50 Years Ago Today - The Vietnam War
Read a sampling of News items and State Department telegrams covering much of the first year of the war in Vietnam.
|
||||
50 Years Ago Today
|
||||
 |
|---|
June 1, 1963: 141. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 1
Saigon, June 1, 1963, 1 p.m.
1084. CINCPAC for POLAD. Reference: Embassy's telegram, 1083.2 Saw Thuan this morning re Buddhist problem. His assessment of situation is generally same as reftel. He says GVN is convinced NFLSV and VC are exploiting situation. President's position is therefore very difficult. If he now makes concessions under pressure, it could simply whet appetites. Next demands, Thuan felt, could be of a sort designed to interfere with war effort, for example, a plea in name of peace that GVN treat with NFLSV.
On other hand, Thuan is fully aware of dangers of inaction. Problem is to find a solution acceptable to President and to Buddhists. Thuan pointed out again that lack of Buddhist hierarchy and authoritative spokesman compounded problem.
Thuan said he did not know Diem's latest thinking but expected see him later today. I suggested possibility of high level commission, along lines reftel, and said that Vice President Tho might be good person to head it. Thuan was rather skeptical; he did not understand why a commission was any more likely to come up with a solution than the government. I said the idea was not so much to come up with an immediate solution as to establish a respectable forum in which Buddhists, whatever their standing, and others could be heard. Once tempers had cooled, the “solution” might be relatively simple. Thuan remained non-committal but I imagine that he will at least mention the idea to Diem. With regard to Tho, Thuan informed me that shortly after Hue incident Vice President had been asked by Ngo Trong Hieu to discuss problem with one of principal Saigon Buddhist leaders but latter had refused to call on him.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 141, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d141
Also on June 1, 1963:
142. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 1
Saigon, June 1, 1963, 1 p.m.
1085. CINCPAC for POLAD. Reference: Embassy telegram 1083.2 Consul Helble reports from Hue (1030 AM) that large crowds Buddhists gathering various places throughout city. One crowd converging on offices Province Chief and provincial delegate, where former has promised convey to Buddhists GVN reaction to Buddhist demands. Another crowd expected total about ten thousand beginning gather Tu Dam Pagoda. Hunger strike of bonzes scheduled end at 14003 with no clear indication Buddhist plans for later today if dissatisfied with GVN response. Crowds very orderly up till now; however many unverified rumors that Buddhists will not remain passive throughout day.
Large number of police positioned in city and augmented by paratroopers and M-113 vehicles from Quang Tri. Total number police and troops in excess number involved May 8 incident.
Situation considered tense and could erupt in violence if sparked by either side. Chief bonze Tri Quang, among staunchest of militants, has reportedly stated earlier this week, that situation in his view beyond compromise and, in direct confrontation with GVN, Buddhists should seek help from any source, including VC.
Reports from Danang indicate that approximately 0800 parade of Buddhist about 60 bonzes and 12 Buddhist nuns proceeded to Mayor's office. They carried international Buddhist flag and did not carry Vietnamese flag.
They now standing and sitting across street from his office. Street cleared of all civilians by police and soldiers for 3 blocks. Crowd started to collect and reached total of approximately 2000 on fringe areas by 0900 and were dispersed shortly thereafter by newly arrived troops with steel helmets and sub-machine guns.4
Situation in Saigon quiet.
Trueheart
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 142, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d142
Also on June 1, 1963:
143. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam 1
Washington, June 1, 1963, 1:59 p.m.
1168. Embtel 1085 [1084].2 Approve your careful and thoughtful handling this difficult and important matter in talks with Thuan. While recognizing Diem's sensitivity it is also true that it is difficult for US with its large stake in Viet-Nam to support GVN in face almost worldwide liberal criticism plus growing Buddhist criticism.
Following thoughts may be helpful:
1. Diem or other GVN members should keep talking with Buddhists even if there is no one group of accredited leaders. Such talks should be reported in press (as done by VN press Embtel 1038).3 Would be useful if commission could be appointed, but meanwhile conversations should be kept open. Eventual appointment of a moderate lay Buddhist leader as Secretary of State Religious Affairs might be useful permanent channel. Buddhist demands and Diem's replies reported Embtel 1038 both seem reasonable. Given peaceful nature and divided leadership of Buddhists continued talks may serve calm immediate crisis and give time for longer range constructive action.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 143, Office of the Historian,
US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d143
June 2, 1963: Three Viet Nam Officials Ousted
Saigon (UPI) --- President Ngo Dinh Diem Saturday replaced three government officials in an apparent effort to mollify the Buddhist majority who accuse his regime of religious discrimination.
The three officials replaced were responsible for the northern coastal plain and the old imperial city of Hue.
...
But Buddhist leaders in Saigon said Diem’s unusual move, announced by the government press agency, would have no real effect on the situation They said the government still showed no sign of giving in to their major demands.
Continued...
Source: Coshocton Tribune, Sunday, June 2, 1963, Newspaperarchive.com http://newspaperarchive.com/coshocton-tribune/1963-06-02
June 3, 1963:
The Hue chemical attacks occurred [today], when soldiers of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) poured liquid chemicals from tear gas grenades onto the heads of praying Buddhists in Huế, South Vietnam. The Buddhists were protesting against religious discrimination by the regime of the Roman Catholic President Ngo Dinh Diem. The attacks caused 67 people to be hospitalised for blistering of the skin and respiratory ailments.
Source: Hue chemical attacks - Wikipedia, June 3, 1963 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hu%E1%BA%BF_chemical_attacks
Also on June 3, 1963:
Buddhist demonstrations in South Vietnam Abstract:
Buddhist demonstrations in South Vietnam [while increasingly concerned with continuing Buddhist demonstrations, Pres. Diem is still unwilling to take more than limited, piecemeal measures to alleviate Buddhist grievances. Buddhist leaders promise more demonstrations, and evidence is growing that the primarily Buddhist lower ranks of the army are increasingly reluctant to move against demonstrators. Rumors of a possible coup if demonstrations escalate are cited. No hard evidence exists to substantiate Diem's suspicion that Viet Cong are directing Buddhist extremists]. Office of Current Intelligence, Memorandum, OCI No. 1561/63. June 3, 1963. 3 p. CONFIDENTIAL. NO FOREIGN DISSEM. Declassified Nov. 2, 1981. Kennedy Library, NSF, Countries, Vietnam, Vol. 2, June 1963, Box 197.
Source: Declassified CIA Documents on the Vietnam War | University of Saskatchewan Library http://library.usask.ca/vietnam/index.php?state=view&id=462
Also on June 3, 1963: 148. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam 1
Washington, June 3, 1963, 6:46 p.m.
1173. We very concerned by report blister gas may have been used.2 As you of course aware adverse effects such action could hardly be exaggerated. Request you ascertain whether poison gas in fact employed and if so, under what circumstances. If blister gas used, would appear imperative for GVN to promptly disassociate itself from such action and announce intention investigate and punish those responsible.
If report true, believe we must also consider best means indicating our thorough disapproval while at same time not appearing to withdraw general support from GVN. If GVN takes proper action problem need not arise. However, if use of poison gas not disavowed by GVN we may have to warn GVN we likely be faced with necessity making some fairly strong public statement of disapproval.
Would appreciate your views this problem.
Rusk
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 148, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d148
June 4, 1963: 146. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 1
Saigon, June 4, 1963, 4 p.m.
1101. CINCPAC for POLAD. Following is text of joint situation report from Hue as of 2400 June 3 referred to in Embtel 1096:2
Begin text:
Since noon June 3 Hue security forces have utilized tear gas and/or other irritant chemicals to disperse Buddhist demonstrators on six occasions.
After 1300 incident which reported previously,3 demonstrators departed area near Delegate's residence. At 1400 group again attempted approach Tu Dam Pagoda area and were repelled by ARVN using tear gas. At approximately 1500, groups of bicycle riding students were observed circuiting areas of approach to Tu Dam Pagoda. The majority of students were high school and college age group. Subjects circled area occasionally grouping at routes providing access to pagoda. Several times gas was utilized to control groups of mobs. Sound trucks were also ordered into action requesting demonstrating Buddhists return home attesting current situation Viet Cong motivated. These pleas were met with jeers from participants. No injuries were reported from dispersal actions up to this point.
It is suspected Buddhists were further motivated by circulation rumor announcing death chief bonze Tri Quang. Local sources claim bonze now serious physical condition but not dead.
Worst conflict occurred 1830 when security forces attempted disperse crowd estimated at 1500. Soldiers were observed dispersing crowd colored glass vial contained liquid over demonstrators (as received). Observers indicated troops pouring liquid on heads of praying Buddhists. Rumors of deaths resulting from this encounter range to three. However no deaths confirmed to date but 67 casualties actually observed Hue hospital in various states of distress. Reliable source denies any fatalities.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 146, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d146
Also on June 4, 1963:
150. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 1
Saigon, June 4, 1963, 5 p.m.
1102. CINCPAC for POLAD. Vietnamese JGS this morning requested through JAOC channels urgent airlift for approximately 350 military police from Vung Tau (Cap St. Jacques) to Hue. Purpose of lift connected with civil disturbances at Hue. Under normal conditions USAF C-123's would be used in this operation. Have discussed the matter with MACV. JGS is being informed by MACV that use of US airplanes will not be permitted.
I shall also inform Thuan at first opportunity explaining that US cannot become involved, even indirectly, in GVN control measures at Hue. I hope that GVN will interpret this decision as reinforcing our recommendations for different approach to this problem. FYI. Use of USAF planes would of course be immediately apparent to Hue population. Even if troops lifted only as far as Danang, which alternate possibility, word would presumably quickly reach Hue. This action will not prevent movement of MP's, as GVN can provide its own lift.2
Trueheart
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 150, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d150
June 5, 1963: Howard Maxwell Eakin, Jr, 29
CAPT, Army,
Reserve
Rochester, PA
Casualty was in South Vietnam
Hostile, died of wounds, GROUND CASUALTY
GUN, SMALL ARMS FIRE
Body was recovered
Panel 01E - Line 23
Source: TheWall.com http://thewall-usa.com/info.asp?recid=14467
Also on June 5, 1963:
153. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 1
Saigon, June 5, 1963, 1 p.m.
1107. For Hilsman from Trueheart. Embtel 1104.2 Thuan called me before breakfast this morning and asked me to come to his house at 8 AM. He said that since seeing me yesterday afternoon he had been involved continuously in a series of separate talks with President, Nhu and Hue Bonze Thich Thien Minh, whom he described as Deputy to Bonze Tri Quang with full power to negotiate with government. He wanted to inform me of these talks, which he believed held out real hope of prompt solution of problem, but he asked that I keep this information for time being strictly to myself in U.S. Mission and that I request Department to limit dissemination of information to greatest possible degree.
Thuan said that in his talks with Minh tentative agreement had been reached on five Buddhist demands. If after seeing President again this morning Thuan was able to assure Minh that there was “good chance” of GVN endorsement of Minh-Thuan agreement, a sort of truce would be put into effect immediately.
This truce would involve Buddhist undertaking to cease all demonstrations and agitation, while GVN would remove not only troops but all uniformed personnel from vicinity of pagodas. In addition there would be a stand-fast on propaganda. Buddhists would stop passing out tracts and GVN would cease radio and press propaganda, e.g., “spontaneous” declarations of support for GVN from obscure Buddhist groups in provinces. Thuan said that Minh had to return to Hue today, as his “delegation of powers expired today”. Although Thuan did not say so, this suggests that negotiations took place in framework of Buddhist ultimatum of some sort. Substance of agreement as described by Thuan is as follows:
1. Flags. Buddhists recognize the superiority of national flag and agree to display it outside pagodas on official, non-religious holidays. On religious holidays national flag and religious flag wil1 be displayed outside pagodas; any number of religious flags may be displayed inside.
2. Decree Law No. 10. GVN disclaims responsibility for this law which was promulgated under Bao Dai and suggests that Buddhists “through normal channels” ask National Assembly to amend it. Under questioning, Thuan admitted that what this really meant was that GVN would see to it that National Assembly passed a new law. (This may be a crucial concession because, according to some reports, Law No. 10 is grievance to which Buddhist leadership attaches most importance. New law would presumably put Buddhists on absolutely equal footing with Catholics in terms of ownership of property, etc.)
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 153, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d153
June 6, 1963: 155. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 1
Saigon, June 6, 1963, 1 p.m.
1114. For Hilsman from Trueheart. Embassy telegram 1107.2 Thuan reports another full day on Buddhist problem yesterday and most encouraging progress. GVN commission (Vice President, Thuan and Luong) met from 4 to 10 pm with Buddhist leaders Thich Thien Minh (reftel) and Thich Thien Hoa (representing southern Buddhists). Entire ground had to be gone over again but result, Thuan said, was “precisely” same as Minh-Thuan agreement previously arrived at (reftel). Hence GVN representatives and Buddhist representatives have now officially reached full agreement on referendum. Thuan has assurance that President will ratify it and is also confident that Buddhists will. Minh left for Hue this morning, accompanied by Thuan's “emissary,” and is expected to return in two or three days for final conclusion of agreement. At that point, full content of agreement will be published and Buddhist leaders will be received by President. Thuan said that Thich Tinh Khiet, octogenarian chief bonze now fasting in Hue, will also come to Saigon for final act. Thuan told me in great confidence that his “emissary”, who is sort of lay bonze—he lives the life of a bonze but does it at home—will live for the next few days with Minh and Khiet in pagoda at Hue to make sure that extremists do not upset agreement.
Meanwhile, truce as described reftel is to go into effect immediately. In this connection, Thuan said that in addition to removing uniformed men from vicinity of pagodas, he had this morning directed military authorities in I Corps area to avoid demonstrations of force as much as possible.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 155, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d155
June 7, 1963: Today's North Adam's Transcript:
Buddhist Monks Threat to Pro-Western S. Viet Nam Government
SAIGON, South Viet Nam (AP)
Buddhist monks pledged to nonviolence present one of the most serious threats which President Ngo Dinh Diem's pro-Western government has faced in its eight stormy years.
Diem's officials are worried that the unarmed demonstrators may be more than a match for their large, American-advised army, battle-tested though it is in jungle fighting against Communist guerrillas.
Until now the Viet Cong Communist guerrillas--led and armed from neighboring North Viet Nam--have been the only force Diem has been unable to overcome.
But the religious revolt is ominous in a country where 80 per cent of the population is Buddhist, ruled by an authoritarian Roman Catholic president.
A movement which one month ago was a scattering of Buddhist demonstrators has become a powerful political factor.
It began May 8, observed internationally as Buddha's birthday. The government had forbidden the public display of any flags other than the national flag, and Buddhist leaders in the central Vietnamese city of Hue objected. A demonstration followed, eight persons were killed when government armored cars moved in.
Hue is in a region controlled politically and economically by President Diem's brothers, Ngo Dinh Canh and Archbishop Ngo Dinh Thuc.
Because the president, his family and many of his top lieutenants are Roman Catholic, the Buddhist movement has taken on some of the trappings of a holy war.
But President Diem has said his government has strictly prohibited religious discrimination.
Leading Catholic priest say the matter is political and not religious. Even the Buddhist leaders insist they have not quarrel with the Catholic Church.
The chief priests of the Buddhist movement are fully aware of the politics aspects of their movement.
In one month, they have welded their movement into something almost resembling a political party. Committees have been formed for negotiation, propaganda, planing and communicating in Viet Nam and abroad.
The leading monks say they will be satisfied if the government grants permission to fly the Buddhist flag, equal legal standing with the Catholic Church, an end to "arresting and terrorizing of the faithful," freedom for monks to preach, and indemnities for persons killed or wounded in the May 8 incident.
But the real aims of the movement seem to go far beyond these.
"We have been in a fight for freedom of religion and social justice in South Viet Nam," one monk said.
"We will fight until we win--not violently, of course."
American diplomats feel the government collapse brought about by the Buddhist movement could plunge the country into chaos. The Viet Cong almost certainly would move swiftly into the power vacuum.
At the same time, American officials are under strict orders not to get involved. U.S. military officers have declined to let the Vietnamese army move troops to Hue in U.S. Air Force transport planes.
Source: North Adams Transcript, Massachusetts, June 7, 1963, Newspaperarchive.com http://newspaperarchive.com/north-adams-transcript/1963-06-07
Also on June 7, 1963: 156. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 1
Saigon, June 7, 1963, 9 p.m.
1128. CINCPAC for POLAD. For Hilsman from Trueheart.2 In my view the political context in which requested $15 million NOA has to be considered, apart from broad question of US support, has two main elements: (1) recent negotiations on counterinsurgency funding, and (2) Vietnamese understanding of Staley-Thuc report.3 With regard to (1), results up to now exceed fondest expectations of anyone here and have totally confounded those who confidently predicted new system would spell end of CI program. GVN is holding up its end of bargain, has established special bank account and put money in it, and has issued Presidential decree defining procedures for use of these funds which accords with our understanding. What is more, in the provinces our Rural Affairs Advisers report that coordination with Vietnamese counterparts and readiness to accept and even seek US advice is greater than ever it was when we were signing the checks. This is no doubt too good to last, but I am certainly not keen to do anything which would rock the boat—as this would almost certainly do.
As for Staley-Thuc agreement, position is well understood in Washington. Suffice it to say that, in light of that report, Vietnamese consider that, at minimum, we have no right use against them rises in foreign exchange reserves below $200 million. As maximum, they feel we have positive obligation to help them bring reserve up to that level. (I am not arguing that we should or can ignore GVN foreign exchange level, simply reporting the way they look at it.) Moreover, at least since I came here in October 1961, Vietnamese have been led to believe that US would support CIP up to whatever level required for war effort, provided only that Staley-Thuc and limited worldwide procurement criteria respected. Their need, in budgetary terms, has never been greater, notwithstanding their acceptance of deficit financing and prospect of deficit this year on order of VN $4 to 5 billion (or 5 to 6 percent of GNP).
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 156, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d156
June 8, 1963:
Madame Nhu released a statement through the Women's Solidarity Movement accusing the Buddhists of neutralism, effectively accusing them of being communist collaborators. It then implored "bonzes of good faith" to stop helping the communists, otherwise Vietnamese Buddhism would be seen as a "small anti-nationalist branch of a dubious international association, exploited and controlled by communism and oriented to the sowing of the disorder of neutralism" and calling on Diem to "immediately expel all foreign agitators whether they wear monks' robes or not." She made another attack on the United States, calling on Diệm to "keep vigilance on all others, particularly those inclined to take Viet Nam for [a] satellite of [a] foreign power or organization."
Source: Wikipedia, Madame Nhu http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Madame_Nhu
Also on June 8, 1963: 157. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 1
Saigon, June 8, 1963, 6 p.m.
1134. CINCPAC for POLAD. Saw Thuan immediately after reading Women's Solidarity Movement Resolution on Buddhist question (telegraphed separately).2 Thuan stated he had not previously seen resolution. Agreed that it could easily upset agreement reached with Buddhist leaders and was in general deeply discouraged. As Thuan is admittedly powerless to do anything about the declaration, I am with encouragement seeking immediate appointment with President Diem. I shall ask him to repudiate resolution publicly and promptly. Odds against his doing so are very heavy, but I see no other way of retrieving situation.
I have also problem of dealing with local press who are now waiting outside my office. I plan to make no statement for the moment but, depending on outcome of meeting with Diem, I am considering saying for attribution that I consider unfortunate that, at a time when fruitful discussions were apparently going on between GVN and Buddhists, anyone should impugn the motives of one of the parties. I will also indicate indignation at reference to involvement foreign powers.
Any guidance Dept may have would be welcome.
Fuller report follows later. I am now leaving for Presidency.3
“Two hour meeting with Diem, just concluded, produced no visible result. Full report follows. Meanwhile, wish Department to know that I have decided against making any statement here, at least for time being.” (Telegram 1135 from Saigon, June 8, 8 p.m.; ibid.)
Trueheart
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 157, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d157
Also on June 8, 1963: 158. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam 1
Washington, June 8, 1963, 12:55 p.m.
1194. Embtel 1135.2 Agree your decision not make public statement at this time. Unable judge here but if occasion arises you think public statement would deter repetition this sort of thing by Madame Nhu, Dept would highly approve.
You are requested inform Thuan or Diem under instructions that to counteract regrettable effect Madam Nhu's statement some immediate and concrete move by GVN is essential. U.S. urgently suggests for example that Diem, under emergency powers available to him repeal French Decree Law 10 which discriminates against Buddhists. You are also instructed inquire officially whether Madam Nhu's statement, which has at least semi-official character, was cleared in advance by GVN.
You should inform GVN orally or by note that in official U.S. view Madame Nhu's intolerant statement has seriously weakened GVN's position as defender of freedom against Communist tyranny and has greatly increased difficulty of U.S. role as supporter of GVN. Her statement will damage American public and Congressional support for GVN. U.S. Government cannot be expected continue aid and assist GVN at heavy cost in men and material unless this policy fully supported by American citizens. Any more statements by her of this nature may irreparably damage US-GVN cooperative effort at very time when this cooperation is showing successful results in defending Viet-Nam against communist aggression.
FYI—Above sent without awaiting full report your talk with Diem. Should nevertheless be transmitted to GVN as official U.S. position unless you have very good reasons for not doing so of which Dept unaware.
Rusk
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 158, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d158
Also on June 8, 1963: 159. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam 1
Washington, June 8, 1963, 5:37 p.m.
1196. As result preliminary study Buddhist problem here, following suggestions submitted for your consideration:
A. Immediate Actions
(1) Since Decree Law 10 apparently one of chief Buddhist grievances, suggest GVN be urged repeal it immediately by decree without waiting for action by National Assembly, which we understand will not meet until September. Believe under his emergency powers Diem could thus demonstrate GVN good faith, move toward prompt solution this issue.
(2) You or Nuncio suggest GVN avoid giving mourning for Pope John2 any official cast.
(3) Believe might be well urge GVN at least temporarily play down Personalism in public pronouncements and GVN propaganda because of popular identification Personalism with Catholicism.
(4) Believe it would be helpful if RVNAF now appointed Buddhist chaplains. Understand Buddhists may later demand this move and see no reason why GVN should not forestall them. In urging such action you might point out even US army has few Buddhist chaplains. Perhaps this matter could be raised on strictly military level, between MACV and ARVN, without going to GVN.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 159, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d159
June 9, 1963: 160. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 1
Saigon, June 9, 1963, 1 a.m.
1136. CINCPAC for POLAD. For Hilsman from Trueheart. Embtel 1135.2 President received me at 5 PM this afternoon (June 8) within minutes after my request. He was throughout two hour interview entirely relaxed and friendly, and he permitted frequent interruptions in a way that is rare for him. Unfortunately, I have no reason to believe that anything I said to him moved him. Opened by giving him French text of Women's Solidarity Movement (WSM) resolution. He read it line by line as if he had never seen it before. (Nothing he said subsequently indicated prior knowledge.) I went on to explain that I had been profoundly disappointed to see this resolution. I had understood that GVN commission under Vice President had achieved large measure of agreement with Buddhist leaders on their demands (late in conversation he himself summarized terms of agreement very much as Thuan had given them to me), and that among other things it had been understood that there would be a truce (detente) on propaganda from both sides pending final settlement. WSM resolution seemed to me a violation of this. I wanted therefore to ask if he would disavow it, would dissociate GVN from it. I feared that otherwise we might see renewal of agitation and demonstrations bringing on government repressive measures and in effect loss of all that had been achieved in past week. I pointed out also that if this came to pass my government would very likely consider that GVN was at fault and would have to dissociate itself from GVN actions—as it had already done in denying that USAF planes had been used in lifting troops to Hue (Diem confirmed that he had read Department's statement).3
Diem said at once that he could not disavow WSM resolution. In light of his later remarks, I fear that the general sentiments of resolution are close to his own. However, he limited himself to saying that it was necessary to warn people against extremists who were misusing affair to further their own interests. (He rarely referred to VC in frequent repetitions of this theme.)
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 160, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d160
Also on June 9, 1963: 161. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 1
Saigon, June 9, 1963, 8 p.m.
1137. CINCPAC for POLAD. Deptel 1194.2 I had full discussion with Thuan on Buddhist problem and its ramifications at his home this afternoon. Following are major points:
1. I opened by telling him that I had come to discuss with him new instructions from Washington. I would wish later to carry out these instructions formally with Diem or, possibly, with him.
2. I then reviewed with him in detail conversation with President yesterday (Embtel 1136),3 explaining concerns which conversation raised in my mind.
3. I next gave him a very detailed run-down of my instructions (Deptel 1194), reminding him again that this was a simple preview.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 161, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d161
June 10, 1963: 162. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 1
Saigon, June 10, 1963, 6 p.m.
1141. CINCPAC for POLAD. Embtel 1137.2 Thuan reported at 9 am that he had made some progress in talks with Diem and Nhu following our meeting yesterday (reftel):
1. Re Decree Law 10, Diem said he could not repeal it by Presidential action because National Assembly in session. (This is probably correct reading of Constitution; it is perhaps debatable whether he could act under emergency powers but that the latter apply only to matters of “security and manpower mobilization”.) I asked about possibility of quick action by Assembly. Thuan said that this would take time because law long and complicated. I said that if, for example, prominent Deputy announced intention to introduce legislation and government let it be known that it would support it, this might be all that was necessary. Thuan said that he would try for this.
2. Answer to our inquiry was that WSM resolution had not been cleared in advance by GVN. Diem had objected to characterization of resolution as “Madame Nhu's statement,” pointing out that it was product bf popular organization. Latter remark was made (and received) with a smile.
3. Regarding reports of planned demonstrations in Saigon organized by Ngo Trong Hieu, Thuan said that President had telephoned Hieu in his presence and latter had denied report. In any case, Thuan said he had talked to Nhu as well about this and could assure me no such demonstrations would take place. Similarly for the reported action in Danang.
4. Re pagoda at Hue, Thuan said he was still working on this but r hoped to arrange for assurances to be given people inside that they could leave without fear of arrests or other reprisals. This might not apply to certain government functionaries who were in pagoda.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 162, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d162
June 11, 1963: Buddhist monk Thích Quảng Ðức sits at a busy Saigon intersection in protest of Diem's regime. He then has himself dowsed in fuel, and strikes a match. His self-immolation brings instant world attention to the scale of injustice within the US-supported Southern Vietnamese government, and increases pressure on the US to revise its ties to Diem.
Source: Vietnam Wall & War Explorer http://vietnamwallapp.com/
Also on June 11, 1963:
163. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 1
Saigon, June 11, 1963.
1146. CINCPAC for POLAD. At about 1000 hours this morning Buddhist bonze burned himself to death2 at corner Phan Dinh Phung and Le Van Duyet Streets in Saigon. Preliminary information indicates Bonze (name unknown) was surrounded by massed ranks of from 200 to 300 Bonzes, applied gasoline to robe, and ignited it. Police tried vainly break through ranks of Bonzes. Embassy officer has viewed body. Burning viewed by crowd of 400-500 spectators.
Quang Duc's suicide was photographed by Malcolm Browne of Associated Press. Several American newsmen had been informed in advance that something important might happen that morning near Xa Loi Pagoda, but only Browne responded. His photograph, taken an instant after the flames erupted, was published around the world. In John Mecklin's view, the photograph “had a shock effect of incalculable value to the Buddhist cause, becoming a symbol of the state of things in Vietnam.” (Mecklin, Mission in Torment, p. 157)
Crowd orderly but growing. Police maintaining Bonzes in places and refusing permit procession to continue. Reportedly another Bonze prepared disembowel himself in protest today.
Trueheart
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 163, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d163
Also on June 11, 1963: 164. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 1
Saigon, June 11, 1963, noon.
1147. CINCPAC for POLAD. Procession of approximately 400 bonzes carried body of dead bonze to Xa Loi Pagoda near USOM. At about 0130 an estimated 800-1000 bonzes now inside pagoda. Large group of pro-Buddhist students have now formed cordon around pagoda and refusing admission to anyone. Students have raised crude banner in English stating “This Buddhist priest cremated himself for five items demanded of the government.”
Meeting at pagoda broke up at 1200 and bonzes quickly dispersed, leaving approximately 100 bonzes inside.
Very few spectators in evidence; however large group of bonzes and lay persons estimated at 2000 now gathering at site of cremation. Crowd orderly. Large number of police (estimated at 1000) in area. Police have allowed bonzes to proceed at will within area which is cordoned off and have attempted keep bonzes and spectators separate.2
Banners in English and Vietnamese carried by bonzes read as follows: “A Buddhist priest burns himself for our five requests,” and “Do not deceive us and the people in any way.”
Dead bonze identified as Thich Quang Duc, a middle level bonze from provinces (reportedly from Nha Trang but unconfirmed). He arrived on scene of his death in a vehicle with central Viet Nam license plates and carrying his own can of gasoline. Burning took place in front of Cambodian representation residence, apparently for purpose obtaining Cambodian attention.3
Colonel Tung, Commander Vietnamese Special Forces, has ordered two Ranger companies of Special Forces moved in from Long Thanh Camp (between Saigon and Vung Tau). Ranger companies will be disposed in the camp near Tan Son Nhut Airport. Colonel Tung stated that he expects further trouble today. Seventh Airborne Battalion also alerted according to MACV.
Reports persist that other bonzes may sacrifice themselves in front of public buildings.
Trueheart
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 164, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d164
Also on June 11, 1963: 165. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 1
Saigon, June 11, 1963, 5 p.m.
1151. CINCPAC for POLAD. Embtel 1148.2 Saw Thuan at his house at lunch time. He had talked with President and Nhu this morning. Contrary reftel, he said there had been no Cabinet meeting. President had talked with individual ministers, however, and might assemble Cabinet this afternoon. He was urging conciliatory action on President and thought he was making some headway. His mood was quite different from last night, and I would guess that events of this morning have considerably strengthened his personal position.
I told Thuan that, in my judgment, GVN position abroad and probably in the country was very precarious. I doubted that position could be restored without an immediate, dramatic and conciliatory move by President Diem personally. Concessions which should be made would, I thought, have to go beyond things Thuan had privately told me last week Diem was prepared to do, and he would have to make his move in a manner which I knew went against his grain. I told Thuan, again as a personal opinion, that I thought if President did not do something of this sort this afternoon he might well be faced with a public US Government disassociation of itself from whole affair, with quite possibly a strong overtone of disapproval of GVN handling Buddhist problem since May 8. (This is, in fact, what I now recommend to Department unless we have action or the promise of it before the day is out.) Thuan took more or less verbatim notes of this and said he would bring it to the attention of the President at once.3
I also told Thuan that since Buddhist action this morning so obviously planned in advance, it seemed reasonable to suppose that there would be other incidents today. I said I was aware of movement of certain troop units to Saigon today and alerting of others. Possibility of clashes was therefore very real.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 165, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d165
June 12, 1963: 168. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 1
Saigon, June 12, 1963, 2 p.m.
1161. Embassy telegram 1157.2 Saw Thuan at 1130 for review of Buddhist situation and found he had two concerns: Behavior of Buddhist leaders from Hue once they reach Saigon and lack of firm negotiating instructions on GVN side.
Buddhist leaders are due to arrive at 1:15 pm. They include Tri Quang as well as those mentioned reftel.3 Tri Quang has been real spark plug of activities in Hue and is reputed to have considerable flair as a demagogue. Thuan indicated GVN was worried that Hue delegation would not proceed promptly to conference table but devote themselves first to some agitation in Saigon. GVN concern was heightened when they received word that group wants to walk into Saigon from airport.
Re negotiating instructions, Thuan continues to believe that commission will get what it needs from President in way of concessions but he admitted that certain unspecified essential points had not as yet been firmly pinned down.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 168, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d168
Also on June 12, 1963:
169. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 1
Saigon, June 12, 1963, 8 p.m.
1168. Deptel 1207.2 I opened meeting with President Diem by saying that I had sought during recent days, in conversations with him and with Thuan (who was also present), to emphasize gravity with which my government regarded Buddhist situation. I had now received new instructions which went somewhat further than what I had been saying. I then handed him a paper,3 unsigned and headed “Memorandum,” which contained a paraphrase of most of reftel. In handing paper over I emphasized that I had not discussed it with anyone.
President read paper carefully, and without any comment except to ask for translation of word “reluctantly”. When he had finished reading, he handed paper to Thuan and sat in silence until Thuan had finished.
Diem then began an exchange with Thuan in Vietnamese, at the end of which Thuan said that the President wanted to point out that any statement by the United States at this juncture would be disastrous for the negotiations with the Buddhists which he expected would begin this evening or tomorrow morning. I pointed out that this was well understood in Washington and I gave him a copy of yesterday's statement by Department Spokesman,4 to effect that US did not want to comment with negotiations in the offing.
Referring to point in suggested communique about banning of public processions by any religious group, Diem pointed out that tomorrow, June 13, is the Fete de Dieu (Corpus Christi), that Catholic processions were scheduled and indeed this was only day in religious calendar on which Catholic liturgy prescribes processions. If he banned them tomorrow, resentment of Catholics would be strong. I explained to president that burden of my demarche was in first three paragraphs of memorandum; remainder was argumentation and a suggestion for a communique. I doubted that Washington had considered the Fete de Dieu angle, but in any case the sentence to which he referred was put in, I was sure, to provide a rationale for temporary banning of Buddhist processions and demonstrations. With regard to tomorrow, he would have to decide whether to permit the Catholic processions, taking into account the expected effect on public order and on the negotiations with the Buddhists. I noted that, although Catholics would doubtless resent the banning of their processions, the gesture might be all the more appreciated by the Buddhists.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 169, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d169
June 13, 1963:
170. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 1
Saigon, June 13, 1963, 7 p.m.
1178. Embtel 1168.2 Following is situation as of 1500 on GVN-Buddhist negotiations.
1. Immediately after arrival of Buddhist delegation June 12, Vice President Tho sent them letter proposing that delegation meet with GVN commission at 1800 same day. (This and other letters mentioned this message cast in polite and respectful language.) Buddhists replied that head bonze Khiet was very weak and tired as a result of 5-day fast and flight to Saigon and would be “incapable of thinking or acting for 3 or 5 days, the more so since Buddhism is at present observing mourning (grand deuil) throughout the country.” Letter proposed meeting take place “on another day which would be more convenient.” Tho replied last night that his commission had proposed early meeting because of desire expressed by Buddhists in a June 8 letter “to proceed rapidly to a satisfactory arrangement.” Tho went on to propose that meeting take place today, June 13, at an hour to be selected by Khiet. Tho said commission considered that there would be many disadvantages in deferring meeting; as for “grand deuil”, Tho said this was a problem which should not be linked with the planned meeting “especially in the present situation.”
2. Thuan informed me at lunch time that Buddhists have now replied to Tho letter agreeing to meet tomorrow, June 14, provided GVN accepts in advance their ex parse version of agreement reached at meeting of June 5, terms of which are set out in Buddhists' letter.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 170, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d170
Also on June 13, 1963:
171. Minutes of a Meeting of the Special Group for Counterinsurgency1
Washington, June 13, 1963, 2 p.m.
PRESENT
Governor Harriman, The Attorney General, Mr. Gilpatric, Mr. Bell, General Taylor, Mr. Murrow, Mr. Forrestal, Mr. Colby vice Mr. McCone
General Krulak was present for Item 1
Mr. Koren was present for Items 1, 2, and 3
Mr. Bowling was present for Item 4
Mr. Maechling was present for the meeting
1. Southeast Asia Status Report
Viet-Nam Mr. Koren commented that the Vietnamese action to follow through on funding of CI project has been most encouraging. About 64% of the rural population has been incorporated into the strategic hamlet program, and the hamlets now completed are over one-half of the projected goal. The press has reacted favorably to recent efforts to brief them on military operations. The Group reviewed the Buddhist problem and expressed concern over the hesitancy of the Vietnamese Government to take action to ease the situation. It was acknowledged that the situation could rapidly become more serious, but that the Country Team is handling the situation well.
Mr. Bell inquired about the validity of the number of returnees reflected in the status report, and what follow-through procedures are utilized to convert them into useful citizens. He observed that if good results have been achieved in this program, these facts should be exploited in the press. The Group requested State to submit a report on the results achieved in this program.2
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 171, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d171
June 14, 1963: Charles Buford Johnson Jr, 29
Oglethorpe, GA
Capt, Army
Location:
Sa Dec Province, South Vietnam
Body recovered
Casualty Type: Hostile, died outright
Casualty Reason:
Ground casualty
Casualty Detail:
Gun or small arms fire
Panel 1E Line 23
Source: The Virtual Wall www.VirtualWall.org/dj/JohnsonCB01a.htm
Johnson was one of the first Americans to go to Vietnam. He was a military adviser in the MAAG, Military Assistance Advisory Group. He was there to advise the Vietnamese. On June 14, 1963 Johnson was traveling unarmed with a group of advisers when he was shot by a sniper. He was the first Georgian killed in the war.
Source: North Georgia’s Vietnam casualties remembered,
Posted on February 26, 2010 by The Saint, The University of North Georgia - Dahlonega, http://www.ungthesteeple.com/2010/02/north-georgias-vietnam-casualties-remembered-6/
Also on June 14, 1963: Today's Time Magazine:
South Viet Nam: The Religious Crisis
A dusk-to-dawn curfew emptied the streets of the ancient Vietnamese capital of Hue, 400 miles north of Saigon. Riot police and armored personnel carriers patrolled the dark and deserted city. Roadblocks were set up on the outskirts, and barbed-wire barricades encircled the sacred Tudam Pagoda. These government security measures were not a precaution against an attack by Communist guerrillas; they were taken to quell demonstrations by Hue's Buddhist population against the regime of Roman Catholic President Ngo Dinh
Source: Time Magazine, Friday, June 14, 1963 http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,874816,00.html
Also on June 14, 1963: 172. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 1
Saigon, June 14, 1963, 4 p.m.
1182. CINCPAC for POLAD. Thuan telephoned me at home at lunch time, in an obviously jubilant mood. GVN-Buddhist meeting this morning had gone well.2 All preliminaries (preambles) had been disposed of and full agreement reached on first of five Buddhist demands (flags). Thuan said this was most difficult of five points—presumably he meant for GVN—and he thought remainder could be agreed this afternoon or at latest tomorrow morning.
Meanwhile, chief bonze Khiet is sending out nationwide order this afternoon calling on all Buddhists to avoid all manifestations and incidents, in view of favorable progress of talks with GVN. For its part, GVN commission, on order of President (Thuan stressed this point), is directing GVN authorities throughout country to suppress all barriers around temples, and so forth, taking care only to be on alert against VC incidents. Thuan thought VC likely to move when they saw GVN-Buddhist agreement was imminent. (I am inclined to agree with him.)
At conclusion meetings, Thuan said there would be a joint press conference.
Buddhist delegation is headed by Thien Minh, who represented Central Region at June 5 talks and who has full powers in writing from Khiet, according to Thuan. Other members are Tam Chau, Duc Ngiep, Tien Hoa, and Huyen Quang. Tri Quang is alternate delegate but he was not present this morning's meeting. This is puzzling and conceivably ominous. Fact Khiet did not appear in person perhaps explained on protocol grounds; possibly he is waiting to be received by Diem at end of drama.
More details as available.3
Trueheart
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 172, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d172
Also on June 14, 1963: 174. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam 1
Washington, June 14, 1963, 4:43 p.m.
1225. Embtel 1182, 1184, 1187; Phnom Penh's 964 to Dept.2 Dept pleased note results reported reftel. You are to be congratulated.
Unfortunate New York Times story (septel)3 stating U.S. has warned Diem it will publicly condemn his treatment Buddhists unless he takes prompt action to meet their grievances will not be carried VOA. In response press queries here at noon press briefing today Dept spokesman stated this was speculative story on which he had no comment. Stated we following this sensitive internal issue very closely and were in touch with GVN officials. Pointed out Diem had set up GVN committee to meet Buddhist leaders in effort resolve this serious question. There were two meetings yesterday with apparently encouraging results. In reply query whether we would make statement spokesman replied we had made clear our concern. Queried as to why story described as speculative spokesman replied it was. Queried as to whether it was inaccurate spokesman replied “No”.
You authorized confirm to GVN under instructions that there has been no U.S. public official statement and that unfortunate New York Times story gives us most serious concern. There has been no change in our policy of supporting GVN and are gratified by news reported reftel.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 174, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d174
Also on June 14, 1963: 175. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam 1
Washington, June 14, 1963, 11 p.m. 2
1219. Re contingency plan enclosed in May 23 letter Nolting to Hilsman3 suggest you consider:
1. Means whereby word [can] be gotten to Vice President that while there is no change in U.S. policy of supporting Diem, we want Tho to know that in event situation arises due to internal political circumstances (in which US would play no part) where Diem definitely unable act as President and only in this situation we would want to back Tho as constitutional successor and that we would assume he would need military support. In view present precarious situation it would seem worthwhile to run risk delivering such message now assuming Tho would not likely consider it in his interest to inform anyone else. We would have to tell Tho that if word leaked we would flatly deny. Assume message would have to be delivered directly by American official who had some reason for seeing Tho. You may wish consider whether it would be preferable to say this directly to Diem.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 175, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d175
June 15, 1963:
176. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 1
Saigon, June 15, 1963, 2 p.m.
1189. CINCPAC for POLAD. Department telegram 1225.2 Saw Thuan 1230. He was deeply distressed and angry at NYT story. Said at first it would “ruin” negotiations.
Thuan reported talks with Buddhists this morning had made little progress. Buddhists had in fact asked unaccountably that meetings be adjourned until Monday, but under GVN prodding finally showed up hour late. Thuan now thought they had gotten word of NYT story (this entirely possible as US press fully aware from their headquarters).
I told Thuan I saw nothing to do at this point but press for quick agreement. He asked for our help. Could I state publicly that there has been no change in our policy of supporting GVN and that U.S. is gratified at reported progress yesterday? I said I would have to request instructions and could not be sure Dept would authorize such statement in present context. I would nevertheless inquire.
I cannot of course guarantee that statement will have any effect on negotiations. It would take some of curse off this affair in GVN eyes. Statement would have no value unless I can make it on explicit instructions. Please instruct.3
Trueheart
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 176, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d176
June 16, 1963:
177. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 1
Saigon, June 16, 1963, 4 p.m.
1193. CINCPAC for POLAD. Following are today's developments on Buddhist problem.
1. GVN and Buddhists issued joint communique announcing agreement on five Buddhist demands. Communique signed by members Buddhist delegation and GVN Interministerial Committee and by President Diem and supreme leader of Vietnamese Buddhists, Thich Tuch Khiet. Text read over radio this morning. Text being sent septel.2
2. Bonze Khiet also announced early this morning that rites for dead bonze postponed for “many reasons, particularly organizational difficulties”. News of postponement circulated by sound trucks near pagodas and by hand bill. However, many people gathered at pagodas and along anticipated route of cortege. Postponement apparently due to disagreement between GVN and Buddhists over size and character of funeral ceremony. Bonzes desired large impressive procession while GVN, for reasons public order among others, desired simple ceremony with limited number participants. Date of funeral not as yet announced.
3. Catholic Archbishop Paul Nguyen Van Binh of Saigon published pastoral letter reminding parishioners that Church and State must remain separate.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 177, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State
http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d177
Also on June 16, 1963: 179. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 1
Saigon, June 16, 1963, 5 p.m.
1195. Deptel 12192 delayed due servicing and just received. Without speculating on actions which might have seemed advisable had message been received promptly, I do not think it would be wise to take any action now on numbered paragraph 1. At this time, we have formal agreement between GVN and Buddhist leadership and outward calm throughout the country, following a relatively minor outburst in Saigon this morning. Moreover, notwithstanding that my misgivings about Ngo family including Diem have greatly increased during last two weeks, I am still not impressed by the competition, nor do I think are any of my colleagues American or foreign.
Our best move at this juncture—and one I propose to make unless otherwise instructed—is to press Diem directly and indirectly to accept Buddhist crisis as blessing in disguise and to use agreement reached as stepping stone to concessions to other groups (before they demand them). The whole operation would be keyed to building up popular support for regime prior to August parliamentary elections and importantly also to making sure that paper undertakings to Buddhists are carried out in full measure.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 179, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d179
June 17, 1963: Letter from Allen Ginsberg [Kyoto, Japan] to Louis Ginsberg [Paterson, NJ]
June 17, 1963
Dear Lou:
Traveling by jet plane kind of a gas, you do get in and out of centuries from airport hangars & glassy modern downtowns to jungle floating markets & 900 year old stone cities in a matter of minutes & hours instead of weeks & months. Like space cut-ups or collages, one minute paranoiac spy ridden Vietnam streets the same afternoon quiet Cambodian riversides. I spent a week in Vietnam talking with opium poets & US directors & State Department spokesmen & Army public relations sergeants & most of all with newsmen & also the Buddhist priests. Horrible mess as you can read in the papers. Curious [thing about] the reporters is that they are all young & relatively eager there unlike most "hotspots" so this a rare instance if you follow the politics war there one can get a relatively straight account within the limits of assumed anticommunist slant & the euphemisms of ticklish situations (i.e. Diem government not referred to outright as Diem dictatorship, but as "Diem Government which has been called dictatorial" etc.) (i.e. phraseology picked to suggest idea rather than say it outright as is done with red dictatorships). Anyway, l'm glad I saw what little I saw of that. Gave me nervous stomach after a week. Then spent a week in Angkor Wit ruins in Cambodia & now here in Kyoto…
Source: The Letters of Allen Ginsberg, by Allen Ginsberg, De Capo Press
June 18, 1963: Percy Wray Howell, LTC, Air Force, of Breckenridge, TX, dies of heart attack in Gia Dinh, South Vietnam
Born:
4/5/1924
Panel 1E - Line 23
Source: The Wall-USA http://thewall-usa.com/info.asp?recid=24405
Also on June 18, 1963: 477. Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy 1
Washington, June 18, 1963.
Laos Planning
A meeting is scheduled for 11 a.m. tomorrow morning for a discussion of planning with respect to the situation in Laos. Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, Governor Harriman, Mr. Hilsman, Mr. McCone and General McKee (Acting Chairman of Joint Chiefs) are expected.
The purpose of the meeting is to get your reactions to the final version of a paper which you may already have read.2 It was included in your week end reading. The final version is attached (Tab A)3 and has been cleared by State, Defense and the J.C.S. It has been changed only in minor respects. Estimates of the time it would take for each phase to be completed have been removed, since it did not appear to be realistic to make such forecasts. There also has been a slight change in the objective of Phase 3. Instead of being designed to achieve only a “hard partition” through a Geneva conference, it is now recognized that we would probably be satisfied if we had an enforceable cease-fire along a satisfactory line without necessarily having formal international sanction for it.
Unfortunately the major problem which has plagued us all along remains in this paper, i.e. the division between State and the military on the nature of the ultimate U.S. reaction. State believes that in order to convince North Vietnam and the ChiComs of the seriousness of U.S. intentions in Laos without running the danger of a rapid escalation, it is essential that some U.S. ground forces, if only of a token nature, be introduced into Laos before an air or ground attack upon North Vietnam.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963,
Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis, Document 477, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v24/d477
June 19, 1963: 180. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 1
Saigon, June 19, 1963, noon.
1209. CINCPAC for POLAD. I called on Vice President Tho June 18 to congratulate him on success his mission in reaching agreement with Buddhists. He seemed genuinely to appreciate the gesture.
In course of conversation, Tho acknowledged that negotiations had been quite difficult. He denied, however, that Buddhist demands had gone so far as in effect to amount to demand that Buddhism become “established” church Vietnam. (British Ambassador had gotten this impression from his separate talk with Tho.) Vice President said that he thought Buddhists were satisfied with results and that if there were no misunderstandings (malentendus) in implementing agreement, there should be no further trouble. However, he made it clear that he thought there was considerable possibility of misunderstandings. For example, when I said I had been pleased to see that the communique2 provided for continuation of his commission to supervise implementation and asked how this would be accomplished, he said that complaints would be referred to commission and that Minister of Interior (member of commission) had all the means necessary to deal with them, provided he had the necessary support from above. Tho was obviously not sure that he would.
Vice President asked me whether I thought agreements were fair, and I said I thought they were.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 180, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d180
Also on June 19, 1963: 478. Memorandum for the Record1
Washington, June 19, 1963.
SUBJECT
Laos Planning
The President met today with Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, Governor Harriman, General McKee, Messrs. McCone, Hilsman, William Bundy, Colby, and General Clay, Jr. at 11:30 a.m. in the Cabinet Room to discuss the Memorandum dated June 17, 1963 on Laos Planning.2
The President asked whether it was wise to strike North Vietnam before sending any U.S. troops in Laos. He asked how much damage air strikes could really do. General McKee said there were over 200 selected targets in North Vietnam, and a great deal of destruction could be wrought against them.
Governor Harriman explained that Phase 1 of the plan contained in the Memorandum of June 17, 1963 was ready for approval by the President at this time. Basically it provides for an increase in logistic support for Kong Le and Phoumi. Governor Harriman suggested that the President approve Phase 2 for planning purposes. He suggested that Phase 3 be given further study.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis, Document 478, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State
http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v24/d478
Also on June 19, 1963: 181. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam 1
Washington, June 19, 1963, 8:28 p.m.
1247. For Trueheart from Hilsman. Embtels 1209,2 1211.3 Entirely concur with line you have been taking as reported reftels. Believe this line must now be followed by very hard-hitting approach to Diem.which you may put on paper as gist of an instruction from Department.
Unless you have most serious reservations you are instructed convey to Diem following as coming from Washington.
Until May 8 incident U.S. public and official opinion increasingly impressed by GVN success against Viet Cong. This favorable trend has now been dangerously reversed. Hilsman and other U.S. officials who must defend in current Congressional hearings U.S. aid and assistance programs for Viet-Nam are finding their position increasingly difficult in the face of grave political pressures and serious questions about the Buddhist problem.
There is room to be generous in dealing with the Buddhists and such dealing is necessary to rebuild the prestige of the Vietnamese Government in America.
While agreement on five points has been reached, suspicions and tensions are still most serious and a reasonable and friendly attitude is absolutely necessary if the GVN is to regain its prestige in Viet-Nam and its reputation in Washington. Also the GVN should not be equated with one individual. For example statement (Embtel 1156)4 “Buddhism can count on the Constitution, in other words, on me” made bad impression here. (FYI Preceding two sentences may be used at your discretion. End FYI)
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 181, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d181
June 20, 1963182. Message From President Kennedy to Prince Sihanouk 1
Washington, June 20, 1963.
I thank Your Royal Highness for the message sent to me on June 14.2 I have followed with concern the events within the Republic of Viet-Nam. The right of every individual freely to practice his faith is basic to my own philosophy and that of the United States. While recognizing that external interference from any source would be inappropriate, I share with Your Royal Highness the hope for a settlement of the recent misunderstandings. I was therefore relieved at the news of the agreement reached.
John F. Kennedy 3
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 182, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d182
June 21, 1963: 183. Research Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to the Secretary of State 1
Washington, June 21, 1963.
RFE-55
SUBJECT
Implications of the Buddhist Crisis in Vietnam
The Diem government's manner of implementing its agreement with South Vietnam's Buddhist leaders could give rise to renewed difficulties. This memorandum examines the implications of such difficulties for the stability of the regime.
ABSTRACT
What appeared to be an isolated Buddhist incident in the city of Hue quickly became a national crisis that crystallized long-standing resentment of what Buddhist leaders regard as the privileged position occupied by the minority Roman Catholic church of which President Diem, his family, and a disproportionate number of civil and military officials are members.
The speed with which the Buddhist issue reached critical proportions was largely the result of the position adopted by President Diem and his family who misread the seriousness of the Buddhist movement and attributed it to political and even Communist inspiration. Until June 16 such concessions as were made to the Buddhists were clearly piecemeal and grudging. On June 16, however, against a background of sharply-increased Buddhist tensions and United States pressure, the Diem government signed an agreement with Buddhist leaders that, for the first time, accommodated all their demands.
A degree of calm having been resolved [reached?] by the June 16 agreement, much will now obviously depend on the sincerity and speed with which it is implemented. If the regime is conspicuously dilatory, inept, and insincere in handling Buddhist matters, renewed tension would probably again reach crisis proportions.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 183, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d183
June 22, 1963: G W MAGBEE, SP5, Army, MACV Advisor,
of Newberry, SC, died of a heart attack in South Vietnam.
8/19/1921 - 6/22/1963
Panel 01E - Line 24
Source: The Wall-USA http://thewall-usa.com/info.asp?recid=31912
Also on June 22, 1963:
184. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 1
Saigon, June 22, 1963, 11 a.m.
1224. CINCPAC for POLAD. Deptel 1247.2 I have requested appointment with Diem today.
As preliminary, I saw Thuan at 9 AM. I did not go over my instructions with him; I told him only that I had instructions to see President and would be speaking to him along same lines as I had taken on personal basis in recent talks with Thuan.
Main purpose of call on Thuan, I said, was to tell him that I was now convinced that—far from taking June 16 agreement as starting point and moving forward—a deliberate campaign was already being mounted, specifically by the Nhus, to sabotage the agreement. I cited following:
1. Nhu had ordered that signatures be obtained from Republican Youth to a petition protesting against June 16 agreement and asking that it be revoked, at least in part [document number not declassified].
2. Article in Times of Vietnam yesterday reporting “National Convention” in Saigon June 20 of Go Son Mon sect,3 at which sect pledged its allegiance to GVN and disassociated itself from “recent politico-religious controversy”. I said this sect was well known to us to be subsidized by GVN. I was also certain that this patently trumped-up convention would be deeply resented by Buddhists.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 184, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d184
Also on June 22, 1963:
185. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 1
Saigon, June 22, 1963, 8 p.m.
1231. CINCPAC for POLAD. Deptel 1247.2 I saw Diem at 5 PM for about an hour. Conversation was businesslike and Diem let me do most of talking. If he was irritated at my bluntness, he did not show it, and his manner at end of talk was if anything rather warmer than at beginning.
I first gave Diem paper based on reftel3 describing it, as suggested, as official Washington assessment which I thought he should see. He read it rather rapidly but made no comment.
I then turned to my belief that deliberate effort was being made by Nhus to sabotage agreement of June 16 and reasons therefor. I cited each of numbered points in Embtel 12244 except one relating to jubilee for Archbisop Thuc. Discussion had become slightly heated by time I reached this item, and I judged it would be more offensive than productive to raise it. Whether Thuan had already gone over these points I do not know; Diem dodged my question on this.
Diem stated flatly that GVN intended to honor agreement—and this was only immediate, positive outcome of discussion. He denied that Nhu was organizing Republican Youth protest against agreement. (On this, as on other points which he disputed, I urged him to make inquiries.)
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 185, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d185
Also on June 22, 1963: S. Viet Nam Frees Buddhists
SAIGON, (AP) --- The South Viet Nam government announced Saturday the release of 241 Buddhist rioters, but a spokesman for the religious sect indicated there is still danger of more violence.
Source: San Antonio Light, Sunday, June 23, 1963, Newspaperarchive.com http://newspaperarchive.com/san-antonio-light/1963-06-23/page-19
June 23, 1963: US Soldiers Hit In Viet Nam
South Viet Nam (AP) --- Two U.S. Army men were wounded by Communist small arms fire north of Saigon Sunday. An enlisted man was hit in in the left arm by a sniper's bullet while marching with a Vietnamese army patrol 40 miles north of the capital.
Source: Ottawa Herald, Tuesday, June 25, 1963, Newspaperarchive.com http://newspaperarchive.com/ottawa-herald/1963-06-25/page-5
June 24, 1963: No items available as of this posting.
June 25, 1963: 186. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 1
Saigon, June 25, 1963, 6 p.m.
1236. Embtel 1231.2 Thuan called me in this morning for what turned out to be longish post-mortem on my meeting with Diem June 22. He said Diem had since discussed meeting with him twice and had shown him paper I had left. Diem was disturbed (I gathered he meant angry) over what he had been told and suspicious that we were trying to undermine him.
I recounted conversation for Thuan and again went over with him our thinking regarding gravity of situation arising from Buddhist affair. I said we had been supporting Diem and GVN for a long time and that what I had done my best to get over to President was that our pressure resulted from our real and serious concern that he must take steps to restore loss of support in this country. We were also trying to bring home effects of Buddhist affair in U.S. We were, in short, trying to help him rather than undermine him.
Thuan again said he agreed with our analysis of Buddhist problem, and he was doing and would do everything he could to see that June 16 agreement was faithfully carried out. He added, with great seriousness, that he was doing so because (a) he thought “the fate of the nation” depended on it, and (b) his personal good faith was engaged as one of the signers. I said I had never doubted his own role in this affair.
I hoped he would succeed (he had not predicted that he would), but Diem should bear in mind that immediate problem was not simply one of carrying out agreement to the letter but of genuinely convincing Buddhists of GVN good faith.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 186, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d186
June 26, 1963: 187. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam 1
Washington, June 26, 1963, 12:51 p.m.
1271. Embtel 1236.2 Request you see Diem promptly and inform him orally or in writing that you have been instructed inform him officially there is no change in consistent U.S. policy supporting Vietnamese Government and people against Communist attack.
Change of Ambassadors was foreshadowed when Ambassador Nolting came to Viet-Nam for two year tour. Appointment of Lodge as Ambassador has been under consideration since late April. (FYI, prior May 8. End FYI.)
In designating a distinguished Republican who has a sympathetic interest in Viet-Nam (FYI, for example, he spent his active duty tour as Major General last year on Viet-Nam problems. You may use this orally. End FYI.), it is our purpose to demonstrate to President Diem, to the Vietnamese people, and to the world the importance which U.S. attaches to its support of Viet-Nam and to demonstrate that this policy has support of both political parties. As U.S. Ambassador, Lodge will continue carry out U.S. policy of supporting Viet-Nam and of perfecting effective cooperation with Government of Viet-Nam
Peril of the present situation has dictated that, as partners in Viet-Nam's struggle, we present our views with utmost frankness.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 187, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d187
Also on June 26, 1963: 188. Special National Intelligence Estimate1
Washington, June 26, 1963.
SNIE 14.3-63
THE IMPACT OF THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE ON NORTH VIETNAM AND ITS POLICIES
The Problem
To analyze the position of North Vietnam in the Sino-Soviet dispute and the effect this has upon Communist policies and actions in Laos and South Vietnam
Conclusions
A. North Vietnam has a large measure of independence within the Communist Bloc, and it has avoided committing itself to either side in the Sino-Soviet dispute. We believe that it will strive to continue avoiding such a commitment. (Paras. 4, 8)
B. In spite of its independent position, Hanoi has apparent sympathy toward certain of Peiping's positions in the dispute, and its neutrality has recently shifted somewhat toward the Chinese. Hence, if Hanoi is moved to commit itself further, it will probably be in the direction of fuller support to Peiping. The development of an open, formal break between Moscow and Peiping or the death of the influential Ho Chi Minh would increase the pressures for a North Vietnamese commitment. Even so, Hanoi will almost certainly attempt to keep as great a measure of independence as possible, and to maintain ties with Moscow. (Paras. 9-10, 12)
C. Moscow almost certainly takes a more sober view than do Peiping and Hanoi of the risk of a US intervention, and probably lays more stress on political means for a Communist takeover in Laos. For their part, the Chinese and North Vietnamese seek a quicker victory through the application of military as well as political pressure. Nevertheless, at the present level of activity, Soviet and Chinese policies are in no essential conflict, and Hanoi has considerable initiative and freedom of action. A drastic change of the situation in Laos (e.g., the threat of large-scale US intervention) might exacerbate Soviet-Chinese differences over policies to be pursued in southeast Asia. However, in a crisis showdown with the US, we cannot assume that Moscow would fail to support Peiping and Hanoi. (Paras. 14-18)
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 188, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d188
June 27, 1963: CONDON HUNTER TERRY, 29,
CAPT,
Air Force,
Dallas, TX
Casualty in MILITARY REGION 4, SOUTH VIETNAM
HOSTILE, FIXED WING - PILOT
AIR LOSS, CRASH ON LAND
Body was recovered
Panel 1E - Line 24
Source: The Wall-USA http://www.thewall-usa.com/info.asp?recid=51443
Also on June 27, 1963: 189. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 1
Saigon, June 27, 1963, 1 p.m.
1243. Deptel 1271.2 I expect to see Diem this afternoon.
In brief talk with Thuan this morning, he informed me that he had followed up on my suggestion and that GVN orders to provincial officials re implementation June 16 agreement would be published immediately. He also informed me in great confidence that President would shortly make visit to Hue with object of talking directly to people there.
In addition Thuan said President was contemplating a major address (whether in connection with Hue trip was not clear). Thuan said he was fairly well satisfied with draft of this speech but was still working to improve it. Present draft reaffirms each of five points and concludes with what Thuan described as ringing personal promise of President to see that agreement is carried out. I said I hoped Diem would not find it necessary to say again that he has “always” accepted five points in principle. Thuan indicated that elimination of this from draft was one of points he was still working on.
Finally, two Hue student leaders (one of whom previously alleged to have been tortured to death) have been released. According to Thuan, Diem had intervened personally to effect release.
Thuan said that he had reported to Diem my statements to him on June 25 (Embtel 1236),3 including remark I had made that President ought to “start acting like an American politician”. He said that he had endorsed this recommendation to Diem, and he implied latter had not rejected it out of hand. We shall see.4
Trueheart
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 189, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d189
Also on June 27, 1963: Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., the Republican nominee for vice president of the United States in 1960, was nominated by the winner of that election, President Kennedy, to be the new U.S. ambassador to South Vietnam.
Source: Wikipedia, Thursday, June 27, 1963 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/June_1963#June_27.2C_1963_.28Thursday.29
June 28th, 1963: 190. Central Intelligence Agency Information Report1
Washington, June 28. 1963.
TDCS DB-3/655, 301
SUBJECT
Appraisal of the Ngo Diem Regime as of 26 June 1963
1. This is a field appraisal of the current situation. It is not an official judgment by this agency or any component. It represents the observations and interpretations of a staff officer based on information available to him at the time of its preparation. Prepared for internal use as a guide to the operational environment, this commentary is disseminated in the belief that it may be useful to other agencies in assessing the situation for their own purposes.
2. The Government of Vietnam (GVN) is now waging what it considers to be a war for survival with its difficulties expanded by the deteriorating military situation in Laos. In the GVN's view, the Laos problem increasingly deprives them of an important buffer against Communist insurgency and opens the GVN frontier to direct Communist aggression. It is therefore most unlikely that the GVN will accept any advice which, in the opinion of its top officials, might undermine its control of the internal political situation. By this reasoning, it can be anticipated that recommendations looking toward broad political and social reforms will be strongly resisted, both by President Ngo Dinh Diem and his family, and by certain military and civilian officials.
3. Efforts to effect any changes, such as broadening the government to include selected oppositionists, relegating the President's brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, and his wife to less prominent roles, and permitting opposition delegates in the National Assembly, are not believed feasible at this time for the following reasons:
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 190, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d190
Also on June 28, 1963: 191. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam 1
Washington, June 28, 1963, 5:48 p.m.
1286. Embtel 1243.2 In light Khiet letter to Diem, [2 document numbers not declassified], we fear renewal demonstrations, possible bloodshed, and serious deterioration whole situation as grace period “given” GVN by Buddhists ends this weekend. Therefore believe you should urge GVN haste in implementing measures indicated reftel.
In particular, immediate publication orders to provincial officials should be helpful. If in fact GVN has arrested and prosecuted GVN officials responsible for Hue May 8 affair as indicated [less than 1 line not declassified] (urtel 1249),3 this should also be publicized. On balance think it would also be well urge immediate action on proposed communique giving number of persons arrested and number still held, with reasons, as per your 1249.
You might consider letting Thuan know we have good information that indicates at least some elements Buddhist hierarchy may be moving rapidly toward more demonstrations and essentially political actions. We think it most important keep moderate elements in control of Buddhist movement by means concrete GVN action in consonance with June 16 agreement.
Ball
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 191, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d191
Also on June 28, 1963: 192. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 1
Saigon, June 28, 1963, 3 p.m.
1246. Deptel 1271.2 Session with President Diem yesterday evening lasted over two and one-half hours. I believe that he was reassured by reftel, of which I gave him text appropriate paragraphs, and by my statement that we would be using first three paragraphs as background for press. However, Diem made no direct comment on demarche and he parried all efforts to get him to speak frankly and directly about his reactions to recent pressures or, indeed, to talk about Buddhist problem at all, except in very superficial way. He did not touch on any of actions and plans mentioned by Thuan (Embtel 1243).3 I concluded that he did not want to allow me to link these actions with U.S. pressures.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 192, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d192
June 29, 1963: 193. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 1
Saigon, June 29, 1963, 6 p.m.
1261. Deptel 1286.2 I am quite as concerned as Department over possibility renewal demonstrations, etc. and need for GVN haste. Thuan, whom I saw few hours ago, is equally concerned.
Situation at moment (1530) is that Vice President has sent and published letter to Buddhists (Embtel 1256)3 which is helpful but does not go far enough. Series of following specific further actions are still in abeyance pending return of President Diem from Hue this afternoon:
1. Publication of actual text of orders to provincial officials.
2. Publication of Ministry of Interior balance sheet on persons arrested and released.
3. Publication of names of GVN officials found culpable of May 8 incident. (Thuan winced when I put this one to him but agreed it was desirable.)
4. Diem's speech reaffirming five points, etc.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 193, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d193
Also on June 29, 1963: 194. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 1
Saigon, June 29, 1963, 7 p.m.
1259. Deptel 1283.2 Following is our assessment two points reftel:
1. We do not believe Buddhists “clearly divided” between older, moderate element and younger activists, as stated reftel. Nevertheless, available evidence suggests that there is group of Buddhist activists who are dissatisfied with agreement Buddhist leaders reached with GVN. Members this group probably not wholly agreed on their demands. Some apparently not so opposed to terms of agreement with GVN as they are suspicious of GVN's intentions; therefore, they seek get GVN so publicly committed in detail on implementation of agreement that it would be very difficult for GVN to renege in future or to take retaliatory action against them. Until GVN so committed, this group likely agitate for continued public Buddhist expressions of dissatisfaction. This group's ends do not seem to exceed legitimacy but its suspicions of GVN's intentions could be difficult for GVN to allay.
Others in activist group without doubt have “tasted blood” of. politics and either see religious issue as way for political changes or have discarded religious issue for outright political objective—change in regime. This latter group appears seek to discredit GVN to extent possible and is willing to receive overtures from political opposition groups. Thus, this group (which may include bonze Tri Quang) has aims going beyond legitimate ends originally sought by Buddhists.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 194, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d194
June 30, 1963: 50 VC KILLED IN FIRST DAY OF OPERATION DUC THANG 32
Cao Lanh (VP) June 30
In its first day Operation Duc Thang 32 in Hong Ngu district near the Cambodian border resulted in 50 enemy killed, the VP Kien Phong correspondent reported this morning.
The air-supported operation began at dawn yesterday and is still underway. The 50 dead were counted after an encounter with a well-armed Viet Cong company. An undetermined number of enemy dead and wounded was carried away.
The Government forces captured five light machineguns, 30 rifles and a large quantity of equipment and documents. Two Bao An were killed.
Source: Vietnam Press Morning Edition - Bulletin Number 2629, 30 June 1963, Folder 01, Box 01, Vietnam Press: Morning Edition (English Version), The Vietnam Center and Archive, Texas Tech University. Accessed 26 Jun. 2013. http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/items.php?item=3160101001
Also on June 30, 1963: during the twelve months ending June 30, 1963, attacks on strategic hamlets were few and none was overrun
Source: Memorandum for the President by Robert McNamara, “South Vietnam,” March 1964, The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition, Volume 3, pp. 496-499 https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon3/doc158.htm
July 1, 1963: CURTIS JOHN STECKBAUER
CAPT - O3 - Army - Regular
MANITOWOC, WI
Length of service 8 years
In , SOUTH VIETNAM
NON-HOSTILE, FIXED WING - PILOT
AIR LOSS, CRASH ON LAND
Body was recovered
Panel 01E - Line 24
Source: The Wall-USA http://thewall-usa.com/info.asp?recid=49578
Also on July1, 1963: KIEN PHONG OPERATION KILLS 10 VC NEAR CAMBODIAN BORDER
Saigon (VP) July 1
Operation Duc Thang 32/KP, launched by Kien Phong command Saturday in the Tam Thuong area of Hong Ngu district, less that two kms from the Cambodian border, has resulted in 110 Viet Cong killed and three captured. Source: Vietnam Press Morning Edition - Bulletin Number 2630, 01 July 1963, Folder 01, Box 01, Vietnam Press: Morning Edition (English Version), The Vietnam Center and Archive, Texas Tech University. Accessed 26 Jun. 2013 http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/items.php?item=3160101003
Also on July 1, 1963: 195. Telegram From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy), at Rome1
Washington, July 1, 1963, 1:34 p.m. 2
CAP 63365. Sitto Nr 39.3 At meeting this morning Ball, Harriman, Hilsman and myself reviewed situation in SVN and following courses of action were discussed.4
1. In last 48 hours as two week truce between Buddhist and GVN draws to end, we have been receiving indications that Buddhists planning further anti-government demonstrations. This occurs against backdrop other reports that brother Nhu attempting sabotage agreements.
2. In light of this situation we believe Nolting must return Saigon by end of week at latest. Although Trueheart has done excellent job we feel U.S. must have Ambassador present during this dangerous period. We also hope to get Lodge move up his arrival Saigon from September to early August.
3. Among reports referred in para 1 is indication that Buddhists planning another self-immolation of bonze soon. We all believe one more burning bonze will cause domestic U.S. reaction which will require strong public statement despite danger that this might precipitate coup in Saigon.
Demarche to Diem insisting on removal of Nhu and wife to post outside SVN before such statement becomes necessary under consideration. Trueheart and Nolting being consulted.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 195, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d195
Also on July 1, 1963: 196. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam 1
Washington, July 1, 1963, 8:52 p.m.
4. From Hilsman and Nolting to Trueheart. Thinking here is that unless GVN has in the meantime made further forthright efforts to meet tensions, domestic and international reactions to another Buddhist protest suicide or further bloodshed in connection with Buddhist demonstrations would compel us to make public statement disassociating ourselves from GVN policy vis-à-vis Buddhists. We fully aware likely impact such statement on GVN internal stability and strength, but see no alternative. US cannot take responsibility in any way for GVN religious discrimination, real or alleged.
You should seek appointment with Diem (or alternatively work through Thuan) for following purpose:
For you to decide whether to tell Diem that we may have to make public statement unless GVN makes forthright effort. You should however impress on him that it may be too late to forestall demonstrations and that you instructed suggest urgently that he should make speech which will, if possible, have dramatic impact to succeed in bridging gap of misunderstanding and of improving mutual good faith between GVN and Buddhists.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 196, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d196
Also on July 1, 1963: 197. Research Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Denney) to the Acting Secretary of State 1
Washington, July 1, 1963.
RFE-58
SUBTECT
Strategic Hamlets
Public misconceptions concerning the strategic hamlet program in the Republic of Vietnam have prompted us to review its aims and development as well as assess its implications for future developments.
ABSTRACT
The basic purpose of the strategic hamlets is to achieve the widest possible popular response to the government's counterinsurgency effort by (1) providing the peasant with an increasing degree of physical security from Communist intimidation and (2) enacting social, economic and political reforms meaningful to the peasants. In addition to arming volunteer peasant groups, elections, medical facilities, education, and social services provide a community development program within the strategic hamlets that may have favorable long-range social and political effects. Arising out of local initiatives in 1961, the program received full central government support in 1962 and has already proved effective in stemming Communist successes, as evidenced by military actions on the ground as well as Communist propaganda attacks, in Vietnam and abroad, against the strategic hamlets. While the program has moved too rapidly for adequate implementation in some areas, its general accomplishment to date has been highly promising.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 197, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d197
July 2, 1963: 198. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 1
Saigon, July 2, 1963, 3 p.m.
10. CINCPAC for POLAD. Deptel 4.2 Saw Thuan this morning before receipt reftel. I opened by asking him if he could report any progress on actions we had discussed (Embtels 1243 and 1261).3 He said he could not. He had seen Diem once since his return from Hue but said he did not know what decisions might have been taken.
I then had Thuan read Times of Vietnam article (Embtel 6)4 which he said he had not seen. I told him that following were significant points in my reading of article (text of which I am now cabling in full):
1. It was clear challenge (defi) to US, in particular our efforts to keep Madame Nhu quiet.
2. It contained veiled criticism of Vice President and his efforts in Buddhist affair and “end of schizophrenia” in headline could well refer to split views in GVN (Tho-Thuan vs Nhus).
3. There was obvious intent to denigrate Buddhists, especially in charges that Quang Duc drugged.
4. Article openly dared Buddhists to carry out further burnings immediately or by inaction admit that their claims have been satisfied.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 198, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d198
Also on July 2, 1963: 199. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam 1
Washington, July 2, 1963, 2:33 p.m.
10. Embtel 10.2 Purpose Deptel 4,3 which was not brought out sufficiently clearly, was not simply to threaten Diem with old threats but to say, in effect: “If you (Diem) will make statement designed to bridge gap of understanding and if there is then a Buddhist incident, GVN and US will be in position to point to your statement as evidence GVN good faith in trying convince Buddhists of genuine desire reach understanding. We believe present state of mistrust in Viet-Nam requires such statement from you very soon before there is another Buddhist incident and in view two week period now over. If there is another incident and you have not made a conciliatory statement, however, we believe the situation in Viet-Nam will soon get out of control. U.S. situation which must be clearly understood, will be as follows:
1. U.S. liberal and press opinion increasingly and now almost unanimously critical of religious situation in Viet-Nam.
2. There are now indications that matter may be brought up in United Nations where US, as chief supporter of Viet-Nam, would face difficult situation.
3. Justly or unjustly this is situation U.S. Government is facing vis-à-vis domestic and international opinion.
4. Most importantly religious toleration is one of the most basic tenets of American civilization. The U.S. Government does not believe that GVN has gone far enough to convince and explain to its people the basic importance it attaches to religious tolerance and national unity.
Therefore unless the GVN acts quickly, the U.S. will have to make its own position perfectly clear.”
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 199, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d199
July 3, 1963: 200. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 1
Saigon, July 3, 1963, 8 p.m.
24. CINCPAC for POLAD. I saw President Diem at 5:45 PM. I thanked him for receiving me promptly, and said that I was sorry to interrupt his busy schedule but the matter was important and, in our view, urgent.
I then gave him my letter (Embtel 18).2 After he had read it, I said that if he were disposed to make an address, we were prepared to offer some suggestions as to its content. He replied with marked politeness that he would be glad to consider any ideas we might have. I then outlined for him the main points in a paper3 which I subsequently left with him, emphasizing that we attach particular importance to his inviting Buddhist leaders to meet with him personally as a matter of urgency. He read over the list, put it to one side, and said that he would consider it, along with the letter, and his “collaborators”.
Diem then talked briefly and in general terms about difficulties of Buddhist problem, giving no hint of what if any action he has in mind. He spoke of difficulties of meeting demands which might in themselves be reasonable but would encourage further demands which government could not meet. He referred to inherent complexity of some of the problems, notably questions relating to ownership of property. He mentioned also, in surprisingly good natured way, that some of Buddhist leaders had political motives and used unfair tactics.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 200, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d200
Also on July 3, 1963: 201. Letter From the Charge in Vietnam (Trueheart) to President Diem 1
Saigon, July 3, 1963.
I have been instructed to see Your Excellency once again on the Buddhist problem, primarily to make certain that you understand clearly the position in which the United States Government finds itself.
Liberal and press opinion in the United States is increasingly, and now almost unanimously, critical of the religious situation in Viet-Nam.
There are now indications also that the matter may be brought up in the United Nations. In that forum the United States, as the chief supporter of Viet-Nam, would face a difficult situation.
Justly or unjustly, this is the situation which the United States Government is facing vis-à-vis domestic and international opinion.
Most importantly, religious toleration is one of the most basic tenets of American civilization. The United States Government does not believe that the Government of Viet-Nam has gone far enough to convince and explain to its people the basic importance which it attaches to religious tolerance and national unity. It considers that the present state of mistrust in Viet-Nam requires a public statement from Your Excellency designed to bridge the gap of understanding
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 201, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d201
Also on July 3, 1963: 202. Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to the President 1
Washington, July 3, 1963.
FAR EAST ROUND UP
There follows a summary of the principal problems which currently face us in the Far East.
South Vietnam
The two-week truce between the GVN and the Buddhists signed on June 16th ended yesterday. We have received various reports from Buddhist circles that they are not satisfied with the manner in which the Government is implementing the agreement, particularly with respect to the release of prisoners, instructions to the province chiefs and rumors which have reached Buddhist ears that the Government does not intend to carry out the agreement in good faith. We have also received reports of coup plotting among the Buddhists and threats to resume demonstrations and incidents of self-destruction.
On the GVN side, we have fairly reliable information that Brother Nhu has been actively working to stir up phony popular demand that the truce agreement be disavowed by the Government, using his Republican Youth organization for this purpose. After a meeting of Diem's family in Hue, the Times of Vietnam, a government-sponsored newspaper, came out on July 1 with a provocative article daring the Buddhist to resume demonstrations.2
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 202, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d202
July 4, 1963: 203. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 1
Saigon, July 4, 1963, 3 p.m.
26. Embtel 24.2 Thuan called me in this morning for specific purpose of asking me to transmit his personal recommendation that Ambassador Nolting return to Saigon as soon as possible.
He said that Diem had shown him letter3 and list of speech suggestions I had left with him yesterday, but had given him absolutely no idea of what action he proposed to take. Thuan had nevertheless concluded that he was probably going to do nothing. This view was reinforced when I told him something of yesterday's conversation, particularly Diem's rather excessive politeness. Thuan said “I would rather have him get red in the face and pound the table; after he cools down he may accept. The least encouraging posture is polite immovability.”
Thuan continued that both he and I had used all our ammunition. He still agreed on our assessment of situation and that we were “running a race with the bonzes”. He would continue to try to bring home to Diem the need to act, but he was plainly not hopeful.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 203, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d203
Also on July 4, 1963: 205. Memorandum of Conversation1
Washington, July 4, 1963, 11-11:50 a.m.
SUBJECT
Situation in South Viet-Nam
PARTICIPANTS
The President
Mr. Ball
Mr. Harriman
Mr. McGeorge Bundy
Mr. Hilsman
Mr. Forrestal
The President was briefed on developments in Indonesia, Laos and Viet-Nam. The portion on Viet-Nam follows:
A joint agreement was signed on June 16 in which the Government met the Buddhists' five demands. The Buddhists and the Government then worked together on the funeral arrangements for the bonze who burned himself to death so that incidents could be avoided. The funeral came off without trouble.
Since then there have been rumors circulating in Saigon that the Government does not intend to live up to the agreement. These rumors were given credence by an article appearing in the English language “Times” of Viet-Nam,2 which is dominated by the Nhus. The article contained a veiled attack on the US and on the Buddhists. There was a suggestion that the Monk who burned himself to death was drugged and a provocative challenge to the Buddhists that, if no further demonstrations occurred on July 2, this would amount to an admission by the Buddhists that they were satisfied with the Government's action. (The President injected questions on the possibility of drugging, to which Mr. Hilsman replied that religious fervor was an adequate explanation.)
At this point there was a discussion of the possibility of getting rid of the Nhus in which the combined judgment was that it would not be possible.
Continuing the briefing, Mr. Hilsman said that the Buddhists contained an activist element which undoubtedly favored increasing demands as well as charging the Government with dragging its feet. There was thus an element of truth in Diem's view that the Buddhists might push their demands so far as to make his fall inevitable.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 205, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d205
Also on July 4, 1963: Excerpt from sound recording of a meeting held on July 4, 1963, between President John F. Kennedy, Under Secretary of State George Ball, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs W. Averell Harriman, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Roger Hilsman, and member of the National Security Council Michael Forrestal. The main focus of this White House off-the-record meeting is the situation in Vietnam.
Unidentified Speaker: "No matter what Diem does, short of sending the news abroad, I think there are going to be coup attempts over the next four months, no matter what he does, uh, and I don't think he can be persueded to send the news abroad, (5 seconds of indistinct audio)
Whether these coup attempts will be successful or not, no one can tell.
If there is a coup, uh, and or, if Diem is killed, it's hard to say whether it will be a smooth transition or chaos. Uh, I think we all are agreed that the chances of chaos are much, much less than they were a year ago. For example, the attacks by government troops on the Viet Cong have continued without [a let?] throughout the Buddhist Crisis. There's not been any change in any of the, uh, of the [anti?] Viet Cong activities. And they've continued at a rate of double what they were a year ago, so the war has continued to go well, in spite of the Buddhist crisis.
Now Nolting thinks that chaos and a civil war is the most likely event, uh, the most likely probability. We don't think it's the most likely, but we think it's possible. We think that we're, we're all agreed that the chances of chaos are much less than they were a year ago.
I think our policy that we've been pursuing in this is a correct one towards Diem...” Source: Meetings: Tape 96. Vietnam, Laos, Indonesia and Brazil, Nuclear Test Ban Negotiations, 4 July 1963, Collection:
Papers of John F. Kennedy. Presidential Papers. President's Office Files
http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/JFKPOF-MTG-096-002.aspx
Also on July 4, 1963: 206. Memorandum From the Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Rostow) to the Secretary of State 1
Washington, July 4, 1963.
SUBJECT
The Viet Minh in Laos and the Harriman Mission2
I wish to call your attention to the situation in Laos and its relation to Governor Harriman's mission.
Very substantial Viet Minh units are now in Laos, positioned to protect the infiltration corridor to South Vietnam. We now also have, for the first time, firm evidence, capable of diplomatic and public presentation, that the Viet Minh have violated the Geneva Accord of 1962 by introducing men (trained political agents) through Laos into South Vietnam after the October deadline.
Although equivalent, firm surfaceable evidence does not yet exist on military units, no one believes that such infiltration has been reduced since October 1962. It may run at a rate of 4-500 per month. To judge the burden imposed on the war effort in South Vietnam one must multiply this figure by about 15. It is evidently Ho's policy to sop up the improved performance in South Vietnam by this cheap device awaiting either a break on the political situation in Saigon or US discouragement with our effort there. South Vietnam has always been Ho's primary immediate objective in Laos rather than the control of the Mekong Valley.
It is evidently bad practice to connive at the violation of a solemn agreement by the Communists. I believe the time has come to call them on this; and the appropriate occasion is the Harriman mission, since he negotiated for us at Geneva and personally received the Pushkin assurances that Moscow would assume responsibility for stopping the use of Laos as an infiltration route into South Vietnam.
Both on principle and in terms of American politics I believe it would be unwise for us to permit a mood of detente to develop with Moscow until this matter is settled. American soldiers are committed in substantial numbers in South Vietnam and we are taking casualties.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 206, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d206
July 5, 1963: 208. Memorandum of a Conversation1
Washington, July 5, 1963.
SUBJECT
Current Situation in Viet-Nam
PARTICIPANTS
George W. Ball, Under Secretary
Frederick E. Nolting, Jr., American Ambassador to Viet-Nam
Chalmers B. Wood, Director, WG/VN
George S. Springsteen (U)
Ambassador Nolting opened with a review of the Buddhist situation which he characterized as serious. He regretted that Diem had not taken it in hand earlier, but emphasized that Diem had given his word that the agreement would be carried out. It was Nolting's experience that when Diem gave his word, he followed through although sometimes it was handled in his own way.
In reply to a question from the Under Secretary as to the future course of events, the Ambassador replied that although interference by the Nhus was serious, he believed that the GVN would be able to come through this one slowly. As to tactics, the more Diem was prodded the slower he went. While Nhu was troublesome he was chiefly responsible for gains which had been made in the provincial pacification program.
Giving a characterization of Mme. Nhu, Ambassador Nolting said that she was authoritarian to her finger tips, violently nationalistic and an attractive woman who was both glib and intolerant. She considered herself a most important person in her own right since she was head of the Women's Solidarity Movement. Her manner was her worst drawback.
The Under Secretary asked what would happen if there were a change in government. The Ambassador replied that he would give his view which was not completely shared by Mr. Wood. In his view if a revolution occurred in Viet-Nam which grew out of the Buddhist situation, the country would be split between feuding factions and the Americans would have to withdraw and the country might be lost to the Communists. This led to the question of how much pressure we could exert on Diem. Mr. Nolting replied that if we repudiated him on this issue his government would fall. The Ambassador believed that Diem would live up to the agreement unless he believed that he was dealing with a political attempt to cause his overthrow.
As to the role of the Catholics in the Government, Ambassador Nolting did not believe that Diem gave them preference. Unfortunately, many persons in the government felt that it would help their careers if they became Catholic. It was true that the Government had been unwise in the ostentatious manner in which it supported and encouraged the publicizing of Catholic ceremonies, however. In general, Viet-Nam had been a country in which there was a great degree of religious tolerance. Now the situation seemed out of hand. It was deplorable because we had been winning.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 208, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d208
July 6, 1963: RICHARD WEBB GEYER
MAJ - O4 - Army - Reserve
SEATTLE, WA
Length of service 26 years
In , SOUTH VIETNAM
Non-Hostile, died of illness/injury, GROUND CASUALTY
HEART ATTACK
Body was recovered
Panel 01E - Line 24
Source: The Wall-USA http://thewall-usa.com/info.asp?recid=18374
PAUL RICHARD SMITH
1LT - O2 - Army - Regular
OMAHA, NE
Length of service 4 years
In , SOUTH VIETNAM
Hostile, died of wounds, HELICOPTER - CREW
AIR LOSS, CRASH ON LAND
Body was recovered
10/11/1937 - 7/6/1963
Panel 01E - Line 24
Source: The Wall-USA http://thewall-usa.com/info.asp?recid=48490
Also on July 6, 1963: 209. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 1
Saigon, July 6, 1963, 5 p.m.
39. Dept pass DOD, MilRep to President, JCS/ISA, ACSI, CNO, CIA, HQUSAF (AFCIN & AFCIN-EI-A) AID, OIA, and USIA. CINCPAC also pass CINCPAC PO LAD, CINCPACFLT, CINCUSARPAC, CINPACAF, DOD/PRO. Bangkok also pass JUSMAAG and JUSMAAG, Deputy Chief. Phnom Penh also pass MAAG. Taipei also for Taiwan Defense Command. Ref: Embtel 1257.2 General Harkins has requested that following amplification of section B (1) of TF Saigon monthly report of June 29 be circulated to all addressees:
At repeated urging of General Harkins to President Diem, Secretary Thuan and General Ty, JGS, RVNAF, issued instructions to corps commanders as noted in monthly report of June 29. Principal political criterion for successful conclusion of Phase I of National Campaign Plan (NCP) was completion of 2/3 of Strategic Hamlet Program. This criterion had been met nationwide, except for Delta in IV Corps tactical zone, well before target completion date of 1 July 1963. It could have been serious set-back had RVNAF taken this opportunity to rest on their oars throughout rest of country while IV Corps, which has by far most difficult task politically and militarily, caught up. To lose or level out momentum built up by RVNAF at this stage would be unthinkable in terms of achieving quickest practicable victory over insurgency.
June 29th wrap-up report treatment is technically correct in terms of original NCP. JGS instructions of June 18 adjusts military tasks and concepts in manner acceptable to US. It accommodates situation and capabilities of both GVN and VC after four months of concerted and aggressive action in all arenas and with all instruments of conflict. Terms Phase I, II and III used in NCP have now lost all real validity in context evaluating over-all national progress. Tasks and objectives outlined in three nominal phases, however, remain essentially valid and provide solid guidelines for control, direction and evaluation of counter-insurgency military effort by GVN authorities and their US advisors. Depending on local RVN conditions, personalities and capabilities and VC counterparts which face them, there is every reason believe that, in many military and political subdivisions of country, pacification will shortly be so far along, if current rates are maintained, that major elements of regular RVNAF forces can be redeployed to more active areas where progress is not as fast and VC problem is tougher.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 209, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d209
July 7, 1963: 210. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 1
Saigon, July 7, 1963, 6 p.m.
46. Dept pass USIA. Altercation took place this morning between Vietnamese plainclothes police and American correspondents, following Buddhist ceremony at Saigon Chantareansey Pagoda. One AP reporter (Arnett)2 roughed up; cameras at least two other reporters damaged by police.
I have talked to several of correspondents involved (Browne, Sheehan, Halberstam) as well as several Mission personnel present on scene. Appears that press had been informed by Buddhists in advance of ceremony (as had our people). They showed up at 0800 and were allowed to observe and photograph ceremony without hindrance. (I understand CBS had camera and lights actually mounted in window of pagoda.)
At about 0900 bonzes and bonzesses left pagoda and moved in procession up very narrow alley towards main street. Police stopped them at exit of alley with object of preventing their carrying procession further. This was eventually accomplished without apparently any serious protest from bonzes.
At point procession stopped American reporters moved into alley to take pictures. It seems clear that plain-clothes police sought to interfere with picture taking and that in process Arnett's camera was snatched away from him and he was thrown to ground. Picture thereafter is far from clear but there seems no doubt that plainclothesmen sought to prevent picture taking and damaged cameras. Also clear that uniformed police made no effort to prevent damage to cameras and in fact tacitly abetted plainclothesmen. There is also no doubt that reporters, at least once fracas had started, acted in belligerent manner towards police.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 210, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d210
Also on July 7, 1963: 211. Telegram From Malcolm Browne of the Associated Press, David Halberstam of The New York Times, Peter Kalischer of CBS News, and Neil Sheehan of United Press International to the President 1
Saigon, July 7, 1963, 10:20 a.m.
Mister President, this Sunday morning at the entrance to Chantareansay Pagoda in Saigon nine representatives of American news organizations were subjected to a swift unprovoked and violent attack by government plain clothes police while covering an otherwise peaceful Buddhist religious ceremony. One correspondent was knocked down and kicked. Other newsmen were shoved, jostled and struck by rocks thrown by the plainclothesmen-all in full sight of forty to sixty uniformed metropolitan policemen and a squad of riot police. In the course of the attack one camera was smashed and several damaged.
The uniformed police did not offer any protection to the newsmen and in fact did everything to prevent the correspondents from apprehending the men who were attacking them.
The inescapable conclusion is that the Government of South Vietnam, a country to which the United States is heavily committed, has begun a campaign of open physical intimidation to prevent the covering of news which we feel Americans have a right to know.
Previously foreign correspondents have been expelled from South Vietnam. This is the first time they have been assaulted by representatives of the government. We believe a precedent has been set for increasing obstruction and violence. Since the United States Embassy here does not deem this incident serious enough to make a formal protest, we respectfully request that you, Mister President, protest against this attack and obtain assurances that will not be repeated.2
Sincerely yours—
Malcolm Browne
Associated Press David Halberstam
New York Times Peter Kalischer
CBS News Neil Sheehan
United Press International
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 211, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d211
July 8, 1963: 212. Central Intelligence Agency Information Report1
Washington, July 8, 1963.
TDCS-3/552,770
SUBJECT
Situation Appraisal of the Political Situation as of 1200 hours on 6 July
1. This is a field appraisal of the current situation. It is not an official judgment by this organization or any component thereof. It represents the observations and interpretations of a staff officer based on information available to him at time of its preparation. Prepared for internal use as a guide to the operational environment, this commentary is disseminated in the belief that it may be useful to other agencies in assessing the situation for their own purposes.
2. In Saigon the political situation remains unsettled with both the government and the Buddhists continuing to exchange charges of bad faith. Elements on each side appear intent upon the submission of the other. Against this background, the coup atmosphere has become perceptibly heavier. During the past few days, coup groups have formed to take advantage of the instability attending the Buddhist crisis. It is not clear at this time whether these groups intend to await further emotional outbursts, which would occur if there are additional Buddhist self-immolations, or whether they are now prepared to move ahead at a time of their choosing, regardless of what the Buddhists do. Buddhist strategy is polarizing around the views of Thich Tri Quang, head of the General Association of Vietnamese Buddhists for Central Vietnam, who has openly stated his intention not to cease agitation until the Diem government falls. Thich Tri Quang also has indicated his intention, if necessary, to call for suicide volunteers. Among thpse allegedly ready to volunteer are Dieu Hue, the mother of Vietnam's leading scientist and Ambassador to the Ivory Coast, Morocco, Niger and Senegal, and her sister, Tu Dieu, the aunt of the Government of Vietnam (GVN) Director of Youth, Cao Xuan Vy.
3. Three coup groups have been reported to be now cooperating, one headed by Lieutenant Colonel Pham Ngoc Thao, former Chief of Kien Hoa Province, and then Ngo Dinh Nhu's special investigator for strategic hamlets, another characterized as the Tran Kim Tuyen group, and a third, primarily military in composition. Little is known about the Thao and the military groups; somewhat more about the Tuyen group.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 212, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d212
July 9, 1963: 213. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 1
Saigon, July 9, 1963, noon.
57. Following letter dated July 7, addressed to Ambassador and signed by Reverend Thich Tam Chau as Chairman of Inter-Sect Committee for Defense of Buddhism, received yesterday. Letter is typed on official stationery of above committee.
Begin verbatim text:
The series of misfortunes that have been occurring to Vietnam Buddhism since May 8, 1963, must not be unknown to Your Excellency. It is also believed that Your Excellency has been fully informed of the development of the situation since the signing of the joint communiqué between the Government of Vietnam and our Association.
The whole affair now seems to be moving to a new stage, since police have not hesitated to bully international reporters this morning, and we have every reason to expect the worst in the days to come.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 213, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d213
Also on July 9, 1963: 214. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 1
Saigon, July 9, 1963, 5 p.m.
59. CINCPAC for POLAD. Embtel 44.2 Thuan informed me today that following conversation reported reftel he had asked Diem directly whether he planned speech on Buddhist problem. Diem said he did not. Thuan said he concluded that Luong in talking to CAS officer (Embtel 41)3 must have been referring to passage on problem contained Double Seven speech (Embtel 49).4 Thuan agreed with me that latter not helpful.
Thuan also indicated that he had had no success in getting GVN orders to provinces published and gave every evidence of having run out of steam on Buddhist problem.
I told Thuan I was most discouraged over situation and particularly lack of GVN actions. I also found offensive continuing articles in Times of Vietnam seeking link US with 1960 coup5 and taunt Buddhists.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 214, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d214
Also on July 9, 1963: 215. Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)1
Washington, July 9, 1963.
SUBJECT
Vietnam
I attach an analysis of the Buddhist crisis in South Vietnam2 by [less than 1 line not declassified]. While I don't believe it warrants being passed on to President, I think it does present a point of view which is shared by Ambassador Nolting.
The main points are:
(a) The Buddhist crisis is more political than religious.
(b) Diem cannot be persuaded to dispense with the services of his family and will probably adopt more rigorous and oppressive policies toward the activist Buddhist leadership.
(c) While there has been a potentially dangerous increase in coup plotting, it is too early to predict an overthrow of the Government within the next few months.
Harriman and Hilsman would agree with (a) but would tend to disagree with (b) and (c). Their main point is that the United States must avoid allowing its own interests to be confused with those of the regime in Saigon. If our estimate is that Diem will take appropriate measures to pacify the situation and will thus survive, then in our own best interests we could be active in our support of him personally. If, on the other hand, our estimate is that his political ineptitude in recent weeks has so weakened his support within Vietnam that he cannot be expected to hold out much longer, then we should be careful to maintain a reasonably friendly touch with potential leaders of non-Communist coup attempts. Our dilemma at the moment is that we cannot yet agree on the estimate. In general, people in Washington are somewhat more pessimistic about Diem's chances of riding this one out than people in the field. You can argue both ways on whose judgment is better at this particular moment. In light of this, my own judgment is that we are entering a period in which our policy must be one of fence sitting, realizing of course that such a policy constitutes something less than full identification between our own interests and those of President Diem.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 215, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d215
July 10, 1963: 216. Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State1
Manila, July 10, 1963-5 p.m.
46. Eyes only Rusk, Ball, Bundy, Hilsman from Bowles.2 Two days in South Vietnam, during which I talked at length with Diem, his top colleagues, US Embassy and military officials, press representatives, Indian head of ICC and other informed individuals, left me with profound feeling of concern.
Situation appears paradoxical in that military measures against Viet Cong are making substantial progress while political outlook sharply deteriorates.
Many qualified observers, in and out of government, privately assert that Diem regime is probably doomed and that while political and military risks involved in a switchover are substantial they may now be less dangerous than continuation of Ngo family in present role.
My personal views are necessarily tentative due to shortness of stay and difficulty of forming objective judgments because of deep commitment of almost all American observers to positions which they have held over a period of time and bitter impasse between US officialdom and US press.
However, I left Saigon with feeling that a political explosion is likely in foreseeable future and that a fresh US government evaluation of political situation is urgently needed by someone who is not emotionally involved.
Embassy instructions for various overturn contingencies also needed.
Do not believe that re-evaluation should wait until new Ambassador arrives in September nor, with due respect to present incumbent, can we expect a fully balanced evaluation from those who have been directly concerned.
Therefore strongly suggest some informed US official who has full confidence of President and Secretary visit Saigon on a most urgent basis. Roger Hilsman would seem to be obvious choice. However Tom Hughes or Mike Forrestal would be less conspicuous.
Stevenson
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 216, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d216
Also on July 10, 1963:
217. Special National Intelligence Estimate1
Washington, July 10, 1963.
SNIE 53-2-63
THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
Scope Note
NIE 53-63, “Prospects in South Vietnam,” dated 17 April 19632 was particularly concerned with the progress of the counterinsurgency effort, and with the military and political factors most likely to affect that effort. The primary purpose of the present SNIE is to examine the implications of recent developments in South Vietnam for the stability of the country, the viability of the Diem regime, and its relationship with the US.
Conclusions
A. The Buddhist crisis in South Vietnam has highlighted and intensified a widespread and longstanding dissatisfaction with the Diem regime and its style of government. If-as is likely-Diem fails to carry out truly and promptly the commitments he has made to the Buddhists, disorders will probably flare again and the chances of a coup or assassination attempts against him will become better than even. (Paras. 4,14)
B. The Diem regime's underlying uneasiness about the extent of the US involvement in South Vietnam has been sharpened by the Buddhist affair and the firm line taken by the US. This attitude will almost certainly persist and further pressure to reduce the US presence in the country is likely. (Paras. 10-12).
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 217, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d217
Also on July 10, 1963: By way of a personal message, President Kennedy is reaffirming his confidence in the Government of South Vietnam. The message was carried by Ambassador Frederick E. Nolting Jr., who left for Saigon.
Source: New York Times Chronology - John F. Kennedy Presidential Library & Museum http://www.jfklibrary.org/Research/Research-Aids/Ready-Reference/New-York-Times-Chronology/Browse-by-Date/New-York-Times-Chronology-July-1963.aspx#Week2
July 11, 1963: 218. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State1
Saigon, July 11, 1963, 8 p.m.
73. Hilsman from Nolting. CINCPAC for POLAD. Had long, private and very frank talk with Thuan this afternoon after briefings here. We discussed strategy for my talk with Diem tomorrow morning.2 Thuan feels dangers of Buddhist tensions somewhat reduced, but he still worried. I have conviction that he is honestly working for government and not infected by coup plotting.
One encouraging development is appointment this morning of government commission, headed by Inspector General of Administration, a Buddhist, to receive and investigate complaints from Buddhist association regarding implementation June 16 agreements. Offsetting this, Thuan told me of request to Vice President from Buddhist leaders to come to see them in Xa Loi Pagoda. Declining this invitation, Tho countered by inviting Buddhist leaders to meet with him, Thuan and Minister of Interior Luong, or with him alone either at office or homer Buddhists declined.
Further reports and assessment this situation will follow.
Trust statement made at airport upon arrival3 was acceptable. Tried to play it down the middle by statement prepared on airplane, rather than trying to field a raft of questions dealing with extremely sensitive points in this situation.
Nolting
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 218, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d218
July 12, 1963: CIA Document Dated July 12: Ngo Dinh Nhu proposed to army general officers on 11 July 1963 that they stage a coup d'etat as soon as possible. This coup must be staged ovenight and the army should turn over control to civilians on the next day.
Source: Declassified CIA Documents on the Vietnam War | University of Saskatchewan Library
http://library.usask.ca/vietnam/index.php?state=view&id=618
Also on July 12, 1963: U.S. 'Expresses Concern" Over Saigon Incident
Washington (UPI) --- The White House has told American newsmen in Saigon that President Kennedy hopes there will be no recurrence of an incident in which South Viet Nam police manhandled them during a recent Buddhist religious service.
The U.S. Embassy has expressed "the full measure of our concern" to the government of President Ngo Dinh Diem, White House Press Secretary Pierre Salinger said Friday.
Source: Holland Evening Sentinel, Saturday, July 13, 1963, Page 12, Newspaperarchive.com http://newspaperarchive.com/holland-evening-sentinel/1963-07-13/page-12
Also on July 12, 1963: Viet Government Charges Newsmen Attacked Police SAIGON Vietnamese government publicly accused two foreign news men here Friday of assaulting its... (text unclear)
Source: Pacific Stars and Stripes, Sunday, July 14, 1963, Page 4, Newspaperarchive.com http://newspaperarchive.com/pacific-stars-and-stripes/1963-07-14/page-4
July 13, 1963: Junk Division 21: Delivered 2 VC with 2 grenades to Duc Pho District, 21st DTZ. Source: Logs, untitled, listing incidents in which Vietnamese Navy patrol vessels (it was clear that these were mostly in the junk forces in 1963 and 1964; the same was probably the case in 1962) seized small vessels or cargo, or detained people, when stopping and searching small vessels.
Source: The Vietnam Center and Archive: Search Results http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/items.php?item=0750110006
Also on July 13, 1963: This cable provides comments on the four reports concerning the 11 July 1963 meeting at the Joint General Staff Headquarters. The meeting was called by Ngo Dinh Nhu, who proposed that the generals stage a coup d'etat against Diem government.
Source: Declassified CIA Documents on the Vietnam War | University of Saskatchewan Library
http://library.usask.ca/vietnam/index.php?state=view&id=618
July 14, 1963: Today’s New York Times: The United States is sending Assistant Secretary of State Robert Manning to South Vietnam this week. He will investigate protests by American newsmen who were man-handled by Vietnamese secret policemen at a Buddhist demonstration last week.
Source: New York Times Chronology - John F. Kennedy Presidential Library & Museum
http://www.jfklibrary.org/Research/Research-Aids/Ready-Reference/New-York-Times-Chronology/Browse-by-Date/New-York-Times-Chronology-July-1963.aspx#Week2
July 15, 1963: NEWS - Funeral of South Vietnam writer who protested the regime of Diem. Government forces kill 50 Vietcong.
Source: Archival Television Audio - Vietnam War (1961-1968) http://www.atvaudio.com/ata_vietnamwar.php
Also on July 15, 1963: 219. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State1
Saigon, July 15, 1963, 1 p.m.
85. CINCPAC for POLAD. Herewith is interim report of situation here as I see it, after two days of intensive briefings, discussions with American, Vietnamese, and foreign officials and private citizens, including American newsmen, and some sampling of Saigon opinion.
Our patient, I think, is still on critical list, but improving. Difficulties seem to be confined mainly to larger cities, affecting only slightly peasant population in central coastal areas and not at all in Delta. Saigon and Hue are still very volatile and people are scared. Buddhist Association leaders, unfortunately, can still take initiative to bring down government, but seem to be hesitant to do so. Each day that passes slightly increases chances of surmounting this crisis. Coup rumors are rife and evidence of plotting exists, but it is my present judgment that no direct intervention in this matter on our part would be helpful or wise. (Have passed the word on position to be taken if approached, as per instruction.)2
Restoration of Diem's confidence in US intentions, badly shaken by several happenings in past weeks, and subsequent leading of him to take more positive and sensible political actions, will take some time. I have spent seven hours with him since my return and have, Thuan reports, made some headway, but I have nothing of significance to report in terms of concrete actions or decisions. He is hurt by what he considers misrepresentations and calumnies (both in Viet-Nam and outside), torn by conflicting advice, resentful of US pressure, and not completely in control of his government's actions (Nhus). He is, in brief, in a martyr's mood himself. We have not yet been able to persuade him to snap out of it, make a virtue of necessity, and take his case fully and candidly directly to the people. We are still working on this. In my judgment, his motives and intentions are still good; some of his resentments and suspicions concerning the Buddhist agitation are well-founded. He is visibly tired. Our main problem at moment is to get him relaxed enough to take the helm and steer the ship on a true and sensible course.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 219, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d219
Also on July 15, 1963:
220. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rice) to the Secretary of State1
Washington, July 15, 1963.
SUBJECT
Reports that Brother Nhu is Planning a Coup
We have four reports2 from Vietnamese Generals of a July 11 meeting of Nhu with officers of that rank. Two (or possibly three) of these reports indicate that Nhu may be planning a coup. We think it not unlikely, however, that Nhu is responding to reports of coup plotting among the Generals themselves, seeking to confuse and divide them, smoke out their intentions, and rally those which he can reach by such blandishments as “active” assignments. He may have had the additional intention of improving his personal position with the Generals against the possibility that they will successfully mount a coup.
The four reports are not wholly consistent with one another, but the following emerges from all four: (1) Nhu asked the Generals for their support; (2) Nhu criticized the government and/or his brothers during the meeting; (3) Nhu extended an olive branch to the Generals by being very cordial and by promising “active” assignments to all.
General Khanh reported Nhu asked for “personal support”; General Kim stated Nhu said he would not blame the Generals if they were thinking of a coup and that he would be with them; General Cao merely said that Nhu had asked for their cooperation in meeting the present crisis. One unnamed “general officer” who may or may not have attended the meeting reported that Nhu had spoken of a “lightning” coup with himself leading it. But a large meeting of this sort would not provide a suitably secure forum in which to make a serious proposal of this sort, and Nhu's position on the Buddhist crisis is not one which would be most likely to appeal to dissatisfied officers.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 220, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d220
July 16, 1963: 221. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State1
Saigon, July 16, 1963, 1 p.m.
91. CINCPAC for POLAD. At 0900 group estimated at over 100 bonzes gathered before Ambassador's residence (Amb was at office). Bonze Nghiep who has covered public relations for Buddhists made address in English over portable loud speaker. Nghiep requested US Government pursue any possible means solve Buddhist problem in Vietnam as soon as possible.
Stated Buddhists are not VC and have never made use of anyone including VC nor are Buddhists exploited by VC. Buddhists are anti-Communist but want cessation of GVN terrorizing, kidnapping and arresting Buddhist monks and nuns. Buddhists completely disagree with GVN communiqué on flying of flag; believe flag symbol of all Buddhist aspirations not of only one Buddhist association. Buddhists favor US aid, US weapons, etc. but disagree with use of aid and weapons to suppress Buddhism in South Vietnam.
Following Nghiep address bonzes commenced chanting. Reporters for international and local press were present (reportedly were advised that some event was forthcoming). Buddhist signs displayed following slogans: “Buddhist flag must be for all Buddhists”; “request government keep its promises faithfully”; “free world and USA are expected to do anything possible for Buddhist problem”. Police cordoned off residence from block away. Small crowds gathered on fringe cordoned area.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 221, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d221
Also on July 16, 1963:
222. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State1
Saigon, July 16, 1963, 8 p.m.
92. CINCPAC for POLAD. Reference: Embassy's telegram 91.2 When it appeared at about 10:30 that another self-immolation might be imminent, I telephoned Thuan and asked him to see Diem urgently. I proposed that President get word to demonstrators immediately by loudspeaker truck that he would be addressing people personally at a stated hour, preferably noon. Told Thuan I judged we're at eleventh hour and personal action by Diem required. Thuan said he agreed and would go immediately to Diem. I asked to see Diem myself if Thuan thought it would be helpful.
About 15 minutes after above call, word received that demonstration at residence appeared be breaking up and Bonzes planning return to Xa Loi to commence fast. I relayed this to Thuan (who had not yet been able to see Diem), but told him in my judgment personal address by President still urgently required. I offered provide some suggestions on content and am doing so.
Nolting
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 222, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d222
July 17, 1963: The [US] Embassy reported, in telegram 96 from Saigon, July 17, that a series of Buddhist demonstrations in and around Saigon that morning had twice led the police to take demonstrators away in trucks to the outskirts of the city. At Giac Minh Pagoda in Cholon, the police action involved violence: “US eyewitnesses report that without any apparent provocation from crowd, police kicked, slugged and clubbed bonzes and la)r people and loaded them forcibly in trucks. Beatings continued while people on floors of trucks. Police then proceeded strip loud speaker and banners from pagoda and sealed off pagoda with barbed wire.” (Department of State, Central Files, SOC 14-1 S VIET)
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 223, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d223
Also on July 17, 1963: 223. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State1
Saigon, July 17, 1963, 11 a.m.
95. CINCPAC for POLAD. Reference: Department's telegram 81.2 In confused situation here, believe I should state my present views on basic issue involved before possible decisions taken Washington regarding “disassociation” or other public statement changing US official position. My view is that Buddhist agitation is now predominantly controlled by activists and radical elements aimed at the overthrow of GVN. It may or may not be deliberately connected with coup plots by military officers, but Buddhists almost certainly aware of these.
This is said without condoning Diem's failure to meet the problem in a timely and politically realistic way. (Report just received on what may be some forward movement by him will follow soonest.)3 In present circumstances, believe US Government should take no immediate action to change balance of its position, even though I realize press reports of what appear to be repressive police actions today will generate a good deal of heat.4
Nolting
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 223, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d223
Also on July 17, 1963: Squads of heavily armed policemen in Saigon stopped a Buddhist protest against religious discrimination by wading into a crowd of demonstrators and beating many of them. It was the first all-out use of force against the Buddhists in the troubled capital of South Vietnam. Eighty demonstrators were arrested.
Source: New York Times Chronology - John F. Kennedy Presidential Library & Museum
http://www.jfklibrary.org/Research/Research-Aids/Ready-Reference/New-York-Times-Chronology/Browse-by-Date/New-York-Times-Chronology-July-1963.aspx#Week3
Also on July 17, 1963: 225. Editorial Note
On July 17, 1963, at 4 p.m., President Kennedy held a press conference at the Department of State. A correspondent asked if the difficulties between the Buddhists and the South Vietnamese Government were impeding the effectiveness of U.S. aid in the war against the Viet Cong. The President answered:
“Yes, I think it has. I think it is unfortunate that this dispute has arisen at the very time when the military struggle has been going better than it has been going in many months. I would hope that some solution could be reached for this dispute, which certainly began as a religious dispute, and because we have invested a tremendous amount of effort and it is going quite well.”
He next expressed his hope that the dispute would be settled to allow a stable government in South Vietnam, able to maintain national independence, and that “behind this military shield put up by the Vietnamese people they can reach an agreement on the civil disturbances and also in respect for the rights of others. That's our hope. That's our effort.”
(Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963, page 569)
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 225, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d225
224. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State1
Saigon, July 17, 1963, 6 p.m.
98. CINCPAC for POLAD. Almost continuous discussions, probings and negotiations with Diem, Nhu and Thuan have been aimed at averting political upheaval here. Some results beginning to show. Question of course, is whether Diem will take action and demonstrate his sincerity to his people (and to the world) in time and in manner to save himself and his government. I hence bore down increasingly hard on requirements from our side-in terms of U.S. public and Congressional opinion. In very frank discussion with Nhu yesterday (during which there was no sign whatsoever of any designs on his part to overthrow Diem), I was able to get his promise to support a move by
Diem to take GVN's case to the people in a broad and magnanimous way aimed at calming the situation. This promise extracted despite Nhu's conviction that Buddhist agitation represents no real threat.
Thuan reports this morning that Diem talked with Nhu last night following our conversation, agreed in principle that he would make such a move, and directed that speech be written by Tho committee. Speech, according to Thuan, was to contain not only a general appeal but further specifics for guaranteeing full religious liberties and implementation June 16 agreements.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 224, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d224
July 18, 1963: CARL HERSHEL BALLARD
SP5 - E5 - Army - Regular
Length of service 6 years
Casualty was on Jul 18, 1963
In , SOUTH VIETNAM
Non-Hostile, died of illness/injury, GROUND CASUALTY
ACCIDENTAL HOMICIDE
Body was recovered
Panel 01E - Line 25
JACK LANCE GOODMAN
MSGT - E8 - Army - Regular
Special Forces
Length of service 14 years
Casualty was on Jul 18, 1963
In , SOUTH VIETNAM
HOSTILE, GROUND CASUALTY
OTHER EXPLOSIVE DEVICE
Body was recovered
Panel 01E - Line 25
LAWRENCE EARL HACKLEY
CAPT - O3 - Army - Reserve
Length of service 8 years
Casualty was on Jul 18, 1963
In , SOUTH VIETNAM
Hostile, died of wounds, GROUND CASUALTY
OTHER EXPLOSIVE DEVICE
Body was recovered
Panel 01E - Line 25
ROBERT KEAL MOSIER
CAPT - O3 - Army - Reserve
Length of service 18 years
Casualty was on Jul 18, 1963
In , SOUTH VIETNAM
HOSTILE, GROUND CASUALTY
OTHER EXPLOSIVE DEVICE
Body was recovered
Panel 01E - Line 25
Source: The Wall-USA thewall-usa.com
Also on July 18, 1963: 227. Memorandum of Conversation1
Saigon, July 18, 1963.
PARTICIPANTS
His Excellency Ngo Dinh Diem, President of the Republic of Vietnam
Ambassador Frederick E. Nolting, Jr. American Ambassador
The Honorable Robert J. Manning, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs
Mr. John M. Mecklin, Counselor of Embassy for Public Affairs
Mr. Marshall Wright, Special Assistant to Mr. Manning
Mr Truong Buu Khanh, Vietnam Press
Mr. Manning said that he considered his trip an opportunity to learn about the situation in Vietnam. He hoped to learn enough to be able, upon his return to the United States, to convey to American editors and journalists both the complexity and the progress of the Vietnam situation. It was very difficult for people outside Vietnam to understand the complexity of the situation here, but Mr. Manning hoped that American journalists would recognize the necessity of viewing developments in Vietnam in their worldwide context. Mr. Manning said that much of the present press difficulty stems from the fact that the day-to-day events in Vietnam are judged narrowly and only in a local context. Mr. Manning said he would much appreciate having the President's views on how the press problem should be handled.
President Diem said Vietnam would always welcome journalists with hospitality and expected only that the journalists would meet their primary duty of reporting objectively. Mr. Manning said there were differing interpretations of objectivity, and this difference in interpretation was the core of the problem in Vietnam. Correspondents have a different function than Government officials and this fact often creates problems. Journalists are free agents and part of their function is to be critical of governments. For the United States it is a necessity that Government activities be submitted to press scrutiny.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 227, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d227
July 19, 1963: 231. Letter From the Ambassador in India (Bowles) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)1
New Delhi, July 19, 1963.
Dear Mac: In addition to the more or less routine report of my impressions of East Asia which I have just sent through the regular channels,2 I feel that I must write to you directly about the situation in Vietnam. Here in brief is the way it appears to me:
1. The highly contradictory nature of reports from South Vietnam is largely the result of a paradox: while the military situation is steadily improving, the political situation is rapidly deteriorating. Thus those who concentrate on military developments are optimistic while those who focus on the political aspects are gloomy. This state of affairs cannot continue indefinitely. If the political situation is not vastly improved, our ability to control the Viet Cong situation is almost certain to deteriorate.
2. Our mission in Saigon is on the edge of severe demoralization. The bitter conflict between the U.S. press and our mission is symptomatic. The morale of our military people, particularly the junior ones who are dealing with the military situation in the field, is high and they appear to be putting on an extraordinary performance. The same is true in the aid program. As you move further up the scale of authority, however, you encounter increasingly emotional differences and antagonisms.
3. We cannot achieve our objectives in Southeast Asia as long as Diem and his family run Vietnam. I met no one who was in a position to judge the attitudes of the Vietnamese people who did not stress this fact.
My own impression of Diem was that of a man quite remote from reality. For three hours and fifty-two minutes he gave me his version of what was happening in the country—a version which on key questions was inaccurate or distorted, and with respect to the U.S. not only misinformed but insulting.
In Diem and his family we have a set-up comparable to that presented by the Generalissimo in China in the 1940's. We failed in China largely because we failed to find an effective means of dealing with an inept ruling power that had lost touch with the people. We will fail in Southeast Asia, and perhaps even more decisively, if we repeat this mistake in Vietnam.
Although the risks in any political switchover are formidable, the risks of staying on dead center are, in my opinion, substantially greater. Nor am I impressed by the familiar argument that “there is no available successor”. It is not too much to say that almost any articulate, courageous, anti-communist Vietnamese with a good reputation who puts himself at the head of a group to overthrow Diem, and who outlines a policy of continued vigorous anti-communism combined with anti-favoritism, better government administration and land reforms, would find himself a national hero in a matter of weeks.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 231, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d231
Also on July 19, 1963: 229. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State1
Saigon, July 19, 1963, 5 p.m.
109. CINCPAC for POLAD. Reference: Embtel 107.2 Urge that Dept. Spokesman make statement along following lines at noon press briefing:
Begin Text.
“President Diem's broadcast of July 18 strikes us as forthright and statesmanlike. It reaffirms in unmistakeable terms the government's intention to carry out in letter and in spirit the agreement of June 16. And it provides a mechanism whereby any complaints about implementation can be amicably settled with the participation of the Buddhists themselves. It would seem to us that the way is clear for the settlement of all religious issues that have arisen in Viet-Nam.”
End text.
In making statement, Dept. should be aware that—
a) Saigon pagodas still barricaded,
b) Bonzes and others detained after Wednesday's3 demonstrations still held; and
c) Buddhists reportedly about to make further demands regarding (a) and (b) above and perhaps other points.
I am working urgently to get GVN open pagodas and release persons arrested. However, I do not think we should wait for GVN to do this before making statement above. Statement in my opinion is a fair characterization of Diem's broadcast. Moreover, it will help me to move GVN and to prevent any undercutting of Diem's broadcast. It may well also cause Buddhists to hesitate before making further demands.
Nolting
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 229, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d229
Also on July 19, 1963:
230. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam1
Washington, July 19, 1963, 8:53 p.m.
103. Ref: Embtels 109,2 112, and 111.3 In view Buddhist reaction to Diem broadcast and your estimate (Embtel 95)4 that Buddhist agitation now controlled predominantly by activists aimed at overthrow of GVN, believe we must anticipate further Buddhist demonstrations and violence. In these circumstances and in light coup rumors, it clear we have to deal with most uncertain and volatile situation.
It seems to us that outcome remains obscure: We do not know whether Diem really will do the things he must if his regime is to survive. We therefore inclined continue for present public posture of noninterference this internal affair, neither favoring Buddhists or Diem in public statements, but merely expressing approval all helpful steps and hope for peaceful settlement.
At same time we think it essential to continue press Diem resolve situation by actions and statements designed to meet squarely Buddhists' legitimate grievances. We much encouraged by progress you have registered to date and hope you can prevail on Diem to insure removal barricades around pagodas, release those arrested during Buddhist demonstrations, and pay compensation to those injured. These Buddhist demands seem reasonable even if motivated by political aims. Meeting them appears to be essential if moderates are to regain control Buddhist movement and if Diem is to rally sufficient support to reestablish stability.
For above reasons we made text of Diem broadcast available to newsmen today and commented on it only as follows:
“This broadcast reaffirms the Government's intent to carry out the June 16 agreement. It provides a procedure whereby differences over implementation of the agreement can be amicably settled between the Government and the Buddhists. We hope that with this new procedure and with good will among all concerned, that the issue can be resolved.”
Rusk
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 230, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d230
July 20, 1963: 232. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State1
Saigon, July 20, 1963, 7 p.m.
117. CINCPAC for POLAD. Deptel 103.2 I am very much disappointed in reftel. It gives us nothing to work with, on either side of equation. A wait-and-see attitude on our part at this juncture will lead only, in my judgment, to further undermining of stability here and to further jeopardizing U.S. vital interests. It will encourage more agitation and demand on part of Buddhists; it will discourage further conciliatory action on part of government; it will increase prospects of a coup.
For two years (and longer), the U.S. has had to make hard choices here. We have made them pretty forthrightly, and the more forthrightly we have made them, the better they have panned out. On these hard choices, clearly taken, we have helped build what is admittedly a much stronger defense against Communist takeover than was thought possible. This has been done despite inefficiencies and goofs on part GVN (and on our part too). Experience has shown that GVN can be counted on to be slow, sticky, and uncoordinated in adopting and implementing any policy. There are many cross-currents of opinion and many free-wheelers. Nevertheless, our best bet still lies in encouraging and prodding and helping them to accept and follow through on policies that look reasonably good, as was done successfully in military strategy and tactics, in clear-and-hold operations, in rural development, in Strategic Hamlet concept and execution, in financing, and in many other fields.
GVN has badly underestimated and mishandled Buddhist problem. It may—although I do not think so—have gotten out of hand, but at last Diem has come out with something that looks good (and has already taken certain concrete actions to back it up), publicly committing his government to a conciliatory course. We should by all available means encourage the GVN in this.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 232, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d232
Also on July 20, 1963: 233. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam1
Washington, July 20, 1963, 2:58 p.m.
104. Ref: Embtel 117.2 Reaction of press here to our statement made re Diem broadcast (Deptel 103)3 was that events (i.e. Buddhist reaction making acceptance conditional on series GVN actions and repositioning of barricades) had already overtaken our statement. As practical matter do not see how we can further comment without another news peg. If Diem releases those arrested in demonstrations, lifts barricades, meets with Buddhist leaders, or takes further constructive action in line with promising [promised?] approach his broadcast, we could again express satisfaction and hope. Until then do not feel. that further comment on Diem broadcast would result in anything here but hostile speculation.
We assume you will tell GVN we encouraged by Diem's broadcast and accompanying orders as constructive steps towards easing situation, and that we are hopefully waiting for more of same sort.
Reftel, well as whole situation, under careful study. We intend by septel send you for comment our estimate situation as it looks from here and avenues open to us.4
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 233, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d233
Also on July 20, 1963: Fierce Battle in Viet Nam Takes Lives of Many SAIGON, Viet Nam (AP) South Vietnamese forces fought the fiercest battle of the year against Communist guerrillas last weekend, killing 68 Reds and capturing 19 others. Nineteen government soldiers of the 7th division was killed and 45 wounded in the battle Saturday just south of Saigon on the Mekong River delta.
Source: Lake Charles American-Press, Edition, Page 5 - Newspapers.com http://www.newspapers.com/newspage/8339602/
July 21, 1963: NY Times: South Vietnam's Government released 267 Buddhist priests and nuns from detention and dismantled barbed-wire barricades around Saigon's main pagodas. Nonetheless, Buddhist leaders declared there were other demands that the Government must meet before they agree to confer with officials on their bitter dispute.
Source: New York Times Chronology - John F. Kennedy Presidential Library & Museum
http://www.jfklibrary.org/Research/Research-Aids/Ready-Reference/New-York-Times-Chronology/Browse-by-Date/New-York-Times-Chronology-July-1963.aspx#Week3
July 22, 1963: Sergeant Eugene Hudson, Advisor to a Vietnamese Ranger Battalion, rendered invaluable assistance, advice, and encouragement to the 2d Platoon, 1st Company, 33d Ranger Battalion, Army of Vietnam, during an encounter with hostile forces. While the Platoon was maneuvering across an open valley, it was suddenly swept by hostile forces which greatly outnumbered them and received an onslaught of heavy automatic rifle and machine gun fire. Sergeant Hudson then displayed fortitude, professional skill, and determination by occupying an exposed position to assist his counterparts. During the entire operation, he remained cool and calculating, bravely making seven trips under intense gun fire to carry wounded Vietnamese soldiers across a small creek to a covered position. Through his strategy, perseverance, and valorous conduct, he inspired his Vietnamese comrades to emulate his actions, which resulted in a pause in the intensity of hostile gun fire and enabled the Platoon to move to a more advantageous position and continue their operations effectively.
Source:
Department of the Army, General Orders No. 15 (April 23, 1964) Source: Citations for Awards of the Silver Star to U.S. Army Personnel in the
Vietnam War
http://www.homeofheroes.com/members/04_SS/5_RVN/citations/army/a.html
July 23, 1963: 234. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam1
Washington, July 23, 1963, 6:51 p.m.
112. For Nolting from Hilsman. As indicated Deptel 104,2 we have carefully considered present Buddhist problem against backdrop successful CI program. Current thinking here on stability Diem regime in general represented by SNIE 53-2-63 (July 10)3 sent you separate cover. We keenly aware of distance which separates us from fast moving situation, and most anxious have your comments on following estimate which represents our present thinking:
1. We inclined anticipate further Buddhist demonstrations and resulting unrest, and believe more protest suicides should be expected. This view based on: (1) Continuing GVN failure act promptly enough to meet legitimate Buddhist grievances and to show true spirit of conciliation; (2) Belief that Buddhist protest movement likely become increasingly militant. Buddhists probably more and more inclined regard overthrow of regime as only possible solution, thus attracting growing support (and conversely) from other major elements plotting regime's overthrow, particularly in armed forces.
2. We also expect that Buddhist unrest and demonstrations will increasingly agitate urban populace, and that this agitation, to degree, may be expected extend to countryside also, with resulting slowdown in war effort.
3. In these circumstances and in light growing crop of reports on coup plans, we judge odds favor attempted coup within next few months if not weeks.
4. Odds also seem to favor success of such coup, although we keenly aware of strong possibility the GVN might still successfully weather Buddhist storm by combination conciliation and repression and that consequently coup attempts may fail or abort.
5. In these circumstances, following courses seem open to us: (a) We can attempt actively influence events by public statements disassociating ourselves from GVN handling of Buddhist issue, with likely result being encouragement or even triggering of coup attempt. (b) We can go even further and seek directly to encourage certain military leaders seek “Constitutional solution” under Tho. (c) Conversely, we can seek actively discourage coup plots by both high-level public statements of support to GVN, and private statements to Buddhist-s and potential coup leaders although this, like the above might have unpredictable results. (d) Finally, we can hold to present posture of watchful waiting while continuing privately to press GVN to demonstrate proper spirit and to take all necessary measures to finally resolve issue.
6. On balance we continue be inclined favor last course for time being. More active role runs obvious risk of putting us in position of having backed loser, and even of prolonging crisis and increasing violence, with all bad effects on war effort that would flow from such error. We may well come to point where we would want to throw all our influence behind either Diem or an acceptable alternative leader or junta (preferably Constitutional successor supported by military) in order to stabilize situation as rapidly as possible. But in light info now available to us here, we do not believe situation has yet jelled to that point. At this moment, though alternatives to Diem seem to be emerging, it is not yet clear who and what they are.
Rusk
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 234, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d234
July 24, 1963: 235. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State1
Saigon, July 24, 1963, 7 p.m.
130. CINCPAC for POLAD. Had a rather reassuring and encouraging session with Thuan today. Discussed many subjects bearing on political situation here, including attitudes of various GVN officials toward Buddhist problem, military attitudes bearing on possible coup d'etat, and Diem's own convictions and especially his control of government.
I found Thuan in more sanguine frame of mind than heretofore. He confirmed that Diem, having finally adopted conciliatory line toward Buddhist problem, was now confidently pursuing that course. I asked whether he was being undercut from any quarter, or whether Thuan expected such undercutting. Thuan replied that, at least for time being, all Cabinet ministers and Nhu were lined up together on line Diem had adopted. He said disciplinary action taken against Lt. Col. Chieu (who had organized yesterday's S.D.C. Veterans' demonstration against Buddhists) had been ordered by Diem with approval of Nhu, who wished it in first place. I asked whether this demonstration had been ordered by anyone above Lt. Col. Chieu. Thuan replied that insofar as he could discover it had not been, but was Chieu's own idea. He also said that at President's request he had just given orders to Ranger company which was planning pro-government demonstrations against Buddhists (in retaliation for alleged Buddhist manhandling of member of company distributing literature at Xa Loi Pagoda) to refrain from any such acti
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 235, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d235
Also on July 24, 1963: 236. Memorandum From the Director of the Vietnam Working Group (Kattenburg) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Hilsman)1
Washington, July 24, 1963.
SUBJECT
Luncheon with Lansdale
1. The luncheon convinced me that Lansdale assesses the situation quite objectively. He is most cognizant of the steady deterioration in the Diem regime over a period of years. He alluded several times to the difficulties he found on his last trip in late 19612 and which he felt to a large degree remained uncorrected.
2. He mentioned that his judgments must be based on what he sees in the reports, and not on what on what he feels since he has not been there for nearly two years. “There is nothing like talking to someone face to face in order to assess him.”
3. He brought up himself the idea of a possible trip on his part to suggest to me that if we wanted him to he would be willing to go out for an assessment of the whole picture. I moved into this opening and asked him how he felt this would be received by various elements on the spot. He thought he could play out any problems on this score and that he could have contact with, and come up with an assessment of, both elements in and closest to the regime and those plotting its overthrow.
4. He definitely does not seem to me to be wedded to the regime. He has, I think, felt for a long time that it is moving to its own funeral but he is not sure whether the moment has yet arrived.
5. For these reasons and because of point 3 in the message to you3—i.e., “I think Lansdale would be helpful in discovering intents among the generals and relieving pressures; in event coup is attempted Lansdale would be most helpful in assessing prospects and in evaluating potential leadership.”—I continue to urge that you favor this move, subject to Lodge's approval. As far as I am concerned there are no “eyes and ears” at this time whose assessment I would rather have.
6. If you were to decide positively, and to discuss the matter with Lodge, I would suggest you waited until after Lodge's own talk with Lansdale, which is now scheduled for 0900 Thursday morning.4 In such case, however, Lodge will not be available until some time late Friday morning.
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 236, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d236
July 25, 1963: 237. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State1
Saigon, July 25, 1963, 8 p.m.
134. Hilsman from Nolting. Deptel 112.2 delayed by servicing. I find myself more sanguine about prospects of GVN's settling Buddhist problem and avoiding coup d'etat than general tenor reftel and SNIE.3 I would put question marks by all of first four numbered paragraphs reftel, which seem to me too gloomy—or at least too logical—for this situation. Without trying to spell out nuances of difference between our respective analyses, perhaps it is sufficient I feel that heat is slowly going out of this crisis and that this government is quite likely survive this crisis, as it has many others in past.
As you know, I also hold that, despite shortcomings of present GVN, it is government which stands best chance (as compared with realizable alternatives) of carrying to successful conclusion counterinsurgency effort here. Therefore, without putting all our eggs in one basket or alienating possible successor governments or leaders, we should, I think, help, by all means consistent with our own principles, to maximize this government's chances of survival.
Since transmission your message, atmosphere has perceptibly calmed, at least on surface. GVN has at last gotten itself into sound posture on religious issue and may be said to be “one up” on Buddhists. In effect, GVN has pledged and repledged itself to implementation June 16 agreement and has offered Buddhists joint investigation any complaints on this score by examination of records or on-the-spot investigations.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 237, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d237
July 26, 1963: 238. Memorandum of Conversation1
Washington, July 26, 1963.
PARTICIPANTS
Roger Hilsman
Robert Manning
Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge
SUBJECT
Press Problems in Viet-Nam
Mr. Manning, who had just returned from a trip to Saigon, thought that the essence of the press problems lay in getting more of the members of the press corps in that city in frequent and meaningful touch with the “horse's mouth”, i.e. the Ambassador and other top U.S. officials. This was certainly not the best press corps in the world nor the worst. It was divided between those who remained permanently in Saigon and who tended to be somewhat in-bred and to suffer from localitis and those coming in on trips from the outside who were more seasoned and had better perspective. Key reporters among. the first group were Halberstam of the New York Times and the AP and UPI correspondents. In the second group the leading reporters were Keyes Beech, Pepper Martin of U.S. News and World Report, and Jim Robinson of NBC.
Mr. Manning thought the main aspect in removing the dissatisfaction of some of these correspondents was to take them into our confidence more, give them an “in” feeling, and invite them more often not only to ritualistic type functions but specifically to say small dinners given by the Ambassador for Vietnamese officials and leading personalities including perhaps one correspondent at a time.
Ambassador Lodge indicated he intended to do just that, that one of the first things he planned to do was to have lunch with several of the key correspondents. Mr. Manning said as a whole the correspondents approved the program we are pursuing in Viet-Nam and supported our effort there—though they were unanimous in despising the Diem regime and in their conviction that we could not win with it.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 238, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d238
Also on July 26, 1963: 239. Report From the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs (Manning) to the President1
Washington, undated.
REPORT ON THE SAIGON PRESS SITUATION
The press problem in Viet-Nam is singular because of the singular nature of the United States involvement in that country. Our involvement is so extensive as to require public, i.e., press, scrutiny, and yet so hemmed by limitations as to make it difficult for the United States government to promote and assure that scrutiny. The problem is complicated by the long-standing desire of the United States government to see the American involvement in Viet-Nam minimized, even represented as something less than in reality it is. The early history of the handling of the situation is marked by attitudes, directives and actions in Washington and in the field that reflect this United States desire.
The effect of these generally restrictive practices had the short-term virtue of keeping the escalating American involvement in a low key in the world and United States press. But a long-term result has been serious deterioration in the credibility attached by American correspondents to the information and assessments given to them by United States military and political authorities in Viet-Nam, and to a certain extent in Washington. Additionally, it can be argued that, whatever the merit of those practices in earlier days of the involvement in Viet-Nam, the public attitude in the United States has been mature and unexcitable—so much so that earlier fears of reaction to American casualties and other aspects of the program may be said to have been exaggerated. This last point argues strongly for relaxation of some—but not all—of the strictures still imposed on American press coverage of the Vietnamese situation, and it argues for a more relaxed attitude on the part of US officials to the reports and assessments of the US press. This would do much to reduce the somewhat sullen Alice in Wonderland miasma that surrounds the Vietnamese press situation, and it would help to build a degree of mutual confidence and mutual credibility between American authorities and American correspondents covering Viet-Nam.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 239, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d239
July 27, 1963: 240. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State1
Saigon, July 27, 1963, 8 p.m.
143. For Lodge from Nolting.
1. When I was in Washington, I had some discussion on economic aid levels for FY 1964. These conversations neither very definitive nor conclusive largely for lack time to go deeply into matter. Since my return Saigon, have reviewed five-year military plan prepared by MAAG connection 1965 MAP submission and economic projections prepared by USOM. In my view, most difficult economic-financial-political problem looms ahead here during next few years. Elements of problem are: meeting security objectives in face increasing belligerence part ChiComs, getting GVN come forward with necessary increased levels financing necessary prosecute war, avoidance dangerous inflation, planned reductions U.S. economic aid.
2. Last year U.S. provided $95 million for commercial import program; there was additionally available about $30ÿ0935 million from prior years' funds (pipeline), making total $125 million approximately for licensing imports. Most recent messages from Washington indicate plans for $cS0 million or less this year with no prior years' funds to add. This figure should not be frozen, I think, until all elements of equation have had careful consideration by you.
3. In summer 1961, U.S. and GVN undertook joint study which resulted in what is now referred to as Staley-Thuc report2 in context of conditions as they existed that time. From this study resulted mutual understanding and/or governmental agreement on force levels, exchange rates, appropriate levels of GVN exchange reserves, deficit financing of war expenditures, and need for other economic reforms on part GVN. Though their performance uneven with respect such matters as in deal [sic] tax collections, reduction unessential imports, etc., GVN have followed through on important parts undertakings including deficit financing for war activities, and exchange rate revisions. Furthermore, they have drawn down exchange reserves substantially below figure set in report. It is perhaps unfortunate that level of reserves only item quantified giving VN strong talking point whereas other measures connected austerity which do not have such benchmarks have not been pursued to our satisfaction.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 240, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d240
July 28, 1963: 241. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State1
Saigon, July 28, 1963, 4 p.m.
144. Some encouraging news and symptoms over past several days re Buddhist problem-but also several perplexing developments.
Was assured yesterday by Bui Van Luong (Interior Minister) that government would use no repressive measures against further Buddhist demonstrations, having concluded that most people bored with Buddhist agitation and becoming convinced that GVN proposals just and sincere attempt settle religious problem. Thus he thought no real risk in letting up on security measures. This checks with info received independently from Diem's doctor, who told me that in his presence Diem had called Interior Minister, Colonel Y (secret police chief), and Saigon Police Chief to instruct them not to use force or arrests against Buddhist agitators or demonstrators. This may be overly optimistic reading, but nevertheless instructions are along lines we have been advocating. May be crucial in connection with big demonstration planned by Buddhists for Tuesday, July 30, which is seventh and final weekly memorial of Quang Duc's death. There has been much publicity about this, with Buddhist appeals to shopkeepers and civil servants and others to quit work and demonstrate. Self-sacrifice of Buu Hoi's mother also forecast by her for this date. (Buu Hoi has not yet returned to Saigon as expected and requested by government, and this is disturbing.)
Meanwhile, Vice President Tho tells me that Buddhist leaders have semi-agreed to meet with government commission on provisional basis (i.e., with no terms of reference set and free to leave if they don't like set-up) on July 31. Tho said that in telephone talks his contact, a moderate Buddhist leader, said in effect that they (Buddhist leaders) wanted to try one more wingding before agreeing to sit down in joint sessions. Tho worried re outcome Tuesday's events, but unable persuade Buddhists to meet beforehand.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 241, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d241
July 29, 1963: New York Times: In Korea, two United States soldiers were killed and a third was wounded in a machinegun and grenade attack just south of the demilitarized zone. The United Nations command said that seven ambush positions had been found near the scene of the attack and that "we can assume there were seven North Korean soldiers in the raiding party."
Source: New York Times Chronology - John F. Kennedy Presidential Library & Museum, July 31, 1963 http://www.jfklibrary.org/Research/Research-Aids/Ready-Reference/New-York-Times-Chronology/Browse-by-Date/New-York-Times-Chronology-July-1963.aspx#Week4
Also on July 29, 1963: 481. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy1
Washington, July 29, 1963.
Tuesday's Laos meeting2 is to report to you the progress made under Phase I of the three-phase Laos program (we have UK, French, Aussie OK on T–28s) and to recommend beefing up Phase I by the inclusion of some parts of Phase II.
On 19 June you directed that no Phase II steps be taken without your approval.3 State and Defense now argue that certain of these steps (see State memo) really belong in Phase I, [1–1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. In effect State/Defense propose a modest step up of Laos pressures and want your OK now so they can carry out these added actions as needed, probably in the next few weeks.
The chief issue is whether you wish to grant this authority now; some of the actions proposed (e.g. selected “offensive” use of T–28s instead of “reprisal” use, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] may go beyond the intent of Phase I, at least as seen on 19 June.
State/Defense also want you to approve in principle the remainder of the Phase II measures, i.e. those involving major US moves outside Laos or leading to overt violation of the Geneva Accords. But they undertake to get your specific approval before carrying these out. We see no problem here, since you already approved these as planning actions on 19 June.
R.W. Komer
[Attachment]4
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
On June 19 you authorized certain steps designed gradually to increase the pressure on the Communists in Laos as a first step in a graduated program to achieve our basic goals in Laos. This is a status report on these authorized actions of Phase I and recommendations on Phase II.
With regard to Phase II, we recommend below a rearrangement of actions to provide better time phasing and control. We present further details on certain actions and recommend that you authorize now some actions subject to Department of State decision, with Department of Defense concurrence, on actual timing.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis, Document 481
http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v24/d481
July 30, 1963: 242. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State1
Saigon, July 30, 1963, 1 p.m.
151. CINCPAC for POLAD. Dept pass DOD, JCS for action. Task Force/Saigon Message. Deptel 10552 requested by first week July full report and evaluation all herbicide operations to serve as basis decision whether to continue defoliation and crop destruction.
During period 1 Jan-30 June 63, only two herbicide operations conducted, first consisting of crop destruction in western Thua Thien Province and second of defoliation of segments of Cua Lon-Bo De Rivers in An Xuyen.
Crop Destruction
Crop destruction operation by hand spray was initiated 6 Feb but discontinued after destruction approximately 12 hectares as result change in military plans and logistical difficulties. Operation which resumed 13 May 1963 has resulted in destruction of approximately 75 percent of approved 140 hectares. Crops include rice, corn and manioc; susceptibility to agent demonstrated by fact marked changes visible 30 minutes to one hour after treatment. In 24 to 48 hours crops lose all color and signs of life.
It is considered too early to evaluate effects on VC of destruction these crops. Moreover, it will be difficult differentiate between food denied VC as result use herbicides and that resulting from crop destruction by other means. Nevertheless, there numerous indications VC food shortage Thua Thien Province, and it is estimated that destruction capability of unit using herbicides as much as four times that of hand destruction. As part of 1st ARVN Division food denial program, it is estimated that a total of 69.8 tons of food will be denied to VC as result current Thua Thien food destruction operations (this is in addition to 140 tons of VC stored food destroyed).
No Montagnards have been relocated as result this operation. Active psywar program using leaflets carried on.
Defoliation
An Xuyen defoliation operation carried out June 6-9, 1963. Complete evaluation of the results of this operation are premature since reaction time of different species involved varies from 15-60 days. In those target areas where growth consisted of mangrove, complete defoliation occurred within two weeks after treatment. Approximately one to five percent of leaves on hardwood trees appear to have turned yellow and fallen off to date. Continuing evaluation in process.
Although in mangrove areas visibility has increased 60-70 percent, no change in VC tactics as yet reported. Intelligence indicates few people in the target area at time of spraying aware mission had been executed. Psywar efforts were directed to leaflet distribution immediately after spraying.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 242, Office of the Historian, US Dept of State http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d242
July 31, 1963: New York Times: After the third U. S. soldier was killed by North Koreans, Washington expressed concern that current clashes in Korea may mean new Communist pressure in Asia.
Source: New York Times Chronology - John F. Kennedy Presidential Library & Museum, July 31, 1963 http://www.jfklibrary.org/Research/Research-Aids/Ready-Reference/New-York-Times-Chronology/Browse-by-Date/New-York-Times-Chronology-July-1963.aspx#Week4
August 1, 1963: 243. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman) and the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Hilsman)1
Washington, August 1, 1963, 9:55 a.m.
WAH told RH that he was disturbed about the reports of Nolting's statement on the Buddhists2 —WAH said he ought to be recalled at once. RH said he couldn't agree more but in his defense he ought to say that it was distorted and taken out of context. WAH said why should he make public statements and RH replied he shouldn't. WAH said he thought when he leaves he ought to be instructed not to make any public statement—or on second thought WAH said that might be awkward but should clear his statement first in the Dept. WAH also said since he was due to come home about the 13th it was probably not necessary to recall him. RH said he would draft a cable.3
1 Source: Library of Congress, Harriman Papers, Telephone Conversations. Transcribed by Eleanor G. McGann of Harriman's staff..
2 In an interview with UPI on July 28, Nolting replied to a question about religious persecution and the Buddhist crisis as follows: “I myself, I say this very frankly, after almost two and one half years here, have never seen any evidence of religious persecution, in fact I have the feeling that there is a great deal of religious toleration among Vietnamese people at all levels.” (Telegram 161 from Saigon, August 1; Department of State, Central Files, SOC-1 S VIET) On July 31, the Inter-Sect Committee for the Defense of Buddhism released a statement taking issue with Nolting's statement. An open letter to Nolting, August 1, signed by “a group of Vietnamese patriots” and distributed to the news media at Xa Loi Pagoda on August 1, attacked Nolting's integrity and understanding of the Buddhist situation. Superior Bonze Tien Khiet on behalf of the Inter-Sect Committee sent President Kennedy a telegram protesting Nolting's statement. Nolting also received a letter from bonze Tam Chau deploring his statement to the UPI correspondent. (Telegrams 156, 159, and 160 from Saigon, July 31, August 1, and August 1, respectively; all ibid.)
3 The cable, telegram 144 to Saigon, August 1, 7:25 p.m., reads as follows: “Press play here of Buddhist communiqué (Embtel 156) commenting on your statement is, as you can imagine, unfortunate, preserving distortion your actual statement. This raises question of how to handle your farewell remarks, which I presume you could not avoid. What ideas do you have about this? Would appreciate opportunity to comment on planned remarks from Washington vantage point.” (Ibid., POLS VIET-US)
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 243
http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d243
August 2, 1963: 244. Central Intelligence Agency Information Report1
Washington, August 2, 1963.
TDCS-3/655,859
SUBJECT
Assessment of the Progress of the War Against the Viet Cong in South Vietnam During the First Half of 1963
The following assessment was prepared by the source in response to a request and also reflects the opinions of Ambassador Frederick E. Nolting, Jr. and other Embassy officers.
1. Summary. Although the progress made in the complex counterinsurgency program in the last six months failed to produce a turning point in the war against the Viet Cong (VC), nothing occurred to change our basic belief that the VC will eventually be defeated, provided that the Buddhist crisis is resolved satisfactorily and the security of South Vietnam is not endangered by the deterioration of the situation in Laos. The war with the VC is being brought under control through the successful implementation of:
a. The isolation of the VC from the people by means of the Province Rehabilitation Program and the Strategic Hamlet Program, which have as yet not completed the task, but which have made solid progress as evidenced by the increasing VC harassment and attacks on strategic hamlets and the initially encouraging results of the Chieu Hoi (Surrender) program.
b. Military operations designed to keep the VC off balance, harass their base areas, and ultimately to destroy the regular VC formations are difficult to assess. However, the VC have been hurt in I and II Corps areas, to a lesser extent in III Corps area, but, whether they have been significantly hurt in IV Corps area is problematical.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 244
http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d244
August 3, 1963: 483. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos1
Washington, August 3, 1963, 2:35 p.m.
129. In our program of strengthening the non-communist forces in Laos, considerable if not major emphasis is being and will be placed on the conservatives. They have for example been given the T–28s and will receive the preponderance of heavy weapons, items with large impact. Although this dictated by fact that only FAR has capability to use this materiel, it, together with fact that to date most all supplies for neutralists have been channeled through FAR, probably responsible for feeling among neutralists that we playing favorites and keeping neutralists subordinate to Phoumi. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]
In order to check this growing feeling, which will almost certainly adversely affect neutralist-conservative cooperation, we hope you will be able to demonstrate to neutralists that it our policy to support them fully (Deptel 120).2 Specifically, hope you can move forward quickly with establishment of separate and independent supply line for neutralists.
For Bangkok: In addition we feel that Embassy Bangkok should actively and strongly press RTG to approve training for neutralist forces (Embtel 197).3 Training the neutralists would be small but important step RTG could take to demonstrate its support of non-communist Lao forces.
Ball
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis, Document 483 http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v24/d483
August 4, 1963: At noon, August 4, novice bonze Huyhn Van Le burned himself to death in front of the Monument aux Morts, Phan Thiet, Binh Thuan Province. This self-immolation was not part of a larger demonstration nor procession, and it was not witnessed by news reporters or photographers. Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 245
http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d245
Also on August 4, 1963: Heavner, Theodore J., Deputy Director of the Vietnam Working Group, Department of State, until August 4, 1963
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963,
List of Persons,
http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/persons
August 5, 1963: 245. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam1
Washington, August 5, 1963, 3:03 p.m.
160. Embtel 173.2 Madame Nhu's attack on Buddhists plus reported threat by Nhu (Reuters despatch of August 3)3 to crush Xa Loi as part of “coup” attempt appears here to indicate GVN may well be preparing move from conciliatory to strong repressive policy. Burning of second monk4 and “fortification” Xa Loi suggests Buddhists will not be easily put down.
If you have not already done so, you are to make it clear to Diem and Nhu that we regard both Nhu's statements as inflammatory and most unwise. These statements give us as well as Buddhists little ground to hope GVN is actually interested in carrying out conciliatory policy promised by Diem on several occasions. You may say further that public opinion in US is such that if Xa Loi is “crushed”, they must expect that USG would promptly and publicly denounce the action.
Ball
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 248
http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d248
August 6, 1963: 246. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Hilsman) to the Acting Secretary of State1
Washington, August 6, 1963.
SUBJECT
Buddhist Problem in Viet-Nam
The following is a status report on the Buddhist situation in South Viet-Nam.
1. Situation Summary
Certain events in the last two weeks have pointed to an amelioration of the situation:
a. Diem's radio broadcast of July 182 expressing the Government's “utmost spirit of conciliation;”
b. Removal of the barricades around the pagodas in Saigon
c. Release by the Government of most, if not all, those arrested in the Buddhist demonstrations;
d. The July 30 Buddhist manifestations were orderly and peaceful and the Government police were at pains to avoid incidents.
On the other hand, the following events of the last two weeks point to continued trouble and unrest:
a. The Buddhists continue to refuse to meet with Vice President Tho's committee to investigate complaints.
b. The Government continues to refuse to identify and punish the officials responsible for the May 8 deaths, which it considers an impossible Buddhist demand.
c. Ngo Dinh Nhu, in an August 3 interview,3 virtually threatened to crush the Buddhist headquarters at Xa Loi Pagoda. On the same day, Madame Nhu made a speech violently attacking the Buddhist leadership.4
2. Analysis
We conclude that the situation remains tense, volatile and potentially explosive. We anticipate further Buddhist demonstrations quite possibly resulting in violence and additional incidents.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 246
http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d246
August 7, 1963: 247. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State1
Saigon, August 7, 1963, 9 p.m.
189. CINCPAC for POLAD. Deptel 160.2 I have received today categoric assurances from Ngo Dinh Nhu that he is supporting fully and with both hands Diem's announced policy of conciliation vis-a-vis the Buddhists. In answer to direct question of whether he favors “crushing” Xa Loi Pagoda or its inmates through any means (i.e. directly, or by means of a coup d'etat or by a false coup d'etat), he said that he did not favor any such move. On contrary, he is convinced, he said, that government must continue to try to conciliate Buddhists, to make further concessions, and to demonstrate to Vietnamese people and to world absolute sincerity of President Diem's July 18 declaration.3 He claimed that he had been urging this course upon the Tho commission as well as upon Diem, specifically that Tho commission should commence investigations of all complaints immediately, unilaterally if necessary, keeping door always open for Buddhist participation. (I understand from other sources that this is going to be done next week.) Nhu stated that any other interpretation of Reuters dispatch was erroneous. I summarized long discussion this point in approximately above language and told him I was going to so report to my government. He said that this would be an accurate report and a truthful statement of his position. He added that this position represented a politically risky course in Viet-Nam, since many people, including large segment of the Army, felt that it represented weakness on the part of the government towards a movement which was standing in the way of, if not actually subverting, the war effort and victory over the Viet Cong. He nevertheless reiterated that he would stand behind this policy, since he was convinced it offers the best way out. I told him, as I have once before, that if he was telling me the truth, he is a most misunderstood man. He replied that he knew he was misunderstood, but I could rely on his word. The conversation was direct but friendly.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 247
http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d247
August 8, 1963: 248. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam1
Washington, August 8, 1963, 8 p.m.
178. Just as report your interview with Ngo Dinh Nhu (Embtel 189)2 reassured us somewhat, Halberstam story carrying Mme Nhu's latest outburst appeared this morning NY Times (see septel).3
You are accordingly to seek new interview with Diem and tell him again that while we recognize Mme Nhu is private citizen rather than GVN official it clear we cannot ignore such destructive and insulting statements by person so clearly identified with him. Diem cannot overlook effect this has of undercutting his authority and creating image abroad that he being led around by apron strings.
Contradictory statements on Buddhist policy by President and Mme Nhu leave us, and Vietnamese people as well, in dark as to actual policy GVN pursuing. Seems essential to us that GVN at this time and without any equivocation publicly reaffirm conciliatory posture on Buddhist issue. This will require at lease implied repudiation Mme Nhu's remarks.
Tell Diem that since he has assured us he following policy of conciliation and since Nhu has reiterated his support this policy to you as late as August 7, USG now regards it as absolutely required that Nhu make public statement confirming he in fact supports this policy.
Public statement Nhu and further conciliatory statements by Diem would go some ways toward assuaging doubts in USG. Tell Diem frankly, however, that at this crucial juncture most convincing action vis-a-vis both Vietnamese and US opinion would be to remove Mme Nhu from scene. We have in mind action similar to that taken in early years Diem regime when she sent to Hong Kong convent.
You could note that in Halberstam's story Mme Nhu claims Diem has no following his own right, and that he must depend on her and his brothers for popular support.4 In Time magazine cover story,5 Mme quoted as stating “scornfully,” connection Diem's policy of conciliation: “President too often wants what French call 'a circle with corners'. He would like to conciliate as the Americans desire, smooth, no bloodshed, everyone shaking hands.”
Ball
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 246
http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d2468
August 9, 1963: 249. Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to the President1
Washington, August 9, 1963.
SOUTH VIETNAM
The principal recent development in the situation in South Vietnam has been the growing number of contradictory statements made by official and semi-official Vietnamese on the Buddhist question.
Brother Nhu was reported late last week to have told a Reuters correspondent that he favored the forceful crushing of Buddhist political activity.2 Two days later, when queried by Ambassador Nolting, he denied having made such a statement and insisted that he was “2-fistedly behind the Government's policy of conciliation.”3
Three days ago Madame Nhu, in a speech to a graduating class of the Women's Solidarity League, attacked the Buddhists violently and followed this up in an interview with a New York Times correspondent (Halberstam) which I am sure you have seen.4
The Department has instructed Nolting to go back to Diem and suggest to him that Madame Nhu is undermining his position as President and should be sent out of the country. Nolting has also been instructed to ask Diem publicly to reaffirm the Government's policy of conciliation (Saigon 178 attached).5
In the meantime Madame Nhu has issued another blast, which is carried on the front page of the government newspaper “Times of Vietnam”. (Saigon 190 attached)6
Hilsman is opposed to going any further at the moment and specifically does not think that the time has come for the United States publicly and officially to indicate disapproval of the GVN's actions and policies. My own feeling is that we must take into consideration a growing domestic and international body of opinion which is becoming more and more critical of our intimate association with Diem.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 249
http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d249
Also on August 9, 1963: Patrick Bouvier Kennedy, two-day-old son of President John F. Kennedy, dies of infant respiratory distress syndrome. A funeral mass for the child was held the next day in the private chapel of Cardinal Richard Cushing in Boston.
Source: August 1963 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/August_1963#August_7.2C_1963_.28Wednesday.29
August 10, 1963: CLARENCE CLEMENT TESSMAN
CAPT - O6 - Navy - Regular
Length of service 22 years
Casualty was on Aug 10, 1963
In GIA DINH, SOUTH VIETNAM
NON-HOSTILE, GROUND CASUALTY
HEART ATTACK
Body was recovered
Panel 01E - Line 26
Source: theWall-USA Vietnam veterans Memorial Panel
http://thewall-usa.com/info.asp?recid=51479
Also on August 10, 1963: 250. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State1
Saigon, August 10, 1963, 7 p.m.
204. This report dictated before receipt Deptel 178.2
Regret my delay reporting series talks with Diem, Nhu and others in effort curb Madame Nhu and make clear GVN policy conciliation on Buddhist issue. This business has been fast-moving, and Dept will appreciate difficulties keeping reporting up to date.
Fact is Madame Nhu is out of control of everybody—her father, mother. husband and brother-in-law.
President Diem promised me, after talks in which I pulled no punches (Deptel 178), to “consider” what he could do about her; said he's been thinking she ought to take a rest. That is as far as he would go. Results to date have been worse than negative. At same time, there have been positive developments on side of GVN: reaffirmations by Diem, as well as Nhu, that GVN through Tho committee intends faithfully to pursue policy of conciliation. Tho committee's announcement of investigation of all complaints and request for details,3 keeping door open for joint investigations—measures which are having, I think, noticeable effect on Vietnamese public opinion, despite Madame Nhu.
I told President Diem very frankly, when he said that she spoke only as a private citizen, that this would not wash in the outside world and I did not think it would wash in Viet-Nam. I told him he could not expect to maintain present relationship with US Government if he would not take this matter into his own hands, back-up his Ambassador in Washington,4 and remove the appearance of schizophrenia from his government. He took this seriously and promised to consider what he could do. I also bore down heavily on the UN aspect.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 250
http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d250
August 11, 1963: Letter From John Fanning:
Dear Al,
Greetings from the fabled Orient. Please forgive my long silence. I seem to have gotten out of the habit of writing, which is bad, because there are a lot of things to write about from here.
I am located in Pleiku, a small (10,000) town in the central highlands of Vietnam, about 250 miles north of Saigon. This is the headquarters of II Corps of the Vietnamese Army (they have the country divided into four corps areas) and I am part of the groups of Americans which advises the staff at the headquarters. I am a member of the "G2" (intelligence) advisory section. Living is fairly pleasant. We have nice quarters (although they are crowded) and a cheap, and good, mess hall. This area is generally safe from enemy harassment, and I have had no contact with the messier aspects of war. My day to day work is in an office, although on occasion there are visits to lower units (out in the field) and the our higher headquarters (in Saigon).
I am in fact an advisor, or more accurately, work in an advisory section. "Advisor" is not a euphemism to cover some greater involvement, or some actual participation in fighting. We are here to help the Vietnamese officers and men. At this level, of course, this is not a question of standing next to savages and teaching them basic toothbrushing. They can use the advice, of course, but it's a reasonably sophisticated operation. The head of the section we advise has been in the intelligence business for about 15 years, in real wars, and while we can help him, we can also learn a great deal from him. I don't know if this is the case up and down the line. I suspect that there are some troop units which are poorly led, and really need advising. There are varying degrees of success in advising, depending on such things as the personalities of the advisor and the counterpart, the technical knowledge and skill of the advisor, and so on. We have been doing pretty well; in a way, the fact that the people we advise are rather competent increases the potential. We are on good terms socially with our counterparts, and we have them to dinner fairly often, and visit in their office each morning at ten for Vietnamese coffee (strong, black), Chinese tea (green, weak) and lotus cakes. This rapport does not always exist, especially at headquarters of this size. Again, personality has something to do with it.
There are a lot of Americans here who are not technically advisors. There are Americans who fly helicopters, and advise no one (you read about them). There are air force people who are filling in in jobs where there are not enough Vietnamese trained, although they are conducting training, and are thus in a sense advisors.
Continued...
Source: Letter from John Fanning, Advisory Team 21 TO Al - re: Job in Vietnam [page two typed over], 11 August 1963, Folder 01, Box 01, John P. Fanning Collection, The Vietnam Center and Archive, Texas Tech University. Accessed 31 Jul. 2013. <http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/items.php?item=20890101005>
August 12, 1963: 251. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State1
Saigon, August 12, 1963, 6 p.m.
208. CINCPAC for POLAD. Deptel 178.2 Had very serious talk with President Diem this morning. I feel he is impressed by gravity of situation confronting him, both internal and external. When he told me that he would take seriously what I had said and would consider what he could do to meet our demands, I told him this was not enough—that time was running out and that he had promised me the same last week. Since then the situation had been made much worse by Madame Nhu's intemperate utterances. He then promised to let me know this afternoon what he would do.
During course of lengthy conversation (in which I did most of talking), read him reftel word for word, explained points and pointed out inter alia that we were now talking about doubts and misgivings in US Government itself, not in US public opinion. I drew heavily, perhaps exhaustively, on store of goodwill and confidence, spoke absolutely frankly from point of view of partner in joint enterprise, could detect no resentment but rather a great sense of struggle between family loyalties and public duty. In this connection I stressed to him that as President his family is entire Vietnamese people and it must be their welfare which must prevail.
My talk with Diem was preceded by a visit at my home last night by Thuan (please protect source). Thuan summed up the feelings of most Cabinet members and his own by saying that it was the 11th hour for Diem to take charge of the government and to act as President. I have reason to believe that this is an accurate summary of most Cabinet opinion from conversations I have had separately with nearly all of them. I gave President Diem my own observations and convictions regarding the attitude, not only of high officials of his own government, but of many lower Vietnamese; stressed absolute necessity for him to take account personally of the crisis resulting from Buddhist problem. I told him that not only abroad, but here in Viet-Nam, it seemed clear that Madame Nhu, with the support of his brother, was usurping his prerogatives and control in this matter (he vehemently denied this) and that in my opinion and in that of my government nothing would now eradicate that impression except vigorous and positive public action by him, demonstrating his control over his own government and repudiating Madame Nhu.
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 251
http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d251
August 13, 1963: DONALD VERNON MC GREGOR
CAPT - O3 - Army - Regular
Length of service 12 years
Casualty was on Aug 13, 1963
In , SOUTH VIETNAM
HOSTILE, GROUND CASUALTY
GUN, SMALL ARMS FIRE
Body was recovered
Panel 01E - Line 26
Souce: theWall-USA Vietnam veterans Memorial
http://thewall-usa.com/info.asp?recid=34004
Also on August 13, 1963: 252. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam1
Washington, August 13, 1963, 7:20 p.m.
193. Embtels 219 and 220.2 Appears here that Tho press conference projects essentially unbending and non-conciliatory policy which is in flat contradiction to Diem promise to take our advice and make an announcement of GVN determination to follow policy of conciliation. We note that Tho appears indicate GVN intends prosecute Buddhists for May 8 affair, which is in direct conflict with Buddhist insistence GVN officials responsible for May 8 deaths. Such action is not only refusal of Buddhist request that these officials be identified and punished but is sure to provide further and legitimate grounds for Buddhist charges of persecution. Tho statement to effect that Buddhists arrested after June 16 may not enjoy clemency also sure to stimulate further Buddhist protest. Comparison of Madame Nhu and Senator Mansfield will not be well accepted here, and his remarks on Mme Nhu will not suffice as GVN repudiation of her intemperate attacks on Buddhists.3
Request your comments on above4 and estimate Diem intentions at this time. FYI: Unless he takes appropriate actions soon we will be compelled make public statement strongly critical of GVN handling religious issue. End FYI.
Do you believe there is any chance that Diem would be willing to take a “vacation” together with Nhus at this time?5 It is conceivable that Buddhist issue could be resolved in his absence, by Tho as Acting President and brother Luyen filling Nhu's role (or new job as caretaker “Premier”) and defending Ngo family interests. We suspect Diem was fishing when he mentioned vacation, seeking to discover US desire to get him off scene in order promote coup, but if there is possibility he was in earnest, believe he should be taken up promptly on it.
Would be absolutely essential of course that both Nhus accompany him. Worst sort of situation would be Diem on vacation and Nhus in full charge.
Rusk
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 252
http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d252
August 14, 1963: 253. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State1
Saigon, August 14, 1963, 8 p.m.
226. CINCPAC for POLAD. Deptels 178, 185, 193, Embtels 208, 220.2 Delay and much hard negotiation on issuance of statement by Diem. I saw him early this morning and he had slipped back into postponement and vacillation, which he attributed to Buddhist attacks (banners, etc. in Saigon) against him and government and to attacks in US press, especially New York Times story by Szulc from Washington sources that Buddhist affair was affecting, or about to affect, war effort.
In face these factors, he said that Ministerial Council had advised him not to issue another conciliatory statement. I told him bluntly that for our part we could not accept this; I had given him before our reasons and he had promised to take positive action explaining clearly government's position and, at least by implication, repudiating position set out so intemperately by Madame Nhu. This exchange occurred following ceremony this morning. I was supported by Chinese Ambassador Yuen and Australian Ambassador Hill.
At eleven o'clock appointment to say goodbye to President Diem, the exchange continued. We were absolutely frank with one another. I drew heavily on reftels (minus last para Deptel 193 re vacation). He maintained stoutly that neither the American press nor apparently the American government understood the real dimensions or all complexities of Buddhist problem, nor did we understand the true situation concerning the Ngo family and their individual contributions to the independence of Viet-Nam. He went into great detail on this, stressing particularly the absolute selflessness of Ngo Dinh Nhu's contribution to the cause. I stuck to the position it would be impossible for the US Government to continue our present relationship to him and to his government if he did not promptly make a declaration which would show clearly who was running the country, would undo some of the damage done by Madame Nhu's statements and would restore faith in GVN's intention to carry out its announced policy of conciliation. Upshot finally was that he promised to make such a statement, if possible before I leave tomorrow. We are working hard on the follow up.3
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 253
http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d253
August 15, 1963: In a New York Times article of August 15, entitled “Vietnamese Reds Gain in Key Area,” Halberstam concluded that the military situation in the Delta had seriously deteriorated over the past year. This decline, Halberstam reported, occurred notwithstanding the previous 20 months of a U.S. build-up of South Vietnamese forces there. Halberstam noted that while the Delta comprised less than a quarter of South Vietnam's land mass, it contained a majority of its population and resources. According to the Halberstam article, U.S. military sources stated that the Viet Cong moved large units of 600 to 1,000 men into the Delta and were well armed with captured American weapons. Instead of attacking the paramilitary Self-Defense Corps or the Civil Guard, the Viet Cong now took on the regular Armed Forces of South Vietnam.
Source: Office of the Historian - Historical Documents - Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume
III, Vietnam, January–August 1963 - Document 257,
http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d257
Also on August 15, 1963:
254. Editorial Note
Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge met with President Kennedy on August 15, 1963, from 11 to 11:35 a.m. at the White House. (Kennedy Library, President's Log Book) No record of their discussion has been found. Lodge subsequently recalled that when he met with President Kennedy on this occasion, he found the President “very much concerned by what was going on in Vietnam. He referred particularly to the famous Associated Press picture of the Buddhist monk, Quang Duc, burning himself alive. I suppose that no news picture in recent history had generated as much emotion around the world as that one had. President Kennedy referred to that picture, to the overall importance of Vietnam, and to what was going on in Saigon—to the fact that apparently the Diem government was entering a terminal phase. He also mentioned the extremely bad relations that the Embassy had with the press. He said, 'I suppose that these are the worst press relations to be found in the world today, and I wish you, personally, would take charge of press relations.”' (Oral history interview with Henry Cabot Lodge, August 4, 1965; Kennedy Library, Oral History Program)
William J. Miller's biography of Lodge, Henry Cabot Lodge, pages 337-338, also contains an account of this meeting based on Lodge's recollections
Continued...
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 254
http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d254
Also on August 15, 1963: 255. Memorandum From the Director of the Vietnam Working Group (Kattenburg) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Hilsman)1
Washington, August 15, 1963.
SUBJECT
GVN Progress in Struggle Against the Viet Cong During First Six Months 1963
REFERENCE
Saigon 203, August 102
Reftel provides an excellent, thorough, very detailed account of progress made by the GVN in the struggle against the Viet Cong during the first six months of 1963. The most important aspects of the progress made are as follows:
Population: MACV estimates GVN effectively controls 6,766,000 as of July 1, 1963, increase of 966,000 over July 1, 1962. (Total population SVN approximately 14.8 million.) GVN has predominant control of 3.5 million, decrease of about 100,000. Under neither GVN nor VC control, about 600,000, increase of 489,000. Viet Cong controls about 700,000, decrease of over 400,000. Viet Cong has predominant control over 1,000,000, decrease of almost 700,000. Overall, changes reflect shift of population into GVN effective control category at more rapid rate than a shift of territory into GVN effective control category.
Villages:GVN effectively controls 939 villages as of July 1, 1963, an increase of 80 over July 1, 1962. GVN has predominance in 741 villages, an increase of 41. Neither GVN nor VC control 148, an increase of 114. VC controls 341 villages, a decrease of 113. Viet Cong has predominance in 375 villages, a decrease of 47.
VCAttacks: The VC was responsible for 6929 incidents of all kinds during the first six months of 1963, compared to 10,270 during the first half of 1962. VC attacks dropped by 36% and the scale of attacks also declined. ARVN forces, during the first six months of 1963, inflicted casualties on the VC at a somewhat higher rate than during the first six months of 1962. Although weapons losses by GVN forces continue to be a problem, improvement has been noted on a statistical basis, and greater proportion of ARVN weapons losses occurred during a few well-conducted actions on the part of the VC. In contacts with VC forces the GVN forces continued to show improvement in offensive capability.
Source: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963
Volume III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 255
http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d255
August 16, 1963: Arthur Eugene Bedal
1Lt - O2 - Air Force - Reserve
Length Of Service 4 Years
Casualty Was On Aug 16, 1963
In Quang Ngai, South Vietnam
Hostile, Fixed Wing - Crew
Air Loss, Crash On Land
Body Was Recovered
Panel 01E - Line 26
Source: The Wall-Usa, The Vietnam Veterans Memorial Wall Page,
http://Thewall-Usa.Com/Info.Asp?Recid=3206
John Howard Mc Clean
Capt - O3 - Air Force - Regular
Length Of Service 12 Years
Casualty Was On Aug 16, 1963
In Quang Ngai, South Vietnam
Hostile, Fixed Wing - Pilot
Air Loss, Crash On Land
Body Was Recovered
Panel 01E - Line 26
Source: The Wall-Usa, The Vietnam Veterans Memorial Wall Page,
http://Thewall-Usa.Com/Info.Asp?Recid=33462
Also on August 16, 1963: 256. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Helms), to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Hilsman)1
Washington, August 16, 1963.
SUBJECT
Transmittal of Estimates on Situation in South Vietnam
Attached hereto are estimates prepared by CIA in Saigon with regard to Government of Vietnam instability, and the likelihood of a coup d'etat, brought on by the continuing Buddhist crisis. Discussions held at our 14 August meeting2 were based upon these reports.
For the Deputy Director (Plans):
W. E. Colby
Attachment 13
SUBJECT
Provisions of the Constitution which Deal with the Succession to the Presidency
1. The President and the Vice President of South Vietnam are elected for five year terms. after initial election they are eligible for reelection for two more terms and can therefore serve a total of 15 years. Consequently, if Diem remains in office, he can run for re-election in 1966 for the third and final time, unless the Constitution is amended in the interim. See Article 32.
Continued...
Source: Office of the Historian - Historical Documents - Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume
III, Vietnam, January–August 1963 - Document 256,
http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d256
Also on August 16, 1963: 257. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff's Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities (Krulak) to the Secretary of Defense (McNamara)1
Washington, August 16, 1963.
SACSA 468-963
SUBJECT
Vietnam
1. I know you are aware of and concerned with yesterday's Halberstam article in the Times.2 We, as well as others, are dissecting it, exposing its factual and statistical weaknesses.
2. This is easy, but misses a key point, which I feel may be of use to you apart from our point-by-point analysis, which is coming. It is this—Halberstam, in his comments on the temperature of the battle in the Delta, exhibits a lack of understanding of our entire Vietnam strategy. From the start, that strategy involved a purification process, north to south; driving the Viet Cong southward—away from their sources of strength and compressing them in the southernmost area of the peninsula. This has proceeded. I Corps is fairly clean; II Corps, not much less so; III Corps, warmer; and IV Corps, still tough.
3. This was expected. The gradual redisposition of Vietnamese power, from the less to the more critical areas, portrays this. As General Cao, CG, IV Corps, said in June, “We want to see all the Viet Cong squeezed into the Ca Mau Peninsula, and then rot there.”
4. If Halberstam understood clearly this strategy, he might not have undertaken to write his disingenuous article. Perhaps this strategy should be more fully explained to the press.
Respectfully,
V. H. Krulak
Major General, USMC
Source: Office of the Historian - Historical Documents - Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume
III, Vietnam, January–August 1963 - Document 257,
http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d257
June 1962 - July 1962 - August 1962 - September 1962 - October 1962
November 1962 - December 1962
January 1963 - February 1963 - March 1963 - April 1963 - May 1963
