saigon.

Rusk
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 17, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

April 25, 1963: New York Times: President Kennedy announced that W. Averell Harriman would go to Moscow to remind Soviet leaders of Premier Khrushchev's pledge to uphold the neutrality and independence of Laos.
Source: New York Times Chronology - John F. Kennedy Presidential Library & Museum, April 25, 1963

Also on April 25, 1963: Pathet Lao rebels and right-wing troops clashed in Savannakhet province on April 25, 1963, resulting in the deaths of 20 rebels.
Source: Laos (1954-present), University of Central Arkansas

Memorandum From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Felt) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff ¹
Honolulu, January 25, 1963.
CINCPAC 3010 Ser 0079
SUBJ
Comprehensive Plan for South Vietnam (CPSVN)
REF
(a) CINCPAC Record of Sixth Secretary of Defense Conference of 23 July 1962, dtd 26 July 1962 (Item No.2)²
(b) JCS Msg 5455, DTG 262318Z July 1962³
(c) OSD Msg DEF 923923, DTG 222243Z January 1963⁴
ENCL

(1) Comprehensive Plan for South Vietnam

1. Pursuant to directives in references (a) and (b), subject plan has been prepared to provide for bringing the counterinsurgency effort to a successful conclusion, withdrawing U.S. special military assistance, and developing within GVN a capability to defend against the continuing threat in Southeast Asia.

2. The primary limiting factor in developing this plan was the GVN capability to provide necessary trained personnel within a short period of time to efficiently assume those special functions now being executed by U.S. military personnel. Shortages of junior leaders, pilots and personnel with special skills will exist to some extent into FY 65. However, such shortages are not considered of sufficient magnitude to affect the feasibility of the plan.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 18, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

Also on April 25, 1963: Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hilsman) and Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to the President ¹
Washington, January 25, 1963.²

A REPORT ON SOUTH VIETNAM

The war in South Vietnam is clearly going better than it was a year ago. The government claims to have built more than 4,000 Strategic Hamlets, and although many of these are nothing more than a bamboo fence, a certain proportion have enough weapons to keep out at least small Viet Cong patrols and the rudiments of the kind of social and political program needed to enlist the villagers' support.

The program to arm and train the Montagnards, which should go far toward choking off the infiltration routes, has also made progress. There are 29 U.S. Special Forces teams training Montagnards (as well as certain minority groups in the Delta), with eleven more teams on the way. By mid-autumn training camps had been set up in all the provinces bordering Laos, and a system of regular patrolling started that hopefully will one day cover the entire network of trails in the mountain regions. Under this program over 35,000 Montagnards have been trained, armed, and assisted in setting up their village defenses, the eventual goal being one hundred thousand.

In both the mountain regions and the heavily populated lowlands, the areas through which one can travel without escort have been enlarged. In contested areas, the government is beginning to probe out, gradually repairing the roads and bridges cut by the Viet Cong as they go. In some of the moderately populated areas fringing the Delta and the coastal plain, as for example Binh Duong province, isolated villages have been bodily moved to positions along the roads where they can be more easily defended.

As of December 1, the Vietnamese government controlled 951 villages containing about 51% of the rural population—a gain of 92 villages and 500,000 people in six months. The Viet Cong control 445 villages with 8% of the rural population-a loss of 9 villages and 231,000 people in six months...

Conclusion

Our overall judgment, in sum, is that we are probably winning, but certainly more slowly than we had hoped. At the rate it is now going the war will last longer than we would like, cost more in terms of both lives and money than we anticipated, and prolong the period, in which a sudden and dramatic event would upset the gains already made.

The question is where improvements can be made-whether in our basic approach to fighting a guerrilla war, or in the implementation of that approach.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 19, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

April 26, 1963: New York Times: President Kennedy's special envoy on Laos received a cool diplomatic reception yesterday in Moscow. W. Averell Harriman was met by a minor Soviet official.
Source: New York Times Chronology - John F. Kennedy Presidential Library & Museum, April 26, 1963

Also on April 26, 1963: Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State ¹
Saigon, April 26, 1963, 5 p.m.

959. CINCPAC for POLAD. Embtel 920.² Have now received (April 23) Diem's written reply³ re Counterinsurgency Fund. It is brief, reiterates GVN unwillingness to apply purchased-piastre procedures to GVN funds on grounds derogation of sovereignty, but states flatly that “GVN intends obtain necessary resources to finance all jointly developed projects listed in annex to your letter of March 18, 1963 (Toaid A-2874),⁴ even if total cost of these projects should go as high as 2 billion 300 million piastres”. Letter also states desire maintain existing relationship between, and apparently functions of, GVN Interministerial Committee on Strategic Hamlets (ICSH) and U.S. Committee on Province Rehabilitation (COPROR) and to continue coordinate U.S. and GVN activities in rural area.

Letter is of course entirely too vague on question of procedures, and Trueheart, Brent and I met with Thuan April 24 to pin down these elements of problem. To set stage, I first proposed to Thuan that—since Diem's only explicit objection to continuing present purchased piastre procedures was that it would be derogation to sovereignty to apply them to GVN funds—the problem would be solved by transferring required piastres from counterpart tentatively earmarked for military budget to Counterinsurgency Fund, with GVN applying its own funds to former. As expected, Thuan threw up his hands at this, and we then proceeded to talk about procedures for using GVN funds. Upshot appears to be that we can get following, confirmed by exchange of letters with Thuan:
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 101, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

April 27, 1963: RUBE ALFRED FREEMAN
MSGT, ARMY
COLUMBUS, GA
DOB: 12/3/1924
Source: The Vietnam Veterans Memorial Fund
Location: Province not reported, South Vietnam
Type: Hostile, Died Of Wounds
Reason: Gun, Small Arms Fire - Ground Casualty
Panel 01E Line 021
Source: The Virtual Wall

Also on April 27, 1963: The U.S. Marine Corps lost its first aircraft to enemy action in Vietnam, when a UH-34D transport helicopter was shot down by Viet Cong ground fire near Do Xa, South Vietnam.
Source: Wikipedia, April 27, 1963

Also on April 27, 1963: Soviet Premier Khrushchev agreed that Laos should stay neutral and unified. A joint communiqué to this effect was issued by the Soviet leader and W. Averell Harriman, representing President Kennedy. There were no indications that the Soviet Union would take a hand directly. Source: New York Times Chronology - John F. Kennedy Presidential Library & Museum, April 27, 1963

April 28, 1963: In Laos, a charge came from the pro-Communists that the United States flew 17 planeloads of rightwing troops to the embattled Plaine des Jarres as neutralist reinforcements.
Source: New York Times Chronology - John F. Kennedy Presidential Library & Museum, April 28, 1963

Also on April 28, 1963: Kabul Times: Laotian Factions Agree To Continue Cease-Fire, Says Souvanna Phouma
VIENTIANE, (Reuter). ---The Neutralist Prime Minister of Laos, Prince Souvanna Phouma, returned from truce talks on the Plain of Jars Saturday said the Left-wing and Neutralist factions had promised preserve a cease-fire pending further discussions.
Continued…
Source: Kabul Times, Kabul, Afhanistan, 1963-04-28

April 29, 1963: Kennedy invited ]ohn Mecklin, the counselor for public affairs at the U.S. embassy in Saigon, to meet with him at the White House on April 29, 1963.
“Why are we having so much trouble with the reporters out there?” the President inquired. Kennedy listened intently while Mecklin explained his perspective.

The newsmen in Saigon compared favorably with newsmen elsewhere, Mecklin contended; they were just frustrated and angry at the U.S. mission and the Diem regime. More favorable coverage, or at least sympathetic understanding, would come if U.S. oflicials gave reporters more latitude and more truth. Washington agencies and the mission in Saigon should stop issuing “excessively optimistic public statements,” stop complaining about unfavorable stories, and take the newsmen into their confidence, particularly about events the newsmen would find out about anyway. Kennedy appeared skeptical but willing to try a different approach.
Source: John F. Kennedy: A Biography, by Michael O'Brien, Macmillan, May 16, 2006

Also on April 29, 1963: Paris officially informed Laotian prince Souvanna Phouma of its intention to withdraw immediately from its Seno base in Laos, authorized under terms of the 1954 and 1962 Geneva Accords. The French departure gave the United States responsibility for Western military support of the Laotian government, removed the last elements of French military presence in Laos and Vietnam, and permitted French president Charles de Gaulle to play a more independent role in trying to resolve the Vietnam quagmire.

Source: The Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War: A Political, Social, and Military History: A Political, Social, and Military History, edited by Spencer C. Tucker, ABC-CLIO

April 30, 1963: Memorandum for the Record¹
Washington, April 30, 1963.
SUBJECT
Daily White House Staff Meeting, 30 April 1963

[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]

4. FORRESTAL was at the meeting this morning, having arrived from Europe last evening with Governor Harriman. His presence at the table led to discussion of the following points.

a. FORRESTAL says Khrushchev seemed in fine health and that his recent remark about his advancing age was merely an aside which the Western press elected to exaggerate.
FORRESTAL, who obviously sat in on the Khrushchev-Harriman conversation, says that the Soviets, including above all old Khrushchev himself, seemed to have practically no interest in Laos except as Laos constitutes a subject for a problem or a relationship with the United States. Despite this indifference, FORRESTAL and Governor Harriman apparently think that the Soviets can still, if they wish, influence the way in which the Pathet Lao, North Vietnamese, and even Red Chinese act with respect to the Laotian situation. Khrushchev did not have the foggiest notion of the geography of Laos and, when Harriman mentioned a few Laotian personalities, Khrushchev impatiently exclaimed that he did not know all those silly Laotian names or the individuals to whom these names belonged.

b. FORRESTAL said that Khrushchev seemed eager to brush Laos aside and discuss items which he considered more important, such as nuclear testing and disarmament and Germany, but of course Governor Harriman did not bite.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis, Document 467, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

June 1962 - July 1962 - August 1962 - September 1962 - October 1962
November 1962 - December 1962
January 1963 - February 1963 - March 1963 - April 1963 - May 1963
Current Month

May 1, 1963: Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Hilsman) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Bundy)¹
Washington, May 1, 1963.

Dear Bill: I was glad to discuss with you the problem of jets for Viet-Nam. Having thought it over, I believe on balance that it is best not to provide the Vietnamese Air Force with jets at this time. Certainly we should consider whether they should have jets before our extraordinary assistance is withdrawn, but this is some years off. Unless some new and important factors arise, I suggest we let the matter rest for the time being.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 104, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

Also on May 1, 1963: Memorandum From the Assistant Director for Rural Affairs, United States Operations Mission in Vietnam (Phillips), to the Director of the Mission (Brent)¹
Saigon, May 1, 1963.
SUBJECT
An Evaluation of Progress in the Strategic Hamlet-Provincial Rehabilitation Program

1. I have asked our Regional Representatives, Ralph Harwood (IV Corps -), George Melvin (III Corps -), John Perry (II Corps -) and Len Maynard (I Corps +) to assess the progress of the Strategic Hamlet-Provincial Rehabilitation Program, in their regions. Their reports, attached to this memorandum,² provide a brief, analytical and realistic province by province review of progress made in this effort to date.

2. This evaluation seems particularly useful at this time, since a major change in the provincial support method is under consideration.³ It should provide useful documentation for discussions of the program at the upcoming Secretary of Defense Conference in Hawaii.

3. In general, highly significant progress has been made in the Strategic Hamlet-Provincial Rehabilitation program in many provinces. Progress is measured in terms of the establishment, in steadily increasing number, of viable hamlets with inhabitants who have the will and the means to resist the Vietcong. There is a sharp difference between the number of such hamlets, and the total number of strategic hamlets officially listed as complete by the Vietnamese Government. That the distinction is both necessary and realistic has been confirmed to us by Colonel Lac and his staff who reviewed these evaluations in draft.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 102, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

Also on May 1, 1963: Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam ¹
Washington, May 1, 1963, 4:29 p.m.

1024. Joint State/AID. Embtel 959,² If Thuan's conversation can be translated into agreement believe this best available resolution difficult situation. You authorized seek memorandum of understanding along lines procedures contained reftel.

Depending on your judgment of current atmosphere you should decide whether or not seek add to memo understanding statement that funds adequate to cover local costs of all provincial plans approved by Interministerial Committee and COPROR will be deposited in specified increments in advance of requirements.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 103, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

Also on May 1, 1963: Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy ¹
Washington, May 1, 1963.
Help to Kong Le and the Meos

In response to your question this morning whether Kong Le and the Meos were receiving American support, I have obtained the following information from State and CIA:²
We are aiding the Kong Le Neutralists and the Meo through five channels.

(1) Under Article 6 of the Geneva Accords,³ military supplies and equipment are permitted to be introduced into Laos at the request of the RLG. Souvanna Phouma has made such a request, but we have not surfaced it because it was not a cabinet decision. U.S. supplies are being delivered to him from Thailand. Souvanna is using his Soviet and American aircraft and crews to airlift these military supplies directly to Kong Le in the Plaine des Jarres.

(2) Phoumi, with our encouragement, has been delivering arms and ammunition out of FAR stocks to Souvanna, who airlifts them to the Plaine des Jarres as described above. We replace the depleted FAR stocks.

(3) Phoumi is also delivering arms and ammunition directly to Kong Le's isolated units, using his own air force.

(4) Air America has augmented its regular airlift of food, clothing, etc., to the Meo tribesmen, who turn some of it over to isolated Kong Le troops.

[2 paragraphs (7 lines of source text) not declassified]
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis, Document 468, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

May 2, 1963: Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Vietnam Working Group (Heavner) to the Director (Wood)¹
Washington, May 2, 1963.
SUBECT
Forrestal Meeting on Contingencies

(1) Forrestal indicated that shortly after your return² he will want a checklist of things which we have asked or which in the future we might ask Diem to do. He seems to be thinking of a large paper which would include various means of pressuring Diem as well as requesting him to do various things. He specifically asked that we include in the paper alternative means of applying economic and fiscal pressures. (I briefly mentioned some of the alternatives we have debated here, and at his request, gave him a rundown on the current status of the CI fund negotiations.) I have asked Jim³ to draft up the various alternatives which we have for pressuring Diem on the economic side, giving both pros and cons and likely GVN responses.⁴

(2) As you know, he also wants a new paper on what to do if Diem passes from the scene.⁵ He was not aware of the existence of the 1961 contingency plan,⁶ which I took with me as you suggested.

CIA has been wamping up some drafts on this. They appear to regard brother Nhu as the most likely if not the most appealing prospect for a successor. This disturbs me personally, because I think Nhu is a sure loser. He is so cordially hated by all and sundry that I think he could not possibly lead the Vietnamese to victory against the VC. Moreover, his anti-American bias seems much stronger than that of Diem; I doubt that we could work with him even as well as we do with the old boy. Finally, I don't think this intellectual acrobat has the grip or the stamina or the practicality required to take and hold power.

I think you might want to discuss this both in Honolulu and Saigon. Our present plan which calls for constitutional succession backed or followed by a military leader is still valid. Saigon has not suggested any alteration, but I gather their thinking is moving away from that solution and in the direction of supporting brother Nhu.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 105, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

May 3, 1963: Memorandum for the Ambassador in Vietnam (Nolting) and the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Harkins)¹
Washington, May 3, 1963.

1) Extensive discussions have been held over this past weeks on press situation in Viet Nam which had shown substantial improvement in the past few months. In our view however, the press situation in South Viet Nam at present still holds unfortunate potential which rigid continuation of present press policies might aggravate. After conversations including State, Defense, the White House (including the President) and USIA, it is thought desirable to keep present favorable momentum by granting more leeway to field in making day to-day news policy as it affects on-the-spot situations. This would include wherever possible taking American reporters in Saigon further into our confidence, particularly on matters which they are almost certain to learn about anyway. Washington will exercise patience with efforts in implementation of this guide in order to give it chance for success.

2) Public statements by high officials of the United States Government either visiting South Viet Nam or discussing our policies in South Viet Nam should continue on the note of caution manifested by the President in his December 12th press conference,² cited here for your information:

”Q: Mr. President, it was just a year ago that you ordered stepped-up aid to Viet Nam. There seems to be a good deal of discouragement about the progress. Can you give us your assessment?

”The President: Well, we are putting in a major effort in Viet Nam. As you know, we have about 10 or 11 times as many men there as we had a year ago. We have had a number of casualties. We put in an awful lot of equipment. We are going ahead with the strategic hamlet proposal. In some phases, the military program has been quite successful. There is great difficulty, however, in fighting a guerrilla war. You need ten to one, or eleven to one, especially in terrain as difficult as South Viet Nam.

”So we don't see the end of the tunnel, but I must say I don't think it is darker than it was a year ago, and in some ways lighter.”

Neither undue optimism nor pessimism are called for.

3) Nothing in this memorandum should be interpreted as any change in your present policy of discouraging public and private comments by United States personnel of a derogatory nature about Vietnamese military efforts.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 106, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

May 4, 1963: New York Times:

COMPLEXITIES CLOUD BATTLE IN VIETNAM

By DAVID HALBERSTAM
SAIGON, Vietnam, May 4---

Most of the engagements in this war are small and isolated, at best nothing but small arrows on a giant briefing map. If there is an American killed you heard about it. If there are more than 20 Vietnamese killed you hear about it.

If, as in the Camau Peninsula last week--traveling the interior of Camau Peninsula is, in the eyes of most Americans like traveling in North Vietnam--there is a massive Vietcong assault that costs nearly 200 lives (the Communists mutilated the bodies and put them on a barge with widows and children of the dead men and 200 weapons, including 12 Browning automatic rifles) then the war is almost tangible.

Then it is suddenly indistinct again: small engagements in strange places, places Americans never learn to spell or pronounce or find on the map, Vietnamese killing Vietnamese.

Yet Americans are learning about Vietnam now in the same bitter way they had to learn about much of Asia. They are going back and studying books about an obscure war in Korea; searching for rare English-speaking authorities on the war to teach United States officers --- even when these authorities disagree bluntly with Washington's policy.

Distant and Obscure

A young American here dashes off an angry letter to a stateside company that has billed him in "Saigon, French Indonesia." A favorite and true story making the rounds about the pilot who was back home during a battle near here in which five helicopters were shot down. He was talking with a businessman in an airport lounge and the businessman asked him where he was stationed.

"Saigon," he answered.

"Well, good for that!" said the businessman. You can thank your lucky stars you're not in Vietnam."
Continued…
Source: David Halberstam, “Complexities Cloud Battle in Vietnam,” New York Times, May 5, 1963

Also on May 4, 1963: U.S. READY IN LAOTIAN CRISIS---A wounded Laotian neutralist soldier is loaded onto a helicopter in Plaine des Jarres, Laos, in preparation for evacuation to a hospital in Vientiane. The United States Seventh Fleet has taken up "precautionary" exercises in the Gulf of Siam although this does not necessarily mean new landings in Thailand, Laos' neighbor. An unofficial source said U.S. was not "very impressed" with Laos cease-fire.
Source: The Virgin Island Daily News, May 4, 1963 on Google News

Also on May 4, 1963: Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Ball to President Kennedy
Washington, May 4, 1963.
SUBJECT
The Burma Problem

In his memorandum dated April 23,¹ Mr. Bundy expressed your concern over the situation in Burma and your wish to know whether there is anything we can do about it which we are not already doing.

Mr. Bundy also asked if there is any way in which we might get closer to Ne Win and influence him against pursuing “so pro-Chinese a course.”

The attached background paper reflects the Department’s opinion that Ne Win is following a course that is not particularly pro-Chinese by Burmese standards. Although his policies are not very helpful I see little to be done that we are not already doing, to influence the situation directly.

In view of the psychological bent of the Burmese we are limited to indirect means to influence the direction of Burmese policies and improve relations with the Ne Win regime.

Last year we invited Ne Win to visit the United States as a Presidential guest but he was unable to come. We will be watching for development of conditions in Burma which may make it appropriate to reextend this invitation. We are also keeping alert for opportunities to bring Ne Win in contact in Rangoon with important US officials and other Americans when this can be done without our appearing to be making special efforts to woo him. For example, we understand that Chester Bowles will be in the area in July and hope he will be able to visit Rangoon.

In our indirect efforts, we are seeking to enlist the help of non-Communist Asian nations. For example, we have tried to encourage Thailand to work with Burma to eliminate potential difficulties over Chinese Irregular troops still in the area. Also, we are suggesting that Souvanna and the Indian Government help promote Burmese understanding of the Laos problem.
George W. Ball
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 56, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

May 5, 1963: Celebrations were held in the city of Huế in South Vietnam, to honor the ordination of Ngo Dinh Thuc, elder brother of President Ngo Dinh Diem, as the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Huế. In advance of the event, the President decreed that religious banners could not be displayed above the national flag.
Source: Wikipedia, May 5, 1963

May 6, 1963: Three Americans Die

PARKER DRESSER CRAMER
1LT - O2 - Army - Regular
Length of service 6 years
Casualty was on May 6, 1963
In , SOUTH VIETNAM
HOSTILE, GROUND CASUALTY
GUN, SMALL ARMS FIRE
Panel 01E - Line 22

ROBERT JAMES HAIN*
SGT - E5 - Army - Regular
Born: November 14, 1932
Dorchester, MA
Casualty was on May 6, 1963
In , SOUTH VIETNAM
Non-Hostile, died of illness/injury,
GROUND CASUALTY
GUN, SMALL ARMS FIRE
Panel 01E - Line 22

ROBERT JAMES MAIN*
SSGT - E6 - Army - Regular
Special Forces
Born: November 14, 1932
Dorchester, MA
Length of service 12 years
Casualty was on May 6, 1963
In , SOUTH VIETNAM
HOSTILE, GROUND CASUALTY
MISADVENTURE
Panel 01E - Line 22
Sources: The Vietnam Veterans Memorial Wall Page & Vietnam Veterans Memorial Fund



Image of The Wall with today's names

Source: View the Wall, Vietnam Veterans Memorial

Also on May 6, 1963: Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State ¹
Saigon, May 6, 1963, 7 p.m.

987. CINCPAC for POLAD and Ambassador Nolting. Deptel 951, Emb A-651.² GVN replied May 4 to ICC concerning DRV charges on “noxious chemicals” (copies being pouched). Reply asserts charges completely without foundation, explains purpose defoliation operations in RVN; claims no chemical product other than 2,4-D 2,4,5-T has “ever” been used, particularly arsenites and others alleged by Hanoi. Letter says DRV charges constitute inadmissible interference in internal affairs of RVN; notes Communist propaganda effort aims at diverting international attention from VC aggressive acts (it mentions particularly VC arsonists in Saigon) in face realization that VN people: turning away from Communist propaganda (Strategic Hamlet and Chieu Hoi programs are cited). GVN letter also encloses text President Diem's VOA interview (Emb A-552)3 and Professor Buu Hoi's April 15 press conference this subject (Emb A-628).4 Finally, letter says in event “some” members ICC wish to form “personal opinion” GVN mission will arrange with local authorities for them to go to provinces where VC propaganda alleges defoliation caused damage or claimed victims.
Continued...

Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 109, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

Also on May 6, 1963: Memorandum for the Record of the Secretary of Defense Conference¹
Honolulu, May 6, 1963.
SUBJECT
Notes and Necessary Actions Resulting from SecDef Honolulu Conference on Vietnam, 6 May 1963

Item 1. Evaluation of the Situation in RVN

a. General Harkins discussed the over-all progress that had been made since the last meeting² and conveyed the feeling of optimism that all elements of the Country Team now have. General Harkins did not attempt to predict a date when the insurgency would be broken, but did feel that we are certainly on the right track and that we are winning the war in Vietnam, although the struggle will still be a protracted one.

In response to a question from the Secretary, General Harkins stated that M-113's have proven to be excellent combat vehicles and have produced a very high number of VC casualties. In regard to M-114's, he stated that they had not been in use long enough to prove their merit, but that he expected them to also be of great value.

(1) Action: The Secretary directed that we should examine the Thai MA Program to see if we should put additional M-113/M-114's in the Thai Program. we should also consider these vehicles for India. In this regard, CINCPAC stated that the most recent submission for Thailand does have APC in the program.

b. General Harkins reported that the M-79 grenade launcher is one of the best weapons they have in Vietnam. It is useful for the troops, paramilitary forces, and for hamlet defense.

(2) Action: The Secretary stated that we should also look into this weapon for Thailand. He wished to know if we have the proper number scheduled. We should also look into the possibility of sending this weapon to South America.

Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 107, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

May 7, 1963: McNamara and Kennedy Discuss Vietnam War (1:57) TV-14

In a recorded meeting at the White House on May 7, 1963, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara briefs President John F. Kennedy on the uprising in Vietnam, laying out a timetable for the withdrawal of American troops and warning [“we certainly don't want another Korea to develop in South Vietnam and we're well on the way of doing that"]
Source: McNamara and Kennedy Discuss Vietnam War. (2013). The History Channel website. Retrieved 9:49, May 7, 2013, from http://www.history.com http://www.history.com/speeches/mcnamara-and-kennedy-discuss-vietnam-war.

Also on May 7, 1963: Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam ¹
Washington, May 7, 1963, 7:57 p.m.

1055. Joint State/Defense message. Embtel 824.² Herbicides. Program has been reviewed by highest levels:

Defoliation: 1. Authority to initiate defoliation operations is delegated to Ambassador and COMUSMACV. 2. Guidelines: Defoliation operations should be few in number, undertaken only in following circumstances: a) where terrain and vegetation peculiarly [particularly?] favor use of herbicides; b) in areas remote from population; and c) when hand cutting and burning are impracticable. A few high priority projects can be undertaken in populated areas where military advantage very clear and hand cutting and burning not feasible.

Crop Destruction: 1. All crop destruction operations must be approved in advance by Assistant Secretary FE and DOD. 2. Guidelines re Crop Destruction: a) Crop destruction must be confined to remote areas known to be occupied by VC. It should not be carried on in areas where VC are intermingled with native inhabitants and latter cannot escape. Also should be limited to areas where VC either do not have nearby alternative sources food or areas in which there is overall food deficit e.g. High Plateau and Zone D.

General Comments (applicable to both defoliation and crop destruction):

a. All herbicide operations to be undertaken only after it is clear both PsyWar preparations and compensation and relief machinery are adequate. Would appear GVN should increase compensation efforts.

b. Suggest further increase reliance on hand operations where feasible which less awesome than spraying by air.

c. Continue efforts counteract international effect Commie propaganda through demonstrations, visits by newsmen, etc.

d. Request by first week July a full report and evaluation of all 1963 herbicide operations to serve as basis decision here whether continue defoliation and crop destruction.

Rusk
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 110, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

May 8, 1963: Hue Vesak shootings: The Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) opened fire on Buddhists who had defied a ban on the flying of the Buddhist flag on Vesak, the birthday of Gautama Buddha. Eight people were killed. Earlier, South Vietnam's President Ngo Dinh Diem allowed the flying of the Vatican flag, symbolic of Roman Catholicism, in honour of his brother, Archbishop Ngo Dinh Thuc.
Source: Wikipedia, May 8, 1963

Also on May 8, 1963: Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense (McNamara) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nitze)¹
Washington, May 8, 1963.

The tentative Military Assistance Program recommended by CINCPAC ² for South Vietnam for the years Fiscal 1965 through Fiscal 1968 totals approximately $575 million. In my opinion, this is at least $270 million higher than an acceptable program.³

CINCPAC's recommendations assume an unrealistically high level for the South Vietnamese forces and assign to them equipment which is both complicated to operate and costly to procure and maintain. I believe the plan needs to be completely reworked.⁴

Before the first of September, please submit to me your recommendations for the Military Assistance Program for South Vietnam for the years Fiscal 1965 through Fiscal 1969. For each of the years I should like to see the following information: the personnel strength of each of the South Vietnamese forces; the weapons inventory of the South Vietnamese forces in a form similar to that attached;⁵ the defense budget to be funded by South Vietnam; the Supplementary Assistance to be furnished by the U.S.; the Military Assistance Program, both in dollars and in terms of the weapons listed in the attached schedule; the U.S. forces assigned to South Vietnam broken down by function.

Robert S. McNamara ⁶
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 111, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State

May 9, 1963: Telegram From the Consulate at Hue to the Department of State ¹
Hue, May 9, 1963, 3 p.m.

4. Buddha Birthday Celebration Hue May 8 erupted into large-scale demonstration at Hue Radio Station between 2000 hours local and 2330 hours. At 2245 hours estimated 3,000 crowd assembled and guarded by 8 armored cars, one Company CG, one Company minus ARVN, police armored cars and some carbines fired into air to disperse mob which apparently not unruly but perhaps deemed menacing by authorities. Grenade explosion on radio station porch killed four children, one woman. Other incidents, possibly some resulting from panic, claimed two more children plus one person age unknown killed. Total casualties for evening 8 killed, 4 wounded.²

Background this incident started May 7 when police attempted enforce law that no flags other than Viet-Namese to be flown.³ Police apparently encountered popular resistance to enforcement of law as thousands Buddhist flags publicly displayed. At police request evening May 7 Province Chief Dang reportedly rescinded order. Morning May 8 demonstration at large Tu Dam Pagoda resulted in speech by Chief Bonze in presence Buddhist Dang criticizing GVN suppression freedom religion, favoritism of Catholics. Parade banners during day anti-GVN orientated. Translations of same will be forwarded when available.

Evening May 8 crowd gathered at radio station where Head Bonze scheduled broadcast speech. Permission refused at last minute by GVN. Bonzes on scene urged people remain peaceful. GVN fire hoses and exhortations of Province Chief unsuccessful in dispersing crowd. Troops arrived and ordered dispersal.
Bonzes said stand still, do not fight, GVN claims some threw rocks at radio station, although indications are this not true. Firing then broke out.

1100 hours May 9, Province Chief addressed estimated 800 youth, demonstrators, explained crowd actions spurred by oppositionist agitators had necessitated troop action to maintain order. Head Bonze requested crowd disperse peacefully and turn in flags. Some of crowd heard chanting “down with Catholicism”.

At moment Hue quiet. Population controls and unusual troop deployment not observed. However, situation very fluid and reports of Buddhist demonstration to occur afternoon May 9 flowing in. Buddhists very upset. American community on Emergency Phase II Alert but no threat to Americans apparent at present.

Helble
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 112, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d112

May 10, 1963: Died Today:
JOHN CARNUL MYATT, 18, Army, PVT, Nederland, TX
In SOUTH VIETNAM
NON-HOSTILE, GROUND CASUALTY
ACCIDENTAL SELF-DESTRUCTION
Panel 01E - Line 22

JAMES ALVIN ELLIS, 32, Air Force, TSGT, Campbell, CA
In GIA DINH, SOUTH VIETNAM
Hostile, died of wounds, HELICOPTER - NONCREW
AIR LOSS, CRASH ON LAND
Panel 01E - Line 22

Also on May 10, 1963: Telegram From the Consulate at Hue to the Department of State ¹
Hue, May 10, 1963, 2 a.m.

5. Early AM May 10 Hue quiet. 9 PM curfew now in effect. May 9 crowd of 3,000 gathered radio station 1700 hours local. Chief Bonze Central Vietnam Tri Quang called on people disperse quietly. He promised call meeting later date. His request obeyed. Quang has now demonstrated on at least three occasions his ability handle his followers. He apparently respected as independent, non-GVN Bonze. GVN mobile loudspeakers roamed streets evening May 9 calling on population stay calm, avoid public assemblies, respect curfew.

[see Source for missing paragraphs]

Population must be judged as tense. Duration and intensity of crisis unusual in view generally passive nature Vietnamese in terms public demonstrations. People seem to have taken seriously Bonze speech morning 8th “now is time to fight”. While word fight perhaps overemphatic, desire of people seems to be to have some sort of showdown following years of frustration for Buddhists. Student banner morning 9th “please kill us”. Man on street expressing great desire for world to know of killings on 8th. While GVN line is VC responsible, no credibility this among population.

Helble
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 116, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State
http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d116

Also on May 10, 1963: Telegram From the Consulate at Hue to
Department of State ¹

Hue, May 10, 1963, 3 p.m.

6. May 10 meeting 10:30 hours local at Tu Dam Pagoda attended by estimated five or six thousand Buddhists. Crowd orderly. ARVN troops and police in area.

Province Chief Dang present. Numerous banners displayed “kill us, ready sacrifice blood, Buddhists and Catholics equal. Cancel Decree Number 10, request stop of arrests and kidnapping; a Buddhist flag will never go down”. Ex-chief Bonze Tri Quang urged all be peaceful. Carry no weapons, be prepared die. Be alert to VC efforts agitate people, follow Gandhi policies. Quang asked people agree to follow him and crowd roared assent.

Buddhist leader [less than 1 line not declassified] told crowd this regime is a good govt. Bonze Quang told people fly flags and he would take responsibility. Letter addressed to GVN ² given to Province Chief related peaceful history Buddhists, even despite many arrests and kidnappings recent years. Some bad men in govt responsible for this. Themes of banners embodied in letter which signed by Quang and other high Buddhists and organizations. Chairman GVN Buddhist Association Mat Nguyen called on GVN pay families of May 8th victims. Nguyen told crowd all Buddhist temples in Vietnam will always remember incident on Buddha's birthday. Nguyen called on GVN punish man who ordered open fire evening May 8th.

Province Chief thanked Buddhists for opportunity address meeting, expressed sorrow for those dead, stated GVN ready help families of victims and guarantees payments to families. Crowd cheered him enthusiastically.³

Final of hour long session was official placing of blame for Decree Number 10 re no flags on former Emperor Bao Dai who allegedly issued original order. Meeting ended peacefully.

Believe crisis nearing end. Although mass funeral which may be held although not now confirmed could still cause difficulties. Population seems quiet, but long term hard feelings will clearly persist. Pacifist direction of Buddhist leadership has avoided additional bloodshed and crystallization of conflict. Catholics here appear almost unanimously sympathetic to Buddhists' situation.

Arriving aspects whole incident: 1) Relatively bold natural language in banners and addresses May 8 of Bonze; 2) Duration of tension highlighted by 5 major demonstrations [of] over 50 [in] one hour; 3) Total failure NRM scheduled meeting May 9 which was to have blamed deaths on VC; 4) Inability or unwillingness GVN to quell overt large scale protest albeit peaceful at early stages; 5) Willingness of people to congregate and demonstrate in face of police and military; 6) Evident grounds will rock roots popularity of cause which not frequently witnessed in Vietnam.

Believe Embassy Saigon and Dept should anticipate some international reaction to incident, particularly in view Bonze Quang telegram to Rangoon. Would seem Communists almost certain to give incident big propaganda play as example GVN suppression freedom of religion and slaughter of innocent people.

Helble
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 117, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d117

May 11, 1963: Memorandum From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Felt) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff ¹
Honolulu, May 11, 1963.
SUBJ
Revised Plan for Republic of Vietnam

REF
(a) JCS msg 9820 DTG 091805Z May 1963²
(b) CINCPAC msg DTG 102246Z May 1963³
(c) USAF AFSMSB 60437 DTB 091639Z May 1963 NOTAL⁴
(d) CINCPAC msg DTG 110017Z May 1963 ⁵
CINCPAC 3010. Ser. 00447-63

ENCL

(1) Outline Revised Plan for Republic of Vietnam
1. Pursuant to directives by the Secretary of Defense during the conference held in Honolulu on 6 May 1963 and guidance in reference (a), an outline revised plan has been prepared. The details of the plan will be developed within the guidelines of a force structure that the RVN budget can support with minimum U.S. MAP assistance, acceleration of RVNAF training for earlier takeover of U.S. equipment and functions, a realistic demobilization program to prevent economic chaos, and minimum forces necessary to cope with reinsurgency and permit timely introduction of U.S. forces in the event of overt aggression.

2. Assumptions:
a. The insurgency can be controlled by the end of CY 1965 (mid-FY 66). Note: In my view, it is overly optimistic to assume that insurgency can be controlled as early as FY 65 as hopefully expressed in reference (a).

b. The necessary training aircraft (9 additional UH-19's and 25 Cessna 185's) and supporting U.S. training personnel will be available in RVN no later than 1 July 1963 to improve the in-country training capability.

c. The USAF and/or USN will provide 44 spaces during FY 63 for training T-28 pilots rather than slipping this program to FY 64 as proposed in reference (c). Reference (d) requested that USAF take necessary action in this regard.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 121, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d121

May 12, 1963: A Washington Post interview published on May 12 [1963] with Ngo Dinh Nhu, Diem's brother and director of the strategic hamlet program, increased Kennedy's interest in withdrawal. Nhu complained that there were too many U.S. military advisers in Vietnam and that at least half could be safely withdrawn.
Source: The Vietnam War: An Encyclopedia Of Quotations, edited by Howard Langer, Greenwood Publishing Group, 2005, p. 70

May 13, 1963: Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam ¹
Washington, May 13, 1963, 6:36 p.m.

1084. Believe public reopening of issue American presence and mutual confidence by Ngo Dinh Nhu in interview with Warren Unna ² cannot be ignored. Unless you perceive objection, request you seek interview with Diem to protest Nhu action and clarify GVN intentions. You may state you speaking under instructions.

You may draw on following at your discretion:

1. We are aware of propaganda Communists generate as result US military presence SVN. We also very much aware of US casualties and dollar costs resulting from assistance we supplying GVN at GVN request. It is in our interest to reduce our military commitment in SVN as fast as VC threat effectively reduced and this has always been our policy.

2. We do not believe that time has yet arrived when Viet Cong threat so reduced and GVN military capabilities so improved that we can safely undertake large reduction US military presence. It is our understanding that this view shared by GVN. (This connection we note Nhu considers even amnesty program premature.) We hope that a cut of perhaps 1,000 men may be possible later this year but that would depend on progress made and would come only after private discussion with GVN.

3. When time does arrive to reduce US forces, best procedure is obviously joint announcement by both governments that in light progress made against VC, cuts in order. We would hope to work it out in that fashion.

4. Public call for cut in US forces by high official like Nhu likely generate new and reinforce already existing US domestic pressures for complete withdrawal from SVN.

5. Statement that some American casualties incurred because our advisors are daredevils and expose themselves needlessly likely to have very bad effect on morale US forces. To be effective, advisors must often be at or near scene of battle.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 122, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d122

May 14, 1963: Big Spring Daily Herald: The Puzzle Of South Viet Nam
Our military commanders continue to express guarded optimism over the course of the war in South Viet Nam. An estimated 12000 US troops are now involved in a holding operation which may or may not succeed. But few military leaders of competence [have] forgotten the lessons of [the] French. In There a French army superior in numbers and in equipment was un able to hold the country because of a lack of popular support. The French had the same disastrous experience in Algeria. [?]nen too remember the words of General of the Army Douglas Mac Arthur speaking to a group of congressmen last August. "Gentlemen, let me warn you of one thing. Keep our foot soldiers out of the jungles of Southeast Asia." What is lacking in South Viet Nam is a popular cause. Who speaks for Ngo Dinh Die? Not the peasants or the general population. On the other side the Viet have adopted Mao's famous dictum[:] The guerrilla must learn to live among the native population like a fish in water. It is not necessarily al[?] to the guerrillas which persuades the villagers to cooperate. Fear is a constant companion- fear of guerrillas that is greater even than fear of Diems Viet. As for communism what fear do the Vietnamese have of a new ism since they cannot believe their lot will be better or worse than under a dictatorship. We were able to hold our own in Korea because the South Korean people were ready and willing to fight North Koreans. In South Viet Nam we have no such will or support. There may still be time but the will and resolution appears lacking to bring forward a popular leader in South Viet Nam. Of course we could disregard warning and pour our foot soldiers ashore, Then of course the Red Chinese would bring up their own foot soldiers and a deadly inconclusive struggle would begin that might last for years draining us of our lives and our treasure. Yet we throw up our hands and give up. We must find a practical alternative to our present course. But what it is no one seems to know considering our [?] to the unpopular Diem government.
Source: Big Spring Daily Herald, Tuesday, May 14, 1963, Newspaperarchive.com
http://newspaperarchive.com/big-spring-daily-herald/1963-05-14/page-14

May 15, 1963: Letter From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Harkins) to President Diem ¹
Saigon, May 15, 1963.

Dear Mr. President: As you well know, for over a year the Government of the United States has been backing an intensified program for aid and assistance to the Government of the Republic of Vietnam. You are conversant with our many and varied programs, particularly those in the military, economic, social, and psychological fields. Last week Ambassador Nolting and I, with selected personnel from our staffs, met in Hawaii with Secretary of Defense McNamara and representatives of other Washington offices to review the status of these U.S. programs. In my short conversations with you during the past few days, I have mentioned certain aspects of this meeting and the various U.S. programs. However, I think it timely to present for your consideration a review of the progress made in certain areas to date, therefore this letter. In this review I will confine my remarks only to the military programs.

Our combined, intensified effort really began in late 1961 and early 1962 and has continued to the present, at which time I can report practically all military programs have been completed or are well on the way to completion.

What has been accomplished? The results are indicated below:
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 123, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d123

Also on May 15, 1963: Letter From the Assistant Administrator for the Far East, Agency for International Development (Janow), to the Assistant Director for Rural Affairs, United States Operations Mission in Vietnam (Phillips)¹
Washington, May 15, 1963.

Dear Rufe: Your letter to me and your memorandum to Joe Brent of May 1² on the question of financing of the counter-insurgency effort have been very much on my mind. I hope you will understand that since I returned to Washington we have been overwhelmed by preparations for our Congressional Presentations. There were two this week. On Monday I was before the Senate Appropriations Committee on our personnel/management and I have just returned today from our hearings before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on the whole of our program.

Today was not a very comfortable environment for the hearings as we had an editorial in The Washington Post³ following up Warren Unna's story on Nhu's suggestion for a 50 percent reduction in the number of GI's in Vietnam that gave some members of the Committee difficult questions to ask concerning our policies in Vietnam. What I am about to say to you is not influenced by this experience of today nor by the news statements.

At the Honolulu Conference I talked with Ambassador Nolting, with Joe Brent, and also raised, on the floor of the conference, the problems of our counter-insurgency operations under the changed financing plan. I asked General Harkins in the general meeting whether he had heard from his MAAG sector advisors that the change in financing would impede the programs establishing the strategic hamlets and the movement of supplies to them. He said he had not heard from them and did not know whether there would be great difficulties.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 124, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d124

Also on May 15, 1963: Memorandum from the Deputy Director of the Vietnam Working Group (Heavner) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Hilsman)¹
Washington, May 15, 1963.
SUBJECT
Possible Responses to Nhu Call for Cut in U.S. Forces

You requested a list of actions we might take which would hurt Diem but not the war effort. The list, plus estimates of likely results, follows:

A. Possible Actions

1. Aid Cuts. This could take a variety of forms on both the civilian and military side. I would suggest—and this is subject to further study—the following possibilities:
(a) POL . Petroleum products for civilian use are financed by our commercial import program; they run around $17 million per year. To cut this flow, we could inform the GVN that licensing under existing purchase authorizations is suspended and no further authorizations will be issued. This would force the GVN to use its own foreign exchange reserves to buy POL-and Diem is very sensitive about keeping up the level of GVN foreign exchange reserves. He probably sees his rather large foreign exchange reserves as a hedge against American withdrawal, aid cuts, or pressures like this.

(b) Sugar and Wheat Flour. We finance, under our CIP and PL-480, about $25 million per year of these commodities. Cutting them would have the same effect on GVN foreign exchange reserves as cutting

(c) [less than 1 1ine not declassified] Support for National Youth Center. This is quite a small item [1-1/2 lines not declassified]. But as a gesture, it might prick Nhu directly because he is the Grand Mogul of r the Republican Youth.

(d) Military Construction. We are planning to fund under MAP a number of construction projects. The problem, of course, is that cutting them will interfere with the war effort rather directly. In this category are items such as rehabilitation of the air field at Danang ($3.5 million) and construction of a quad wall at Saigon ($1.6 million).

2. Stopping Herbicide Operations. This has been a pet project for Diem. We have had our doubts and misgivings about it, but dropping crop destruction would, in my opinion, also hurt the war effort to some degree.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 125, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d125

May 16, 1963: Guerrillas Kill 21 SAIGON South Viet Nam AP guerrillas ambushed a column of Vietnamese army trucks today on a lonely mountain road killing 21 soldiers and wounding 25
Source: Indiana Evening Gazette, Thursday, May 16, 1963, Newspaperarchive.com http://newspaperarchive.com/indiana-evening-gazette/1963-05-16

Also on May 16, 1963: Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos ¹
Washington, May 16, 1963, 6 p.m.

1104. Kong Le preoccupation with need improve his military and prestige position in Plaine des Jarres well and sympathetically understood here. As stated previous messages, our concern is that he should take appropriate action designed assure his continuing ability maintain integrity his military forces. While realizing such assurance not attainable in absolute terms, his dispositions, his logistics and his forces morale should be such that, in order destroy his forces or drive him from PDJ communists will be required launch such overt and flagrant attacks that they might be above threshold political risk and opprobrium which even Viet Minh would be willing to bear.

We do not have full confidence in Kong Le's military and political judgment such matters, and particularly have doubts if such judgment exercised in collaboration General Phoumi. Most disastrous occurrence, in our view, would be repetition Nam Tha fiasco, but we recognize there are circumstances under which military action by Kong Le might be necessary.

It is impossible, from Washington vantage point, develop adequate information or criteria enable us give guidance or even useful reactions re specific military moves. Our kibitzing must perforce be concerned primarily with evaluating, in advance, rpt in advance, predictable international political repercussions to contemplated military moves.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis, Document 470, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v24/d470

May 17, 1963: Editorial Note

On May 17, 1963, President Diem and Ambassador Nolting issued a joint communique to announce United State-Vietnamese agreement on counterinsurgency funding. The text of the communique reads:

The Government of Vietnam and the American Embassy announced on May 17 that agreement has been reached regarding funding for counter-insurgency and other economic development projects, particularly those supporting the Strategic Hamlet Program, during 1963. The agreement provides inter alia for the continuation of counter-insurgency projects supported under the piastre-purchase agreement announced in August, 1962. As explained at that time, the latter was an extraordinary arrangement necessitated by the fact that full provision for the counter-insurgency operations in question was not made either in the Vietnamese budget for 1962 or in the United States AID Program. It was planned that the continuation of these operations would be budgeted and programmed in a manner calculated to be responsive to the requirements of the present situation.

Under the agreement just announced, the Government of Vietnam has undertaken to supplement U.S.-owned funds and counterpart, so as to make available up to $2.3 billion piastres during calendar year 1963. The United States is also providing some $55 million in the form of agricultural products, barbed wire, weapons for hamlet militia, cement, fertilizer and other commodities for the program.

Counter-insurgency projects will continue to be initiated and developed by the Vietnamese authorities, and all of them will be fully coordinated between the Vietnamese and American central committees, as in the past. The execution of projects will also continue to be closely coordinated between the Vietnamese authorities and American experts in the provinces.

During the course of the discussions, it was also reaffirmed that the scale of the U.S. advisory and support effort in Vietnam is directly related to security requirements and to the need to bring about throughout the country the economic and social improvements envisaged in the strategic hamlet program. Although at this time the present level of the advisory and support effort is still necessary, as the security situation improves and as the strategic hamlet programme progresses, it is expected that the need for foreign assistance, both in terms of material and personnel, will be progressively lightened. (American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pages 854-855)
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 127, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d127

Also on May 17, 1963: Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State ¹
Saigon, May 17, 1963, 4 p.m.

The attached cable from Fritz Nolting (which you may already have seen) gives a cheerful picture of progress in South Vietnam.

I believe it should be read with a grain of salt, although the fact that Diem has gotten out into the country is in itself hopeful. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series, 4/63-5/63)

1036. CINCPAC for POLAD. During past week several members of our mission and I have accompanied President Diem on trips to various provinces, mainly to areas recently brought under Government control through clear and hold operations, road and canal building, strategic and combat hamlet establishment, and related measures. On trips last Sunday and Tuesday² in seven provinces, it was the consensus of all of us, including several other foreign ambassadors, that important improvements were unmistakable. First was the evident enthusiasm among peasants and officials alike in progress to date towards permanent security and follow-up benefits to the people. In one recently cleared area the farmers, expressing their thoughts freely, had only one request-that a hundred families living to the West of their zone be also “liberated” promptly. Second was the evident goodwill and cooperation existing between U.S. advisors, both military and civil, and their GVN opposite numbers. (I talked personally with more than a dozen on both sides and I found no indications of friction or frustration-on the contrary, the prevailing mood was one of encouragement in accomplishments, goodwill, and confidence in the future.) Third was the obvious purpose of President Diem to show Americans, as well as other foreigners and Vietnamese, his appreciation of American help, including advisors, and his satisfaction with results achieved to date.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 126, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d126

Also on May 17, 1963:Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam ¹
Washington, May 17, 1963, 8:51 p.m.

1104. For Nolting from Hilsman. Gratified you able persuade Diem issue statement to effect present level our personnel SVN necessary to meet VC threat.

Communique on CI funding agreement² excellent device permit Diem disavow Nhu remarks indirectly and without loss of face.

As you know, this reaffirmation need for our assistance may not get extensive press play because it seems buried in communique on funding, and in any case slate would not really be wiped clean here. I hope you able find additional opportunities continue impress on Diem and Nhu fact that we having rough going defending our Viet-Nam program at best and this incident likely leave lasting bad impression in spite of communique. You may say we hope future statements will be more helpful to joint effort defeat VC.

Nhu rejoinder to Unna,³ which we have not yet seen, also may create further difficulties. Unna has reputation on Hill and elsewhere in government as accurate reporter no matter what his policy view. An insulting accusation against him could provoke even stronger resentments.

Doubt that there is anything you can do to change immediate situation, but repeat both my own fear that Nhu likely to repeat performance if not brought up sharply and above hope that you able find opportunity continue to impress consequences on both Diem and Nhu.

Rusk
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 128, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d128

May 18, 1963: Apprehensions ... regarding recent events in Vietnam

Abstract:
The combination of three unwise political acts in the past month may ultimately prove fatal to the regime of President Ngo Dinh Diem despite its gains in the military struggle against the Viet Communists (VC). These three acts were: 1) dismissal of Huynh Van Lang of the Office of Exchanges from his position of power in the southern faction of the Can Lao (Revolutionary Worker's) Party; 2) the denigration and removal from power and authority of Dr. Tran Kim Tuyen, Director of SEPES; and 3) most importantly, the Hue incident on Buddha's Birthday 8 May in which Buddhist paraders were killed by the Civil Guard. Each of these separate acts has served to weaken the motivation of different segments of Vietnamese and to further narrow, possibly to a fatal degree, the base of support for the regime.
Source: Declassified CIA Documents on the Vietnam War | University of Saskatchewan Library http://library.usask.ca/vietnam/index.php?state=view&id=615

Also on May 18, 1963: 129. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State ¹
Saigon, May 18, 1963, 4 p.m.

1038. CINCPAC for POLAD. References: Embtel 1005, Deptel 1066, Hue tels 5 and 6² May 15, following preliminary discussions with Vice President Tho (Buddhist), delegation Buddhist leaders met with President Diem to present series of demands. Secretary Interior Luong and Secretary Civic Action Hieu also were present. Semi-official Vietnam Presse and local press May 17 gave lengthy report of press conference by Buddhist leaders giving their version of meeting with President. According Vietnam Presse, Buddhists demanded following:

a. Rescission of order prohibiting flying of Buddhist flags. Diem replied both Catholics and Buddhists guilty “disorderly use” of religious flags, which should be confined to temple grounds and subordinated to national flag. (Same issue VN Presse reports communique from Saigon Archbishop that Vatican flag to be flown only inside churches and noting that violations of rule have recently been seen.)
b. Give Buddhists rights with Catholics. Buddhists pointed out GVN Ordinance Number 10 does not cover Catholic organizations, which still enjoy privileges originally granted by French. Buddhist organizations on other hand considered foreign by Property Registration Office so that presidential permit required to allow them to buy property. Diem stated inconsistencies resulted from administrative errors and that he would have matter investigated.

c. Stop arbitrary arrests of and halt pressures on Buddhists in Hue. Diem replied that suspending practice of arrests could be taken advantage of by subversive elements. Discussion of facts which had transpired at Hue apparently did not bring agreement.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 129, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d129

May 19, 1963: SAIGON Viet Nam (UPI)---South Vietnamese government troops in fast-moving armored personnel carriers wiped out most of two Communist Viet Cong companies Saturday killing at least 85 guerrillas military as reported. The sources said another 15 guerrillas were wounded and 25 captured. It was the biggest victory re- ported by the government forces in months.
Source: Post Herald And Register, Sunday, May 19, 1963, Newspaperarchive.com http://newspaperarchive.com/post-herald-and-register/1963-05-19

Also on May 19, 1963: Excerpt from John Fanning letter:

"There is a terrible fear of journalists among certain soldiers. This Corps area has fared badly at the pen of one Neil Sheean (?sp.) of Newsweek (I think) and the Senior Advisor is rather concerned about the problem of a good press. I think that untimately [sp] a good press will be gotten if we are honest and direct with the press people. A few weeks ago my boss was away in the hospital and the G2 Lieutenant was out in the field, and I was the sole G2 advisor at Corps Headquarters. A team of journalists came, and the second string people (like me) had to stage a briefing for them. I think I did rather well, as did the other officers (a colonel, deputy senior advisor, and a major, asst G3 advisor, and a lt col, G5 advisor), as we were open and direct with these people, and didn't assume that they would injure us and our Vietnamese counterparts. The group consisted of about 15, including someone from NBC, a priest from NCWC news service, a few people from Vietnam Press, other assorted reporters, and about 3 or 4 PIO people from the US Army and Air Force. I don't think we gave away any secrets, although we did give them a pretty thorough and complete briefing. One good thing about briefing press people is that they have a wholly different view of things, and can raise questions that we simply wouldn't think of otherwise. It was an excellent experience, and I hope it happen[s] again, although I'm sure next time my boss will be here to brief them.

Source: Letter from John Fanning, Advisory Team 21 TO Mike - re: News Coverage of Vietnam and Other Information,  19 May 1963, Folder 01, Box 01, John P. Fanning Collection, The Vietnam Center and Archive, Texas Tech University. Accessed 18 May. 2013.http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/items.php?item=20890101027

May 20, 1963: 471. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Thompson) to Secretary of State Rusk ¹
Washington, May 20, 1963.
SUBJECT
Conversation aboard the Patrick J on Saturday, May 18, 1963

During the boat trip which the Secretary arranged for Ambassador Dobrynin, the Soviet Embassy Counselor, Alexander Zinchuk, made two interesting statements about Laos. The first one was that the Soviets had little means of influencing developments there. The second was that one difficulty in Laos was that both the Right and Left Wings were strong, whereas the center was weak.

Information received today to the effect that the Soviets are apparently pulling out personnel that have remained with Laotian neutralist forces could have two explanations. The first is that the Soviets are now going to back the Pathet Lao, and probably work for partition. The second is that they may be wanting to disengage in order to put full responsibility for what happens upon the Viet-Minh and Chinese Communists. To the extent that the latter might be true, a strong United States reaction to any Pathet Lao resumption of hostilities, or attempt to partition the country, would appear to be called for. I would suggest that we should have a contingency plan for consideration if it should develop that the Soviets in their quarrel with the ChiComs would like to demonstrate that the Chinese high-risk policy is too dangerous. One such action might be something along the following lines:
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis, Document 471, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v24/d471

May 21, 1963: 130. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam ¹
Washington, May 21, 1963, 10:48 a.m.

1111. Re press policy. Primary purpose this message is to recapitulate our basic approach and policy on press relations Viet-Nam.

In line with policy laid down at outset increase US assistance effort, first principle press relations Viet-Nam must continue be to provide fullest possible cooperation to press in order make available to newsmen complete picture complicated Viet-Nam situation and US role. US public must have accurate story our Viet-Nam program if we are to justify our large human and material investment there. Assistance to press thus commands very high priority.

We aware mission has made extraordinary efforts assist press and encourage GVN adopt liberal and generally helpful press policy. Believe however that wherever possible we should take reporters further into our confidence in order to be certain their background understanding of situation is more complete.

We also have in mind more frequent pre-operations briefings. While considerations of military security must naturally come first, believe it might be possible to do more such briefings without endangering war effort.

You should also continue your efforts persuade GVN cooperate more fully with US press. Primary responsibility for access to news is theirs and hence primary effort get Viet-Nam story fully told should be Vietnamese also.

We understand difficulties your situation and fully appreciate your efforts. Department also confident press accounts Viet-Nam situation are bound to reflect overall improvement situation as progress against VC becomes more evident. Foregoing intended only to reiterate standing policy and suggest what may be done to further implement that policy.

Ball
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 130, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d130

May 22, 1963: 131. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State ¹
Saigon, May 22, 1963, 2 p.m.

1050. CINCPAC for POLAD. Deptel 1117.² During meeting with Diem May 18, he devoted about two hours to Buddhist questions. I sought to impress on him need for further GVN action and specifically suggested public declaration by him and/or appointment commission along lines Embtel 1038.³ Diem was non-committal re commission and took position that declaration should be deferred until people had had time to reflect on various statements which have been made, particularly at press conference held by Buddhist leaders following meeting with him.

From Diem's extensive remarks to me, it was quite clear that he is convinced that (a) Hue incident was provoked by Buddhist leaders, (b) deaths were caused by grenade or grenades thrown by VC or other dissidents and not by GVN, and (c) certain Buddhist leaders are seeking to use Hue affair as means of enhancing their own positions within Buddhist movement. Finally, Diem appears to feel that whole affair is far less serious matter than we do. I said I hoped he had not underestimated seriousness of situation; that our information re facts and attitude of people was considerably different from his.

With regard to Buu Hoi's suggestion,⁴ there might be merit in creation of Cabinet-level post for religious affairs. I do not feel, however, that this is propitious moment to propose it, and I frankly think that at any time, proposal would have far better chance of acceptance if made by Vietnamese rather than American. We will work toward this at suitable opportunity.

Nolting
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 131, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d131

Also on May 22, 1963: President John F. Kennedy's News Conference:

QUESTION: Mr. President, the brother of the President of South Viet-Nam has said that too many American troops are in South Viet-Nam. Could you comment on that, and give us some progress report on what is going on?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I hope we could -- we would withdraw troops, any number of troops, any time the government of South Viet-Nam would suggest it. The day after it was suggested, we would have some troops on their way home. That is Number 1.

Number 2 is we are hopeful that the situation in South Viet-Nam would permit some withdrawal in any case by the end of the year, but we can't possibly make that judgment at the present time. There is still a long, hard struggle to go, and we have seen what happened in Laos, which must inevitably have its effect upon South Viet-Nam, so that I couldn't say that today the situation is such that we could look for a brightening in the sky that would permit us to withdraw troops or begin to by the end of the year. But I would say, if requested to, we will do it immediately. As of today, we would hope we could begin to perhaps do it at the end of the year, but we couldn't make any final judgment at all until we see the course of the struggle the next few months.
Source: President John F. Kennedy’s News Conference #56, 22 May 1963 - John F. Kennedy Presidential Library & Museum
http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/JFKPOF-060-001.aspx

May 23, 1963: 133. Letter From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Nolting) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Hilsman)¹
Saigon, May 23, 1963.

Dear Roger: I enclose a contingency plan drafted by Ben Wood for the U.S. role in the event of a change of government in Viet-Nam. I think it is about as good and sound guidance as one can develop on this subject, and I have concurred in it. We will keep it for reference and will update it at least annually. I hope you will clear it and suggest that it be submitted for White House approval. In the event of an emergency it would be invaluable for the Ambassador or the Charge to know that this plan had top level approval and could be used as the basis for action here.
Sincerely,
Fritz
[Enclosure]
Contingency Plan Prepared by the Director of the Vietnam Working Group (Wood) ²
Saigon, undated.
SUBJECT
Eventual Change of Government in Viet-Nam

I. Dissemination of this Memorandum
Knowledge of the existence of this memorandum which replaces earlier memoranda on the same subject³ is to be limited to the smallest possible number of people. Dissemination in Washington will be the sole responsibility of the Assistant Secretary for FE; in Saigon it will be the sole responsibility of the Ambassador.

II. Purposes of Memorandum
—To plan in advance the U.S. role when there is a change in the Government of Viet-Nam. Since this is inevitable, plans should be made and reviewed with the same care that a prudent man devotes to his will.

—To recognize, in the basic American tradition of supporting free governments, that the Vietnamese should, if possible, exercise their own choice without U.S. or any other outside intervention; that any U.S. interference runs a serious risk of branding a successor government as U.S. dominated. The U.S. role should, if possible, be limited to indicating discreetly, but clearly the conditions under which the U.S. would recognize and support a new government. Should further steps be required to prevent, for example, a dangerous interregnum, they must be exercised with sound knowledge, great firmness, good timing and the awareness that there will probably be only one chance to intervene effectively.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 133, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d133

Also on May 23, 1963: 132. Minutes of a Meeting of the Special Group for Counterinsurgency¹
Washington, May 23, 1963, 2 p.m.

PRESENT
Governor Harriman, The Attorney General, Mr. McCone, Mr. Forrestal, Mr. Coffin vice Mr. Bell, Mr. Wilson vice Mr. Murrow, Mr. Bundy vice Mr. Gilpatric, General Krulak vice General

Taylor Mr. Engle and Mr. Poats were present for Item No. 2 Mr. Martin, Mr. Koren and Mr. Heavner were present for Item 3 Mr. Maechling was present for the meeting

[Here follow items 1, “Special Report-Mr. Forrestal,” and 2, “Follow-up Report on Indonesia from May 16 Meeting.”]

3. Discussion with Colonel Serong on the Situation in Viet-Nam
Colonel Serong, Head of the Australian Training Mission to South Viet-Nam, stated that he believes we are winning the war in VietNam, current statistical indicators reflect favorable trends, and the most significant development is the increase in volume of spontaneous intelligence provided by the people. This is because the Government is now providing them with security from the Viet Cong.

He pointed out that there are problems with the press in Viet-Nam but they are reporting what they see or are being told. He believes this situation can be improved by working more closely with them in the field. Our U.S. military advisors are reflecting in their comments to the press their frustrations to get the Vietnamese to accept their advice. The big success story in Viet-Nam is the strategic hamlet program and this story has not yet been fully told. He stated that out of a total population in Viet-Nam of about 16 million some 8 million have been moved into the strategic hamlets, resulting in one of the biggest population moves in history.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 132, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d132

Also on May 23, 1963: 134. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State ¹
Saigon, May 23, 1963, 2 p.m.
1056. CINCPAC for POLAD. Before departure on home leave,² would like to summarize briefly recent conversations with GVN officials, in addition to those with President Diem reported separately.³

1. Counselor Ngo Dinh Nhu. Nhu was most forthcoming in his observations and assessment of situation here, with particular emphasis on role of U.S. advisors. He appreciates and regrets problems caused by recent published interview. In long discussion, I found nothing inconsistent with U.S. objectives in what he had to say. This was, in brief, that South Viet-Nam must continually strive for self-sufficiency in all fields if it is to endure as free nation. It cannot be expected that foreign assistance will continue in present dimensions for prolonged period, and it is up to Vietnamese people to make this unnecessary. While much remains to be done, a great deal has been accomplished under difficult circumstances, thanks in large part to American material assistance and advice. Said he hoped I realized that he is neither anti-American nor xenophobic. Said he realized that he is unpopular among many Vietnamese, because he is trying to get GVN to promote a genuine revolution among the people and this annoyed the stand-patters. Nhu gave many examples of what he called his “lectures” to Vietnamese officials, high and low, civilian and military.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 134, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d134

Also on May 23, 1963: 134. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State ¹
Saigon, May 23, 1963, 2 p.m.

1056. CINCPAC for POLAD. Before departure on home leave,² would like to summarize briefly recent conversations with GVN officials, in addition to those with President Diem reported separately.³

1. Counselor Ngo Dinh Nhu. Nhu was most forthcoming in his observations and assessment of situation here, with particular emphasis on role of U.S. advisors. He appreciates and regrets problems caused by recent published interview. In long discussion, I found nothing inconsistent with U.S. objectives in what he had to say. This was, in brief, that South Viet-Nam must continually strive for self-sufficiency in all fields if it is to endure as free nation. It cannot be expected that foreign assistance will continue in present dimensions for prolonged period, and it is up to Vietnamese people to make this unnecessary. While much remains to be done, a great deal has been accomplished under difficult circumstances, thanks in large part to American material assistance and advice. Said he hoped I realized that he is neither anti-American nor xenophobic. Said he realized that he is unpopular among many Vietnamese, because he is trying to get GVN to promote a genuine revolution among the people and this annoyed the stand-patters. Nhu gave many examples of what he called his “lectures” to Vietnamese officials, high and low, civilian and military.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 134, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d134

May 24, 1963: 472. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos ¹
Washington, May 24, 1963, 6:23 p.m.

1136. Ref: Embtel 1719.² Role of US and/or SEATO in case Lao situation should deteriorate further is again being studied in Washington along with general updating of contingency plans.³ However, as you point out, Reftel raises several questions which are unanswerable at this time. Therefore, this message can only provide general guidance on our policy objectives in respect to non-communist Lao military forces.

1. Objectives. Our efforts with non-communist forces should be directed at (a) maintaining non-communist forces at level of morale and equipment which can hold long enough against attack to focus international attention on situation and crystallize the elements out of which we must make decision as to what actions to take. It obvious whatever we choose to do would be immeasurably harder to achieve if non-communist Lao simply folded completely and at once. (b) Producing strongly enough motivated non-communist forces to resist communist nibbling tactics where non-communists and communists are in direct contact. (c) Supporting forces which could eliminate PL elements from areas generally dominated by FAR, particularly in South and vicinity of Vientiane. (d) Supporting forces which could attempt to extend FAR into areas which PL has not yet firmly occupied or where it is weak.

2. Support. We agree with Reftel that neutralists and FAR could not resist for long strong VM supported PL attacks. Further, we doubt whether merely by increasing materiel support to non-communist forces we could overcome powerful psychological boost PL get from presence their North Vietnamese comrades. For these reasons it does not appear advisable for us to attempt build-up of non-communist forces either in numbers or in new equipment (aside from replacements worn-out items).
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis, Document 472, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v24/d472

May 25, 1963: 135. Letter From the Charge in Vietnam (Trueheart) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Hilsman)¹
Saigon, May 25, 1963.

Dear Roger: Yesterday afternoon Mr. Ngo Dinh Nhu asked General Harkins, General Weede, John Richardson and me to call on him for a discussion of a highly sensitive matter. Thuan and General Khiem, Chief of the Joint General Staff, were also present.

Nhu stated that he wished to recount to us an intelligence report which he had just received, to reach a joint evaluation of the report, and to consider together what should be done about it. The report concerned a meeting held on May 19 (Ho Chi Minh's birthday) at the Mimot plantation in Cambodia, at which all the principal VC political and military leaders in South Viet-Nam had been present, as well as representatives from Hanoi. Nhu's informant had been one of the participants. (This is not the first time that Nhu has claimed to be in touch with a top VC leader. So far as I know, previous information from this or these informants has not turned out to be particularly significant. Richardson confirms this impression and suggests that Bill Colby may be able to provide further comment. In this case, at any rate, we have no confirmation whatsoever.)

Nhu said that at this meeting the VC leaders had been informed that the Communists had now assigned top priority to liquidating the Laotian problem. South Viet-Nam would for the time being have secondary priority. In accordance with this decision, a directive was issued at the meeting, with effect from May 20, that all VC “special forces” in South Viet-Nam should be withdrawn to southern Laos. (Neither we nor Nhu had ever heard of VC “special forces”. He explained that, according to his informant, these were elite units, about six battalions in all, divided between the southern and central areas of SVN, a sort of hard hard-core authorized to operate throughout South Viet-Nam without prior permission from higher authority. The ordinary VC regular units had to get permission to operate outside of their assigned area.) In addition, it had been directed that the VC regular units in SVN should retire into their “maquis” (or Cambodia) and cease operations, dispersing if necessary to avoid contact with GVN forces. In short, the effect of the alleged directive would be to leave all the fighting in SVN to the regional or territorial VC forces.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 135, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d135

May 26, 1963: LAOS CENSORS NEWS ---VIENTIANE, Laos (AP)—
Censorship of outgoing news dispatches from Laos went into effect today on orders of Neutralist Premier Prince Souvanna Phouma.
Source: New York State Digital Library - Long Island City NY Star Journal 1963

May 27, 1963: Acknowledging the deteriorating situation in strife-torn Laos, the Russians have initiated new talks with Britain on a possible joint peace appeal to the warring factions there. Britain and the Soviet Union were co-chairman of last year's 14-nation conference in Geneva, which pledged to guarantee Laotian neutrality and independence. British officials were cautious in assessing the Soviet initiative because of two futile attempts to obtain joint action with the Russians. The British also believe the Chinese and North Vietnamese not the Russians, dominate Communist policy in Laos. (1:8)
Source: New York Times Chronology - John F. Kennedy Presidential Library & Museum http://www.jfklibrary.org/Research/Research-Aids/Ready-Reference/New-York-Times-Chronology/Browse-by-Date/New-York-Times-Chronology-May-1963.aspx#Week3

May 28, 1963: CHARLES ELLSWORT DOERRMAN
7/12/1919 - 5/28/1963
TSGT - E6 - Air Force - Regular
Reading, PA
Length of service 16 years
Casualty was on May 28, 1963
In GIA DINH, SOUTH VIETNAM
Non-Hostile, died of illness/injury, GROUND CASUALTY
HEART ATTACK
Body was recovered
Panel 01E - Line 22
Source: The Wall-USA http://thewall-usa.com/info.asp?recid=13537

Also on May 28, 1963: Today's Charleston Gazette: OPIUM ADDICT ARRESTED Envoy Target For Extortion
SAIGON
American Embassy officials said Monday that an employed Vietnamese accountant had confessed to an unsuccessful extortion plot against U.S. Frederick Nolting Jr. They said Nguyen Van Muu demanded one million piastres for information about an alleged Communist plot to assassinate Notling. Vietnamese sources said Muu was an opium addict and was not an agent but only wanted money. During nearly a month-long correspondence between Muu and Nolting the embassy … ended its security protections for the ambassador but it went back to normal status on May 7 when a female friend of Muu fell into a police trap and led them to Muu. The story was made public Monday. Nolting and his family went home on leave on Thursday. Nolting has been allegedly the number one on the so-called Viet Cong assassination….

Source: Charleston Gazette, Tuesday, May 28, 1963, Newspaperarchive.com http://newspaperarchive.com/charleston-gazette/1963-05-28/page-9

May 29, 1963: JAMES HENRY BRODT
6/4/1932 - 5/29/1963 APT - O3 - Army - Regular
Cocoa, FL
Length of service 8 years
Casualty was on May 29, 1963
In , SOUTH VIETNAM
HOSTILE, GROUND CASUALTY
OTHER CAUSES
Body was recovered
Panel 01E - Line 23
Source: The Wall-USA http://thewall-usa.com/info.asp?recid=5775

NEIL KIRK MAC IVER
PFC - E3 - Army - Regular
Special Forces
10/13/1943 - 5/29/1963
Takoma Park, MD
Length of service 1 years
Casualty was on May 29, 1963
In , SOUTH VIETNAM
HOSTILE, GROUND CASUALTY
GUN, SMALL ARMS FIRE
Body was recovered
 Panel 01E - Line 23
Source: The Wall-USA http://thewall-usa.com/info.asp?recid=31788

Also on May 29, 1963: 138. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam ¹
Washington, May 29, 1963, 7:07 p.m.

1159. Embtels 1038 and 1050; Deptel 1117² New York Times today reports Buddhists still very upset by Hue incident and failure GVN take meaningful steps toward religious equality. Story states Buddhists planning hunger strikes and four weeks of memorial services.³

We have noted your recommendations and Diem's essentially negative response as contained reftels. In face continuing Buddhist agitation, however, believe Diem may after further reflection be willing shift his ground. Urge Embassy make continuing effort move him on this problem which could either become very serious for GVN or be susceptible considerable easing by greater show GVN good will.

You may wish again raise problem with Diem, in whatever terms you think best in order persuade him take further actions meet Buddhist demands. You might wish consider suggesting public reassurance by Diem that Constitutional provision (Article 17) for religious freedom will be enforced, especially with understanding Buddhists will have equal rights with Catholics to hold processions, display flags, etc, promise full investigation of Hue incident by special commission, release of any Buddhists held by Hue authorities, and offer continue discussions with Buddhist leaders. Doubt GVN can be persuaded now to admit responsibility for Hue incident, but investigation headed by prominent Buddhist could cover this problem.

Since drafting above have received Reuters ticker May 29 on GVN communique urging “Absolute Respect” for all religious groups. What is background?⁴

Rusk
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 138, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d138

May 30, 1963: Buddhist crisis: More than 500 monks demonstrated in front of Vietnam's National Assembly building in Saigon, evading a ban on public assembly by hiring four buses and pulling the blinds down. It was the first open protest against President Ngô Đình Diệm's regime since he came into power eight years earlier.
Source: Wikipedia, May, 30, 1963 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/May_1963#May_30.2C_1963_.28Thursday.29

May 31, 1963: 140. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State ¹
Saigon, May 31, 1963, 7 p.m.

1083. CINCPAC for POLAD. Deptel 1159;² 1162.3 No further Buddhist demonstrations last evening or today. Bonzes continuing their fast in pagodas until 1400 tomorrow. Reports from Hue, Danang and My Tho indicate those cities quiet with no Buddhist manifestations.

In assessing general situation it quite clear that feeling continues run deep among Buddhists. Equally clear that problem facing GVN goes well beyond issues religious freedom and discrimination. These issues-though real enough-are now also being used as label and facade behind which other groups seek express opposition to Diem government and exploit situation for various aims. This greatly complicates problem of GVN—and our advice to them—since they must act on assumption they are dealing with political opposition. Problem is further compounded by fact that Buddhists have no recognized hierarchy with which government can deal and which can take position on behalf of movement. (Thus Thuan complained to me May 29 that Diem had spent some hours with group of Buddhist leaders only to be confronted later by other groups demanding to be heard and complaining first group not the “real” leaders.)

Given history of events it seems unlikely to us that GVN can back off its stand on responsibility for Hue incident. Psychological moment to do so has long passed in any event. Unhappily, it appears that it may also be too late for GVN concessions of other sorts to halt Buddhist agitation. For example, May 29 GVN communique which clearly reaffirmed religious freedom under Article 17 of Constitution and gave firm assurance against discrimination, appears to have had no effect on militants. Moreover, those seeking to use Buddhist agitation for their own purposes can be counted on to keep pot boiling if possible.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 140, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d140

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